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Abstract 
					The	following	dissertation	explores	the	past	60	years	of	self‐help	housing	in	Lima.		
Specifically,	it	looks	at	the	uneven	development	that	has	occurred	in	parts	of	a	
municipality	called	San	Juan	de	Miraflores.		I	argue	that	self‐help	housing	is	part	of	a	
larger	modernization	project	that	aims	to	encourage	the	emergence	of	a	self‐
regulating	individual.		This	particular	inflection	of	both	liberal	and	neoliberal	
principles	sees	elites	working	to	creat	a	selective	history	of	marginal	
neighbourhoods,	effectively	silencing	the	histories	of	working	class	Miraflorinos.		
The	aim	of	this	ethnographic	study	is	to	destabilize	official	histories	and	
representations	about	development	in	marginal	communities.		The	bulk	of	the	
dissertation	looks	at	the	most	recent	land	occupation	in	January,	2000	on	the	fringes	
of	the	municipality	to	understand	how	progress	is	experienced	by	locals.		Special	
attention	is	given	to	insert	the	study	in	its	political,	economic,	and	social	context.		I	
conclude	that	development	process	at	work	in	Lima	since	the	end	of	WWII	reflects	
an	unresolved	tension	in	the	urbanization	movement	in	Peru.		Common	working	
class	people	resist	the	drive	toward	a	progress	that	favours	individual	achievement	
over	community	well‐being.		I	argue	that	underprivileged	groups	have	always	been	
included	in	development	schemes.		Social	inclusion,	then,	is	not	the	solution	to	
uneven	development.		Rather,	we	need	to	look	to	the	resistances	to	development	
that	underprivileged	classes	mount,	incorporating	their	criticisms	into	a	new	vision	
for	society	that	challenges	the	merits	of	the	kind	of	individuality	promoted	by	liberal	
and	neoliberal	proponents.		
	
Keywords	
Urbanization,	Community	development,	Development,	Governmentality,	
Neoliberalism,	San	Juan	de	Miraflores,	Williams,	Gramsci,	Oral	History,	Ethnography,	
Modernization,	Self‐help	housing,	Latin	America	
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 Introduction 
	
	 On	October	27,	2007,	ex‐president	Alan	García	(2006‐2011)	dropped	the	
gauntlet	against	those	that	he	and	others	who	support	a	neoliberal	restructuring	of	
the	Peruvian	economy	felt	had	become	like	a	“dog	in	the	manger”	(García	2007).		
The	dog	in	the	manger	was	a	fable	that	first	appeared	in	a	collection	of	Aesop’s	
fables	by	the	German	folklorist	Heinrich	Steinhöwel,	owing	its	origins	to	the	second	
century	Latin	compilers	of	fables	Lucian	and	Sardis	(Priest	1985:52).		The	dog	in	the	
manger	in	these	tales	watched	over	the	grain	in	the	manger	not	allowing	the	horse	
to	eat	the	grain.		To	add	insult	to	privation,	the	dog	did	not	eat	the	grain	either.		In	its	
contemporary	evocation	by	García	the	classic	fable	is	given	a	different	twist.		He	
wrote:	“there	are	a	lot	of	resources	not	being	used	that	are	not	tradable,	that	do	not	
receive	investment	and	that	do	not	generate	employment.		And	all	of	this	because	of	
ideologies	that	have	been	overcome,	because	of	laziness,	because	of	indolence	or	
because	of	the	law	of	the	dog	in	the	manger	that	states:	‘If	I	don’t	do	it,	then	nobody	
does	(García	2007).’		García	implicitly	makes	reference	to	neoliberal	doctrine,	
echoing	the	neoliberal	orthodox	belief	that	placing	products,	resources,	and	services	
at	the	disposal	of	market	forces	will	ensure	their	efficient,	and,	by	extension,	their	
profitable	administration.		Those	who	obstruct	access	to	resources,	or	that	stall	
business,	are	like	the	dog	in	the	manger:	they	do	not	need	the	resources,	but	they	do	
not	allow	others	access	to	them	either.			
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						 In	effect,	García	draws	a	line	between	the	good	that	seek	material	and	social	
advancement,	and	the	complacent	that	rest	on	their	laurels	and	the	recalcitrant	that	
resist	this	free	market	model	due	to	outdated	ideological	concerns.		Temporally,	
those	who	belong	to	the	present,	and	its	consequent	future,	are	urged	to	abandon	
defeated	ideologies	and	adhere	to	the	ideals	of	a	neoliberal	doctrine	that	gives	free	
reign	to	market	forces.		Gone	are	the	days	of	the	social	welfare	state,	or	the	state	that	
guaranteed	the	rights	of	all	citizens	equally.			
						 The	text	really	fits	into	a	contemporary	universe	of	neoliberal	and	nationalist	
inspired	authorship	that	continuously	postulates	how	the	people	of	a	nation	ought	
to	govern	themselves	and	their	resources.		According	to	this	discourse,	the	nation	
stands	to	gain	by	submitting	the	nation,	people,	and	resources,	to	the	dictates	of	the	
market.		A	corollary	of	this	proposal	is	that	the	beacon	of	desire,	nations	in	the	East	
and	West	that	have	industrialized	becoming	mass	consumer	societies,	can	be	
reached	by	eschewing	traditions	that	contravene	this	inexorable	advancement.		No	
admission	is	made	that	the	plurality	of	cultures	that	presently	inhabit	Peru	may	
have	a	valuable	contribution	to	make	about	how	the	country	ought	to	function.			
						 While	political	ecologists	have	viewed	the	text	as	directed	toward	indigenous	
and	mestizo	populations	in	resource	rich	areas	of	Peru	(cf.	Babbington	2009),	the	
text	also	implicates	those	on	the	frontiers	of	cities,	like	Lima,	where	people	have	
come	since	the	1940s	to	seek	this	highly	touted	progress.		In	the	opening	paragraph	
of	his	article	García	wrote:	
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The	demand	for	a	property	title	is	very	big.		Every	Peruvian	knows	that	with	a	
legalized,	saleable,	mortgageable	and	transferable	property	one	can	improve	
their	situation.		But,	Peru,	as	whole,	has	the	same	problem	and	does	not	know	
it.		A	lot	of	its	goods	cannot	be	valorized,	nor	sold,	nor	can	one	invest	in	them,	
nor	generate	employment	with	them	(García	2007).		
For	García,	it	is	evident	that	the	formalization	of	property	and	the	commodification	
of	Peru’s	vast	resources,	tangible	and	intangible,	will	bring	about	the	future	
prosperity	of	Peru.			
						 García	reiterates	a	firm	neoliberal	belief	when	he	claims	that	land	titling	and	
the	subsequent	access	to	credit	that	it	will	ensure	will	lead	to	economic	growth	(cf.	
De	Soto	2000).		In	the	phrasing	of	García,	those	who	seek	land	titles	are	equally	
disadvantaged	in	obtaining	their	share	of	progress.		The	progress	on	the	vertical	and	
horizontal	frontiers	of	cities	of	the	country,	then,	like	that	occurring	in	other	corners	
of	the	country,	should	be	considered	as	part	of	a	larger	developmental	vision,	the	
discursive	manifestation	of	a	particular	vision	of	how	a	nation	should	be	
constructed	and	one	that	is	no	less	fraught	with	the	tensions	that	are	occurring	in	
areas	rich	in	natural	resources.	
						 David	Harvey	in	his	Brief	History	of	Neoliberalism	(2005)	discusses	the	
historical	configuration	of	economic	and	political	forces	that	saw	neoliberalism	rise	
to	prominence	as	the	dominant	economic	paradigm	throughout	the	world	since	the	
early	1970s.		He	argues	that	neoliberalism	has	been	a	veiled	attempt	by	economic	
and	social	elites	to	retake	a	disproportionate	share	of	capital,	leading	to	the	creation	
of	new	elites	in	places	like	China	(Harvey	2005:19).		In	the	Latin	American	context,	
neoliberal	reforms	were	ushered	in	to	address	debt	crises	that	were	often	IMF	
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generated	(refusing	to	lend	to	countries	that	implemented	import	subsitution	
schemes).		Neoliberials	sought	to	invigorate	stagnant	or	failing	economies.		In	the	
1970s	and	1980s,	neoliberalism	became	the	dominant	political	economic	paradigm	
in	the	world,	with	local	inflections	that	reflect	characteristics	of	local	power	
relations.		Harvey	shows	how	the	application	of	neoliberal	economic	reforms	were	
often	held	to	guarantee	individual	freedoms	and	human	dignity	—in	spite	of	the	
violent	and	repressive	applications	of	neoliberal	orthodox	reforms	in	places	like	
Chile	and	Argentina.		According	to	Harvey,	the	type	of	entrepreneurial	freedom	
sought	by	neoliberals	has	resulted	in	“…a	seductive	but	alienating	possessive	
individualism	on	the	one	hand	and	the	desire	for	a	meaningful	collective	life	on	the	
other.		While	individuals	are	supposedly	free	to	choose,	they	are	not	supposed	to	
choose	to	construct	strong	collective	institutions	(such	as	trade	unions)	as	opposed	
to	weak	voluntary	associations	(like	charitable	organizations)	(Harvey	2005:69).”			
						 In	Peru,	neoliberal	reforms	began	in	1980	with	Beláunde’s	second	
government.		Faced	with	soaring	inflation,	a	drop	in	real	wages	and	profligate	
expenditures	in	a	large	state	sector,	the	government	attempted	to	make	widely	
unpopular	orthodox	economic	adjustments.		Alan	García	and	his	first	majority	APRA	
government	(1985‐1990)	attempted,	in	vain,	to	deny	the	structural	reforms	being	
requested	by	international	lending	agencies	(the	IMF	and	World	Bank	in	particular},	
opting	for	heterodox	reforms	(wage	increases,	request	for	national	capital	to	
underwrite	social	spending,	tax	breaks	to	national	economic	interests,	etc.).		
Political	scientist	Jo‐Marie	Burt	argues	that	the	problem	with	this	approach	was	that	
García’s	rampant	and	often	personalistic	spending	did	not	allay	the	concerns	of	the	
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national	business	elite.		After	nationalizing	the	central	bank,	for	fear	of	capital	flight,	
the	economy	took	a	rapid	nose	dive,	generating	hyperinflation	amidst	allegations	
that	García’s	party	had	named	inexperienced	people	to	key	ministerial	positions.		
The	reality	was	that	García	ignored	advisors	who	cautioned	him	about	his	profligate	
social	expenditures	(Burt	2007).	
						 Near	the	tail	end	of	García’s	first	government	the	public	had	lost	faith	in	Peru’s	
traditional	political	parties	to	resolve	the	country’s	economic	problems.		The	1990	
election	campaign	pitted	two	newcomers	to	the	political	arena	in	Peru	against	one	
another	—Mario	Vargas	Llosa	for	a	centre	right‐wing	coalition	(Frente	Democrático,	
or	Democratic	Front),	admitting	that	a	“shock”	was	necessary	to	stabilize	the	
Peruvian	economy,	and	Alberto	Fujimori	for	Cambio	90,	or	Change	90,	promising	
that	he	would	not	introduce	austerity	measures	and	would	offer	a	solution	to	the	
intransigency	of	traditional	political	parties	in	Peru.		Fujimori	would	win	the	
elections	and	promptly	work	to	implement	neoliberal	reforms	to	the	state,	using	the	
fear	generated	by	the	precarious	state	of	the	economy	and	ongoing	conflict	with	
Sendero	Luminoso	and	MRTA	(Movimiento	Revolucionario	Tupac	Amaru)	to	quietly	
reconfigure	class	relations	and	the	political	and	economic	landscape	of	Peru	(Burt	
2007).			
						 In	the	case	of	Peru,	neoliberalism	could	be	felt	and	seen	in	a	number	of	ways.		
The	right	to	free	enterprise	was	enshrined	in	the	1993	Constitution.		Labour	rights	
were	eroded	and	the	rights	of	particular	communities	were	stricken	in	favour	of	
universal	rights	(the	good	of	communities	versus	public	good).		The	state	sold	off	
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companies	and	assets	that	were	once	state‐owned	to	private	interest	groups.		More	
guarantees	were	given	to	foreign	investors.		The	1990s	saw	the	negotiation	of	many	
multi‐billion	dollar	mining	and	gas	projects	throughout	the	Peruvian	territory.		
Chilean	retail	giants	Ripley	and	Falabella	entered	the	Peruvian	market	in	the	1990s,	
offering	cheap	credit	and	solid	competition	to	local	small‐scale	industrial	
production.		Peruvian	economic	sociologist	Francisco	Durand	shows	that	
multinational	firms	took	over	a	larger	share	in	commerce	in	the	country	from	the	
state	and	national	businesses	(Durand	2010:Chapter	3).		One	can	begin	to	see	whose	
formal	interests	are	being	referred	to	when	one	speaks	of	the	benefits	of	formalizing	
business	transactions.						
						 What	is	missing	from	panegyrics	like	that	of	García	is	the	cost	that	people	incur	
with	these	bold	influxes	of	foreign	capital	and	the	ongoing	struggle	of	those,	who,	
even	with	a	land	title,	seek	to	improve	their	situation	in	a	country	that	is	aspiring	to	
have	the	economies	like	we	see	in	the	developed	world.		We	are	led	to	believe	that	
people	will	get	jobs	from	the	entrance	of	large	corporations,	banks	and	financiers	
into	the	country,	despite	the	low	priority	place	on	total	employment	by	neoliberal	
doctrine	(they	place	more	emphasis	on	controlling	inflation).		With	the	introduction	
of	easy	credit,	those	that	have	formal	sector	jobs	enjoy	access	to	credit	that	allows	
them,	despite	meager	wages,	to	pay	for	almost	any	commodity	in	installments.		Yet,	
the	measures	mentioned	here	do	little	to	tell	us	what	life	is	like	under	neoliberalism.		
What	is	progress?		Can	it	be	reflected	in	econometric	indicators	like	the	number	of	
televisions	in	one’s	home,	the	material	that	one’s	home	is	constructed	of,	etc.?	
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						 Social	thinker	Raymond	Williams	in	his	Keywords,	traces	the	roots	and	
connections	of	many	terms	that	have	become	part	of	our	contemporary	world	
(Williams	1985).		Particular	words	that	form	part	of	the	discourse	around	the	social	
and	economic	changes	over	the	past	centuries	are	given	special	consideration	by	
Williams.		Progress	is	one	word	toward	which	Williams	draws	our	attention.		In	its	
17th	century	sense,	the	word	came	to	signify	a	fatalistic	journey	into	the	future.		This	
journey	picked	up	inflections	from	the	Enlightenment	concern	with	universal	
trajectories	of	civilization	that	inexorably	terminated	in	incipient	secular	states	in	
Europe	in	the	18th	century.		Progress	thus	became	entwined	with	Enlightenment	
notions	of	evolution	and	improvement	(Williams	1985:243‐245).	
						 We	see	that	this	idea	of	progress	as	improvement	has	become	part	of	the	
discourse	on	national	development	in	Peru.		What	this	progress	signifies,	though,	
has	to	be	extended	beyond	the	realm	of	discursive	formations.		We	have	to	ask	what	
progress	entails	on	the	ground.		Who	carries	it	out,	and	who	is	implicated	in	the	
instrumentalization	of	its	dictates?		Furthermore,	we	need	to	recognize	ways	in	
which	this	vision	is	being	negotiated	by	real	actors	with	complex	histories.			
						 To	imagine	this,	I	think	it	is	helpful	to	bring	philosopher	and	historian	of	
thought	Michel	Foucault’s	notion	of	governmentality	into	our	analysis.		Foucault	
sums	up	governmentality	as	the	“conduct	of	conduct,”	or	“action	upon	action,”	to	put	
it	succinctly.		He	urges	us	to	look	at	governance	not	in	the	narrow	sense	of	
government	practices,	but	the	practices	of	everyone	who	works	to	implement	
interrelated	subject	forming	projects	and	how	we	as	subjects,	in	addition,	act	upon	
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ourselves	according	to	exhortations	that	may	form	part	of	larger	strategies,	or	
theories,	of	governance	(Foucault	1991,	1992).			
						 From	the	brief	definition	given	here	one	can	appreciate	that	Foucault’s	
insistence	that	we	look	at	how	bodies	are	governed	by	particular	rationalities	of	
governance	can	lead	us	to	many	sites	where	actions,	or	techniques,	are	used	to	
achieve	particular	ends	that	articulate	with	larger	strategies	like	neoliberal	
economic	doctrine.		One	of	the	strengths	of	looking	at	practices	of	governance,	as	
opposed	to	ideologies	that	characterize	a	time	period	under	consideration,	is	that	it	
shifts	our	focus	to	that	critical	point	where	abstract	doctrines	are	being	translated	
by	officials	and	how	these	translations	link	up,	or	do	not	link‐up	with	other	
techniques	of	governance	perhaps	reflecting	more	pervasive	patterns	(Schild	2000,	
2007).		In	this	study	I	try	to	take	governmental	analysis	one	step	further	by	looking	
at	the	social	world	that	state	and	non‐state	interventions	have	worked	to	create	in	
the	shantytowns	of	Lima.		However,	as	we	will	see,	the	origins	of	many	government	
strategies	involving	development	seem	to	have	begun	as	grassroots	initiatives	to	
make	do,	or	attempts	by	underprivileged	classes	to	gain	access	to	the	same	
opportunities	as	their	social	superiors.			
						 What	I	wanted	to	shed	light	on	in	this	study	is	how	progress	is	both	enacted	
and	understood	on	the	frontier	of	Lima.		To	do	so,	I	chose	to	look	at	the	history	and	
practices	of	people	whose	actions	led	eventually	to	the	founding	of	one	district	in	
Lima	—San	Juan	de	Miraflores.		Following	Foucault,	I	wanted	to	understand	that	
crucial	relationship	between	practices	of	governance	of	all	sorts	and	the	everyday	
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lives	of	the	people	that	make	San	Juan	de	Miraflores	their	home.		Because	of	the	
importance	of	the	movement	to	acquire	land	in	Lima,	as	evidence	that	one	had	
indeed	progressed	(cf.	Lobo	1982),	and	the	contested	nature	of	this	movement,	I	
quickly	found	myself	telling	the	story	of	how	people	came	to	occupy	private	
property	in	January	of	2000	on	the	fringe	of	San	Juan	de	Miraflores.		By	focusing	on	
this	recent	land	invasion1	I	could	see	how	a	new	area	of	the	city	was	organized	and	
how	people	made	sense	of	this	organization,	although,	admittedly,	the	
circumstances	surrounding	this	invasion	were	very	unique.		I	could	also	see	who	
came	to	lend	support	from	outside	and	the	techniques	that	they	brought	with	them.		
As	one	can	imagine,	the	field	of	governance	is	one	where	multiple	actors	and	
organizations	work	to	shape	people:	the	churches,	state	ministries,	NGOs	(both	
national	and	international),	mass	media	(national	and	international),	neighbours,	
returned	ex‐pats,	cultural	traditions,	etc.		Add	to	this	the	emergence	of	a	politically	
condoned	tradition	of	seizing	control	of	land	as	a	means	of	partaking	in	the	social	
advancement	that	Lima	is	supposed	to	offer	to	migrants	to	the	city.		Given	the	nature	
of	this	complex	field	of	interactions,	any	project	to	shape	a	subject	will	meet	
different	techniques,	reflecting	different	strategies	about	how	one	ought	to	be.			
						 Throughout	this	work	the	one	tension	that	plays	out	constantly	is	that	
between	a	residual	element	in	the	city	that	values	community	and	stability	and	a	
																																																								
1	My	choice	to	use	the	word	invasion	here	is	not	without	reservations.		When	used	by	those	that	did	
not	participate	in	a	movement	to	acquire	land	for	their	family,	it	seems	to	act	as	a	condemnation	of	
these	practices.		When	used	by	those	who	participated	in	an	organized	attempt	to	acquire	land,	the	
word	invasion	highlights	the	sacrifices	that	occurred	for	them	to	have	a	piece	of	land	to	call	their	own	
and	the	fact	that	they	had	to	take	drastic	measures	to	ensure	their	livelihood	and	that	of	their	
families.		When	I	use	the	word	invasion	throughout	this	dissertation	it	is	with	the	second	sense	that	I	
make	use	of	the	term.			
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newer	element	particular	to	the	city	of	Lima	—because	it	has	taken	on	local	
inflections—	about	the	value	placed	on	individual	achievement	and	material	
prosperity.		As	I	write	this,	this	tension	has	not	been	resolved,	however	one	will	see	
that	in	order	to	maintain	political	power	in	Peru	it	is	crucial	to	balance	this	tension.		
To	illustrate	this	point,	I	trace	the	pattern	of	informal	urban	expansion	in	Lima.		The	
silver	lining	in	this	cloud	is	the	importance	placed	upon	community	and	
redistribution	by	some	at	particular	moments	in	time.		I	do	not,	however,	want	to	
romanticize	this	element	because	the	sense	of	community	that	has	come	into	
existence	in	Lima	is	a	temporary	phenomenon.	
										The	following	dissertation	is	an	exploration	into	one	of	the	frontiers	of	this	
transformation,	that	of	the	city	of	Lima.		The	municipality	where	I	decided	to	
conduct	my	research,	as	mentioned,	was	San	Juan	de	Miraflores	in	Lima.		The	
founding	event	of	this	district	was	a	land	invasion	that	occurred	on	Christmas	Eve	
1954.		Formally,	the	district	was	not	a	political	entity	until	1965.		The	2007	National	
Census	placed	the	population	of	the	municipality	at	362,643	inhabitants	living	in	
69,942	households.2		It	is	one	district	of	43	in	Lima,	a	city	that	in	2007	numbered	
8,445,211	inhabitants.			
						 Much	of	the	municipality	is	located	on	the	sandy	plains	of	the	Pacific	littoral.		
The	area	is	a	desert,	with	any	water	being	provided,	like	most	coastal	cities	in	Peru,	
by	rivers	that	wind	their	way	down	from	the	Andes.		Human	occupation	in	the	
municipality	has	now	reached	into	the	foothills	of	the	Andes,	making	the	
																																																								
2	The	statistics	that	follow	were	taken	from	the	2007	INEI	national	census.	
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construction	of	homes	on	precarious	rocky	slopes	a	necessity.		Space	for	the	
horizontal	expansion	of	the	city	is	scarce	and	present	concerns	are	rightly	placed	on	
where	new	generations	of	Miraflorinos	will	find	a	home	for	their	families.		To	
understand	some	of	the	complexities	of	this	expansion	will	require	a	more	lengthy	
discussion	that	will	be	picked	up	later	in	the	following	chapters.		
						 If	one	looks	at	the	statistics	for	the	municipality	there	are	a	few	noteworthy	
trends	that	have	occurred	over	the	past	three	to	four	generations.		These	trends	
correspond	with	the	fieldwork	data	that	was	gathered	for	this	investigation.		Firstly,	
there	is	a	general	trend	for	migrants’	children,	if	they	spoke	an	indigenous	language,	
to	lose	the	language.		Rates	of	Spanish	speakers	increase	geometrically	over	age	
groups,	while	the	use	of	Quechua,	Aymara,	or	other	languages	drops	off	
dramatically.		As	far	as	education	is	concerned,	the	trend	is	for	succeeding	
generations	to	set	their	educational	goals	higher	and	higher.		While	many	parents	of	
the	founders	had	primary	education,	nowadays	it	is	not	uncommon	to	see	most	with	
at	least	a	high	school	diploma	and	many	with	some	form	of	postsecondary	education	
(18.8%	of	the	population	over	6,	with	almost	as	many	not	completing	their	studies).		
Economically	speaking,	census	results	indicate	that	there	is	a	3.7%	unemployment	
rate.		The	employment	rate,	however,	does	not	reflect	the	quality	of	jobs	available	or	
the	precarity	of	such	jobs,	or	the	fact	that	most	work	to	eat	and	slowly	construct	
their	homes	with	aid	of	friends,	family,	and	neighbours.	
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Figure	1	Source:	Corzo	and	Riofrío	2006:9						
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Figure	2	Source:	Corzo	and	Riofrío	2006:29	One	will	notice	in	the	upper	left	district,	San	Juan	de	
Miraflores,	the	dark	area	in	the	upper	right	hand	corner	of	the	municipality.		This	is	the	area	
that	was	invaded	in	January	of	2000,	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		From	photographs	that	are	
included	later,	it	will	become	clear	just	how	unconsolidated	some	of	the	homes	are	and	how	a	
need	exists	to	find	an	alternative	to	urban	growth	in	Lima.						
						 Numbers	seem	to	tell	a	truth	of	their	own	in	this	district	and	the	country	as	a	
whole	.		Categories	collapse	into	one	another.		Definitions	of	what	goes	into	
categories	open	and	close,	depending	on	what	one	wants	to	demonstrate,	or	find.		At	
times,	respondents	are	confused	by	the	line	of	questioning	in	national	surveys.		And,	
yet,	they	still	allow	us	to	see	some	patterns,	however	this	only	gets	us	so	far.		To			
interpret	a	census	one	must	have	experience	to	know	what	the	numbers	show,	or	do	
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not	show.		This	is	where	measuring	progress	becomes	tricky.		What	constitutes	a	
positive	figure?		Once	again	we	reach	a	point	where	we	must	ask	who	possesses	the	
power	to	represent	progress	and	who	decides	what	progress	entails,	hardly	an	
apolitical	task	no	matter	how	much	surveyors	insist	on	their	impartiality	(cf.	
Ferguson	1994).			
						 Even	if	the	numbers	were	correct	in	what	they	suggest,	we	are	still	missing	a	
picture	of	the	world	that	has	formed	in	a	place	like	San	Juan	de	Miraflores.		In	
conducting	this	research	I	wanted	to	look	at	how	people	live	their	daily	lives	in	parts	
of	this	district.		This	was	not	an	easy	task	because,	as	I	discovered,	not	everyone	was	
in	the	same	circumstances.		Statistical	aggregates	do	little	to	tell	us	about	the	social	
world	of	a	population,	especially	the	inequalities	that	exist.		The	following	is	an	
effort	to	add	a	layer	of	complexity	to	the	numbers,	taking	the	voices	of	Miraflorinos	
as	a	basis	for	understanding	the	progress	that	has	taken	place	in	this	municipality.			
						 Chapter	1	is	an	explanation	of	how	I	conducted	this	research	and	what	turns	it	
had	to	take	as	I	mapped	out	the	material	changes	in	the	municipality.		In	this	chapter	
I	try	to	give	a	reader	a	sense	of	the	places	where	this	research	was	undertaken	and	
the	challenges	faced	in	doing	urban	research.		What	emerges	here	is	the	necessity	to	
focus	more	on	the	relationship	between	places	to	understand	larger	development	
process	in	the	city	and	nation	as	a	whole.	
							 In	the	next	chapter	we	look	at	Don	Malvinas’s	account	of	the	changes	that	have	
happened	in	a	sector	in	Pamplona	Alta	(one	of	the	six	districts	in	San	Juan	de	
Miraflores).		He	describes	how	the	community	has	played	an	active	role	in	
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everything	from	building	infrastructure	to	organizing	themselves.		I	describe	how	
these	efforts	are	incorporated	into	national	and	international	discourses	that	tend	to	
see	these	efforts	as	evidence	of	a	desire	to	progress	and	a	reflection	of	the	success	of	
self‐help	initiatives.		This	voice	that	urges	households	to	define	their	place	in	the	city	
works	a	lot	like	Mikhail	Bakhtin’s	authoritative	voice,	except	that	contrary	to	
Bakhtin’s	notion	that	this	voice	is	static	and	dead,	I	argue	that	authoritative	voices	
that	make	demands	on	how	people	ought	to	dedicate	their	energies	have	been	active	
and	finely	attuned	to	what	has	been	happening	in	sectors	like	that	of	Don	Malvinas.		
Using	Bakhtin	to	theorize	the	framing	of	self‐help	efforts	allows	us	to	see	the	
movement	of	discourses	and	the	relationship	between	discourse	and	practice.		
Following	this	argument,	I	assert	that	self‐help	discourse	is	persuasive	in	the	value	it	
assigns	to	the	efforts	of	people	to	be	socially	progressive.	
						 In	the	next	two	chapters	I	explore	the	emergence	and	complex	history	of	self‐
help	housing	in	Peru	with	a	more	specific	focus	on	San	Juan	de	Miraflores.		What	I	
aimed	for	here	was	a	genealogy	of	the	practice	of	invading	land	and	building	it	up	
with	minimal	outside	assistance.		Over	time,	governments	in	Peru	have	had	to	
simultaneously	control	and	let	this	practice	persist.		The	result	has	been	a	delicate	
balance	where	the	state	has	worked	to	capture	these	efforts,	however	at	the	same	
time	it	has	given	communities	techniques	to	organize	and	make	demands	on	the	
state.		Foreign	aid	workers	and	specialists	affiliated	with	foreign	aid	in	Peru	and	
other	developing	countries	appear	to	have	played	an	instrumental	role	in	forming	
the	image	of	the	innovative	squatter	who	is	quite	amenable	to	the	social	mobility	
and	individual	opportunities	available	in	the	city.		I	argue	that	underlying	this	
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recognition	is	a	subject	making	process	like	that	theorized	by	Foucauldian	scholars	
like	Verónica	Schild	(Schild	2000,	2007).		Self‐help,	in	this	sense,	becomes	a	practice	
whereby	citizens	come	to	view	self‐regulatory	behaviour	as	emancipatory	(I	pick	up	
this	point	more	explicitly	in	the	conclusion).		The	type	of	subject	posited	recalls	
Harvey’s	observation	that	neoliberalism	has	led	to	the	emergence	of	a	possessive	
individualism	that	works	against	a	deeper	desire	for	meaningful	communities.			
						 What	becomes	clear,	especially	in	chapter	4,	is	that	the	sense	of	community	
found	in	self‐help	communities	is	ephemeral.		As	soon	as	basic	amenities	are	
brought	into	communities	the	solidarity	of	these	communities	begins	to	give	way	to	
the	tensions	that	social	mobility	and	assimilative	pressures	exert	on	individuals	in	
Lima.		These	two	chapters	suggest	that	a	possessive,	self‐regulating,	socially	
competitive	and	mobile	individual	is	not	a	subjectivity	that	is	unique	to	
neoliberalism,	but,	rather,	appears	to	be	connected	to	the	type	of	progress	inherent	
in	a	broader	global	modernist	project.		Sentiments	like	that	of	García,	where	
tradition	becomes	an	impediment	to	the	growth	of	national	economies,	make	more	
sense	when	seen	from	this	vantage	point.			
						 In	the	final	section	of	Chapter	4	I	critically	assess	the	proposals	of	economist	
Hernando	De	Soto.		Like	predecessors	that	saw	potential	locked	in	the	ability	of	the	
underprivileged	to	help	themselves,	De	Soto	provided	the	ideological	backing	for	the	
restructuring	of	the	Peruvian	economy,	legal	system,	and	imagined	destination	of	
the	nation.		He	argued	that	removing	restrictions	from	enterprise	and	awarding	land	
titles	would	allow	common	citizens	to	become	entrepreneurs.		The	reality	was	more	
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complex.		Contrary	to	the	arguments	of	De	Soto,	deregulation	has	meant	that	
international	financiers	and	corporations	are	able	to	squeeze	out	national	elites	and	
the	state	in	seeking	benefit	from	economic	activity	in	Peru.		Not	only	that,	but	
economic	gains	for	few	in	reality	have	led	to	social	fragmentation	in	communities	
that	demonstrated	a	great	degree	of	unity	in	mobilizing	for	their	rights	in	the	1970s	
and	1980s.		These	changes	have	been	accompanied	by	a	discourse	that	values	iron‐
handed	authoritarian	governance	practices	over	dialogue	and	a	careful	
understanding	of	social	problems	like	crime.		The	theme	of	neoliberalism	and	
punishment	is	explored	in	chapters	5	and	9.	
						 Self‐help	as	a	governmental	strategy	tends	to	complicate	current	notions	of	
social	inclusion	in	its	various	forms.		What	I	suggest	is	that	underprivileged	migrant	
groups	have	been	included	ever	since	they	began	to	look	at	invasions	as	a	means	of	
acquiring	a	home.		Therefore,	self‐help	and	this	greater	push	toward	individual	
achievement	and	social	mobility	may	be	part	of	what	is	driving	communities	apart	
in	the	city,	generating	behaviours	that	undermine	trust	and	unity	between	
neighbours.		Discourses	around	envy	and	greed	indicate	that	there	is	a	degree	to	
which	the	competitiveness	and	individuality	found	in	many	developed	nations	is	
present	on	the	frontiers	of	expanding	urban	areas	in	developing	countries	like	Peru,	
despite	analyses	that	argue	for	a	continuity	of	indigenous	practices	in	the	city.		What	
studies	that	argue	for	a	continuity	of	indigenous	traditions	within	the	city	suggest	is	
that	there	are	different	ways	of	being	a	modern.		Notwithstanding	this	view,	the	data	
collected	for	this	investigation	suggests	that	there	is	a	marked	tension	between	
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traditional	practices	and	urban	practices	that,	once	again,	is	reflected	in	everyday	
talk.			
						 The	remainder	of	the	dissertation	shifts	to	an	analysis	of	a	land	invasion	that	
occurred	in	January	of	2000	on	the	frontier	of	San	Juan	de	Miraflores	on	land	that	
has	been	private	property	since	it	was	bought	in	a	state	auction	in	1968.		This	
particular	case	allows	us	to	understand	how	neoliberal	reforms	have	been	
translated	into	jurisprudence,	especially	those	relating	to	issues	of	private	property	
and	housing	in	Lima.		The	range	of	topics	that	are	covered	in	this	remaking	of	the	
city	allows	a	detailed	analysis	of	multiple	themes.		For	instance,	we	can	see	how	
political	patronage	often	articulates	with	community	organizations.		It	allows	us	to	
look	at	community	formation	and	the	interaction	between	sectors	and	external	
organizations.		We	also	see	how	narratives	about	contemporary	events	like	the	
invasion	of	private	property	reflect	underlying	tensions	in	the	liberal/neoliberal	
development	process.			
						 The	multiple	themes	that	we	explore	between	chapters	5–9	bring	us	full	circle	
back	to	one	of	the	central	unifying	themes	of	this	dissertation:	progress.		Progress	as	
we	understand	from	multiple	vantage	points	means	different	things	to	different	
people	in	different	positions	with	different	histories.		For	someone	new	to	the	city	it	
might	be	finding	a	job,	moving	out	into	their	own	home,	and	sending	their	children	
to	a	state	school.		For	the	children	of	this	first	generation	migrant	it	might	be	getting	
a	high	school	diploma	then	attending	either	a	technical	institute	or	getting	a	
university	degree.		For	a	middle	class	professional	it	might	be	ensuring	that	one’s	
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children	attend	private	schools	and	that	employment	is	gainful	enough	to	accrue	
status	through	the	consumption	of	the	material	and	immaterial	symbols	of	
distinction	and	all	that	they	confer.		For	neoliberal	economists	and	politicians	it	
might	mean	titling	properties,	tapping	resources,	facilitating	the	flow	of	finance	
capital,	decreasing	bureaucratic	impediments	to	trade	and	entrepreneurialism,	etc.			
						 We	cannot	help	but	notice	that	progress	can	describe	many	things.		Its	
polyvalence	is	part	of	the	devil	in	the	concept.		How	is	it	that	it	can	refer	to	so	many	
things	at	one,	or	is	that	it	is	being	referenced	by	multiple	people	to	describe	the	
activity	that	they	propose.		Where	are	we	going	with	this	progress?		Are	we	going	
together?		I	argue	that	we	have	to	be.		Progress	is	a	movement	forward,	however	
one	that	is	hardly	free	of	tensions.		The	ambiguity	of	what	constitutes	progress	is	
created	by	the	multiplicity	of	activities	that	are	described	as	progress.		However,	we	
see	that	in	the	move	to	Nueva	Rinconada	the	argument	that	the	land	would	be	made	
to	produce	more	with	the	presence	of	squatters	in	Chapter	9	points	us	back	toward	
the	who	and	the	how	of	how	progress	is	enacted.		What	practices	accompany	
progress?	
						 Indeed,	we	see	the	political	frame	for	how	progress	is	imagined	and	debated	in	
the	context	of	the	2000	elections	in	Chapter	5.		In	this	chapter	I	discuss	how	
invasions	became	politicized	in	the	2000	re‐re‐election	campaign	of	Alberto	
Fujimori.		In	emblematic	cases	like	that	which	occurred	in	Villa	El	Salvador	the	
central	government	and	police	ignored	warnings	by	the	mayor	that	invasions	of	
private	property	and	state	property	were	being	planned.		Various	requests	to	
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intervene	and	prevent	the	invasions	were	ignored.		I	argue	that	in	many	ways	both	
legislative	changes	prior	to	the	invasions	as	well	as	explicit	support	for	informal	
sector	activities	provided	a	rich	culture	for	popular	movements.		In	what	remains	of	
this	chapter	I	talk	about	the	search	for	truth	in	the	various	versions	about	the	
invasion	that	one	encounters	in	the	field.		I	urge	that	the	reader	understand	these	
disputes	as	reflecting	a	theoretical	consciousness,	the	complement	to	the	practical	
consciousness	that	we	possess	as	the	result	of	our	daily	activities	(Gramsci	1971).		
Seen	in	this	light,	the	invasion	is	more	about	the	desire	for	equality,	dignity,	and	an	
escape	from	paying	rents	or	mortgages	for	a	home.		Ours	is	not	to	place	a	strong	
moral	judgment	on	the	invasion,	rather	we	ought	to	try	to	understand	the	invasion	
within	a	larger	political,	economic,	social	and	historical	framework.		In	this	section	I	
also	argue	that	social	justice	lies	not	in	perpetuating	a	struggle	between	the	rich	and	
the	poor.		Seeing	things	in	these	terms	tends	to	prevent	us	from	understanding	how	
social	inequality	works.		However,	in	Chapter	6	when	I	move	to	discuss	the	
circumstances	of	the	invasion,	I	question	the	behaviour	of	authorities	who	appeared	
to	have	involvement	in	the	invasion.		My	criticism	is	based	on	the	consequences	of	
the	decision	to	invade	private	property.			
						 It	is	not	so	important	to	understand	who	was	behind	the	invasion	as	to	what	
kind	of	a	precedent	this	sets.		My	biggest	fear	here	was	that	people	become	
accustomed	to	giving	support	to	politicians	who	use	the	necessity	of	people	in	order	
to	gain	political	capital	which	they	in	turn	use	to	support	economic	and	political	
agendas	that	go	against	the	best	interest	of	the	populace.		My	reference	here	is	to	the	
neoliberal	reforms	that	were	implemented	using	a	discourse	and	program	that	had	
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broad	appeal	to	underprivileged	classes.		In	Chapter	5,	I	revealed	that	the	mass	
media	was	used	to	divert	public	attention	away	from	the	changes	to	the	constitution	
that	were	made	in	1993	that	represented	an	attack	on	labour	rights	and	the	social	
welfare	state.		Much	of	the	cause	for	the	invasion	was	a	deep	sense	of	indignation	
felt	by	people	who	had	no	home.		It	was	only	reasonable	then	that	land	that	was	not	
being	optimally	used	became	a	target	for	a	land	invasion.		Given	the	previous	history	
of	invasions,	it	does	appear	that	the	invasion	was	part	of	a	cyclical	process	of	growth	
in	Lima.		We	should	not,	however,	underestimate	the	social	component	to	the	
invasion.		In	many	ways	it	brought	many	underlying	tensions	in	the	uneven	
development	of	Lima	to	the	surface.	
						 Chapter	7	goes	some	way	in	exploring	some	of	the	tensions	that	came	to	the	
surface.		Despite	the	violence	of	the	initial	invasion,	I	argue	in	this	chapter	that	such	
acts	were	not	beyond	the	pale	for	many	squatters	but	reflected	a	banalization	of	
violence	in	the	everyday	lives	of	workers	in	Lima.		There	was	also	a	sense	to	which	
the	brazenness	of	the	invasion	of	private	property	had	a	lot	to	do	with	the	political	
climate	of	Peru	under	the	Fujimori	dictatorship.		According	to	many	of	those	who	
participated	in	this	invasion	the	attitude	was	very	much	“do‐or‐die”.		
						 After	the	invasion	took	place	efforts	were	made	to	create	sectorial	councils	to	
administer	the	land	that	had	been	occupied.		Chapter	8	deals	primarily	with	the	
creation	of	communities	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	and	the	tensions	that	emerged	
between	households	and	community	councils.		The	threat	of	eviction	tended	to	
generate	a	culture	of	fear,	distrust,	and	confusion.		At	the	same	time	the	pretensions	
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of	a	front	that	took	the	name	of	Fujimori’s	political	party,	Perú	2000,	created	an	
environment	where	people	reacted	defensively	creating	a	number	of	counter‐fronts	
to	balance	the	ambitions	of	Perú	2000	to	become	the	central	authority	of	the	area.		
In	this	section	we	look	at	how	a	number	of	fronts	coalesced	then	eventually	
fissioned	due	to	the	inability	of	fronts	to	broker	a	solution	with	the	municipality	and	
the	central	government.		I	suggest	that	such	fissioning	and	the	emotions	that	
underlie	it	are	not	unlike	those	found	in	areas	outside	the	invasion	and	in	more	
advanced	stages	of	the	urbanization	process.		I	suggest	that	the	tensions	inherent	in	
the	liberal	subject	are	working	to	generate	an	air	of	distrust	that	came	to	play	a	part	
in	the	fragmentation	of	collective	efforts	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada.			
						 Despite	the	fragmentation	of	sectors	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada,	I	argue	in	
Chapter	9	that	there	was	unity	in	certain	moments.		The	first	case	of	collective	unity	
I	discuss	is	that	exhibited	in	bringing	the	demands	of	many	invasions	to	the	
Peruvian	Congress	to	bring	about	a	number	of	legislative	changes	that	extended	the	
possibility	of	obtaining	land	titles	to	invasions	occurring	up	until	December	31,	
2004.		Communities	also	worked	together	to	defend	their	land	from	numerous	
eviction	attempts.		Patrols	were	organized	and	duties	assigned	to	different	
communities	in	the	case	of	an	eviction.		The	final	case	I	discuss	is	that	of	community	
policing,	which	works	to	bring	about	sectorial	unity,	but	also	indirectly	guarantees	
that	certain	rules	are	established	for	the	Nueva	Rinconada	as	a	whole.		When	it	
comes	to	regulating	the	behaviour	of	households	in	sectors,	though,	it	appears	the	
character	of	justice	seems	to	favour	productive	family‐based	households	that	abide	
by	particular	inflections	of	state	laws.		Community	justice	is	a	result	of	the	absence	
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of	the	police,	a	practical	need	for	security	by	people	with	families	in	the	area,	and	a	
delegation	of	policing	to	communities.		This	delegation	seems	consistent	with	spirit	
of	self‐help	development.		It	is	also	noted	in	this	section	how	policing	has	much	to	do	
with	regulating	individual	behaviours	and	attaching	particular	rights	and	
obligations	to	a	nuclear	family	based	household.	
						 In	Chapter	9	I	illustrate	how	different	discursive	positions	espoused	by	
property	owners	and	squatters	have	crystallized	over	time.		The	data	presented	
here	are	an	illustration	of	what	collective	discourses	holding	up	a	particular	morally	
superior	position	tend	to	occlude.		I	argue	that	mythological	stories	of	the	first	years	
of	the	Nueva	Rinconada	appear	to	have	worked	as	an	outlet	for	expressing	popular	
rejection	of	the	abuses	of	community	councils	in	the	area.		Compared	to	more	
rationalistic	alternatives	to	explain	the	grueling	living	conditions	at	first,	I	find	that		
both	fetishize	the	social	relations	and	conditions	in	the	area.		This	seems	to	suggest	
that	there	is	some	truth	to	all	of	this.		What	I	assert	is	that	the	only	truth	that	can	be	
had	is	that	expressed	in	the	suffering	and	pain	of	families	that	have	had	to	endure	
living	between	councils,	property	owners,	politicians,	economists,	and	others	that	
decide	how	they	ought	to	live	their	lives.		I	think	that	much	hope	lies	in	the	ability	of	
people	to	recognize	and	comment	on	the	suffering	of	others.		It	is	only	through	a	
more	empathetic	understanding	of	the	life	of	the	underprivileged	that	a	critical	
consciousness	and	possible	alternative	to	neoliberalism	can	be	found.	
						 The	final	chapter	is	an	exploration	into	what	progress	means	for	people	in	the	
Nueva	Rinconada.		I	preface	the	chapter	with	a	series	of	workshops	where	a	
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strategic	plan	was	formulated	for	the	development	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada	over	the	
next	ten	years	or	so.		The	plan,	however,	does	not	get	to	the	heart	of	the	tensions	
that	affect	people	on	a	more	intimate	level.		In	this	chapter	I	attempt	a	cursory	
application	of	Walter	Benjamin’s	attempt	to	collect	data	on	emotions	that	had	
become	prevalent	in	modernist	Europe	(Benjamin	2002[1999]).		What	I	assert	is	
that	we	cannot	speak	of	development	without	looking	at	the	demons	it	tends	to	
create	in	its	wake.		In	this	section	I	am	skeptical	of	attempts	to	channel	generalized	
discontent	with	current	social	relations	into	a	political	movement	based	on	
inclusion.		From	the	discussions	in	the	previous	chapters	it	should	be	clear	that	
social	inclusion	has	been	at	the	heart	of	modernization	in	Peru	since	the	1940s.		I	
conclude	by	arguing	that	we	need	a	development	that	fosters	cooperation,	respect	
for	difference,	balance	with	life	on	this	planet,	and	a	general	environment	where	our	
lives	are	not	constrained	and	channeled	by	dehumanizing	market	forces.		Let	us	
move	on	to	survey	the	field	of	this	investigation.		
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Chapter 1 —The Lay of the Land 
 
						 What	ethnography	has	come	to	be	in	practice	at	present	is	quite	complex,	
especially	in	a	contemporary	urban	context.		The	importance	of	identifying	not	only	
global	flows	(Appadurai	1996),	but	also	local	complexity	has	meant	a	shift	to	multi‐
sited	research.		George	Marcus’s	observation	that	anthropologists	must	now	shift	
between	thick	and	thin	analyses,	increase	reliance	upon	collaborators,	respond	to	a	
broadening	range	of	what	an	anthropologist	can	pursue	in	the	field	and	hone	their	
ethnographic	skills	to	deal	with	complex	relationships	between	different	social	
contexts	is	a	fairly	accurate	description	of	the	field	for	many	ethnographers	these	
days,	and	it	has	been	for	some	time.		As	a	consequence	of	this	complex	field,	the	text	
an	anthropologist	will	produce	nowadays	has	moved	away	from	the	classic	all‐
encompassing	ethnography	of	x	culture	that	became	a	hallmark	of	ethnography	in	
the	early	to	mid	20th	century	and	more	toward	a	multi‐voiced	text	(Marcus	1995,	
2001,	2009).		
					 Thinking	about	what	the	fieldwork	experience	means	and	how	it	goes	about	
transforming	the	ethnographer	and	collaborator	are	common	in	anthropological	
texts	since	the	1980s	when	anthropologists	began	to	question	the	privilege	inherent	
in	previous	anthropological	writings.		The	spirit	of	this	reflection	is,	in	many	ways,	
my	attempt	to	build	on	and	engage	the	recent	work	of	political	scientist	Allaine	
Cerwonka	and	anthropologist	Liisa	H.	Malkki	(2007),	albeit	in	a	much	more	
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abbreviated	manner.		In	Improvising	Theory,	the	two	authors	expose	the	heuristic	
process	of	anthropology	revealing	that	as	an	epistemological	practice,	anthropology	
involves	a	complex	improvised	process	of	moving	back	and	forth	in	the	field,	fraught	
with	constant	anxiety,	fear	and	doubt.		I	would	add	depression,	frustration,	anger,	
and	exhilaration	to	this	list	because	ethnography	is	a	process	that	defies	any	sort	of	
planning	and	often	places	anthropologists	in	a	position	where	they	feel	isolated,	
misunderstood,	and	emotionally	overwhelmed.		What	they	often	do	is	to	load	up	
their	metaphorical	backpack	with	as	many	research	and	sundry	experiences	as	
possible,	then	hope	that	they	will	be	prepared	for	the	mostly	unknown	task	ahead.	
						 And	so,	with	metaphorical	backpack	in	hand,	I	set	out	to	find	out	how	people	in	
the	informal	parts	of	Lima	experienced	rapid	urban	growth.		I	wanted	to	understand	
the	social	world	that	emerged	from	the	meeting	of	various	ethnic	groups	in	Lima	
under	precarious	living	conditions.		This	task	is	difficult	for	any	investigator	because	
nobody	can	really	have	the	prerequisite	cultural	understanding	to	perceive	the	
complexity	of	a	social	environment	where	migrants	from	different	indigenous	and	
non‐indigenous	backgrounds	have	interacted	in	complex	ways	over	the	past	five	
centuries,	however	my	hunch	from	my	earlier	experiences	in	Lima	was	that	there	
was	a	process	of	negotiation	occurring	between	newcomers	and	previous	
generations	in	Lima	(Rouleau	2007).		Understanding	development	as	a	process	
would,	I	surmised,	entail	a	lot	of	movement	between	areas	and	the	consultation	of	
folk	spatial	divisions.	
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						 Throughout	my	fieldwork	I	could	not	help	but	feel	that	I	was	spreading	myself	
too	thinly.		Collaborators	would	constantly	inquire	about	where	I	disappeared	to	
often.		At	many	times,	I	was	moving	back	and	forth	between	areas	to	keep	people’s	
memories	warm.		I	could	not	help	but	feel	that	I	was	leaving	people	with	the	
impression	that	I	was	just	after	them	for	an	interview	or	to	hang	out	to	get	what	I	
needed	and	then	be	off.		It	is	likely	that	most	people	understood	that	I	was	doing	my	
job	and	that	meant	that	I	would	not	be	able	to	return.		Nevertheless,	that	left	me	
feeling	that	I	was	missing	out	on	something	almost	all	the	time.
	
Figure	3	Source	Guía	2000	This	map	shows	what	would	become	the	Nueva	Rinonada.		The	
property	marked	Associación	Agropecuaria	La	Rinconada	is	where	events	mentioned	later	in	
this	dissertation	would	occur.		There	are	numerous	sectors	here	of	the	upper	part	of	
Pamplona:	Rinconada,	Nazareno,	Ollantay,	etc.				
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Figure	4	Source:	Guía	200	This	map	details	lower	parts	of	Pamplona	Alta,	Pamplona	Baja,	Zonas	
A‐D	of	the	urban	area	of	the	central	core	of	the	municipality	can	be	noted	here.		I	have	circled	
the	area	where	I	lived	in	Zona	A	and	have	also	circled	the	market	on	Pista	Nueva	and	PEBAL	
on	the	map.		
						 What	I	would	like	to	do	in	this	section	is	to	give	the	reader	a	sense	of	the	
movement	that	occurs	and	the	compromises	that	were	made	in	this	project	so	that	
the	reader	may	understand	why	this	investigation	took	the	form	it	did.		My	hope	
here,	as	well,	is	to	provide	some	detail	so	that	future	investigators	may	improve	
upon	my	efforts	or	perhaps	work	toward	a	more	collaborative	vision	of	how	urban	
investigations	can	be	done.	
						 Before	going	back	to	Lima	in	August	of	2009	I	had	spent	about	three	months	
doing	exploratory	work	living	with	the	partner	and	children	of	a	friend	of	mine	in	
the	urban	zone	of	San	Juan	de	Miraflores.		I	later	discovered	the	area	I	was	staying	in	
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to	be	an	addition	to	a	planned	neighbourhood	intended	for	ex‐government	
employees.		I	say	that	this	was	exploratory	because	up	until	that	point	I	had	only	
lived	in	the	central	part	of	Lima;	the	northern,	eastern,	and	southern	municipalities	
were	areas	that	I	had	only	briefly	visited,	yet,	I	began	to	increasingly	feel	that	they	
were	the	focal	point	for	understanding	how	people	changed	and	made	Lima	over	the	
past	six	decades	or	so.		To	understand	Lima,	in	other	words,	one	would	have	to	
understand	how	different	areas	of	the	city	interact,	or	relate	to	one	another.					
						 Lima	was	a	city	that	grew	horizontally	instead	of	vertically	for	much	of	the	
twentieth	century.		Now,	in	the	twenty	first	century,	Lima	is	in	a	process	of	
consolidation	and	vertical	growth	because	the	cost	of	occupying	increasingly	distant	
flat	areas	along	the	coast	outweighs	the	benefit	of	occupying	these	areas,	not	to	
mention	the	fact	that	some	areas	are	protected	or	privately‐owned	(Corzo	and	
Riofrío	2006).		Growth	has	been	contained	by	geography,	land	use	designations,	
land	ownership	and	legislation	that	explicitly	states	that	land	invasions	will	no	
longer	be	recognized	by	the	state.		The	official	cut‐off	point	for	land	invasions	at	
present	is	December	31,	2004.				
						 That	winter	of	2008,	my	first	incursion	into	Lima	South,	I	lived	with	Isabel	and	
her	two	girls.		I	immersed	myself	in	the	routine	of	a	housewife:	we	cooked,	we	
gossiped,	we	went	to	the	market,	I	accompanied	her	to	leave	the	elder	daughter	at	
her	daycare	and	I	began	to	meet	her	siblings	and	relatives,	accompanying	them	as	
well	to	different	places.		I	became	an	adopted	tío,	or	uncle,	to	the	girls.		In	the	middle	
of	the	summer	I	went	back	to	Isabel’s	hometown	in	Ayacucho	for	two	weeks	with	
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her,	her	aunt	and	the	girls.		I	met	her	parents,	her	two	brothers,	who	stayed	there	
helping	their	parents	with	their	fields	and	livestock,	her	friends	and	other	townsfolk.		
It	was	this	relationship	that	would	form	the	starting	point	for	further	wanderings	in	
a	year.			
						 When	I	returned	the	following	year	around	the	beginning	of	August	I	
continued	to	explore	Isabel’s	area	of	San	Juan	de	Miraflores	(Zona	A).		I	met	local	
professionals	and	talked	to	her	uncle	and	aunt	about	the	history	of	the	area.		This	
was	not	really	where	I	wanted	to	be.		But,	my	probing	here	would	certainly	put	
things	into	perspective	later	on	in	my	fieldwork.		It	would	become	a	reference	point.			
						 I	came	to	realize	that	I	wanted	to	be	in	an	area	where	people	had	more	
recently	squatted,	been	settled,	or	a	complex	combination	of	the	two,	and	slowly	
built	up	homes	there,	as	this	was	the	experience	of	most	people	in	Lima.		Many	of	
the	people	I	was	meeting	were	professionals	and	entrepreneurs,	or	people	who	
distinguished	themselves	from	people	in	Pamplona	Baja	and	Pamplona	Alta	(see	
Figures	3	and	4)	—areas	which	they	often	perceived	as	dangerous	places	with	
gangs,	vice,	and	suffering.		Notwithstanding	this	denigrating	impression,	it	was	also	
recognized	that	people	in	predominantly	working	class	Pamplona	stand	together	in	
solidarity,	struggling	to	get	ahead	in	the	city.			
						 It	became	apparent	that	people	in	the	commercial	core	of	San	Juan	de	
Miraflores	were	an	emerging	middle	class	that	were	marking	a	difference	from	
others	like	themselves	who	had	followed	a	similar	trajectory	to	Lima,	but	had	
managed	to	position	themselves	in	economically	advantageous	occupations.		While	
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surveying	the	district	one	day	with	the	aunt	and	cousin	of	Isabel,	we	began	
discussing	the	people	in	the	hills.		She	thought	aloud:	“Why	do	they	come	here?”		She	
answered	her	question	opining	that	people	came	for	education	and	jobs,	things	that	
one	does	not	always	find	in	abundance	outside	of	Lima.		Her	son	chimed	in	saying	
that	people	are	exploited	in	Lima,	then	moved	on	to	say	that	social	classes	do	not	
exist	in	Lima;	what	do	exist	are	five	socioeconomic	levels:	A,B,C,D,E,	which	are	
present	in	all	districts.		This	view	is	one	that	is	championed	by	professionals	in	
universities	who	live	in	more	affluent	neighbourhoods	in	Lima.		Their	analysis	and	
classificatory	systems	are	those	of	surveys	and	marketing	focus	groups,	not	
ethnography	or	an	understanding	of	the	lived	experience	of	people	in	other	parts	of	
Lima.		That	Isabel’s	aunt’s	young	son,	a	student	at	the	posh	private	University	of	
Lima,	adopted	such	a	reference	is	information.		So,	while	one	may	acknowledge	that	
exploitation	and	injustice	exist,	a	classificatory	system	has	been	generated	that	
neutralizes	the	feelings	and	worldview	of	those	in	economically	and	socially	
disadvantageous	position,	reducing	their	lives	to	alphabetical	categories	that	
correspond	to	income	levels	or	consumer	types	(cf.	Arellano	and	Burgos	2004).		
Such	studies	“discover”	that	the	entrepreneurial	mindset	is	well	and	thriving	in	
Lima.		Consumption	of	newfangled	goods	is	seen	as	a	burgeoning	market,	yet	not	all	
consumer	types	desire	such	commodities	due	to	differences	in	their	consumer	
types.		This	view	obscures	the	lives	of	“those	people	in	the	hills,”	stripping	them	of	
their	voice	and	experiences	depoliticizing	the	development	process	in	ways	not	
unlike	those	described	by	James	Ferguson	in	Lesotho	(1994).	
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						 If	I	wanted	to	understand	people,	I	realized,	I	would	have	to	become	more	
mobile	and	more	enmeshed	in	the	daily	activities	of	people.		The	problem	at	this	
point	was	that	I	knew	not	a	soul	in	Pamplona,	that	is,	except	for	Maribel,	Isabel’s	
older	sister	who	I	had	visited	on	one	occasion	the	previous	summer.			
						 As	it	turned	out,	Maribel	worked	in	a	market	on	the	median	of	Pista	Nueva	(Av.	
S.	Allende	on	the	map	above),	the	main	thoroughfare	in	Pamplona.		What	I	did	not	
know	is	that	she	was	the	acting	president	of	her	section	of	an	eight‐stage	market.		I	
started	to	visit	the	market	on	a	regular	basis,	spending	much	of	my	time	with	young	
adults	and	mature	adults.		Her	support	helped	me	to	quickly	establish	rapport	with	
many	of	the	people	who	worked	in	the	market.		In	the	evening,	I	worked	as	a	
security	guard	on	several	occasions	to	get	a	sense	of	the	neighbourhood	at	night.		It	
took	a	while,	but	I	got	to	know	something	about	the	people	that	made	their	living	in	
this	market	and	the	world	that	they	lived	in.			
						 Competition	to	get	ahead,	as	manifested	in	discourses	of	envy,	gossip,	viveza,	
desconfianza	and	the	like,	was	common	talk.		Yet,	also	present	was	a	strong	social	
prescription	for	group	solidarity.		These	values	seemed	to	clash;	there	appeared	to	
be	a	tension	here	between	a	recognition	of	the	benefits	of	mutual	support	and	a	
desire	to	progress,	to	make	it	in	the	city.		What	was	clear	was	that	people	here	were	
actively	building	communities	against	forces	that	were	pulling	communities	apart,	
forces	like	gossip,	envy,	decadence,	egotism,	ambition,	betrayal,	viveza,	
opportunism,	personalism,	etc.		I	will	discuss	this	dynamic	in	more	detail	in	the	
concluding	chapter	of	this	dissertation,	however	throughout	this	dissertation	I	will	
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draw	attention	to	instantiations	of	these	emotions	and	their	relationship	to	events	
that	I	chronicle.			
						 At	this	point,	I	formed	a	working	hypothesis,	a	hypothesis	that	I	would	attempt	
to	falsify	and	qualify:	Progress	had	and	continued	to	occur	in	Pamplona.		Progress,	
as	experienced	by	people	in	Pamplona	and	other	working	class	areas	of	the	city,	I	
discovered,	was	a	struggle	to	gain	a	foothold	in	the	city	and	to	gain	some	measure	of	
dignity	in	a	new	environment.		Progress	was	both	a	material	and	cultural	gain,	but	a	
modest	gain	for	most.		Aside	from	building	a	home	or	making	educational	gains,	I	
wondered	what	type	of	social	dynamic	existed	in	the	midst	of	this	transformation.	
						 People	often	griped	about	a	lack	of	values,	or	a	moral	degeneration	that	had	
seemed	to	accompany	material	advancement,	but	they	also	commented	on	how	
things	had	gotten	better	over	the	years.		Views	differed	at	times,	with	some	
collaborators	adopting	a	very	bleak	view	of	the	past	decades	under	neoliberal	
policies	and	the	future	of	such	policies,	especially	those	who	remembered	times	
when	real	wages	could	buy	more	(since	the	1970s	real	wages	have	been	greatly	
reduced	making	it	necessary	for	both	parents	to	work).		Corruption	was	rife	in	the	
view	of	many	older	collaborators	in	Pamplona.		Political	scandals	were	the	most	
conspicuous	evidence	of	such	a	claim.		The	municipality	and	central	government	
made	headlines	for	influence	trafficking	and	embezzlement	regularly	over	the	
months	of	my	research,	further	fueling	local	cynical	views	toward	politicians	and	
society,	in	general.		
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						 At	about	the	same	time	that	I	began	to	visit	the	market	regularly,	I	was	pointed	
toward	Programa	de	Educación	Básica	Laboral,	or	The	Program	of	Basic	Labour	
Education	(PEBAL).		PEBAL	is	a	local	primary	school,	night	school,	medical	clinic,	
administrative	centre,	and	social	development	centre	run	by	the	Jesuits	in	
Pamplona.		It	was	founded	in	1971	and	built	by	the	community	and	the	Jesuits	to	
serve	the	local	community.		I	entered	PEBAL	and	immediately	befriended	a	
charismatic	and	socially	conscious	Spanish	architect	and	his	political	scientist	
compatriot.		Alfredo,	the	Spanish	architect	volunteering	in	the	social	area	of	PEBAL,	
invited	me	to	form	part	of	a	training	course	for	local	community	leaders.		It	was	at	
one	of	the	seminars	for	this	course	that	I	would	meet	Madelen	and	Josefina.	The	
latter,	a	charismatic	and	forthcoming	middle‐aged	woman,	would	become	one	of	my	
key	collaborators	and	friend.		Madelen,	seeing	that	I	had	an	interest	in	getting	a	
foothold	in	the	area	offered	me	her	place	in	the	Rinconada	Nueva	(see	figure	3	
above).					
						 I	had	been	to	the	Rinconada	Nueva	with	the	elderly	father	of	one	of	the	women	
who	had	a	food	stand	in	the	market	that	I	was	working	in	to	feed	pigs	one	day,	so	I	
knew	that	this	area	was	the	frontier	of	Pamplona	where	people	lived	in	ramshackle	
homes	amongst	pig	sties.		I	jumped	at	the	opportunity	to	have	a	foothold	in	yet	
another	part	of	the	municipality.		I	was	getting	to	know	my	environment	from	the	
perspective	of	the	people	who	lived	here.		Much	of	this	information	was	not	
contained	in	books,	so	I	figured	my	first	step	was	to	figure	out	what	had	happened	
and	was	going	on	around	here.		At	the	very	least,	I	was	gaining	an	experiential	
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understanding	of	life	in	Pamplona	and	that	was	getting	closer	to	what	I	had	
envisioned	myself	doing	and	where	the	emphasis	of	my	study	ought	to	fall.	
						 Near	the	beginning	of	November,	I	moved	into	Madelen’s	place	in	a	sector	of	
the	Nueva	Rinconada	called	Esperanza.		Her	place	was	a	dilapidated	shack,	dusty	
from	a	lack	of	occupation.		While	here	I	became	close	to	Elvira,	Don	Domingo	and	
their	two	children	–both	young	adults.		I	began	to	participate	in	community	work	
projects	and	decided	to	the	play	the	role	that	the	community	had	cast	me	in	–
benevolent	gringo	come	to	help	the	poor	and	needy	materially	and	emotionally.			
						 I	bought	formula	for	orphaned	twins,	paid	for	the	medical	exams	of	a	man	
crippled	with	arthritis	and	unable	to	work,	and	organized	an	art	contest	and	
Christmas	event	for	local	children.		I	enjoyed	being	cast	into	this	role,	but	a	part	of	
me	felt	uneasy	because	I	felt	I	was	not	really	researching,	or	that	many	people	were	
not	seeing	me	for	who	I	was	but	more	as	a	shell.		It	also	felt	disingenuous,	no	matter	
how	much	these	acts	reflected	my	sensitive	nature.		I	wondered	what	I	was	really	
doing.		I	did	not	realize	it	at	the	time,	but	I	was	participating	in	life	here,	sharing	
what	I	had,	and	becoming	a	person	in	the	community.		Little	by	little,	I	would	
become	a	person,	distinct,	but	nonetheless	as	human	as	anyone	else	here.		Suffice	it	
to	say,	people	were	more	comfortable	with	my	presence	than	I	was	with	being	in	
their	presence.		It	would	take	time	for	me	to	become	better	synchronized	with	my	
surroundings.				
						 While	I	lived	in	Madelen’s	place,	neighbours	began	to	tell	me	that	Madelen	was	
a	viva,	or	boldy	unscrupulous	person	roughly,	for	charging	rent	to	take	care	of	a	
	 36
place	that	she	was	not	caring	for.		Neighbours	were	reluctant	to	help	me	improve	my	
new	home	because	they	felt	that	Madelen	would	be	the	beneficiary	of	our	efforts.		As	
I	became	more	familiar	with	the	social	norms	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada,	I	realized	that	
people	who	did	not	live	in	the	area,	but	looked	to	benefit	from	having	property	there	
represented	a	direct	affront	to	those	who	live	with	their	families	in	this	area	
enduring	regular	privations	and	having	to	invest	their	labour	in	the	infrastructure	
improvements	in	the	area.		If	Madelen	had	a	place,	I	suspected	it	was	because	of	her	
link	to	PEBAL,	a	source	of	aid	to	the	community.		The	General	Secretary,	Wily,	as	a	
solution,	offered	me	free	accommodation	in	the	sector	locale.	
					 When	one	does	not	live	in	a	home	and	maintain	it,	it	becomes	infested	with	
fleas	and	other	pests.		I	really	had	no	idea	what	to	do,	or	how	to	get	by	in	this	house,	
and	I	did	not	want	to	stoke	the	flames	of	community	conflicts.		If	this	was	not	
enough,	I	became	ill	with	a	stomach	infection	and	a	chronic	cough	that	lasted	much	
of	my	time	in	this	house.		I	became	very	gaunt.		Elvira	and	Domingo	suggested	that	I	
talk	to	one	of	the	Jesuit	brothers	to	see	if	I	could	get	a	room	in	PEBAL.		I	did	not	want	
to	admit	defeat,	however	my	health	was	more	of	a	concern.		Recently,	a	neighbour	
had	died	of	tuberculosis.		I	also	felt	that	I	was	in	the	middle	of	internal	conflicts	that	I	
knew	nothing	about	and	wanted	to	gain	some	distance	for	a	moment	and	look	for	a	
place	that	was	more	neutral.		I	vowed	to	return	on	more	favourable	conditions,	
scouting	out	my	future	home	a	little	better	to	avoid	unsettling	the	community	in	
which	I	would	live.			
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						 I	returned	to	live	near	the	market	in	Pamplona	in	the	Jesuit	compound	around	
the	middle	of	January	of	2010,	although	I	began	to	pay	regular	visits	to	Esperanza	
not	wanting	things	to	cool	off	in	the	zone.		After	Christmas,	I	decided	that	I	would	
teach	English	in	another	sector	called	Martha	Chavez	because	the	General	Secretary,	
Marta,	was	much	more	open	and	willing	to	help	me	understand	life	in	the	area.		She	
invited	me	along	on	her	trips	to	the	municipality	and	helped	me	with	my	paperwork	
to	get	into	the	municipality.		I	could	accompany	her	and	was	invited	to	do	so	
regularly.		I	taught	English	there	for	almost	three	months	in	the	evenings	to	an	
enthusiastic	group	of	local	children	and	young	adults.			
						 At	the	time,	I	did	not	realize	it	but	I	was	paying	my	dues	in	the	community	and	
demonstrating	that	I	was	willing	to	give	to	the	community	in	a	way	that	was	unique	
from	the	approach	most	NGOs	and	the	state	take.		I	lived	with	people	and	I	listened	
to	them.		I	was	not	really	there	to	tell	them	how	they	ought	to	live	then	retreat	back	
into	a	sheltered	world	of	privilege.		I	made	the	acquaintance	of	a	variety	of	people	I	
never	imagined	I	would	come	to	be	on	friendly	terms	with	–from	juice	vendors	to	
garbage	pickers.		My	aim	was	to	understand	what	it	meant	to	be	from	there,	what	
troubled	the	minds	of	people,	what	moments	comprised	the	brief	respites	in	the	
daily	lives	of	people	here.		I	wanted	to	know	what	living	there	was	really	like.		At	the	
same	time,	I	was	taking	an	interest	in	how	one	went	about	building	a	community,	a	
place	in	the	hills,	where	the	land	was	mostly	private	property	that	had	been	
squatted	on.			
	 38
				 While	I	lived	in	PEBAL,	I	started	hanging	out	with	the	staff	in	the	social	area	
and	participating	in	their	activities	in	Pamplona.		I	talked	to	volunteers	and	I	got	to	
know	the	locals	who	worked	in	PEBAL.		I	tried	to	be	close	and	to	maintain	a	distance	
at	the	same	time,	not	wanting	to	become	too	strongly	associated	with	assistance	
given	by	this	institution	for	fear	that	it	would	type‐cast	me	or	close	doors	for	me	in	
the	area	I	worked	in.		Whether	this	was	a	realistic	position	or	not	is	certainly	
debatable.			
						 At	this	point,	being	in	PEBAL	allowed	me	to	maintain	contacts	I	formed	near	
the	market,	look	for	new	contacts	in	different	sectors	of	Pamplona,	and	still	maintain	
ties	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		It	was	hectic.		I	knew	that	at	some	point	I	would	have	
to	focus	in	on	one	particular	area,	nevertheless	I	needed	to	gain	a	knowledge	of	the	
lay	of	an	area	that	contained	150,000	people	before	I	could	do	that.	
						 For	the	next	few	months	I	continued	to	focus	on	generating	a	picture	from	the	
ground	about	what	had	happened	in	Pamplona	since	its	beginnings	in	1968.		I	talked	
to	a	lot	of	older	men	and	women	who	had	been	community	leaders	in	different	
sectors	over	the	years.		My	focus	shifted	to	Pamplona	mostly	and	I	paid	occasional	
visits	to	the	Nueva	Rinconada	to	keep	things	simmering	up	there.		
						 On	occasions	when	I	felt	that	I	was	not	getting	enough	depth,	I	consoled	myself	
by	saying	that	I	had	gone	places	and	learned	a	lot	about	an	area	in	which	I	never	
imagined	I	would	ever	work	the	first	time	I	went	to	Peru	in	1998.		What	had	been	a	
mystery	had	become	a	familiar	place	that	I	now	knew	how	to	navigate	and	was	not	
afraid	to	navigate	alone.		I	had	come	a	long	way,	I	reminded	myself.		Somehow,	in	a	
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place	where	people	were	supposedly	alienated,	nobody	cared	about	anybody	and	
crime	was	on	the	rise,	I	was	constantly	being	aided	and	was	unscathed.		I	felt	
humbled	and	grateful.		Things	are	not	always	what	people	imagine	or	say	they	are.			
						 That	said,	many	of	my	acquaintances	told	me	that	being	a	gringo	was	a	strong	
deterrent	for	many	thieves	because	if	any	harm	came	to	me	there	would	be	political	
pressure	to	see	that	the	case	be	resolved.		I	think	what	really	kept	me	safe	was	a	
combination	of	prudence,	paying	heed	to	local	warnings	about	hotspots	for	
muggings	and	the	precedent	for	compassionate	and	selfless	action	that	prior	
foreigners	had	generated	in	the	community.					
						 At	the	beginning	of	April	of	2010,	I	moved	with	my	girlfriend,	now	my	partner,	
to	an	apartment	in	the	more	affluent	side	of	the	municipality	of	San	Luis,	an	area	
that	started	out	as	a	planned	neighbourhood	–in	many	cases	the	first	floor	nucleus	
of	these	homes,	being	identical	in	many	cases,	was	evident.		The	area,	in	contrast	to	
Pamplona,	and	even	the	urban	zone,	boasted	parks	that	were	well‐maintained.		
There	were	no	street	vendors,	people	did	not	take	over	the	streets	to	play	volleyball	
in	the	summer,	there	were	no	polladas	(community	fund	raising	events	for	sick	or	
needy	families),	and	neighbours	kept	to	themselves	more.		Nobody	cared	about	me	
there,	save	a	group	of	local	adults	who	tried	to	tease	me	at	first,	but	tired	when	I	
gave	them	no	reaction.		I	continued	to	go	to	Pamplona	and	the	Nueva	Rinconada	
during	the	day	for	a	few	months.						
						 Around	July	of	2010	I	shifted	all	of	my	attention	toward	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		
This	decision	was	based	on	the	rapport	that	I	had	generated	through	my	generosity,	
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good	will	and	more	intense	involvement	with	people	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		One	
of	the	community	leaders	offered	me	a	place	where	I	could	sleep	on	Saturday	and	
Sunday	nights.		I	spent	three	to	five	days	a	week	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada,	returning	
home	to	type	up	fieldnotes	and	decompress	from	time	to	time.		Living	in	San	Luis	
meant	that	I	got	to	talk	to	people	in	this	area	about	Pamplona	and	get	their	
impressions	of	people	who	lived	in	these	areas,	gaining	an	understanding	of	the	real	
lack	of	contact	that	exists	between	more	affluent	areas	and	places	like	Pamplona.		To	
be	more	accurate,	I	came	across	people	from	areas	like	Pamplona	working	as	maids,	
street	vendors,	or	trades	people	in	San	Luis.		Needless	to	say,	our	interaction	was	
very	different	–this	time,	they	were	out	of	place.		People	who	I	could	joke	with	and	
talk	to	openly	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	would	not	make	eye	contact	with	me	when	I	
greeted	them,	or	they	would	maintain	an	insurmountable	distance.		The	relationship	
was	entirely	different.		When	I	invited	friends	from	the	Nueva	Rinconada	to	visit	me,	
they	looked	and	felt	out	of	place.		Many	never	came.		It	was	easier	for	me	to	visit	
them	than	it	was	for	them	to	visit	me.		To	some	degree,	the	Nueva	Rinconada	
brought	me	down	to	their	level,	reminding	me	that	there	were	invisible	barriers	
which	divided	us.		The	experience	in	both	places	suggested	that	the	role	of	
benefactor	that	I	played	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	created	a	possibility	for	interaction	
that	did	not	exist	in	an	area	that	was	more	affluent.		As	the	foreign	aid	
worker/anthropologist	people	would	talk	to	me,	however	as	the	gringo	in	an	
affluent	neighbourhood	social	dialogue	was	awkward	and	out	of	place.	
						 To	be	honest,	I	relished	the	peace	of	this	area	of	the	city	and	the	indifference	of	
my	neighbours	and	people	who	surrounded	me.		Not	having	running	water	or	
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appliances,	Internet	and	other	luxuries	that	I	take	for	granted	in	the	Nueva	
Rinconada	made	living	uncomfortable.		In	San	Luis,	I	could	live	in	a	way	that	I	had	
grown	accustomed	to	for	much	of	my	life.		If	I	wanted	to	go	to	a	gym,	there	was	a	
gym	nearby.		If	I	wanted	to	go	to	the	market,	it	was	nearby.		San	Luis	was	a	
compromise	in	all	senses.		The	cost	of	living	in	San	Luis	for	everything	was	slightly	
higher	though,	but	not	near	as	expensive	as	Miraflores,	San	Isidro,	Surco,	or	even	
more	affluent	areas	of	Lima.			
						 Being	deprived	of	the	conveniences	of	the	contemporary	world	for	extended	
periods	of	time	generated	anxiety,	frustration,	anger	and,	yes,	even	boredom.		I	
wanted	to	maximize	my	time,	so	that	I	could	spend	more	time	on	writing	and	
reading,	things	that	are	generally	not	part	of	the	activities	of	most	people	in	the	
Nueva	Rinconada.		I	did	not	want	to	spend	a	whole	day	hand	washing	clothes.		I	did	
not	want	to	go	to	the	market	everyday	to	buy	groceries	because	I	had	no	fridge.		I	
was	habituated	to	technological	conveniences,	and	I	had	grown	accustomed	to	
immediate	results	and	impersonal	transactions.			
						 Yet,	being	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	made	me	feel	the	coldness	and	absurdity	
that	often	accompanies	an	individualistic	pursuit	for	merit	and	recognition.		The	
long	solitary	hours	of	reading	and	writing	were	a	stark	contrast	to	the	almost	
constant	socialization	that	could	be	had	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		Being	part	of	the	
community	work	projects	made	me	feel	part	of	something	bigger	than	myself.		I	felt	
like	I	was	making	a	visible	contribution	to	the	community	in	which	I	lived.		I	was	a	
part	of	something.		We	were	working	toward	something	together.					
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						 I	figured	I	could	commute	to	the	Nueva	Rinconada	during	the	weekend	and	
during	the	week	and	then	return	home.		I	think	it	would	have	been	disingenuous	to	
say	that	it	was	fine	to	live	the	way	people	did	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		Most	people	
there	are	struggling	so	that	their	community	is	like	that	of	areas	like	San	Luis.		This	
is	a	theme	that	will	receive	detailed	attention	in	the	following	chapters.		San	Luis	
and	areas	like	it	are	the	way	they	are,	however,	because	people	have	worked	
together	to	improve	these	communities	(paying	municipal	taxes	is	a	major	factor	
here)	and	there	has	been	a	process	of	economic	and	social	segregation	at	work	here	
whereby	people	moving	here	value	the	order	they	have	established.		It	is	hard	not	to	
notice	that	most	locals	around	here	are	either	professionals	or	successful	
entrepreneurs.	
						 The	moral	of	this	tale	is	that	when	working	in	a	city	people	must	understand	
multiple	places	to	make	sense	of	the	place	they	are	in	and	how	it	fits	into	processes	
of	urban	growth.		Viewing	the	city	as	something	dynamic,	processual	and	relational	
means	that	we	must	be	prepared	to	de‐centre	our	investigation,	to	lose	ourselves	in	
order	to	find	ourselves,	as	Walter	Benjamin	astutely	wrote	(Benjamin:1935).		
Otherwise,	we	risk	missing	the	significance	of	the	parts	we	are	working	in.		The	
consequence	of	this	is	that	research	becomes	less	predictable,	long	term	and	
flexible,	leading	us	places	we	never	imagined.			Now,	that	I	have	discussed	the	
movement	involved	in	doing	this	research	and	given	some	indication	of	what	will	
come,	let	us	continue.	
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Chapter 2 —Don Malvinas’s Pamplona 
	
						 My	first	trips	into	Lima	South	were	made	during	my	master’s	thesis	research	
into	popular	fashion.		I	remember	going	to	La	Chanchería,	an	informal	market	in	
Villa	El	Salvador	with	a	friend	to	interview	vendors	about	the	clothing	that	they	sold	
and	to	see	what	people	were	buying.		Both	she	and	I	had	never	been	in	Villa	El	
Salvador	and	we	did	not	know	what	to	expect.		We	were	both	ready	for	anything,	
knowing	that	we	were	in	unknown	territory.		There	likely	was	very	little	danger.		
The	way	that	lore	and	truly	harrowing	tales	about	people	being	brutally	robbed	
because	they	wandered	into	the	wrong	neighbourhood	and	met	the	wrong	group	of	
people	mixed	in	our	minds.			
						 Teresa	Caldeira	in	her	excellent	analysis	of	crime	and	segregation	in	Sao	Paulo,	
Brazil	talks	about	how	perceptions	of	violence	as	a	contagion	that	originates	in	
predominantly	working	class	areas	of	the	city	often	work	to	reinforce	both	symbolic	
segregation	(in	the	form	of	prejudices	and	stigmatization)	and	physical	segregation	
(walls,	fences,	etc.)	(2000:53‐101).		As	in	Sao	Paulo,	fear,	especially	that	based	on	
the	symbolic	and	physical	forms	of	segregation,	is	an	effective	barrier	to	meaningful	
social	interaction	between	different	social	classes	in	Lima.		
						 Despite	our	trepidation,	we	got	lost,	which	is	an	accepted	and	not	uncommon	
way	of	arriving	in	many	parts	of	Peru,	and	had	to	ask	directions	from	locals	about	
how	to	get	where	we	were	going.		When	we	did	arrive	we	took	a	motortaxi	—the	
choice	of	short‐range	transportation	in	Lima’s	self‐made	settlements.		This	was	the	
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segment	of	society	in	Lima	with	whom	I	felt	most	comfortable;	however,	at	the	same	
time	I	lived	and	worked	in	circles	that	kept	me	separate	from	them.		A	line	was	
drawn	here	that	became	manifested	in	everything	from	body	language,	fashion,	
music	choice	to	how	people	move	in	the	street.	
						 That	line	between	a	dominant	Creole	culture	and	what	is	referred	to	locally	by	
Peruvian	anthropologist	José	Matos	Mar	(1984)	as	a	“cultura	contestatoria,”	or	
counter‐culture,	for	lack	of	a	better	term	in	English,	has	been	the	subject	of	many	
studies	and	varying	interpretations	(cf.	Portocarrero	et	al.	1993,	Uzzell	1980,	
Mangin	1967).		The	subculture	that	has	emerged	in	developing	cities	has	been	
theorized	as	tactical	resistances	(De	Certeau	1984)	to	an	imposing	order,	or	a	set	of	
practices	that	people	develop	to	negotiate	their	relationships	with	institutions	that	
are	incapable	of	designing	policy	and	institutions	that	are	based	on	a	nuanced	
understanding	of	people’s	behaviour	in	the	real	world.		According	to	this	view,	
people	make	do	with	elements	of	a	dominant	order,	transforming	institutions	and	
practices	to	suit	their	needs.		Depending	on	how	one	looks	at	the	issue	of	popular	
culture	and	practice,	one	can	view	it	as	a	separate	set	of	dispositions	in	constant	flux	
with	dominant	value	systems	(Bourdieu	1984),	or	as	a	population	targeted	for	
insistent	interventions	that	seek	to	form	a	particular	subject	amenable	to	prevailing	
social,	political	and	economic	forces	(Foucault	1991,	1992).		If	this	is	not	enough,	
there	are	those	who	proclaim	the	enterprise	of	popular	classes	as	evidence	that	they	
too	are	oriented	toward	personal	achievement	in	ways	that	are	not	
incommensurable	with	capitalistic	ideals	of	free	enterprise	and	material	reckonings	
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on	the	societal	worth	of	an	individual	(cf.	Adams	and	Valdivia	1991).		Effectively,	we	
move	between	the	most	critical	and	optimistic	of	portrayals.			
					 The	feeling	people	get	as	they	become	more	familiar	with	this	popular	culture	
is	that	all	of	the	various	interpretations	of	popular	culture	contain	an	element	of	
truth.		Nonetheless,	we	must	be	cautious	about	full‐heartedly	supporting	positions	
that	uncritically	laud	the	adaptation	of	rural	dwellers	to	the	urbe.		The	modern	mass	
media	does	not	tire	of	reinforcing	a	divide	between	tradition	and	modernity,	leading	
us	to	believe	that	either	people	are	modern	or	they	are	stuck	in	an	anachronistic	
traditional	way	of	living.		In	other	words,	dominant	cultures	the	world	over	work	to	
stigmatize	difference,	despite	the	exemplary	and	valiant	actions	of	some	to	fight	this	
tendency.		The	survival,	and	dignity,	of	those	from	a	traditional	mode	of	living,	then,	
is	very	much	dependent	on	their	willingness	to	accept	modern	capitalistic	cultural	
ideals.		These	ideals	are	often	local	inflections	of	local	hierarchies	and	complex	
global	connections	with	social	elites	in	other	nations.			
						 Matos	Mar	(2004[1984]),	closer	to	Michel	de	Certeau,	argues	that	migrants	
who	could	not	deal	with	formal	institutions,	or	were	discouraged	from	doing	so	
because	of	a	combination	of	generalized	corruption,	abuse	and	discriminatory	
practices	began	to	form	their	own	institutions.		It	follows	that	more	recent	demands	
for	equality	before	the	law,	full	citizenship,	participation,	transparency,	institutions	
that	work	for	the	people,	decentralization,	fair	taxation,	equal	opportunity	and	a	
general	respect	for	human	rights	are	a	positive	consequence	of	this	counter‐
culture’s	demand	for	fairness	and	dignity	(Matos	Mar	2004[1984]:128‐129).		
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Whether	these	demands	are	being	met	is	certainly	debatable,	but,	as	one	will	see,	
equality	and	dignity	are	certainly	at	the	heart	of	working	class	demands	in	Lima.			
					The	first	impression	that	the	bustle	of	an	urban	outdoor	market	makes	on	a	
person	is	certainly	memorable.		Instead	of	chaos,	which	is	a	common	privileged	
trope	for	describing	the	order	that	migrants	to	Lima	have	(re)created,	I	just	saw	
crammed	repetition,	among	the	curious	stares	that	I	met.		Years	of	classes	where	I	
was	admonished	to	look	beyond	the	surface	for	some	underlying	meaning	no	doubt	
led	to	such	an	appreciation.		I	had	this	feeling	that	if	I	wanted	to	understand	what	it	
meant	to	be	Peruvian,	I	was	not	going	to	know	from	living	like	a	tourist	in	Lima.		
Lima,	as	a	place	occupied	by	people	with	a	wide	range	of	practices,	was	also	what	
was	happening	in	areas	of	the	city	where	migrants,	their	children	and	their	
grandchildren,	and	even	their	great	grandchildren	had	made	new	communities	on	
the	sandy	plains	and	hills	of	the	desert.		I	came	to	realize	that	I	was	not	going	to	get	
far	in	understanding	the	relationship	between	people	in	Lima	if	I	did	not	live	and	get	
to	know	how	people	lived	in	places	like	the	area	surrounding	the	market	in	Villa	El	
Salvador.			
						 I	felt	vulnerable,	lost,	awkward	and	more	exposed	than	I	had	ever	felt	in	my	
whole	life.		I	reckon	now	that	this	discomfort	was	fair	and	instructive.		It	was	fair	
because	what	I	felt	in	certain	moments	was	nothing	compared	to	what	someone	
who	is	perceived	as	poor	and	in	need	of	help	experiences	throughout	their	life.		I	can	
only	begin	to	imagine	how	it	must	feel	to	have	most	authority	figures	and	outsiders	
making	judgements,	often	patronizing,	about	how	you	live	your	life	and	how	you	
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ought	to	live	your	life.		And,	it	was	instructive,	because	like	so	many	anxiety‐	and	
fear‐ridden	experiences	in	life,	when	we	do	confront	them,	they	enrich	our	outlook	
on	life	in	a	way	that	more	distanced	quantitative	and	qualitative	research	methods	
do	not.		In	my	own	way,	I	was	getting	lost	or	losing	my	mind.3		
						 Now,	I	had	realized	what	I	must	do.		I	had	to	gain	knowledge	of	everyday	living	
in	areas	of	Lima	that	had	become	a	housing	alternative	for	the	majority.		I	had	to	find	
people	who	were	willing	and	knowledgeable	about	local	history	to	talk	to	me	about	
what	happened.		Many	people	are,	but	it	is	often	a	matter	of	circumstance	that	
brings	certain	people	into	our	acquaintance.		Getting	acquainted	with	Don	Malvinas	
was	one	such	encounter.		I	was	presented	to	his	group	through	a	mutual	
acquaintance	that	I	met	through	one	of	my	collaborators	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		
When	I	asked	his	group	if	someone	would	be	willing	to	talk	to	me	about	what	had	
happened	in	Pamplona,	his	peers	recommended	him.		He	was	gracious	in	accepting	
his	peers’	recommendation	and	I	am	grateful	that	he	shared	his	perspective	on	local	
history	with	me.	
																																																								
3	I	am	referring	to	an	essay	by	Walter	Benjamin	where	he	argues	that	in	order	to	know	a	city,	one	
must	lose	oneself	(Benjamin	2005[1932]).		Similarly,	anthropologist	Johannes	Fabian	in	his	analysis	
of	European	epistemological	practices	in	Africa	during	the	19th	and	20th	centuries	documents	the	
absurdity	of	a	more	detached	objective	stance	in	data	collection	that	occurred	during	the	colonial	
period	(Fabian	2000).		He	encourages	anthropologists	to	lose	their	minds,	in	a	positive	sense,	
eschewing	the	trappings	of	detached,	impersonal	observation.		Elsewhere,	he	questions	the	denial	of	
synchronous	experiences	between	anthropologists	and	their	research	objects,	arguing	that	inter‐
human	research	is	an	intersubjective	experience	(Fabian	1983).		A	collection	of	essays	edited	by	
historian	James	Clifford	and	anthropologist	George	E.	Marcus	effectively	explore	the	objectivist	
tradition	and	its	historical	genesis,	troubling	the	belief	that	what	anyone	does	in	cultural	
representation	is	anything	but	objective.		Since	all	representations	are	subjective,	the	truth	of	an	
interpretation	should	rest	with	the	ability	of	those	who	are	represented	to	see	their	truth	in	that	
work,	not	in	the	authority	of	the	work	and	the	compiler	of	that	work.		The	authority	of	the	expert	
must	be	vulnerable	to	the	scrutiny	of	the	public.		This	work	is,	therefore,	my	subjective	interpretation	
of	events	that	have	occurred	in	an	imagined	space	called	Lima.		The	value	of	this	project	depends	in	
large	part	upon	the	responses	it	will	generate.		I	therefore	take	the	position	espoused	by	
anthropologists	George	E.	Marcus	and	Michael	Fischer	when	they	maintain	that	anthropology	should	
be	considered	a	form	of	cultural	critique	(1986).		
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						 If	you	were	to	find	someone	willing	to	talk	to	you	who	had	been	actively	
involved	in	his	community	(it	could	equally	be	a	she)	they	would	get	a	testimony	
something	like	what	follows.		Some	elements	are	no	doubt	typical	and	shared,	
whereas	others	may	reflect	the	speaker’s	political	convictions,	gendered	experience,	
age,	generation,	etc.		I	urge	my	reader	to	read	between	the	lines	of	his	testimony,	
because	how	he	perceives	his	plight	and	how	he	positions	himself	and	others	in	his	
position	in	relation	to	authority	and	state	institutions	will	bear	some	relevance	later	
in	this	chapter	and	in	those	that	follow.		I	would	like	to	start	with	his	voice	in	this	
chapter	then	work	into	the	various	scholarly	compilations	that	seek	to	understand	
what	has	happened	in	his	neighbourhood	and	neighbourhoods	like	his.		I	am	
especially	interested	in	the	tone	that	Don	Malvinas	uses	and	his	personalization	of	
the	changes	that	have	occurred	in	his	neighbourhood.		Let	us	look	at	Don	Malvinas’	
account,	or	at	least	a	part	of	it.	
D.M.:	The	history	of	here,	of	our	country,	above	all,	of	this	place,	born	of	the	
surge	of	marginal	zones,	starts	with	more	force	in	1940	and	onward,	because	
the	hacienda	owners,	the	landowners	from	the	Andes,	did	not	permit	the	
children	of	peasants	to	study	in	schools	because	they	knew	that	they	would	
see	with	better	clarity	how	unjust	it	was,	that	they	were	being	exploited	in	a	
brutal	way.	
Therefore,	what	happened,	the	only	hope	of	children	and	youth	of	that	time	
was	to	immigrate	to	Lima	to	big	cities	like	Trujillo,	Arequipa,	Cuzco,	Huancayo.		
So,	those	spaces	began	to	become	overpopulated.	
And,	what	happened	here	in	Lima,	above	all,	is	that	Lima	started	to	receive	an	
enormous	flow	of	emigrants	from	the	interior	of	the	country,	who	came	from	
the	four	cardinal	points.		And,	there	was	already	no	housing.	
Housing	and	jobs	began	to	become	scarce.		So,	what	happened?		They	started	
to	practically	organize	themselves	in	groups	to	figure	out	how	to	survive	and	
where	to	find	spaces	to	live.				
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And,	in	1954,	four	groups,	led	by	a	man,	López	Agreda,	the	famous	“one‐legged	
Agreda,”	and	Aldave	Paredes,	decide	to	invade	the	sands	of	the	South;	and	on	
the	24th	of	December	of	1954,	they	invaded	what	is,	what	is	today	called	
Ciudad	de	Díos,	giving	birth	to	the	district	of	San	Juan	de	Miraflores.	
And	according	to	the	history	of	that	time,	the	invasion	swelled	to	up	to	ten	
thousand	people,	where	practically,	and	that	was	the	hard	part,	they	did	not	
have	any	type	of	amenities.		There	was	no	water,	sewage.		Nothing.		Not	one	of	
those	amenities,	not	even	electricity,	nothing.		They	were	only	provisioned	
with	sticks	and	reed	matting.	
According	to	what	people	say,	around	ten	thousand	invaded,	but	in	1956,	
when	General	Manuel	Odría,	who	was	President	at	that	time,	built	a	thousand	
houses	here	in	Ciudad	de	Díos	only	800	stayed,	leaving	200	houses	empty.		
Almost	nobody	wanted	to	come.	
Later,	after	that,	the	flow	of	provincial	migrants	coming	to	Lima	continued	and	
people	started	to	spill	over	[from	inner	city	tenements	and	other	peripheral	
settlements].		There	was	no	housing.		People	saturate	one	area,	so	they	start	
looking	for	another.		Housing	becomes	scarce,	it	is	insufficient,	all	[livable	
spaces]	are	occupied.	
So,	then,	in	1964,	until	that	date,	until	1963,	there	was	only	Ciudad	de	Díos	and	
Pamplona	Baja.		Pamplona	Alta	was	unoccupied.	
B.R.:	And	in	Pamplona	Baja	there	were	only	basic	nuclei	[of	houses]?	
D.M.:	Yes,	in	the	lower	part,	yes	there	were	basic	nuclei.		They	gave	a	basic	
housing	unit	[that	of	a	sites	and	services	model]	that	was	administered	by	
EMADE.	
B.R.:	And	how	was	that?	
D.M.:	It	was	a	house	at	the	back,	a	lot	of	180m?.		At	the	back,	where	the	garden	
was	going	to	be,	there	was	a	basic	dwelling,	like	a	bull	ring,	or,	rectangular,	
split	in	the	middle.		That	was	a	basic	dwelling.		They	left	the	front	part	open	so	
that	they	could	continue	building.	
That	was	Pamplona	Baja,	everything	that	was	Ciudad	de	Dios	and	Pamplona	
Baja.		Pamplona	Alta	was	totally	free.		On	the	28th	of	May,	1963,	Tacora	caught	
fire,	which	is	an	avenue	between	la	Parada	and	Aviación	Ave.,	which	was	
between	Aviación	and	2	de	Mayo	Hospital,	which	is	on	Grau	Ave.	
B.R.:	I	have	been	there	to	buy	furniture…	
D.M.:	Yes,	so,	the	mayor	of	Lima	then	was	Dr.	Luis	Bedoya	Reyes.		So,	then,	he	
wanted	to	unite	the	roads,	build	some	roads	to	connect	Aviación	with	Grau,	but	
informal	entrepreneurs,	from	blocks	3	and	4	did	not	want	to	leave	and	on	the	
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28th	of	May,	1963	a	fire	started.		Everything	was	burnt.		[The	commercial	area]	
caught	fire	and	the	occupants	left,	and	Dr.	Bedoya	Reyes	could	make	his	road.		
But,	because	of	that,	people	were	transported	to	that	part	of	Pamplona	Alta	
[that	was	unpopulated].		The	sectors	of	Nuevo	Horizonte	and	28	de	Mayo	were	
the	first	settlements	in	Pamplona	Alta.		That	happened	in	January	of	1964.	
Seeing	them	located	there,	those	people,	those	dwellings,	those	people	who	
were	living	in	Ciudad	de	Díos	thought	that	it	was	an	invasion	and	on	the	6th	of	
January…	
B.R.:	Why	did	they	think	that?	
D.M.:		On	the	6th	of	January	of	1965,	they	invaded	the	sands	of	San	Francisco	de	
la	Cruz.		I	don’t	know	if	you	have	seen	the	hill	in	the	distance,	where	Christ	the	
Redeemer	is?			There,	there	was	a	cross.	
They	invaded	those	sands.		They	passed	word	that	there	was	an	invasion.		At	
that	time,	I	lived	in	Breña	district	[near	the	center	of	colonial	Lima].		A	family	
member	passed	word	to	me	and	I	too	came.		The	rent	was	expensive	and	work	
was	getting	scarce.		No.		There	was	no	way	to	be	able	to	pay	anymore	and	I	
came	to	invade	in	San	Francisco	de	la	Cruz.	
In	1966,	the	lots	were	surveyed	in	this	zone.		But,	because	it	is	very	
treacherous	it	belonged	at	that	time	to	San	Francisco	de	la	Cruz	[it	was	not	an	
independent	sector	where	he	moved	because	it	lacked	the	conditions	to	make	
it	a	central	population	centre].			
The	National	Housing	Committee	(Junta	Nacional	de	Vivienda),	said:	“No.		We	
are	going	to	survey	lots	up	until	the	half‐way	mark	because	higher	up	it	is	
going	to	be	impossible	to	have	electricity	and	water.		It	can’t	be	done.		So,	you	
are	going	to	stay	in	the	lower	part.”		They	destined	us	for	this	side	where,	Los	
Laureles,	Los	Buenos	Milagros	y	Virgen	de	Buen	Paso	would	be.	
But,	people	did	not	want	to.		They	said:	“No.	That	is	a	pig‐sty.”		Because	they	
raised	pigs	where	the	Rinconada	is	now.		That	was	where	they	raised	pigs,	no,	
swine.		
People	revolted.	So	the	National	Housing	Committee	surveyed	this	zone,	that	
was	the	lowest	and	flattest	and	at	that	time,	in	1967.		In	January	of	1967,	we	
moved	into	that	zone,	not	as	invaders,	but	as	surveyed	dwelling	holders.		In	
spite	of	that,	we	were	always	without	any	type	of	amenities	‐no	water,	no	
electricity,	none	of	those	things.		So,	we	separated	from	San	Francisco	de	la	
Cruz.		And,	now	that	we	were	separated	from	San	Francisco,	there	was	also	28	
de	Mayo	and	Nuevo	Horizonte.		We	were	totally	separated.		
So,	El	Brillante,	those	who	lived	here	then,	we	decided	to	separate,	to	make	our	
own	organization	to	administer	and	find	a	solution	to	our	necessities.	
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B.R.:	That	is,	before	you	were	part	of	San	Francisco	de	la	Cruz?	
D.M.:	Yes,	we,	el	Brillante,	are	descendents	of	San	Francisco	de	la	Cruz.		
B.R.:	But,	spatially,	no,	but	only	by	descent,	is	that	correct?	
D.M.:	So,	from	there,	we	tried	to	separate.		We	said:	“They	know	that	it	is	done	
practically.		They	can’t	[do	anything]	because	there	are	other	sectors	and	they	
too…			.”		So,	what	happened?		We	decided	to	separate,	but	with	one	condition,	
to	try	and	make	all	efforts	to	satisfy	our	needs	ourselves	and	try	to	eradicate	
the	paternalism	that	we	were	always	used	to:	leaving	the	government,	the	
state,	to	do	everything,	to	extend	our	hand.		
B.R.:	Or,	the	church…	
D.M.:	So	we	said:	“You	know	what?		We	are	going	to	start	to	work	here	to	find	a	
solution,	to	meet	our	needs:	electricity,	water,	all	of	that.		We	need	[these	
things].		So,	we	are	going	to	present	projects,	save	our	money,	and,	well,	make	
them	do	our	projects.”	
But,	first,	when	we	came	here,	in	the	quicksand,	no	vehicle	would	enter	to	
leave	us	water,	and	people	had	to	walk	below,	the	young	women	and	married	
women,	to	Pamplona	Baja,	to	Ciudad	de	Díos,	to	bring	water	in	a	bucket.	
So,	our	first	task	was:	You	know	what?		We	are	going	to	pack	the	roads.		So,	we	
went	to	the	Ministry	of	Public	Works	(Ministerio	de	Fomento).		We	voiced	our	
demands	to	the	Ministry	saying:	“You	know	what?		You	have	the	vehicles	
resting	Saturdays	and	Sundays,	so	we	want	you	to	help	us.		We	are	going	to	
pay	you:	pay	the	gas,	and	we	are	going	to	give	lunch	to	the	workers.			We	want	
you	to	collaborate	with	your	machines	to	pack	our	streets.”		We	said	this	so	
that	the	Ministry	would	accept	it.		So,	on	Saturdays	and	Sundays	they	began	to	
asphalt	everything,	to	pack,	to	spread	crushed	stone	on	all	the	streets.		It	was	
like	this	that	we	were	the	first	sector	to	pack	our	streets,	all	of	our	streets,	so	
that	the	cistern	truck	could	enter.	
Now	that	we	had	our	water,	we	made	our	cisterns.		We	had	water	in	cisterns.		
After,	from	there,	we	began	to	do	the	paperwork	for	the	electricity,	so	that	they	
would	install	electricity,	water	and	sewers.	
But,	at	that	time,	seeing	us	here,	and	Alfonso	Ugarte;	12	de	Noviembre,	Miguel	
Grau,	Ollantay,	Leoncio	Prado,	Los	Buenos	Milagros,	Virgen	del	Buen	Paso,	16	
sectors	in	total	started	or	were	born.					
What	happened	at	that	time	was	that	an	organization	of	the	state	called	
SINAMOS,	National	System	of	Social	Revolution	[National	System	of	Social	
Movement]	was	functional.		So,	we	went	to	present	our	projects,	each	sector,	
separately.	
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So,	Monseigneur	Bambarén	suggested	and	said	to	us:	“It	is	going	to	be	difficult	
and	in	small	groups	the	projects	are	going	to	be	more	expensive.		Better	yet,	
why	don’t	you	unite,	organize,	create	a	macro‐sectorial	organization,	and,	then,	
this	organization	can	present	the	water	project,	the	electricity	project	and	
sewers	on	behalf	of	everyone.”		We	did	it	like	this.		We	joined	together	in	a	
General	Central	Committee	and	we	presented	one	electricity	project	led	by	the	
Secretary	General	of	the	General	Central	Committee	of	Pamplona	Alta.		We	
started	with	electricity,	then	water,	then	sewers.	
To	do	that	we	united	with	…	they	recognized	us	in	1974,	recognized	the	
unification	of	Pamplona	Alta,	with	16	sectors,	duly	identified.		From	there,	
Pamplona	Alta	has	grown	more	and	more.		Not	by	invasion	anymore,	but	
expanding,	expanding,	expanding,	with	expansions	for	the	children	of	
landowners	from	there,	from	the	previous	owners	of	lots.		They	had	their	
children,	or	other	families	came.		They	expanded,	expanded	to	the	point	that	
now,	I	think,	Pamplona	now	has	75	sectors.																																																																																			 																				
(Don	Malvinas,	Interview	recorded	on	June	3,	2010)	
	
						 When	I	listened	to	Don	Malvinas’	story,	told	within	the	community	library	in	El	
Brillante,	Pamplona,	I	thought	about	the	other	stories	that	people	had	told	me	about	
their	experiences	in	Pamplona	and	the	published	studies	that	made	Pamplona	the	
field	of	their	study	(cf.	Anderson	2002,	Altamirano	1988,	Burns	1994,	Riofrio	1980,	
Riofrio	and	Driant	1987).			These	stories	can	fit	into	a	larger	group	of	stories	that	I	
will	discuss	shortly.		When	I	began	to	reflect	upon	these	stories,	especially	after	the	
realization	that	tens	of	thousands	of	people	had	their	stories	in	Pamplona,	I	thought	
about	what	a	story	is,	who	it	belongs	to	and	why	they	told	that	story.		We	might	
more	accurately	think	of	these	stories	as	narratives,	that	succeed	or	not,	garnering	
precious	time	in	the	social	spotlight.		Each	narrative	belongs	to	its	time	or	times,	
depending	on	how	one	parses	time,	and	is	in	dialogue	with	other	narratives,	
drawing	from	one	another,	in	effect	(cf.	Bakhtin	1981).		This	makes	the	task	of	
interpreting	these	narratives	a	difficult	one.		We	may	wonder	why	people	include	
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what	they	do	and	omit	other	details;	yet,	we	only	get	a	sense	of	what	details	may	be	
omitted	by	reading,	listening,	and,	if	we	are	doing	ethnographic	work,	immersing	
ourselves	in	the	worlds	of	people	with	whom	we	work.		Even	then,	as	the	reader	will	
see,	our	understanding	remains	partial.	
						 It	should,	therefore,	be	striking	to	come	across	narratives	that	purport	to	hold	
a	general	truth	or	superior	interpretation	that	excludes	the	multiplicity	of	voices	
that	exist	at	a	particular	time,	or	that	works	to	silence	some	elements	of	
commentary	in	a	social	context	while	elevating	others.		Much	more	worrisome	is	it	
when	these	narratives	become	prescriptive,	as	we	will	see	shortly.			
						 Mikhail	Bakhtin	elaborates	on	such	interplay	of	voices	and	differentiates	
between	two	tendencies,	one	centripetal,	pulling	all	voices	toward	it,	and	the	other	
centrifugal,	working	against	the	homogenizing	tendencies	of	centripetal	force	
(Bakhtin	2006[1981]:272–273).		Narratives,	like	that	of	Don	Malvinas	tend	to	
simultaneously	work	against	and	be	scavenged	by	authoritative	sources	about	what	
happened	in	Pamplona.		As	we	will	see,	threads	of	his	narrative,	like	the	resilience	
and	ingenuity	of	settlers,	are	often	picked	up	by	academics	and	politicians	who	seek	
to	promote	a	particular	vision	of	the	world.		Nonetheless,	judging	by	the	cynicism	of	
many	of	my	collaborators,	this	vision	and	its	promise	of	progress	is	not	accepted	
uncritically.		That	said,	there	does	not	seem	to	be	much	choice	in	the	matter.			
						 Bakhtin	referred	to	the	phenomenon	of	multiple	voices	existing	
simultaneously	in	the	discourse	of	a	single	person	as	heteroglossia.		Heteroglossia	
is:		
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…another’s	speech	in	another’s	language,	serving	to	express	authorial	
intentions	but	in	a	refracted	way.		Such	speech	constitutes	a	special	type	of	
double‐voiced	discourse.		It	serves	two	speakers	at	the	same	time	and	
expresses	simultaneously	two	different	intentions:	the	direct	intention	of	the	
character	who	is	speaking,	and	the	refracted	intention	of	the	author	(Bakhtin	
2006[1981]:324).	
	
						 We	can	often	find	this	double‐voiced	discourse	—that	where	the	speaker	plays	
on	the	implicit	understanding	of	a	second	group—	in	the	use	of	irony,	for	example.		
So,	one	person	could	be	aware	of	what	was	being	said	while	another	remained	in	the	
dark.		The	concept	of	different	voices	becomes	more	applicable	to	our	case	when	
Bakhtin	goes	on	to	discuss	its	implications	for	politics	and	ideology.		He	states:	
The	tendency	to	assimilate	others’	discourse	takes	on	an	even	deeper	and	
more	basic	significance	in	an	individual’s	ideological	becoming,	in	the	most	
fundamental	sense.		Another’s	discourse	performs	here	no	longer	as	
information,	directions,	rules,	models	and	so	forth	–but	strives	rather	to	
determine	the	very	bases	of	our	behaviour;	it	performs	here	as	authoritative	
discourse,	and	an	internally	persuasive	discourse	(2006[1981]:342).	
	
						 For	Bakhtin	these	two	discourses	were	engaged	in	a	constant	dialectic,	such	
that	personality	was	formed	in	the	space	between	an	imposing	voice	and	one	that	
“was	denied	all	privilege,	backed	up	by	no	authority	at	all,	and	is	frequently	not	even	
acknowledged	by	society	(not	by	public	opinion,	not	by	scholarly	norms,	nor	by	
criticism),	not	even	in	legal	code.”		He	continues	to	elaborate,	then,	on	the	character	
of	authoritative	discourse,	describing	it	with	adjectives	such	as	static,	dead,	
complete,	magisterial,	sharply	demarcated,	etc.		Yet,	it	still	possesses	this	ability	to	
organize	around	itself	great	masses	of	other	types	of	discourses	(Bakhtin	
1981[2006]:342‐343).	
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						 What	I	would	like	to	take	from	Bakhtin	is	his	idea	of	ideologies	functioning	
through	the	casting	and	recasting	of	voices.		I	think	it	is	very	apt	when	we	talk	about	
development	processes.		However,	I	want	to	modify	authoritative	discourse,	pulling	
a	bit	from	Antonio	Gramsci’s	notion	of	the	importance	of	consensus	in	hegemonic	
projects	(1971[2003]:12‐13).		Authoritative	discourse	draws	in	different	voices,	
including	them	in	its	corpus	to	appeal	to,	if	not	cajole	the	masses	into	participating	
in	its	vision,	making	coercion	less	necessary.		As	such,	it	is	by	no	means	static	or	
dead,	but	very	dynamic.	
						 Not	only	the	voices	of	people	like	Don	Malvinas,	but	their	physical	presence	is	
often	borrowed	in	the	mass	media.4		They	regularly	applaud	their	achievements,	
shed	their	tears	publicly	for	their	privations,	and	are	congratulated	for	making	their	
appearance	in	the	social	spotlight.		The	struggle	to	progress	has	very	much	become	
a	media	spectacle,	with	media	attention	and	work	directing	much	energy	to	those	
who	adhere	to	neoliberal	notions	of	individual	enterprise	to	achieve	financial	
wellbeing.										
						 What	I	hope	to	demonstrate	in	this	analysis	is	that	projects	that	posit	an	
alternative	future	outcome	to	present	actions	are	always	a	utopic	project.		When	
Thomas	More	first	wrote	his	Utopia	—an	ironic	play	on	words,	the	translation	from	
Latin	being	closer	to	No	Place	because	of	the	idyllic	functioning	of	the	island	nation	
described	by	More—	the	notion	that	any	vision	of	society	where	social	unity	and	
																																																								
4	This	strategy	is	common	practice	in	national	television	programs	in	Peru.		If	one	were	to	go	to	a	
media	archive	for	the	past	five	or	six	decades	they	would	have	ample	footage	to	elaborate	numerous	
studies	on	this	train	of	thought.	
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community	could	be	envisioned	as	an	operating	principle	became	a	thing	of	fantasy	
(More	2012[1516]).		Utopia	eventually	came	to	refer	to	a	vision	of	a	society	that	is	
hopelessly	unrealistic,	contrary	to	the	idea	of	an	enlightened	society	that	More	
envisioned.		I	would	like	to	consider	the	writings	of	free	market	pundits	as	utopic	
texts	in	the	sense	that	critics	of	a	more	humanistic	society	have	come	to	define	it.			In	
other	words,	leaving	this	world	at	the	will	of	market	forces	that	seek	to	extract	
profits	for	an	elite	destitutes	and	dehumanizes	the	majority	of	human	beings.		That	
it	will	bring	peace,	unity,	and	justice	is	utopic	in	the	perverted	sense	that	the	word	
has	now	taken.	
					 Presently,	the	notion	that	there	could	be	a	just	society	seems	outlandish.		
Human	beings,	as	conventional	wisdom	would	hold,	are	driven	by	a	combination	of	
greed,	lust	and	power.		How	did	such	a	horrific	and	cynical	view	of	humanity	come	
about?		But,	how	is	it	that	voices,	so	specific	in	detail,	do	not	find	a	place	in	public	
discourse?		They	do,	however	insofar	as	they	are	refracted	and	incorporated	into	
authoritative	renderings	of	how	society	is	operating	and	ought	to	operate.		In	the	
following	chapter,	I	will	give	another	example	of	how	not	just	what	people	say,	but	
people’s	behaviour	in	trying	circumstances	was	recast	as	a	solution	to	the	housing	
problems	of	a	growing	Lima.	
						 As	I	listened	to	Don	Malvinas	and	others,	I	wondered	how	much	a	story	had	to	
be	made	up	of	verifiable	“facts”	for	it	to	be	recognized	as	having	“objective”	weight.		
Was	his	version	rigorous	enough?		I	wondered	what	his	voice,	what	the	voice	of	
many	could	say	would	differ	from	and	complement	scholarly	research.		His	reason	
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for	why	people	came	to	Lima	was	too	general	to	be	true	for	everyone,	yet	he	was	
saying	something	that	he	wanted	me	to	understand	that	was	true	for	him	and	
certainly	others.		My	daily	conversations	and	observations	lead	me	to	believe	that	
the	peasants’	emancipation	from	the	whims	of	social	superiors	was	far	from	being	
won	in	Lima.		Nonetheless,	there	is	a	feeling	of	having	triumphed	over	odds	that	
must	have	been	daunting	for	the	first	pioneers	who	struck	out	into	the	desert	below	
where	Don	Malvinas	lived	in	1954.		He	evoked	images	of	this	struggle	by	
emphasizing	the	austerity	of	these	pioneers:	they	had	nothing	but	“sticks	and	reed	
matting.”		His	notion	of	progress	seemed	to	be	based	on	overcoming	immediate	
obstacles	that	ensured	the	well‐being	of	his	family	and	community	in	a	new	place.					
						 There	appeared	to	be	various	discourses	at	work	in	the	narrative	of	Don	
Malvinas.		The	struggle	against	rural	oppression	could	very	well	have	been	a	Marxist	
discourse	adapted	to	the	Andean	context	and	somehow	now	part	of	the	urban	
environment.		At	the	same	time,	the	struggle	against	oppressive	forces	is	no	doubt	a	
timeless	discourse	that	finds	its	words	from	time	to	time,	coalescing	into	popular	
movements	–the	foil	to	Bakhtin’s	internally	persuasive	discourse.		There	were	
elements	of	a	position	espoused	by	many	whereby	disenfranchised	people	had	
overcome	odds,	uniting	to	make	a	living	in	the	city.		The	media,	specifically	those	
sources	partial	to	the	message	of	neoliberal	notions	of	individual	achievement,	have	
been	very	capable	when	it	comes	to	picking	up	on	working	class	triumphalism,	
echoing	it	back	to	them	to	coax	them	on,	downplaying	the	criticisms,	twisting	words	
around	to	cajole	people	into	active	collusion,	incessantly	bombarding	them	with	
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success	stories	of	those	who	have	overcome	poverty	due	to	their	relentless	
entrepreneurial	spirit.	
						 The	starting	point	for	Don	Malvinas’	narrative	is	provincial	life.		While	
academic	analyses	tend	to	emphasize	droughts,	the	draw	of	urban	jobs	and	an	
imagined	space	of	opportunity	in	the	city	(Paerregaard	1997,	Lobo	1982),	the	loss	of	
land	and	livelihood	(Smith	1988)	and	even	cultural	archipelagos	(Colloredo‐
Mansfeld	1999)	that	are	part	of	a	centuries	old	subsistence	strategy,	the	move	to	the	
city,	like	Don	Malvinas’s	narrative	on	the	struggles	faced	by	his	community,	was	an	
emancipatory	movement.		But,	it	was	certainly	one	that	meant	people’s	traditional	
practices	had	to	undergo	dramatic	change.		It	seemed	more	like	another	voice	came	
to	habitate	his	mind	alongside	that	of	the	social	revolutionary.		The	revolution	
seemed	to	be	primarily	about	gaining	more	access	to	the	material	possessions	and	
means	to	social	advancement	that	constitute	a	modernist	society.		The	only	path	to	
liberty	in	this	new	context	was,	ironically,	through	competition	and	accumulation	at	
the	expense	of	others.	
						 Somehow,	in	all	the	talk	about	why	people	were	moving,	much	analysis	tended	
to	deny	the	subjective	truths	of	people	who	were	living	development	processes	in	
the	developing	world.		There	were,	of	course,	exceptions	of	sorts	to	the	normal	
paternalistic	interventions,	and,	as	we	will	see,	the	solution	to	the	problem	of	Third	
World	poverty	was	a	subject	of	much	inquiry	in	Peru	and	elsewhere.		The	moral	
tone	of	the	assessments	of	poverty	is	important	because	they	work	to	impart	a	
moral	imperative	on	development	processes	–people	are	good	if	they	accept	the	
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status	quo	and	the	promised	benefit	of	following	the	prescriptive	behaviours	that	
bring	about	general	progress.		How	people	come	to	view	progress,	however,	is	
circumstantial,	as	we	can	see	from	Don	Malvinas,	yet	it	still	adheres	to	larger	
societal	projects.			
						 But,	it	is	not	as	simple	as	saying	that	people	are	inculcated	into	behaving	the	
way	a	political	and	economic	elite	desires	them	to	behave.		Don	Malvinas	details	the	
daily	struggles	of	people	in	Pamplona.		When	they	were	denied	education,	as	a	
means	of	more	advantageously	managing	their	rural	position	vís‐a‐vís	hacienda	
owners,	they	sought	it	elsewhere.		When	they	got	to	the	city	in	search	of	a	better	life,	
they	were	confronted	with	a	struggle	for	both	work	and	housing.		This	forced	them	
to	work	together,	no	doubt	putting	aside	regional	and	cultural	differences.		When	
they	organized	themselves	and	then	set	out	to	seek	housing,	it	was	inadequate.		This	
inadequacy	led	to	decades	of	political	mobilization	and	solicitations	to	ministers	and	
ministries	to	lend	them	machinery	or	to	divert	public	funding	to	their	community.		
Yet,	not	all	is	struggle	and	strife.		What	is	common	in	Don	Malvinas’	rendition	of	
events	over	the	past	decades	with	many	people	in	Pamplona,	starting	with	his	
arrival	in	Pamplona	in	1964,	is	a	narrative	of	struggle	and	successive	victory,	thanks	
in	large	part	to	the	solidarity	of	people.			
					 Not	all	foreground	their	prior	exploitation.		Others,	like	a	local	founder	who	
played	an	important	role	in	the	maintenance	of	her	sector	park,	told	how	short	visits	
to	family	in	Lima	turned	into	a	desire	for	a	permanent	stay,	for	instance,	choosing	
not	to	couch	her	narrative	in	revolutionary	terms.		Her	landowning	family	in	the	
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North	did	not	have	the	same	economic	privations	as	other	migrants	to	Lima	had.		If	
there	were	more	people	present	when	Don	Malvinas	spoke,	they	would	pick	up	on	
threads	of	his	narrative	and	add	their	own	experiences,	nod	in	agreement,	and	beam	
with	pride.		Nonetheless,	there	would	be	those	who	would	likely	have	an	aversion	to	
certain	elements	of	his	story,	detecting	the	sympathies	for	General	Velasco’s	
corporatist	state	model	at	later	points	in	his	narrative.		We	must,	hence,	be	
conscious	of	the	differences	in	origins	and	how	they	contribute	to	the	narrative	that	
people	will	publicly	adopt.			
						 This	story	is	woven	into	the	fabric	of	people’s	lives	here,	in	their	canteen	and	
market	talk,	in	their	talk	with	strangers	too.		There	is	a	profound	sense	that	people	
here	have	made	the	lives	that	they	and	their	families	now	have	in	the	city	by	
working	against	paternalism,	demonstrating	that	they	can	do	it	on	their	own.		To	put	
it	another	way:	people	are	defiant	about	how	they	bring	about	their	own	
incorporation	into	a	modernist	state.					
						 Just	as	intellectuals	draw	lines	between	liberal,	populist,	national	
revolutionary	governments	and	neoliberal	times,	people	draw	their	own	lines.		The	
“state”	never	seems	to	do	enough.		If	it	did,	curiously,	it	was	during	the	well‐
remembered	dictatorships	of	Manuel	Odría,	Juan	Velasco,	or	more	recently	Alberto	
Fujimori.		That	all	of	these	governments	should	be	lumped	together	is	telling,	for	it	
suggests	to	people	that	governments	which	are	productive	have	to	be	authoritarian,	
and	that	there	must	be	physical	improvements	in	infrastructure	for	a	government	to	
have	been	perceived	as	effective	(no	opportunity	is	lost	to	remind	the	public	of	
	 62
these	works	through	inauguration	ceremonies,	plaques	and	naming	ceremonies),	
regardless	of	the	ideological	leanings	of	the	government	(from	corporatist	to	
neoliberal).		The	state,	in	this	sense,	is	fetishized,	despite	the	fact	that	at	least	the	
leaders	of	communities	have	an	idea	of	how	to	lobby	national	government	
ministries.			
						 It	was	not	uncommon	to	hear	collaborators	of	different	social	classes	comment	
that	what	is	needed	nowadays	is	a	strong	leader	who	rules	with	an	iron	fist.		People	
often	make	this	remark	when	discussing	delinquency,	drug	use	among	the	youth,	
generalized	corruption	and	egotism.		There	is	a	strong	impression	that	the	only	time	
things	get	done	on	a	national	scale	is	when	there	is	a	unilateral	idea	of	what	needs	to	
get	done,	with	dissident	elements	being	suppressed.		I	will	have	more	to	say	about	
this	sentiment	when	I	discuss	the	backdrop	to	the	invasion	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada.						
						 In	spite	of	this	prevalent	sentiment	that	says	central	executive	power	is	
productive,	Don	Malvinas	tells	his	history,	where	the	protagonists	are	neighbours	
who	overcome	political	hurdles	to	constitute	a	community.		He	creates	a	discursive	
world	where	the	outsiders	are	politicians,	planners	and	well‐intentioned	
professionals.		He	tells	how	people	came	together	and	how	they	have	eventually	
come	to	redefine	their	struggle.		People	talk	about	how	everyone	in	Pamplona	are	
provincianos5	and	how	much	they	have	all	had	to	endure	over	the	years.		Yet,	as	we	
																																																								
5	Being	a	provinciano,	or	one	from	the	provinces,	is	something	like	being	country	folk	as	opposed	to	
being	city	folk.		Country	folk	are	usually	humbler,	less	ambitious,	honest,	hard	working,	cooperative,	
forthcoming	and	they	maintain	a	moral	order	that	contrasts	with	Creole	culture,	which	is	viewed	as	
lazy,	passive,	venal,	sordid,	opportunistic	and	individualistic.		This	opposition	has	been	widely	
commented	upon	by	anthropologists	(cf.	Lobo	1982	or	Adams	and	Valdivia	1991).		Blacks,	the	
Chinese,	the	Japanese,	Italians,	people	from	the	jungle	and	other	ethnic	or	cultural	groups,	constitute	
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see	in	the	brief	history	of	Don	Malvinas,	everyone	owes	some	devotion	to	their	
sector,	to	their	community,	communities	within	in	a	city,	communities	that	link	with	
other	communities	petitioning	the	abstract	and	Kafkesque	workings	of	a	modernist	
Peruvian	state	(both	municipal	and	national	government	ministries).				
						 It	is	appropriate	to	precede	a	chapter	on	the	background	of	Pamplona	with	the	
recollections	of	one	of	the	earlier	founders.		In	many	ways,	Don	Malvinas’	version	is	
one	that	has	been	tempered	in	his	own	experience	and	participation	in	community	
politics.		It	is	an	insider’s	view	of	a	phenomenon	that	has	captured	outsider	
attention	since	the	mid‐fifties,	at	least.		As	we	read	through	his	narrative	we	see	how	
one	group	of	people	worked	together	to	develop	their	neighbourhood,	benefitting	
from	the	guidance	of	everyone	from	archbishops	to	social	revolutionaries,	
petitioning	the	government	for	support	to	build	the	infrastructure	that	would	
provide	their	community	with	the	amenities	that	formal	housing	projects	possess	as	
a	rule	of	thumb.		In	many	ways,	leaders	of	these	communities	took	an	active	role	in	
their	own	development	working	with	outsiders	who	brought	their	knowledge	and	
experience	to	bear	on	the	situation	in	places	like	Pamplona.			
						 But,	how	was	it	that	these	communities,	as	Don	Malvinas	details	them,	had	to	
organize	themselves	and	then	use	their	resources	to	complete	these	essential	
																																																																																																																																																																					
a	local	folklore	of	behavioral	types	that	have	their	corresponding	prejudices.		The	category	
provinciano	was	often	extended	to	include	multiple	generations	over	vast	areas	(San	Juan,	in	my	
case),	with	people	collapsing	differences	at	times	claiming	that	everyone	in	areas	like	the	one	that	I	
was	studying	were	provincianos.		In	a	similar	manner,	people	would	say	that	everyone	is	a	cholo,	a	
term	usually	reserved	for	progressive	indigenous	migrants	from	the	Andes	in	the	1950s.		Racial	
differences,	despite	the	insistence	that	they	actually	exist,	are	frequently	downplayed	just	as	much	by	
the	same	people	with	a	popular	refrain	that	in	Peru	“Quien	no	tiene	de	indio,	tiene	de	Mandingo.”		This	
translates	roughly	as:	One	that	doesn’t	have	Indian,	has	African	ancenstry.		In	other	words,	nobody	is	
pure	blooded	in	a	country	like	Peru.											
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projects?		How	did	such	a	relationship	come	about	and	how	did	it	change	over	the	
decades	since	the	initial	Christmas	invasion	of	Ciudad	de	Dios	that	would	form	the	
spark	of	the	southward	advance	of	the	growth	of	Lima?		To	understand	this	we	will	
have	to	explore	the	relationship	between	earlier	studies	in	the	shantytowns	of	Peru	
and	the	relationship	that	they	had	to	developing	policy	alternatives	toward	
shantytowns	and	self‐help	housing	in	particular.		At	the	same	time,	I	want	to	
consider	how	the	“here”	of	Don	Malvinas	was	represented	by	intellectuals.		Who	
were	these	people	to	them?		From	there,	we	can	try	to	put	the	pieces	together	to	
figure	out	what	kind	of	transformations	were	occurring	in	Pamplona	over	
successive	decades.		
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Chapter 3 —The Rise of Self-help Housing in Lima 
	
						 As	Don	Malvinas	recalled,	the	constant	arrival	of	new	migrants	in	Lima	and	
their	desire	to	have	families	meant	that	people	were	eventually	forced	to	unite	to	
look	for	land.		But,	was	it	really	just	a	matter	of	people	deciding	to	go	somewhere	
and	then	simply	occupying	a	piece	of	land?		This	section	gives	a	tentative	view	of	
what	happened	leading	up	to	the	invasion	of	Ciudad	de	Dios	and	how	this	invasion	
was	not	so	different	from	others	that	would	occur	later.		We	will	see	that	what	was	
happening	in	Peru	helped	to	establish	international	policy	toward	urban	
development	up	until	the	1980s,	and,	I	would	argue	continues	to	be	the	pattern	in	
Peru	based	on	my	interviews	and	experience	in	Pamplona,	the	Nueva	Rinconada,	
and	trips	to	other	parts	of	the	country	between	2008–2011.	
						 What	stands	out	in	this	chapter	is	the	ability	of	the	central	state	and	
municipalities	in	Lima	along	with	international	housing	agencies	and	experts	to	
capture	the	insurgent	practices	of	an	urban	population	in	need	of	a	home.		
Effectively,	what	may	have	started	out	as	a	challenge	to	state	authority	came	to	be	
absorbed	and	condoned	by	the	state	and	international	agencies	as	a	solution	to	the	
housing	problem	in	developing	countries.		This	tacit	acceptance,	however,	
maintained	a	degree	of	ambivalence,	for	it	tended	to	undermine	modernist	attempts	
to	rationalize	the	city.		James	Holston	describes	a	similar	undercurrent	that	rejected	
modernist	architectural	practices	in	Brasilia	(1989).		He	argued	that	“in	the	process	
of	appropriating	the	structures,	institutions,	and	images	of	industrial	modernity,	the	
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underclass	transform	them	into	the	instruments	of	new	initiatives	—into	original	
copies,	so	to	speak.”		Yet,	Holston	recognizes	that	these	initiatives	“become	the	
ground	for	new	hegemonies	(Holston	1991:462–463).”		The	high	modernist	city	of	
straight	lines	and	impressive	monumental	architecture	in	the	style	of	Le	Corbusier	
(cf.	Scott	1998)	is	a	stark	contrast	to	the	squatter	neighbourhoods	that	began	to	
appear	en	masse	after	the	first	land	invasions	in	the	later	half	of	the	1940s	in	Lima.		
Despite	his	obvious	reservations	Holston	later	writes	that	these	places	represent	
“spaces	of	insurgent	citizenship,”	or	spaces	which	contemporary	planning	must	
incorporate	into	its	visions	of	how	the	city	ought	to	function	(Holston	1999).		In	this	
chapter	and	the	previous	one	this	is	precisely	what	ministries	charged	with	finding	
solutions	to	the	housing	crisis	attempted	to	do.		Yet	the	result	was	one,	as	we	saw	in	
Don	Malvinas’s	narrative,	where	people	became	responsible	for	their	own	
development.		Politicians	sought	to	impose	order,	or	to	restrict	such	a	style	of	urban	
growth,	like	passing	laws	to	limit	the	legal	recognition	of	such	settlements	and	to	
stipulate	requirements	for	the	legal	recognition	of	communities	(green	space,	
community	infrastructure,	road	widths,	lot	sizes,	etc.).		This	chapter,	then,	argues	
that	there	has	been	a	complex	dialectic	between	squatters	and	policy	since	land	
invasions	became	a	common	practice	in	the	mid	1940s,	thus	making	it	difficult	to	
say	that	these	invasions	are	strictly	insurgent	practices	from	which	governments	
ought	to	draw	lessons.	
						 This	chapter	suggests	why	Don	Malvinas’s	narrative	seemed	to	consider	self‐
help	housing	in	such	a	positive	light.		The	information	provided	here	on	its	
emergence	as	a	housing	strategy	in	Lima	and	at	a	national	level	suggests	that	a	lot	of	
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effort	was	behind	promoting	it	and	casting	it	in	a	positive	light.		One	cannot	help	but	
notice	that	the	homeless	were	being	made	responsible	for	their	own	development	as	
part	of	a	larger	process	of	modern	subject	making.		What	appeared	to	start	out	as	a	
practical	response	to	overcrowding	and	as	a	means	of	saving	money,	quickly	
became	promoted	as	a	solution	to	the	housing	crisis	in	urbanizing	countries	
throughout	the	world.		Before	we	move	on	to	look	at	self‐help	housing	in	particular,	
I	would	like	to	provide	some	contextual	backdrop	for	its	emergence.							
						 Historian	Peter	Klarén	pieces	together	the	political	economic	context	for	mass	
migrations	to	Lima	(Klarén	2004:351–368).		Prior	to	and	during	the	Second	World	
War,	local	markets	and	exportations	boomed,	leading	hacendados	(owners	of	
haciendas)	to	expand	their	holdings	and	remove	yanaconas6.		Innovations	in	
medicine,	like	penicillin,	sulphate	drugs,	cortisone	led	to	a	drop	in	infant	mortality	
rates.		Changes	in	public	health	attention	no	doubt	added	to	the	salubrious	effects	of	
breakthroughs	in	medicine.		As	a	consequence	of	hacienda	expansion	and	
improvements	in	public	health	care,	rural	Peru	quickly	went	from	a	situation	where	
labour	was	in	short	supply	to	one	in	which	there	was	a	surplus.		After	1945,	it	was	
not	uncommon	to	hear	of	disputes	between	landholders	and	their	tenants	in	rural	
areas.		Locals	began	to	encroach	on	landholder	lands.		Wage	labour	became	more	
common	and	where	locals	were	unable	to	find	work	locally	they	often	sought	it	on	
coastal	plantations,	mines	and	urban	centres.			
																																																								
6	Yanaconas	were	peasants	who	cultivated	a	portion	of	landowners’	plots	in	exchange	for	money,	
agricultural	products,	or	access	to	a	subsistence	plot.	
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						 Internally,	processes	of	development	were	often	uneven,	enrichening	some	
regions,	while	leaving	others	impoverished	and	dependent	on	wage‐labour,	which	
was	mainly	controlled	by	dominant	social	groups.		In	the	Mantaro	Valley	in	Peru,	for	
instance,	local	communities	have	undergone	dramatic	changes	since	the	end	of	the	
nineteenth	century	(until	the	1970s	in	this	article),	which	come	to	bear	on	more	
recent	trends.		Julian	Laite	discusses	how	Oroya,	a	small	community	of	about	150	
adults,	went	to	a	bustling	city	of	25,000	with	its	inhabitants	maintaining	a	strong	
relationship	to	a	local	foreign	owned	mine	between	1893	and	1922	(Laite	1978).		In	
his	account	we	are	uncertain	where	migrants	originated,	but	we	are	left	to	assume	
they	came	from	surrounding	communities.		He	claims	that	80	percent	of	the	workers	
in	La	Oroya	are	seasonal	migrants,	yet	he	does	not	explore	this	in	much	detail.	
Laite’s	account	recounts	the	complex	relationship	between	local	hacienda	owners	
and	indigenous	communities	and	the	corporation.		The	corporation	at	different	
times	was	powerful	and	weak	in	local	negotiations	as	changing	political	tides	
empowered	and	weakened	local	resistance.		This	rich	relationship	attests	to	the	
complex	local	negotiations	that	occured	with	foreign	capital	in	Peru.	
						 Studies	of	plantations	and	haciendas	in	the	decades	prior	to	the	end	of	WWII	
have	yielded	similarly	nuanced	accounts	of	the	relationship	between	local	elites	and	
or	enclaves	funded	primarily	by	foreign	capital	and	the	state,	peasants,	and	foreign	
labourers	(Gonzales	1985,	Peloso	1999,	Klaren	1973,	Lyons	2006).		These	studies	
serve	to	remind	us	that	the	relationship	between	peasants	and	their	masters	was	
anything	but	smooth.		On	the	contrary,	it	involved	an	often	tenuous	negotiation	of	
interests	and	expectations.		Labour	regimes	along	the	Peruvian	coast,	for	example,	
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have	undergone	dramatic	changes,	with	African	slaves	providing	the	bulk	of	labour	
needs	initially,	followed	by	a	reliance	on	indentured	Chinese	coolies,	only	to	finish	
with	a	preference	for	local	seasonal	and/or	subsistence	wage	labourers	in	the	
twentieth	century	(Gonzales	1985).		Jean‐Claude	Driant	notes	that	the	agrarian	
crisis	between	1940‐1945	resulted	in	extensive	jobs	loses	in	haciendas	that	began	to	
modernize	their	production	due	to	increasing	competition	from	coastal	plantations	
(Driant	1991:82).		Workers	of	a	multiple	origins,	reliant	on	this	wage‐labour,	then,	
often	ended	up	in	cities.		This	explains	the	rich	cultural	diversity	found	in	Lima	at	
present.	
						 Around	the	turn	of	the	twentieth	century,	many	economies,	some	more	
successfully	than	others	‐Argentina,	Brazil,	Mexico,	and	Uruguay	being	notable	
cases‐	began	to	implement	import	substitution	programs.		As	various	countries	
pursued	modernization	projects	we	see	a	general	move	to	cities	due	to	
improvements	in	transportation	and	emerging	urban	primacy	where	industrial	
production	becomes	concentrated	in	few	cities	(Roberts	1978,	Cardoso	and	Faletto	
1979).		Urban	primacy	coupled	with	a	pattern	where	people	migrated	to	where	
wage	labour	opportunities	were	available	led	many	to	go	to	cities	like	Lima	and,	in	
time,	establish	roots	there.			
						 According	to	Klarén,	demographic	changes	brought	about	political	pressure	at	
a	time	when	an	alliance	between	the	American	Popular	Alliance	for	Revolution,	
hencefore	APRA,	and	reformer	José	Luis	Bustamente	y	Rivero	(1945–1948)	
promised	to	bring	about	democratic	reforms	that	would	favour	the	majority	of	
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Peruvians,	not	just	traditional	landowning	oligarchs	and	those	keen	on	selling	
concessions	to	Peru’s	abundant	natural	resources.		Internal	divisions	between	
moderates	in	APRA	and	more	radical	members	of	the	party,	who	did	not	favour	a	
political	economic	agenda	that	left	aside	the	interests	of	indigenous	peasants	in	the	
sierra,	led	to	multiple	acts	of	violence	against	the	state	and	those	pushing	for	a	more	
liberal	economy.		The	violence	came	to	a	head	with	an	attempted	bombing	of		
	 	
Figure	5	Source:	Driant	1991	This	map	illustrates	that	Lima	was	a	city	that	grew	from	a	fortified	
centre	toward	the	coast	and	toward	the	port	of	Callao.		Growth	southward	had	yet	to	occur.			
a	government	minister	in	1946	and	the	assassination	of	the	editor	of	the	
conservative	paper	La	Prensa	in	1947.		In	response	to	these	actions	and	a	plot	to	
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overthrow	the	government	by	elements	of	APRA	in	the	navy	in	February	of	1948,	
the	APRA	cabinet	was	dissolved	and	a	military	general,	Manuel	A.	Odría,	was	placed	
in	power	(1948–1956).	
						 Klarén	goes	on	to	note	that	the	government	raised	taxes	on	exports	—
particularly	cotton	and	sugar—	took	a	stance	in	support	of	labour	demands,	and	
began	to	control	the	exchange	rate.		Such	measures	smacked	of	interventionalism	
and	increased	statism	for	large	landholders	with	a	stake	in	the	exportation	of	
agricultural	products	and	minerals.			
						 At	this	point,	one	of	the	more	vociferous	critics,	and	representative	of	
landholder	interests,	came	to	the	forefront.		Hailing	from	the	cotton	rich	area	of	
Cañete,	cotton	man	Pedro	Beltrán	took	the	reins	of	La	Prensa	with	other	oligarchs.		
Beltrán,	educated	at	the	London	School	of	Economics,	was	a	strong	proponent	of	
free	market	reforms.		After	a	failed	coup	attempt,	APRA	was	once	again	proscribed,	
leaving	Odría	to	push	the	now	highly	unpopular	and	destitute	Bustamente	into	exile	
in	Argentina.	
						 Once	Odría	was	in	power,	he	ruthlessly	pursued	APRA	members.		More	
importantly,	he	openly	rubbed	shoulders	with	figures	from	the	right‐wing	oligarchy:	
the	Miró‐Quesadas	(the	family	that	controlled	and	still	does	the	most	trusted	
newspaper	in	the	country	–El	Comercio),	Pedro	Beltrán	(owner	of	La	Prensa)	and	
Ramón	Aspíllaga.		So,	Odría	had	decided	to	follow	liberal	economic	policies,	naming	
Beltrán	as	manager	of	the	Central	Bank.		As	one	would	expect,	orthodox	reforms	
were	brought	in	and	foreign	investment	soared.		
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						 Odría’s	approach	to	the	population	of	provincial	migrants	that	had	swelled	
Lima	from	600,000	in	1940	to	2	million	in	1961	was	reminiscent	of	the	populist	
governments	elsewhere,	especially	that	of	Juan	Perón	in	Argentina.		He	extended	
social	security	to	more	workers,	built	a	military	hospital	and	raised	wages	for	the	
military	and	the	police	force.		He	built	schools,	educating	masses	of	people	who	
would	later	radicalize	in	the	60s	and	70s	demanding	social	change	–mostly	
peacefully,	but	some	more	violently.			
						 In	1961,	the	population	of	the	settlements	that	began	to	emerge	on	the	
outskirts	of	Lima	was	around	300,000.		However,	Odría	rightly	gauged	the	
importance	that	these	settlements	would	come	to	play,	dedicating	resources	to	them	
in	exchange	for	political	allegiance	to	his	government.		When	invasions	of	lands	took	
place,	Odría	would	intervene	directly	and	according	to	Klarén	he	openly	promoted	
invasions.		The	idea	here	was	to	divert	support	from	these	sectors	away	from	the	
left	and	APRA.		Public	demonstrations	where	popular	support	for	Odría	was	voiced	
were	not	uncommon.		Many	of	my	older	collaborators	fondly	remembered	Odría	for	
his	support	of	invasions	and	his	construction	of	basic	infrastructure	like	roads,	
schools	and	hospitals.		
						 At	about	this	point	it	seems	to	me	that	a	relationship	that	my	collaborators	
often	spoke	of	—a	“tú	me	das,	yo	te	doy,”	or	“you	give	to	me,	I	give	to	you”	practice—	
may	have	emerged	in	the	burgeoning	settlements	that	Don	Malvinas	spoke	of	that	
had	the	implicit	support	of	Odría,	or	it	may	have	already	been	common	practice.		
This	practice	amounts	to	a	form	of	political	capital	that	is	traded	between	squatter	
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communities	and	federal,	provincial	and	municipal	authorities.		Odría	channelled	
resources	toward	and	implicitly	allowed	invasions	to	occur.		In	return,	people	
mobilized	in	support	of	his	government.		In	practice,	the	reciprocity	implied	in	this	
relationship	could	be	reneged	upon;	for	instance,	when	election	enticements	that	
are	given	to	local	communities	to	support	a	particular	candidate	in	return	for	a	vote.		
During	my	research	a	candidate	for	mayor	donated	building	materials	to	a	local	
community	along	with	a	stack	of	campaign	posters.		When	asked	why	he	accepted	
the	gift	and	the	charge,	my	collaborator,	a	block	leader,	told	me	that	the	vote	was	
secret.		In	other	words,	he	was	taking	advantage	of	this	candidate’s	generosity	for	
the	benefit	of	his	block.		This	room	for	negotiation	with	central	political	figures	gives	
the	illusion	that	the	population	of	squatter	settlements	is	capable	of	undermining	
larger	political	projects;	however	I	want	to	stress	here	that	acts	like	this	have	not	
changed	the	general	direction	of	the	Peruvian	nation	in	the	time	period	analyzed	in	
this	dissertation.		Paradoxically,	the	individualistic	pursuit	of	power	and	its	
concomitant	self‐monitoring	has	strengthened.	
						 According	to	urbanist	Jean	Claude	Driant,	it	was	not	until	the	latter	half	of	the	
1940s	that	the	population	in	Lima	reached	a	point	where	it	could	bring	about	a	
demographic	explosion	in	the	city	of	Lima,	due	mainly	to	the	birth	averages	for	
women	at	the	time	(3.3	children	for	women	born	in	Lima	and	3.5–3.8	children	for	
women	who	were	not	born	in	Lima).		Interestingly	enough,	the	shantytowns	of	that	
time	were	populated	by	people	who	identified	as	being	from	provinces	(60%),	yet	
only	22.7%	of	migrants	lived	in	shantytowns.		The	majority	of	people	were	
concentrating	in	existent	housing	in	the	city,	mainly	the	centre	of	Lima.		It	is	
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important	to	note,	though,	that	45%	of	those	living	in	the	more	affluent	
neighbourhoods	of	Miraflores	and	San	Isidro	hailed	from	the	provinces	as	well.		
Lima	was	very	much	a	provincial	city	in	the	late	1940s,	a	city	in	transition	(Driant	
1991:47).		
						 Economist	Carlos	Ponce,	in	his	seminal	work,	Gamarra:	formación,	estructura	y	
perspectivas	(Ponce	1994:40–67),	discusses	the	importance	of	La	Parada	and	the	
adjacent	textile	complex	Gamarra	in	the	economic	expansion	of	Lima.		Despite	
previous	industrial	activity	in	La	Victoria	that	began	around	the	turn	of	the	20th	
century,	it	was	not	until	mayor	Juan	Carbone	was	in	office	between	1920	to	1922	
that	his	housing	company,	Compañia	Urbana	La	Victoria,	began	constructing	
working	class	housing.			Later,	during	the	governments	of	Oscar	Benavides	(1933–
1939),	and	the	first	government	of	Manuel	Prado	(1939–1945)	working	class	
housing	needs	were	satisfied	by	private	construction	companies.		Prado’s	financial	
group	bought	part	of	the	Cánepa	family’s	El	Pino	hacienda	and	together	with	the	
Cánepa	family	built	housing	complexes	in	El	Porvenir.		Hospitals,	schools	and	
stadiums	were	also	constructed	by	the	state	in	La	Victoria	during	this	time	period.	
						 The	area	around	La	Parada	became	a	new	focal	point	for	commerce	and	small	
industry	after	its	construction	in	1945.		It	was	strategically	situated	along	the	
central	highway	that	went	into	the	central	part	of	Peru	and	into	the	Mantaro	Valley.		
The	importance	of	the	Central	Market	for	commerce	in	the	city	was	quickly	replaced	
by	the	concentration	of	activity	around	the	wholesale	market.		To	this	day,	the	area	
is	an	informal	hub.		Most	vendors	throughout	Lima	tell	of	regular	visits	to	this	
	 75
central	market	to	buy	produce	and	dry	goods	for	their	stalls	in	the	early	hours	of	the	
morning.		Interprovincial	bus	stops	and	transport	routes	used	to	cut	through	this	
busy	area,	as	well	(some	still	do),	making	it	a	distribution	point	for	people	coming	
into	Lima.						
						 In	1946,	Cerro	San	Cosme,	the	hill	behind	La	Parada,	was	invaded	by	box	and	
basket	vendors,	street	vendors,	porters,	and	food	vendors,	setting	a	precedent	for	
decades	to	come.		A	few	months	later	San	Pedro	was	formed	and	then,	in	1947,	came	
the	formation	of	El	Augustino	(see	Figure	7	below).		Apparently,	the	same	people	
behind	the	invasion	of	the	Cánepa	family	lands	around	the	land	donated	by	the	
family	for	the	construction	of	the	wholesale	market	also	were	involved	in	land	
invasions	around	El	Augustino	(Ponce	1994:61).		Driant	claims	that	these	invasions,	
particularly	those	associated	with	El	Augustino,	were	brutally	repressed	by	General	
Odría.	However,	the	reaction	of	the	public	was	so	strong,	that	he	was	eventually	
forced	to	order	the	withdrawal	of	his	troops	in	January	of	1947	(Driant	1991:47–
48).		The	shift	from	private	construction	companies	that	built	working	class	
dwellings	to	associations	and	groups	that	organized	invasions	without,	or	
sometimes	with,	implicit	political	consent,	appears	to	have	been	a	watershed	
moment	in	Lima.				
Over	the	next	few	years	the	areas	on	the	other	side	of	the	Rimac	River	and	
adjacent	areas	to	the	now	bustling	market	area	around	La	Parada	saw	the	
continuous	expansion	of	informal	dwellings	(Driant	1991:48).		Anthropologist	José	
Matos	reveals	that	the	Ministry	of	Public	Works	invited	these	landholders	to	buy		
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Figure	6	Source:	Ponce	1994	In	the	upper	right‐hand	corner	one	can	note	Cerro	San	Cosme.		
Adjacent	to	it	is	El	Augustino.		One	can	see	the	gradual	movement	eastward	here	from	the	
working	class	district	of	La	Victoria.	
	their	lands	from	the	state.		In	response	to	this	initiative,	settlers	from	Mirones,	one	
neighbourhood	in	the	affected	area,	secretly	founded	an	association	that	began	
surveying	lots,	occupied	these	lots,	then	set	about	planning	a	school	for	their	
children	(Matos	1977:79–85).		These	settler‐driven	initiatives	do	not	seem	unlike	
those	described	by	Don	Malvinas,	nor	those	that	we	will	see	later	when	we	discuss	
the	Nueva	Rinconada.		
						 Not	surprisingly,	both	Odría	and	the	municipality	of	La	Victoria	made	
decisions	that	would	favour	the	continued	growth	of	this	artisan	production	and	
sales	and	distribution	centre.		Odría,	for	instance,	made	the	use	of	school	uniforms	
mandatory	in	all	state	schools,	providing	important	business	for	incipient	textile	
producers	in	the	area.		The	municipality	gave	informal	vendors	a	median	on	
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Aviación	Ave.,	a	major	thoroughfare,	to	ply	their	wares	(Ponce	1994:64).		So,	as	
much	as	the	Odría	government	worked	to	favour	the	interests	of	large	landowners	
and	private	capital	interests,	they	also	simultaneously	courted	the	masses	through	
populist	gestures	like	these.		Favouring	invasions	and	facilitating	the	emergence	of	
the	informal	sector	were	likely	important	concessions	that	military	governments	
that	still	favoured	local	oligarchs	had	to	make	to	the	increasing	power	of	unions	and	
well‐organized	political	opposition	from	APRA	and	the	left	(López	2004:205–207).			
						 We	can	look	at	the	implicit	support	for	land	invasions	as	less	than	a	populist	
gesture,	however.		The	benefits	for	private	interests	that	utilize	the	state	to	achieve	
their	own	end	are	manifold.		If	factories	did	not	have	to	provide	housing	to	workers,	
if	housing	could	be	self‐built	and	if	that	building	could	take	place	on	marginal	state	
lands,	the	benefit	to	industry	is	obvious.		Employers	would	no	longer	have	to	
subsidize	the	construction	of	homes	by	paying	a	living	wage	plus	an	additional	
amount	for	housing	costs,	especially	a	mortgage.		If	there	was	not	enough	credit	to	
satisfy	the	demand	for	working	class	homes,	it	seemed	practical	to	allow	people	to	
invade	state	lands,	so	long	as	private	property	was	not	placed	in	jeopardy.		With	
growth	would	come	more	opportunities	for	investment,	more	consumption,	and	real	
estate	values	in	middle	class	areas	would	continue	to	increase.		Holston	argues	that	
auto‐construction	allowed	workers	to	gain	a	sense	of	independence	and	self‐worth	
in	Brazil,	however	it	simultaneously	contributed	to	their	reproduction	as	workers	in	
the	city	(Holston	1991:448).			
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						 An	additional	advantage	of	allowing	invasions	is	that	populations	that	invaded	
would	have	to	depend	on	political	patronage	to	obtain	basic	amenities.		If	a	
population	is	always	waiting	for	something	from	the	state,	it	makes	them	easier	to	
manipulate	and	control.		Keeping	people	waiting	for	aid	from	the	state,	and	the	
private	sector,	allows	the	state	and	others	to	impose	conditions.		As	we	will	see	this	
encourages	political	divisions	among	groups	competing	for	the	same	resources	and	
ensures	that	those	who	go	against	the	model	of	development	being	promoted	by	the	
state	and	private	interests,	i.e.,	capitalist	development	promoting	the	individual	
pursuit	of	happiness,	are	looked	upon	disfavourably	by	those	who	want	to	improve	
their	immediate	conditions	and	not	jeopardize	their	livelihood.		Things	would	have	
to	look	fairly	dismal	for	more	radical	solutions,	like	those	proposed	by	Sendero	
Luminoso	in	the	1980s	and	1990s,	to	appeal	to	factions	within	these	urban	working	
class	neighbourhoods.					
						 At	this	point,	populist	policies	Odría	and	previous	governments	began	to	
jeopardize	the	interests	of	national	oligarchs	and	foreign	investors.		Legislation	and	
actions	that	favoured	foreign	investment	and	the	growth	of	the	primary	sector	in	the	
country	simultaneously	made	concessions	to	an	expanding	informal	urban	sector	
that	was	politically	organized	and	whose	interests	were	represented	by	strong	
unions.		Striking	a	balance	between	pleasing	industry	and	investors	and	pleasing	the	
masses	was	a	challenge,	especially	when	social	reforms	made	since	the	1930s	
extended	education	and	voting	rights	increasingly	to	the	public.	
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						 Within	the	context	of	the	Cold	War,	the	battle	for	countries	in	Latin	America	
was	also	heating	up.		This	is	where	local	interests	and	foreign	interests	appear	to	
have	met.		During	the	1940s	and	1950s	Jacob	L.	Crane	did	much	to	promote	the	idea	
of	self‐help	housing	internationally,	contrary	to	the	popular	belief	that	architect	
John	Turner,	with	key	publications	in	the	late	1960s	and	1970s,	was	the	main	
proponent	of	the	policy	(Harris	1998).7		The	history,	at	least	the	official	one,	began	
with	the	Housing	Authority	of	Ponce	in	Puerto	Rico.		Jacob	L.	Crane,	then	Assistant	
Director	of	the	U.S.	Public	Housing	Administration,	was	instrumental	in	the	
implementation	of	the	Ponce	project.		John	Turner	would	later	admit,	however,	that	
Crane	and	his	office	encouraged	his	work	in	Peru.	
						 The	Ponce	project	was	meant	to	be	a	low	cost	version	of	U.S.	housing	schemes	
where	contractors	were	hired	to	build	homes	that	were	then	made	available	to	rent	
at	subsidized	prices.		The	Ponce	scheme	had	to	make	do	with	less	available	
financing.		In	the	earliest	stages,	the	project	was	a	land	and	utilities	scheme,	
meaning	that	land	with	hook‐ups	for	basic	amenities	was	provided	to	families	on	
which	to	build	their	homes.		The	Puerto	Rican	project	was	promoted	at	a	housing	
conference	in	the	U.S.	in	1957,	but	pilot	projects	of	its	ilk	were	widespread	in	the	
Caribbean	throughout	the	1940s	and	early	1950s.			
						 From	the	mid‐1940s	until	his	retirement	in	1954,	Crane	untiringly	promoted	
self‐help	housing	through	the	national	and	international	office	of	the	Housing	and	
Home	Finance	Agency.		For	example,	in	1948	he	arranged	for	U.S.	embassies	to	
																																																								
7	The	following	discussion	on	self‐help	housing	draws	exclusively	on	the	work	of	Richard	Harris.	
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supply	their	staff	with	reports	and	literature	favourable	to	such	an	approach.		He	
wrote	to	contacts	in	22	countries	in	1949,	enclosing	his	tract	Huts	and	Houses	in	the	
Tropics.		David	Vega‐Christie,	director	of	Peru’s	Corporación	Nacional	de	la	Vivienda,	
or	National	Housing	Corporation,	was	one	of	these	contacts.		Crane	organized	the	
visit	of	Vega‐Christie,	then	Chief	of	Urbanization	in	the	Peruvian	Ministry	of	Works,	
to	his	office	in	the	United	States.		Recognizing	that	Vega‐Christie	was	in	such	an	
influential	position,	Crane	encouraged	Vega‐Christie	to	request	a	housing	advisor	
through	the	Peruvian	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs.			In	1951,	he	placed	Donald	Laidig	
in	Peru	to	promote	self‐help.		The	next	year	he	had	Wilson	Longmore	sent.		
						 USAID	advisors	and	HHFA	continued	to	work	in	Peru	throughout	the	1950s.		In	
1956,	Pedro	Beltrán	was	appointed	by	Prado	to	head	a	housing	commission	in	
which	Vega‐Christie	served	as	a	Technical	Secretary	and	Housing	Advisor.		The	
result	of	this	commission	was	a	strong	endorsement	for	self‐help	projects.		A	
number	of	projects	were	started.		Harris	draws	a	connection	between	USAID,	HHFA	
and	the	Peruvian	architect	Eduardo	Neira	who	worked	for	the	Ministry	of	Public	
Works	when	John	Turner	first	arrived	in	Arequipa	to	pilot	a	self‐help	project	there	
in	1955.				
						 Despite	his	efforts,	self‐help	would	not	be	made	development	policy	by	the	UN	
until	the	1970s,	mainly	through	the	publications	of	John	Turner.		Peruvian	
authorities,	however,	were	aware	of	self‐help	housing	and	its	endorsement	by	U.S.	
experts	as	a	practical	solution	to	the	needs	of	urban	migrants	in	Latin	America.		Self‐
help	projects	later	showed	up	in	Africa	and	India,	based	on	pioneering	work	that	
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was	done	in	the	Americas.		For	all	the	connections	that	Harris	is	able	to	provide,	in	
the	end,	he	is	unable	to	determine	what	effect	such	lobbying	had	on	the	Peruvian	
case.				
						 What	we	can	say	for	certain	is	that	the	work	of	John	Turner	and	a	cadre	of	ex‐
Peace	Corps	workers	—who	not	only	promoted	self‐help,	but	spearheaded	a	
positive	assessment	of	the	processes	of	urbanization	that	was	occurring	in	Latin	
America	using	Peru	as	their	case	study—	worked	to	establish	the	practice	in	
positive	and	flattering	terms	(cf.	Portes	1971).		So,	the	attitude	of	government	
officials	and	foreign	aid	workers	was	likely	celebratory	and	laudatory	rather	than	
critical.		Their	work,	as	we	will	see,	contested	the	culture	of	poverty	thesis	being	
promoted	by	Oscar	Lewis	in	the	1950s	and	1960s,	which	would	have	been,	at	least,	a	
methodological	foil.		I	will	have	more	to	say	about	this	shortly.		
						 Now,	if	I	can	rewind	this	discussion	back	to	where	Don	Malvinas	talked	about	
Ciudad	de	Díos,	I	remind	the	reader	of	the	apparent	grassroots	organization	of	this	
invasion,	with	charismatic	figures	such	as	One‐legged	Agreda,	hobbling	at	the	
forefront	(see	Figure	8	below).		Driant	gives	some	detail	on	this	invasion	(Driant	
1991:52‐53).		No	sooner	was	Ciudad	de	Díos	formed,	than	La	Prensa	gave	extensive	
coverage	to	the	event,	arguing	that	the	housing	shortage	was	a	critical	issue	in	
rapidly	growing	Lima.		Driant	shares	the	details	of	a	census	of	Ciudad	de	Díos	made	
in	February	of	1955	by	The	Institute	of	Ethnology	at	San	Marcos	University.		They	
found	4,841	people	in	936	families.		As	Don	Malvinas	had	reported,	the	initial	
invasion	never	really	spurred	on	more	invaders.	
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						 Interestingly,	in	1958,	the	government,	after	Beltrán’s	study,	supported	the	
squatters,	proposing	the	sale	of	the	lands	with	basic	units	—a	site‐and‐service	plan	
plus	a	basic	dwelling	on	a	rent‐to‐own	basis.		It	seems	that	some	of	Crane’s	
proposals	had	found	fertile	ground.		This	program	would	not	persist	as	government	
policy,	however,	and	would	be	only	one	of	many	pilot	projects.		Peter	Lloyd	argues	
that	Beltrán	was	an	ardent	free‐market	pundit,	believing	that	house	ownership	and	
middle	class	consumer	lifestyles	would	invigorate	the	Peruvian	economy.			Lloyd	
remarks	that	Beltrán	was	opposed	to	the	radicalism	of	APRA	and	saw	no	benefit	in	
the	paternalism	of	Odría	(Lloyd	1980:43).		The	site	and	service	model	with	a	basic	
dwelling	provided	on	a	rent	to	own	basis	seems	consistent	with	Beltrán’s	ideological	
leanings,	therefore.				
						 Political	movements	that	sought	a	middle	ground	between	the	left	and	the	
right	were	not	adverse	to	the	idea	of	the	poor	helping	themselves	either.		Two‐time	
ex‐president	Fernando	Belaúnde’s	The	Conquest	of	Peru	by	Peruvians	appeared	in	
1959	and	served	as	the	doctrinaire	foundation	of	Acción	Popular,	a	party	that	
promoted	itself	as	a	middle	ground	between	the	left	and	the	right	in	Peru.		Belaúnde	
in	his	1956	campaign	tour	of	the	country	noted	the	capacity	of	politically,	socially	
and	economically	excluded	communities	to	“help	themselves”.		The	inefficient	and	
centralized	Peruvian	state	was	viewed	by	Belaúnde	as	the	biggest	impediment	to	
the	development	of	rural	Peru.		According	to	Belaúnde,	the	origin	of	what	he	terms	
cooperación	popular,	or	popular	cooperation,	could	be	traced	back	to	“the	old	minka	
that	made	the	[Inca]	Empire	great	and	whose	characteristics	persist	in	communities	
(Belaunde	1994[1959]:40).”	
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						 Geographer	Ray	Bromley	discusses	the	differences	between	Belaúnde	and	
Beltrán	(2003:282–286).		Beltrán	tended	to	support	the	idea	of	government‐	
sponsored	housing	projects	for	the	poor,	which	amounted	to	a	site‐and‐services	
model.		For	him	the	new	shantytowns	were	focal	points	for	disease	and	delinquency.		
He	wanted	minimal	state	intervention,	leaving	housing	to	private	companies	with			
		 	
Figure	7	Source:	Driant	1991	Just	to	the	west	of	the	little	block	with	Villa	Maria	del	Triunfo	
written	above	it,	one	will	notice	another	little	population	island.		That	block	represents	the	
isolated	Ciudad	de	Díos	invasion.	
state	tax	exoneration.		Belaúnde,	in	contrast,	had	a	much	grander	vision	of	people	
working	together	as	communities	to	build	a	great	nation.		Bromley	notes	that	a	more	
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moderate	centrist	position,	which	sought	to	build	a	nation	on	attributes	unique	to	
Peru	—especially	the	value	placed	on	community	and	the	great	public	works	
projects	of	its	past—	became	commonplace	and	resonated	in	even	the	once	radical	
APRA’s	rhetoric.8		Belaúnde,	being	an	architect,	also	favoured	apartment	complexes	
and	believed	in	a	compact	city,	as	opposed	to	Beltrán’s	emphasis	on	single‐family	
dwellings.		In	the	end,	Belaúnde’s	apartments	would	end	up	being	for	the	upper‐
middle	class	and	only	a	handful	of	Beltrán’s	single‐family	units	would	be	built.						
						 The	notion	that	the	poor	could	have	been	helping	themselves	seems	to	have	
caught	on	among	intellectuals	linked	to	self‐help	pilot	projects	like	those	of	John	
Turner	and	anthropologist	William	Mangin.		At	this	point,	I	would	like	to	explore	the	
ideas	of	Mangin	and	Turner,	because	there	are	some	peculiarities	about	their	
propositions	when	seen	aside	their	contemporary	Oscar	Lewis.		Turner	and	Mangin	
were	by	no	means	the	first	to	recognize	the	traits	that	they	spoke	of	in	the	
shantytowns	of	Lima	(cf.	Córdova	1958,	Paz‐Sóldan	1957,	and	Matos	Mar	1967),	but	
they	are	given	international	credit	for	drawing	attention	to	the	progressive	nature	
																																																								
8	The	idea	of	elevating	characteristics	of	the	Incas	in	state	discourse,	while	abhorring	contemporary	
indigenous	people	is	something	that	had	extended	to	at	least	the	end	of	the	Velasco	regime,	according	
to	historian	Cecilia	Méndez.		Méndez	traces	the	origins	of	Creole	nationalism	to	the	Peruvian‐Bolivian	
Confederation	of	1836‐39	in	a	very	suggestive	essay	(Méndez	1996).		I	feel	uncomfortable	with	
Méndez’s	opinion	that	such	a	use	of	history	has	ebbed.		From	my	appreciations	of	social	interactions	
in	Lima	and	various	parts	of	Perú,	there	is	a	still	a	very	appreciable	contradiction	in	the	official	
treatment	of	indigenous	people	and	practice	in	the	country.		The	overwhelming	majority	of	my	
collaborators	did	not	pass	their	native	tongues	on	to	their	children,	preferring	to	educate	them	in	
Spanish.		It	is	probably	more	likely	that	a	Quechua	speakers	child	in	Lima	will	speak	English,	French,	
German,	Japanese	or	Chinese,	than	it	is	that	they	will	speak	Quechua.		Children	of	first	generation	
migrants	from	the	sierra	or	selva	go	so	far	as	to	change	their	eating	habits,	refusing	to	eat	foods	of	
their	parents	in	favour	of	more	urbane	foods.		The	same	applies	to	clothing.		The	Catholic	Church	
worked	actively	to	encourage	self‐confidence	in	youths	in	Pamplona,	noting	that	there	was	an	
identity	crisis	of	sorts	where	being	provinciano	was	not	a	positive	attribute.		Presidents	Alberto	
Fujimori	(1990‐2000),	Alejandro	Toledo	(2001‐2006),	and	Alan	García	(2006‐2011),	rarely	missed	
photo	opportunities	with	a	poncho	and	traditional	garb	in	various	parts	of	the	Andes	‐all	of	this	while	
they	forced	mining	concessions	on	the	populations	of	the	Andes	and	the	jungles	of	Peru.	
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of	nature	of	land	invasions	(cf.	Portes	1971).		These	studies	remarked	upon	the	
histories	of	various	land	invasions	and	the	organization	of	these	settlements.		What	
was	different	with	Turner	and	Mangin	is	that	the	two	ex‐Peace	Corps	volunteers	
worked	to	support	official	U.S.	policy	after	the	Cuban	Revolution	culminated	on	
January	1,	1959.	
						 Bromley	discusses	American	policy	in	the	Americas	during	the	Cold	War	
(Bromley	2003:276‐278).		Through	the	Alliance	for	Progress	military	aid	and	
development	aid	were	doled	out	to	recipient	countries	in	different	measures.		In	
September	of	1960,	funding	and	technical	assistance	for	“aided	self‐help	housing”	
was	made	the	official	U.S.	policy	toward	Latin	America.		Policies,	like	“aided	self‐help	
housing”	satisfied	World	Bank	and	Inter‐American	Development	Bank	requirements	
for	low‐budget	programs	that	would	encourage	the	growth	of	capitalism	in	
developing	countries	in	Latin	America.		Bromley	claims	that	7300	Peace	Corps	
volunteers	were	in	the	field,	serving	in	44	countries.		By	1966,	this	number	more	
than	doubled	to	15,000.		In	early	Peace	Corps	efforts,	William	Mangin	served	as	
Deputy	Director	and	eventually	Director	of	the	Peru	Program.		By	1976,	after	almost	
two	decades	of	publishing	on	self‐help,	the	agenda	of	the	1976	UN	Habitat	
conference	hinged	on	Turner’s	concepts	(Harris	2003:246).	
						 Harris,	in	discussing	Turner’s	brand	of	housing,	stresses	his	connection	to	
anarchists	like	Patrick	Geddes,	Peter	Kropotkin,	and	Lewis	Mumford.		Turner’s	
arguments	are	not	so	different	from	those	of	James	Scott	or	James	Holston’s	work	on	
urban	planning.		He	tended	to	stress	local	initiatives	to	solving	housing	problems	
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instead	of	authoritarian	central	planning	schemes.		Turner,	in	an	article	for	the	
World	Development	journal	in	1978	wrote:	“I	believe	that	in	all	contexts	a	mix	of	
small‐scale		‘petty	commodity’	production	and	local	cooperative	enterprise	is	both	
viable	and	necessary:	and	in	all	contexts	I	believe	that	central	planning	and	
administration	has	to	be	limited	to	major	infrastructures	and	to	legislation	limiting	
concentration	of	wealth	and	guaranteeing	equitable	access	to	locally	scarce	
resources	(Turner	1978:1136).”		He	goes	on	to	state	his	disapproval	of	leftist	central	
planning	regimes	that	were	prevalent	at	the	time	and	in	the	past,	viewing	them	as	
inefficient	and	destructive	in	their	use	of	resources	and	psychologically	stultifying.		
Turner	sought	“another	development,”	as	he	put	it,	calling	it	“fulfilment	through	
convivial	modes	of	production…	(Turner	1978:1137).”			
						 Turner	preferred	to	view	housing	as	a	verb,	not	as	a	noun,	claiming	that	his	
view	was	akin	to	that	of	Richard	Pirsig’s	in	Zen	and	the	Art	of	Motorcycle	
Maintenance	(1974),	or	that	subjects	and	objects	could	not	be	separated	(Turner	
1978:1137).		I	take	this	to	mean	that	a	house	should	be	the	product	of	the	will	of	the	
builder	and	not	so	much	some	preconceived	design	that	is	mass‐produced	cookie‐
cutter	fashion	in	the	city.		Housing	was	something	that	people	ought	to	do,	according	
to	their	means	and	needs.		His	critique	of	capitalist	production,	or	“conservative	
anarchism,”	as	he	puts	it,	is	just	as	cogent	(Turner	1978:1139‐1141).		Capitalist	
schemes,	for	him,	are	too	inefficient	at	supplying	housing	to	the	masses.		Not	only	
that,	but	they	are	too	rigid	in	meeting	the	individual	needs	of	dwellers.		These	
statements	make	it	clear	that	Turner	is	seeing	housing	as	a	way	of	meeting	
individual	needs,	as	something	that	cannot	be	mass‐produced	or	mandated,	as	
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something	that	is	more	organic	and	creative	in	nature.		Harris,	in	interviewing	
Turner,	remarks	on	how	Turner	became	increasing	alienated	from	the	
implementation	of	his	own	ideas,	with	his	emphasis	on	dweller	control	as	opposed	
to	a	sites‐and‐services	model	(Harris	2003:263).	
						 While	Turner	was	slowly	becoming	the	spokesperson	for	self‐help,	William	
Mangin	worked	alongside	him	extolling	the	virtues	of	self‐development	too.		In	a	
1960	paper	that	Mangin	prepared	for	the	Annals	of	the	New	York	Academy	of	
Sciences	he	notes	the	following	about	migrants	to	Lima:	
For	many	people	migration	is	a	response	to	a	change	in	level	of	aspiration;	for	
others	it	is	a	continuation	of	some	early	aspiration;	for	still	others	it	is	forced	
by	economic	or	political	conditions.		For	some	it	reflects	hope,	for	others	
despair.		There	are	migrants	who	try	to	carry	their	mountain	cultural	patterns	
over	into	Lima,	and	among	them	are	those	who	succeed	and	those	who	fail.		
There	are	also	those	who	try	to	change	markedly,	usually	in	the	direction	of	
modern	Peruvian	culture	and	social	class	mobility,	and	among	them	there	are	
those	who	succeed	and	those	who	fail.		Actually	most	people	fall	somewhere	in	
between.		The	largest	numerical	group,	those	who	preserve	a	semblance	of	
mountain	culture	in	Lima,	appears	to	be	only	a	one	or	two‐generation	
category,	since	most	of	the	individuals	involved	do	not	want	their	children	to	
remain	in	the	same	condition.		They	are	in	fact	markedly	and	unrealistically	
upwardly	mobile	for	their	children	while	maintaining	low	levels	of	aspiration	
for	themselves	(Mangin	1960:912).	
	
						 He	compiled	a	list	of	the	qualities	of	a	barriada9.		Most	adults	were	provincial‐
born,	being	younger	with	children,	as	opposed	to	being	older	or	single.		Most	had	
resided	in	Lima	for	some	time,	with	few	direct	migrants	from	the	provinces.		Each	
																																																								
9	Name	given	to	shantytowns	in	Lima.		It	would	eventually	be	replaced	by	pueblo	jóven,	or	young	
town,	during	the	Velasco	regime	because	it	eliminated	the	stigma	attached	to	the	term	barriada,	
placing	emphasis	on	the	progressive	nature	of	shantytowns	in	general.		The	term	used	nowadays	is	
asentamiento	humano,	or	human	settlement.		I	have	decided	to	use	the	term	barriada	to	prevent	
confusion	for	my	readers	and	underline	the	idea	that	I	am	referring	to	areas	that	have	started	out	as	
invasions	or	government	assigned	lots.			
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house	that	was	constructed	housed	a	nuclear	family.		Associations	or	groups	tend	to	
favour	established	families.		The	general	posture	of	the	group	was	defensive	and	a	
sense	of	being	under	siege	was	pervasive.		People	were	proud	to	be	part	of	the	new	
group	and	there	was	a	sense	of	belonging.		Groups	tended	to	be	self‐appointed	and	
leadership	was	based	predominantly	on	personality,	with	kin	and	regional	loyalty	
being	a	factor	in	some	instances.		People	in	the	neighbourhood	often	acted	as	
bridgeheads	for	kin.		As	time	passed,	renting	became	more	frequent,	with	some	
individuals	deciding	to	sell,	lease,	or	lend	their	homes,	despite	the	lack	of	clear	title.		
The	overall	trend	was	from	reed	matting	and	rudimentary	public	institutions	to	
cement	and	brick	homes	with	public	infrastructure	and	institutions	like	schools,	
churches,	markets,	police	stations	and	community	centres.			
						 Mangin’s	observations	on	the	social	dynamic	of	the	typical	progressive	
barriada	are	especially	pertinent	to	this	study	because	they	indicate	that	social	
fragmentation	was	prevalent	before	the	dirty	war	in	Peru	in	the	1980s	and	1990s.		
Over	time,	the	group	lost	the	feeling	of	being	separate,	becoming	more	urbanized.		
Socially,	the	integration	and	euphoria	of	being	part	of	a	group	that	was	working	
toward	establishing	service	and	title	fades	as	these	objectives	were	attained.		Some	
of	the	original	dwellers	move	out.		Where	unity	against	outside	threats	was	a	must,	
the	disappearance	of	threats	led	residents	to	turn	on	one	another.		Mangin	described	
how	older	inhabitants	started	quarrelling	with	one	another	and	how	they	began	to	
comment	unfavourably	on	new	arrivals.		It	was	not	long	before	old	leaders	moved	
out,	typically	amidst	allegations	that	“following	a	time‐honoured	Peruvian	tradition,	
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a	reform	faction	accuses	them	of	stealing	money	and	they,	in	turn,	can	choose	to	
fight,	flee,	or	sulk	(Mangin	1960:914).”			
						 In	a	psychological	assessment	of	a	typical	community	by	a	psychologist	and	
Mangin,	a	number	of	significant	findings	were	made.		For	some	reason,	fear	of	the	
dark	and	bed‐wetting	were	significantly	higher	than	the	norm	for	children	up	to	12.		
Local	diseases	like	the	evil	eye,	fright	(susto),	bewitchment	(no	doubt	various	ways)	
were	found	to	be	widespread.		As	one	would	expect	of	almost	any	area	without	
adequate	water	treatment,	the	most	frequent	illnesses	treated	by	doctors	were:	
vomiting,	diarrhea	and	fever.		Both	the	psychologist	and	Mangin	were	intrigued	by	
the	occurrence	of	envy,	particularly	the	fact	that	informants	mentioned	that	they	
were	often	the	object	of	envy.		They	found	that	envy	was	directed	toward	people	
who	had	managed	to	satisfy	their	“dependency	needs”.		Severe	depression	was	also	
quite	common	among	barriada	dwellers,	contrary	to	the	popular	belief	of	outsiders	
that	barriada	dwellers	were	always	smiling	and	happy‐go‐lucky	people.		Mangin	
found	that	the	ideal	personality	type	is	not	“strong	and	forebearing	but	rather	
frightened	and	ineffective	(Mangin	1960:915).”		This	last	assertion	flies	in	the	face	of	
studies	over	the	past	four	decades,	however	everything	else	cited	above	sounds	as	if	
it	was	written	at	the	time	that	I	did	my	research.		
						 After	writing	what	seemed	like	a	grounded	and	balanced	assessment	of	life	in	
the	barriadas	of	Lima,	Mangin	published	an	article,	to	which	Turner	makes	
reference,	where	he	presented	squatter	settlements	as	both	problem	and	solution	
(1967).		The	article	was	written	to	dispel	prevailing	views	held	by	planners,	
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politicians,	journalists	and	the	public	alike	that	shantytowns	were	anomic	places	
fraught	with	crime,	disorder,	political	radicals,	provincial	attitudes	and	lifestyles.		At	
the	time,	only	two	solutions	to	the	problem	appeared:	stop	migration,	or	pass	laws	
to	prevent	the	formation	of	new	shantytowns.		Mangin,	in	deciding	to	emphasize	the	
behaviour	of	migrants	in	the	city,	chooses	to	“…see	the	squatter	settlements	as	a	
process	of	social	reconstruction	through	popular	initiative.”	(Mangin	1967:67)		
Here,	Mangin	is	in	agreement	with	the	theoretical	push	of	William	Thomas	and	
Florian	Znaniecki	in	their	classic	The	Polish	Peasant	(1918),	noting	that	a	
reconstitution	of	social	behaviour	is	occurring	in	the	industrialized	urban	city.		
Throughout	the	article	Mangin	demonstrates	a	nuanced	understanding	of	the	
culture	of	shantytowns.		He	views	the	organization	of	communities	as	part	of	the	
urbanization	process.			
						 In	a	paper	published	the	following	year,	Turner	uses	his	Peruvian	data	to	
construct	a	transitional	model	of	city	growth	(Turner	1968).		He	had	people	moving	
to	the	core	of	Lima;	then,	when	crowding	became	a	problem,	people	moved	to	the	
outskirts,	after	which	time	the	outskirts	became	consolidated,	with	industry	and	
commerce	emerging	there.		This	is	not	far	off	the	mark,	at	least	on	the	surface.			
						 While	Turner	focused	on	the	physical	development	of	the	city	as	a	planner,	
Mangin	emphasized	the	social	life	of	the	city.		He	noted	that	families	were	complex,	
although	the	general	organization	of	a	household	was	nuclear	and	bilateral.		While	
some	family	members	fell	into	hopelessness	and	depression,	others	rose.		It	was	not	
possible	to	say	that	the	city	contributed	to	social	alienation	and	setbacks.		Part	of	the	
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problem	with	Lima,	he	surmised,	was	the	lack	of	public	institutions	in	which	new	
Limeños	could	place	their	trust.		Setbacks	aside,	Mangin	stressed	the	economic	
vibrancy	of	these	new	communities	and	their	desire	to	progress.		This	desire	to	
progress	was	picked	up	by	anthropologist	Karsten	Paeerregaard	in	his	study	of	
Tapeños	in	the	1990s	(Paerrgaard	1997).		It	was	noted	by	Peruvian	and	non‐
Peruvian	anthropologists	in	the	1980s	(Smith	1988,	Matos	1984,	Gölte	and	Adams	
1987),	and	in	the	1970s	by	Susan	Lobo	in	Callao	(1982).			
						 In	the	picture	Mangin	paints,	migrants	are	protagonists	in	their	futures	in	the	
city,	futures	that	are	often	envisioned	in	relation	to	others	in	the	city.		Migrants	build	
schools	because	they	want	their	children	to	have	the	education	that	they	did	not.		
Access	to	mass	media	ensures	that	people	are	more	informed	about	daily	life	and	
the	rest	of	the	world	than	ever	before.			
						 People	acculturate	“to	defend	themselves	(Mangin	1967:79).”		Indeed,	from	
the	accounts	and	observations	I	made,	defending	oneself	is	what	one	does	in	Lima	as	
a	newcomer.		People	learn	the	language,	especially	the	slang	to	demonstrate	that	
they	are	in	the	know.		One	also	learns	how	people	negotiate	life.		People	learn	to	
distrust	everyone	and	to	cultivate	a	wide	network	of	people	from	whom	they	can	
draw	support	because	they	never	know	when	their	fortune	will	change	or	when	
they	will	need	someone	to	do	them	a	favour	or	provide	a	service.		People	often	find	
themselves	accumulating	knowledge	on	diverse	matters:	legal,	political,	building	
trades,	commerce,	etc.		This	occurs	because	one	has	to	keep	checks	on	others.		If	
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people	do	not	know	something	about	something,	they	are	vulnerable	to	the	cunning,	
or	viveza,	of	others	who	do	know.			
						 As	opposed	to	popular	belief,	barriada	folk	do	not	all	vote	for	radical	
candidates,	even	to	this	day.		Mangin	argued	that	they	prefer	safe	bets,	like	the	
paternalistic	caudillo	populist	leader	Odría.		This	does	not	hold	for	everyone,	but	it	
certainly	holds	for	some	people.		I	will	have	more	to	say	about	this	paradox	later.		
Mangin	sums	up	his	assessment	of	Lima’s	barriadas:	
The	dominant	ideology	of	most	of	the	active	barriada	people	appeared	to	be	
very	similar	to	the	beliefs	of	the	operator	of	a	small	business	in	the	19th	
century	England	or	the	United	States.		These	can	be	summed	up	in	the	familiar	
and	accepted	maxims:	Work	hard,	save	your	money,	trust	only	family	
members	(and	them	not	too	much),	outwit	the	state,	vote	conservatively	if	
possible,	but	always	in	your	own	economic	interest;	educate	your	children	for	
their	future	and	as	old	age	insurance	for	yourself.		Aspirations	are	toward	
improvement	of	the	local	situation	with	the	hope	that	children	will	enter	the	
professional	class.		All	of	the	above	statements	pertain	perfectly	to	favelas10	
(Mangin	1967:85).					
		
						 If	we	follow	Mangin	here,	barriada	people	are	just	like	people	from	the	United	
States,	except	they	are	living	like	people	did	in	the	19th	century.		If	people	continue	
this	way,	someday	they	will	reach	the	level	of	progress	that	one	can	enjoy	in	the	
United	States.		It	is	impossible	to	resist	the	draw	of	modernity,	it	would	appear.		The	
scorn	of	more	privileged	and	refined	segments	of	the	population	of	Lima	is	
unfounded.		The	poor,	contrary	to	popular	belief,	are	social	progressives	that	seek	
social	mobility.		Mangin	adds	that	while	they	maintain	some	semblance	to	small	
town	sociability,	with	a	tendency	toward	gregariousness,	this	only	persists	because	
																																																								
10	The	Brazilian	equivalent	of	barriadas.	
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of	their	defensive	position	vis‐à‐vis	public	institutions	and	the	rest	of	the	population	
in	private	housing	(Mangin	1967:90).			
						 In	a	collection	of	essays	edited	by	Mangin	in	1970,	he	criticizes	Oscar	Lewis	
and	his	culture	of	poverty	theory,	with	its	insistence	that	the	culture	of	poverty	
represented	a	subculture	of	Western	society,	“with	its	own	structure	and	rationale,	a	
way	of	life	handed	on	from	generation	to	generation	along	family	lines	(Lewis	1961,	
cited	in	Mangin	1970:xvii).”		Mangin’s	objection	is	based	on	his	interpretation	that	
Lewis	is	being	“cyclical,”	and	that	his	theory	“does	not	account	for	change	(Mangin	
1970:xvii).”		He	takes	issue	with	Lewis’s	purported	view	that	the	culture	of	poverty	
is	pervasive,	stating	that	he	believes	“…the	opportunity	for	autonomous	behaviour	
that	reflects	some	control	over	one’s	destiny,	and	the	possibility	of	realizing	a	
portion	of	the	desirable	goals	of	a	society	are	not	associated	with	the	culture	of	
poverty	as	described	by	Lewis.”		(Mangin	1970:xxiii)		Mangin	maintains	that	
migrants	to	Lima,	in	organizing	invasions,	creating	their	own	political	bodies,	and	
generating	institutions	that	provide	credit	and	mutual	assistance,	defy	Lewis’s	
notions	that	a	culture	of	poverty	exists.						
						 My	reading	of	Lewis	(1959,	1961,	1963)	suggests	that	he	concerned	himself	
more	with	compiling	the	voices	of	some	very	trusted	collaborators	to	give	his	
readers	a	sense	of	life	from	the	vantage	point	of	families	that	had	migrated	to	the	
city	from	rural	Mexico.		His	work	provides	an	emic	perspective	of	life	in	the	
urbanization	process	in	Mexico	City	in	the	1950s	that	is	brilliant	for	its	depth,	
commitment,	patience	and	suspension	of	disbelief	(at	least	in	his	ethnographic	
	 94
work).		He	focused	on	the	micro‐dynamics	of	families	caught	up	in	the	rush	of	the	
new	city,	at	a	point	in	time	when	behaviours	and	expectations	about	how	to	behave	
in	the	city	were	being	established.		The	text	can	be	read	from	multiple	angles,	as	his	
collaborators	were	given	the	opportunity	to	steer	the	text	in	directions	that	they	
saw	as	being	relevant.					
						 The	concept	of	the	culture	of	poverty	is	much	more	nuanced	than	Mangin	
would	have	us	believe	(Lewis	2011[1961]:xxxvi–xliii).		He	is	hardly	unaware	of	the	
changes	that	were	occurring	in	the	city.		In	the	introduction	to	the	Children	of	
Sanchez,	he	wrote	that	“Many	of	the	traits	of	the	subculture	of	poverty	can	be	
viewed	as	attempts	at	local	solutions	for	problems	not	met	by	existing	institutions	
and	agencies	because	the	people	are	not	eligible	for	them,	cannot	afford	them,	or	are	
suspicious	of	them	(Lewis	2011[1961]:xxxix).”		Mangin,	Turner,	Matos	Mar	and	
other	analysts	note	the	formation	of	parallel	institutions	to	meet	the	needs	of	
migrants	in	cities.		Uniquely,	at	least	for	his	time,	Lewis	noted	that	the	sub‐culture	of	
poverty	had	“a	residual	quality	in	the	sense	that	its	members	are	attempting	to	
utilize	and	integrate	into	a	workable	way	of	life	the	remnants	of	beliefs	and	customs	
of	diverse	origins.”		The	scope	of	Lewis’	theory	is	intriguing.		He	writes:	
The	culture	or	subculture	of	poverty	comes	into	being	in	a	variety	of	historical	
contexts.		Most	commonly	it	develops	when	a	stratified	social	and	economic	
system	is	breaking	down	or	is	being	replaced	by	another,	as	in	the	case	of	the	
transition	from	feudalism	to	capitalism	or	during	the	industrial	revolution.		
Sometimes	it	results	from	imperial	conquest	in	which	the	conquered	are	
maintained	in	a	servile	status	which	may	continue	for	generations	(Lewis	
2011[1961]:xxxvii).											
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						 In	short,	Lewis	realized	that	cultures	undergo	dramatic	changes,	and,	that	in	
the	process	of	these	changes	people	are	forced	to	resort	to	tactics,	in	opposition	to	
strategies	of	subordination,	which,	may,	in	many	circumstances	work	to	their	
disadvantage	as	well.		Mangin	rightly	criticizes	the	tendentious	nature	of	Lewis’s	
work,	however,	in	asserting,	for	example,	that	cultural	contact	between	different	
cultures	results	in	a	pauperization	and	trauma.			
						 It	should	be	noted,	though,	that	both	Lewis	and	Mangin	suffer	from	the	
crusading	impulse	of	middle	class	professionals	from	a	society	that	positions	itself	at	
the	pinnacle	of	human	development.		While	Mangin	opts	for	positive	behavioural	
reinforcement,	Lewis	takes	a	revisionist	tack,	focusing	on	the	negative	with	a	hope	
for	social	reform,	positing	by	implication	a	moral	mainstream.		He	wants	to	see	
reforms	toward	“a	more	equitable	distribution	of	the	growing	national	wealth	and	a	
greater	equality	of	sacrifice	during	the	difficult	period	of	industrialization	(Lewis	
2011[1961]:xliii).”		Lewis	was	attempting	to	refute	the	means	by	which	everyone	
arrives	at	the	same	end,	it	appears.				
						 Mangin	apparently	was	aware	of	the	contradictions	in	his	position.		He	wrote,	
“When	rural	people	migrate	to	cities,	however,	the	type	of	limited	aspiration	
encountered	in	the	closed	community	can	rarely	continue	for	more	than	one	
generation	(Mangin	1970:xxviii).”		He	acknowledges	the	global	peril	in	pursuing	a	
development	agenda	based	on	capitalist	consumer	societies.		Near	the	end	of	the	
introduction	to	his	1970	book	he	cites	Edward	Sapir’s	grave	assessment	of	Western	
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modernization,	after	acknowledging	the	resentment	expressed	in	the	work	of	Franz	
Fanon:	
The	transformation	of	ends	is	of	the	greatest	cultural	importance	because	it	
acts	as	a	powerful	force	for	the	preservation	of	culture	in	levels	in	which	a	
fragmentary	economic	functioning	of	the	individual	is	inevitable.		So	long	as	
the	individual	retains	a	sense	of	control	over	the	major	goods	of	life,	he	is	able	
to	take	his	place	in	the	cultural	patrimony	of	his	people.		Now	that	the	major	
goods	of	life	have	shifted	largely	from	the	realm	of	immediate	to	that	of	remote	
ends,	it	becomes	a	cultural	necessity	for	all	who	would	not	be	looked	upon	as	
disinherited	to	share	in	the	pursuit	of	these	remoter	ends.		No	harmony	and	
depth	of	life,	no	culture,	is	possible	when	activity	is	well‐nigh	circumscribed	by	
the	sphere	of	immediate	ends	and	when	functioning	within	that	sphere	is	so	
fragmentary	as	to	have	no	inherent	intelligibility	or	interest.		Here	lies	the	
grimmest	joke	of	our	present	American	civilization.		The	vast	majority	of	us,	
deprived	of	any	but	an	insignificant	and	culturally	abortive	share	in	the	
satisfaction	of	their	immediate	wants	of	mankind,	are	further	deprived	of	both	
opportunity	and	stimulation	to	share	in	the	production	of	non‐utilitarian	
values.		Part	of	the	time	we	are	dray	horses;	the	rest	of	the	time	we	are	listless	
consumers	of	goods	which	have	received,	no	least	impress	of	our	personality.		
In	other	words,	our	spiritual	selves	go	hungry,	for	the	most	part,	pretty	much	
all	of	the	time	(Sapir	in	Mangin	1970:xxxviii–xxxviv).	
	
						 It	turns	out	that	Mangin,	despite	his	misgivings	toward	Lewis,	has	some	
misgivings	about	the	progress	for	which	he	advocates.		What	is	unfathomable	is	why	
Mangin	would	come	out	in	favour	of	self‐development.		He	does	acknowledge	that	
the	culture	of	poverty	theory	has	some	explanatory	power	for	some	people	and	
families	that	he	encountered	in	the	barriadas	of	Lima,	however	it	is	not,	as	he	clearly	
states,	indicative	of	the	social	reality	that	exists	there.		After	indicting	consumer	
capitalism,	he	turns	to	an	article	by	John	Turner	(1970)	promoting	the	desirability	
of	self‐help	housing	as	opposed	to	state‐sponsored	housing	schemes	(a	clear	
broadside	to	the	state	organized	housing	and	community	models	being	promoted	by	
the	left‐leaning	nationalist	revolutionary	government	of	Velasco	at	the	time).		
	 97
						 I	think	Lewis	intended	a	moral	indictment	of	the	progress	that	was	not	only	
occurring	in	the	working	class	areas	of	Latin	American	cities,	but	also	across	the	
whole	planet.		He	asked	us	to	question	what	kind	of	reality	we	lived	in	and	how	our	
way	of	living	affected	others.		He	questioned	machismo,	unemployment,	
individualist	egoism	(a	core	value	of	capitalist	democracy),	and	documented	the	
contradictions	inherent	in	community,	the	individual	and	the	modern	nation	state	in	
modernist	cities.		Lewis	did	not	select	data	to	either	support	the	view	that	people	
wanted	capitalist	progress,	or	on	the	contrary,	that	they	wanted	to	live	in	a	socialist	
state	free	of	class	distinctions.		But,	he	seems	to	assume	the	ideological	role	of	
“moral	demagogue,”	instead	of	promoting	any	real	alternative	vision	for	humanity.		
That	leads	one	to	ask:	By	whose	set	of	morals	would	he	have	people	behaving?			
						 I	believe	that	Lewis’s	work	was	tarnished	because	it	was	too	realistic	for	the	
veiled	ideological	projects	of	scholars	like	Mangin	and	Turner	(despite	Turner’s	
insistence	that	he	is	an	anarchist).		Much	was	at	stake	during	the	time	that	frames	
this	debate.		People	were	torn	between	two	visions	of	the	world,	both	grotesquely	
exaggerated	by	their	proponents.		Communists	were	cast	as	austere	authoritarians	
who	stifled	freedom,	whereas	capitalists,	with	self‐regulating	economies	and	liberal	
democracy,	were	viewed	as	greedy	opportunists	with	an	insatiable	appetite	for	
profit.		What	was	the	reality	behind	these	caricatures?	
						 Perhaps	if	Lewis’s	approach	had	become	the	norm,	policy	might	have	taken	a	
different	direction.		But,	policy	still	would	not	have	questioned	the	teleological	view	
that	all	roads	lead	to	industrial	capitalism.		We	must	ask	who	stood	to	gain	and	what	
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set	of	practices	and	ideals	would	be	promoted.		What	I	am	defending	in	Lewis	is	his	
desire	to	render	the	world	of	social	aspirants	in	their	own	terms	with	a	focus	on	the	
details	of	their	everyday	lives.		His	representation	of	the	Sanchez	family	displays	a	
remarkable	capacity	for	self‐reflection	and	compassion	that	is	rich	and	open	to	
multiple	readings,	something	not	found	in	many	texts,	or	assessments	of	those	who	
are	subjects	of	power.		People	are	capable	of	recognizing	the	injustice	of	behaviour	
that	they	have	suffered	and	also	capable	of	forgiving	others.		The	text	does	not	
provide	easy	answers	or	pave	over	the	contradictions	of	adhering	to	liberal	
economic	principles.								
						 For	the	sake	of	clarity,	I	distinguish	my	analysis	here	from	that	of	Mangin	and	
Lewis.		My	discomfort	arises	from	their	support	for	a	model	of	development	that	
sees	the	self	assuming	responsibility	for	their	own	circumstances.		The	intention	of	
Mangin	and	Turner,	like	that	of	Lewis,	does	not	seem	to	have	been	to	subject	more	
vulerable	social	actors	to	new	regimes	of	domination.		Lewis’s	efforts	were	
appropriated	by	conservative	elites	looking	for	a	moral	legitimation	to	support	their	
liberal	projects	for	the	less	privileged	classes.		Seeing	them	as	being	trapped	in	a	
culture	of	poverty	not	only	explained	their	economic	marginalization,	but	it	justified	
the	paternalistic	interventions	that	made	conservative	groups	look	live	benevolent	
philanthropists.		Recognition	that	the	poor	were	more	progressive	and	organized	
than	Lewis	proposed	with	his	culture	of	poverty	thesis	(while	his	narratives	
indicated	the	opposite)	and	that	they	indeed	wanted	some	form	of	social	and	
economic	progress,	also	had	unintended	consequences.			Here,	I	see	a	parallel	with	
the	recent	work	of	Verónica	Schild	and	her	concept	of	a	market	citizen	who	reflects	
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liberal	economic	notions	of	how	an	individual	ought	to	function	(Schild	2000:4).		
Under	such	a	conceptualization	of	the	individual,	we	are	all	responsible	for	the	
choices	that	we	make	and	are	expected	to	make	rational	decisions	among	multiple	
options	available	to	us.		These	choices,	by	extension,	in	accord	with	liberal	market	
principles,	are	to	realize	the	potential	of	each	individual.		Those	who	do	not	
“succeed”	or	reject	the	competition	involved	in	getting	into	a	privileged	position,	or	
who	do	not	stand	on	an	equal	footing,	hold	themselves	responsible	for	their	
“failings.”		Such	a	view	ignores	the	complexity	of	the	social	world	of	many	actors	and	
treats	all	social	actors	as	if	they	had	similar	opportunities	(in	a	system	with	obvious	
structural	inequalities),	taking	exceptional	cases	as	representative	of	the	
possibilities	available	to	all.		In	the	last	chapter	of	this	dissertation,	I	delve	more	into	
the	emotional‐behavioural	contradictions	inherent	in	the	liberal	project	of	limited	
good	for	a	limited	number	of	people.					
						 Social	thinker	Raymond	Williams,	in	his	writings	on	the	relationship	between	
dominant,	residual,	and	emergent	cultures,	provides	a	processual	approach	to	look	
at	the	meeting	of	migrants	with	dominant	liberal	notions	of	progress	in	Lima,	even	
though	he	did	not	have	the	meeting	of	different	cultures	in	mind.		His	ideas	push	the	
debate	a	little	further	than	simply	noting	that	people	are	adapting	to	their	new	
environment.		Williams	defines	the	residual	as:	
…effectively	formed	in	the	past,	but	as	an	effective	element	of	the	present.		
Thus	certain	experiences,	meanings,	and	values	which	cannot	be	expressed	or	
substantially	verified	in	terms	of	the	dominant	culture,	are	nevertheless	lived	
and	practised	on	the	basis	of	the	residue	–cultural	as	well	as	social‐	of	some	
previous	social	and	cultural	institution	or	formation	(Williams	1977:122).		
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						 The	residual,	he	notes,	cannot	be	separated	from	dominant	cultural	forms.		
There	is	always	a	risk	of	allowing	parallel	cultures	to	persist	unchecked.		Therefore,	
it	becomes	necessary	to	incorporate	residual	elements	by	“reinterpretation,	
dilution,	projection,	discriminating	inclusion	and	exclusion	(Willams	1977:123).”		
For	him,	emergent	are:	
…new	meanings	and	values,	new	practices,	new	relationships	and	kinds	of	
relationships	that	are	continually	being	created.		But	it	is	exceptionally	difficult	
to	distinguish	between	those	which	are	really	elements	of	some	new	phase	of	
dominant	culture	(and	in	this	sense	‘species‐specific’)	and	those	which	are	
substantially	alternative	or	oppositional	to	it:	emergent	in	the	strict	sense,	
rather	than	merely	novel.		Since	we	are	always	considering	relations	within	a	
cultural	process,	definitions	of	the	emergent,	as	of	the	residual,	can	be	made	
only	in	relation	to	a	full	sense	of	the	dominant	(Williams	1977:123).	
	
						 To	understand	Williams’s	idea	of	the	dominant,	we	must	make	reference	to	his	
idea	of	hegemony.		He	defined	hegemony	as:		
“…a	whole	body	of	practices	and	expectations,	over	the	whole	of	living:	our	
senses	and	assignments	of	energy,	our	shaping	perceptions	of	ourselves	and	
our	world.		It	is	a	lived	system	of	meanings	and	values	–constitutive	and	
constituting‐	which	as	they	are	experienced	as	practices	appear	as	reciprocally	
confirming.		It	thus	constitutes	a	sense	of	reality	for	most	people	in	society,	a	
sense	of	absolute	because	experienced	reality	beyond	which	it	is	very	difficult	
for	most	members	of	the	society	to	move,	in	most	areas	of	their	lives.		It	is,	that	
is	to	say,	in	the	strongest	sense	a	‘culture’,	but	a	culture	which	has	also	to	be	
seen	as	the	lived	dominance	and	subordination	of	particular	classes	(Williams	
1977:109).”		
	
						 I	do	not	bring	Williams	into	this	discussion	to	interrogate	barriada	culture.		On	
the	contrary,	I	want	to	apply	his	notion	of	a	selective	tradition	as	offering	“a	
historical	and	cultural	ratification	of	a	contemporary	order”	(Williams	1977:116)	to	
the	analysts	and	figures	who	have	seen	capitalism	and	free	markets	as	the	best	
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possible	solution	for	the	masses	of	migrants	who	would	come	to	make	up	Lima.		In	
the	adoption	of	self‐help	as	a	strategy	for	housing	in	developing	countries,	the	
World	Bank,	the	Peace	Corps,	U.S.	government	departments	and	foreign	government	
departments	began	a	recasting	of	self‐help,	downplaying	the	complex	emergence	
and	functioning	of	this	means	of	homeownership.		The	idea	of	an	independent	and	
resourceful	progressive	working	class	citizen	was	more	amenable	with	hegemonic	
capitalist	views	than	an	insurgent	indignant	citizen.	
						 In	the	previous	history	of	self‐help	development	we	could	see	the	interplay	of	
forces	that	sought	to	capture	the	underground	current	that	seemed	to	guide	most	
land	invasions.		The	recasting	of	these	invasions	as	self‐help,	or	as	a	grasp	for	
progress,	however,	was	an	ideological	project	to	inscribe	meaning	unto	these	
events,	a	meaning	that	worked	to	occlude	the	underlying	political	and	economic	
interests	behind	these	developments	and	the	tensions	that	emerged	when	people	
began	progressing.		The	intentions	of	Mangin	and	Turner	may	not	have	been	to	
provide	an	interpretation	of	events	that	would	lend	itself	to	such	a	project,	
nevertheless,	their	positive	reading	of	self‐help	foreshadowed	a	tendency	for	
decades	to	come	in	places	like	Peru.			
						 The	transfer	of	survival,	or	pioneer	tactics,	often	a	result	and	part	of	a	culture	
of	patronage	and	exploitation,	seems	to	have	been	a	distinct	feature	of	the	earliest	
invasions	that	began	to	occur	in	the	1940s	and	have	continued	up	until	the	present.		
How	this	behaviour	has	been	interpreted,	as	we	can	see	from	assessments	like	that	
of	Mangin	or	Turner,	seems	to	coincide	with	Williams’	observations	about	how	
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dominant	cultures	interact	with	subordinate	groups	by	incorporating	residual	and	
emergent	elements	into	a	larger	project	of	liberal	and	neoliberal	development.		Even	
progressive	centrist	politicians	like	Belaúnde	have	not	lost	the	opportunity	to	
incorporate	a	communal	work	spirit,	something	intrinsic	to	most	agrarian	societies,	
as	part	of	his	national	development	program.		
					The	strategy,	as	we	have	seen,	was	to	extol	what	was	a	necessity,	and/or	a	social	
mechanism	for	extracting	collective	labour,	as	a	virtue.		At	the	same	time,	the	
political	networks	of	patronage,	identified	by	historians	of	the	time	period,	are	
downplayed	and	the	behaviour	is	interpreted	as	evidence	that	barriada	dwellers	
were	demonstrating	their	desire	to	progress,	much	like	their	more	affluent	
counterparts.			
					A	necessary	counterpart	to	this	desire	to	progress	has	been	the	anecdote	of	the	
poor	migrant	who	finds	success	in	the	city.		The	innate	entrepreneurial	spirit,	so	
often	touted	by	intellectuals,	journalists,	television	programs	and	politicians,	is	a	
sine	qua	non	of	this	school	of	thought.		Apparently,	we	are	led	to	believe,	commerce	
and	trade,	something	that	has	been	going	on	for	thousands,	if	not	tens	of	thousands	
of	years	between	different	human	groups,	is	a	precursor	and	necessary	precondition	
for	the	more	enlightened	system	of	capitalistic	democracy.	
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Chapter 4 —The Legacy of Self-Help Housing 
	
						 After	looking	at	the	emergence	of	self‐help	housing,	I	turn	now	to	what	
happened	after	Odría.		As	we	discussed	before,	Pardo’s	second	government	(1956–
1962)	created	a	commission	to	study	the	housing	problem	in	Lima.		Aside	from	
implementing	some	experiments	in	sites	and	services	models,	one	of	the	most	
important	laws	to	be	passed	in	the	second	half	of	the	20th	century	for	most	
inhabitants	of	Lima’s	sprawling	barrios	was	the	1961	Barriada	Law,	or	Law	13517,	
as	it	is	known	in	constitutional	law.		While	it	forbade	further	invasions,	it	recognized	
invasions	that	had	occurred	up	to	September	20,	1960	and	extended	the	right	to	a	
provisional	title,	which	was	held	to	be	a	de	facto	title	to	the	lands	that	squatters11	
had	settled.		The	law	set	out	rights	and	obligations	of	both	the	state	and	squatters	in	
founding	and	establishing	communities	that	would	work	toward	formal	
incorporation	into	the	existent	formal	land	market.		It	set	out	guidelines	for	state	
expropriation	whereby	squatters	would	have	to	repay	the	state	at	no	more	than	6%	
interest	over	a	period	of	nine	years	for	lands	that	the	state	bought	at	fair	market	
value.		It	set	limits	to	how	many	lots	people	could	own	and	whether	they	could	
participate	in	invasions	if	they	still	had	property.		The	idea	here	was	to	eliminate	
duplicity	in	claims,	more	commonly	known	as	land	trafficking.	
																																																								
11	In	Peruvian	jurisprudence	the	term	posesionario	is	often	used	to	refer	to	people	who	occupy	land	
that	already	has	an	owner,	whether	it	be	the	state	or	a	private	party.		My	collaborators	often	
preferred	this	term	because	it	confers	particular	rights	to	people	who	occupy	lands	out	of	necessity	
and	have	the	legal	possibility	of	obtaining	legal	injunctions	that	will	award	them	title	to	the	land.		A	
gloss	for	the	term	in	English	is	squatter,	however	it	will	become	clear	that	the	legal	system	in	Peru	is	
reluctant	to	favour	squatter	rights	over	those	of	property	owners	for	reasons	that	will	become	
apparent	later.	
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						 What	squatters	ought	to	pay	remains	a	thorny	issue	to	this	day.		Some	feel	that	
they	should	pay	no	more	than	what	the	land	is	worth.		What	happens	though,	is	that	
land	assayers	value	land	according	to	the	prevailing	market	values.		This	means	that	
squatters	often	pay	for	their	own	sweat	equity,	which	leads	to	demands	that	lands	
be	appraised	at	pre‐invasion	values	before	people	moved	in	and	made	
improvements.		While	the	Barriada	Law	of	1961	ushered	in	formal	changes	to	the	
relationship	between	squatters	and	landowners,	it	still	favoured	landowners	over	
the	squatters	who	had	a	legitimate	claim	to	land	and	housing.		
						 Another	result	of	the	law	was	the	creation	of	UPIS	(Urbanizaciones	Populares	
de	Interés	Social),	or	Social	Interest	Popular	Urbanizations.		The	idea	here	was	for	
the	government	to	build	site‐and‐service	lots	that	were	affordable	for	even	the	
poorest	resident.		The	nuclei	that	were	constructed	around	Ciudad	de	Díos	were	one	
instance	of	this	policy.		Peruvian	sociologist	Gustavo	Riofrío	analyzes	the	impact	of	
the	law	in	the	succeeding	Belaúnde	government,	noting	that	in	practice	the	
government	abandoned	the	initiatives	set	out	upon	by	Pardo’s	government,	
generating	unprecedented	violent	invasions.		By	the	end	of	the	1960s,	people	
stopped	demanding	that	the	government	build	site‐and‐service	projects.		In	the	end,	
the	government	created	traced	lots	for	those	unable	to	qualify	for	mortgages	and	
live	in	the	modernist	projects	in	the	core	of	Lima.		Instead	of	demanding	affordable	
housing,	argues	Riofrío,	people	settled	for	land,	and	the	government	understood	its	
position	as	a	provider	of	that	land	and	not	much	more	(Riofrío	1990:34–36).				
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						 After	Pardo,	there	was	a	short	military	coup	before	civilian	elections	saw	the	
runner‐up	in	the	1958	elections	take	control	for	five	very	tumultuous	years.		
Architect	Fernando	Belaúnde	Terry	(1963–1968)	took	office	in	1963	promising	
sweeping	changes	to	the	state	and	its	role	in	development.		Bromley	discusses	his	
policies	in	some	detail	(Bromley	2003:284–285).		In	what	some	viewed	as	a	
mirroring	of	the	Peace	Corps,	Belaúnde	formed	his	own	core	of	community	social	
workers	called	Coopop,	or	Popular	Cooperation.12		The	idea,	it	appeared,	was	to	lend	
a	helping	hand	to	local	communities	and	work	in	collaboration	with	them	to	develop	
the	country.		In	the	radical	political	climate	of	the	time	many	community	organizers	
were	accused	of	prosyletizing	communities	for	leftist	parties.			
						 Although	Belaúnde	promised	housing	for	all,	what	he	managed	to	deliver	was	
quite	different.		He	embarked	on	the	construction	of	multiple	apartment	complexes	
for	the	people.		This	appealed	to	his	architectural	sensibilities.		He	felt	that	a	city	
ought	to	be	compact,	have	basic	services,	lend	itself	to	the	automobile,	or	have	
access	to	key	transportation	routes	and	create	opportunities	for	order	and	
commerce	(Bromley	2003:284–285).		The	architecture	of	this	time	is	grandiose	and	
modernist	with	a	tropical	appeal.		San	Felipe	in	Jesús	María	is	emblematic	of	
Belaúnde’s	vision.		The	residence	is	an	economically	independent	core	of	apartment	
																																																								
12	The	adjective	“popular”	is	often	used	as	a	politically	neutral	term	to	refer	to	the	working	class	in	
Peru.		Perhaps	it	goes	beyond	class	usage	as	the	term	also	incorporates	indigenous	populations	that	
have	come	to	the	city.		Marxists	refer	to	the	same	group	as	the	lumpen	proletariat.		A	self‐referential		
term	used	by	the	majority	that	is	striving	to	improve	their	lot	would	be	el	pueblo,	or	the	people,	
roughly	in	English.		From	experience	the	line	between	the	people	and	those	who	are	above	them	is	a	
fine	one,	defined	by	taste,	attitude,	location,	language,	social	contacts,	and	the	standpoint	of	the	
observer.		Pamplona	belongs	to	el	pueblo,	and	those,	like	myself,	politicians,	state	professionals,	NGO	
workers,	missionaries,	priests,	nuns	and	Peruvians	who	have	moved	out	or	now	have	more	are	seen	
as	being	in	opposition	to	the	people.	
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towers	for	middle	class	professionals	and	entrepreneurs.		Some	1600	units	were	
built.		One	of	the	first	area	supermarkets	belonging	to	the	Wong	family	became	an	
anchor	store	in	Lima	and	at	a	national	level.		Javier	Prado	and	other	main	avenues	
that	connect	with	the	downtown	core	criss‐cross	the	district.		It	also	reflected	the	
importance	that	commerce,	preferably	on‐the‐books	commerce,	would	come	to	
have.	
						 Later,	retrospective	analyses	of	the	period	revealed	a	peculiar	trend.		While	
residences	like	Jesús	María	were	built	ostensibly	for	the	masses,	the	actual	building	
cost	of	the	housing	was	such	that	only	those	with	stable	formal	income,	like	middle	
class	professionals	could	qualify	for	the	mortgages.		Sociologist	Gustavo	Riofrío	
identified	this	two‐faced	strategy	toward	housing	in	Lima.		One	face	of	the	
government	spoke	of	building	affordable	houses	for	those	willing	to	pay;	the	other	
face	condoned	and	collaborated	with	poorer	working	class	workers	to	occupy	land	
and	build	their	own	homes	(Riofrío	1990).			
						 Disappointed	with	promised	reforms	to	the	agricultural	sector	that	did	not	
occur,	a	left	leaning	nationalist	military	dictatorship	took	the	reins	of	power	in	Peru.		
Throughout	the	1960s	a	more	radical	core	of	military	officers	was	groomed	for	the	
possibility	that	the	military	might	one	day	gain	control	of	government.		The	
character	of	this	military	junta	was	very	different	from	previous	attempts	at	
imposed	change.			
						 Carlos	Delgado,	a	sociologist	with	visions	of	a	more	mobilized	and	politically	
active	population	created	SINAMOS	—a	play	on	the	words	“without	masters,”	in	
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Spanish.		The	project	was	very	much	a	conscious‐building	project	to	mobilize	people	
toward	the	development	of	national	industry	and	resource	extraction	for	the	nation.		
Bromley	describes	how	SINAMOS	incorporated	previous	state	development	
agencies,	like	Coopop,	in	the	newly	formed	ONDEPJOV	(Oficina	Nacional	de	Pueblos	
Jovenes),	and	many	left‐of‐centre	professionals	and	military	personnel,	to	
implement	its	alternative	development	schemes	(Bromley	2003:286–287).		The	
military	government	eschewed	the	use	of	the	former	term	barriada,	replacing	it	
with	pueblo	jóven	or	young	town,	in	an	attempt	to	inspire	hope	and	take	away	some	
of	the	stigma	no	doubt	attached	to	living	in	self‐help	housing.			
						 Don	Malvinas	recalled	in	his	interview	how	organizers	from	the	government	
came	and	helped	people	to	form	block	organizations	with	a	central	representative	
committee.		These	committees	were	overseen	by	different	offices	of	SINAMOS	that	
passed	on	information	to	these	groups	and	received	their	petitions.		The	legacy	of	
SINAMOS	was	the	sectorial	organization	that	we	see	in	present	neighbourhoods,	
according	to	Don	Malvinas.		From	what	I	could	tell,	while	the	desire	was	to	
administer	people	from	the	top‐down,	the	result,	as	we	will	see	in	the	next	section,	
was	to	create	an	effective	system	of	self‐government	that	could	petition	the	state	
when	land	possessors	desired	so	that	basic	services	and	rights	could	be	extended	to	
them.			
						 Critics	(usually	neoliberal)	viewed	the	government’s	project	as	authoritarian,	
as	an	imposition	of	the	will	of	the	government.		This	argument	is	still	prevalent	
today	when	people	urge	more	state	intervention	in	economic	and	social	issues.		But,	
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as	we	have	seen,	previous	governors	used	their	positions	to	promote	their	own	
housing	schemes,	as	well.		Qualification	of	Velasco’s	scheme	as	authoritarian	is	a	bit	
of	the	pot	calling	the	kettle	black.			
						 Anthropologist	Susan	Lobo	wrote	about	how	state	reorganizing	—by	
reassignment	lotteries—	in	her	research	site	in	Callao	effectively	relocated	people	
away	from	their	kin	in	the	1970s	(Lobo	1982).		In	this	sense,	the	government	did	
intervene	in	how	people	went	about	distributing	themselves;	however	this	
reorganization	was	a	result	of	the	impracticality	of	self‐help	surveying	practices	and	
the	lack	of	provisioning	for	public	infrastructure.		In	other	areas	like	Lima	South,	
however,	the	government	went	about	organizing	tens	of	thousands	of	lots	and	even	
setting	up	industrial	and	commercial	zones	for	municipalities.		Villa	El	Salvador,	
with	its	large	square	blocks	and	strong	industrial	furniture	and	textile	sector,	is	
emblematic	of	the	Velasco	area.		The	fingerprint	of	the	community	planning	of	
SINAMOS	is	an	indelible	mark	on	the	maps	of	Lima.		Some	parts	of	Pamplona	Alta,	if	
one	consults	the	map	previously	included,	bears	this	mark	with	its	large	blocks,	
ordered	streets	and	spacious	parks	being	indicative	of	the	urban	planning	of	this	
era.			
						 Gustavo	Riofrío	(1980),	in	an	assessment	of	development	strategies	in	
Pamplona	in	the	1970s,	after	the	famous	Pamplona	invasion	in	1971	that	resulted	in	
the	creation	of	SINAMOS	and	the	rise	of	planned	settlements,	was	critical	of	the	state	
and	the	rise	of	NGOs	and	philanthropic	organizations	that	promoted	self‐help	
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housing.		Riofrío	describes	the	efficacy	of	multiple	programs	that	were	begun	in	
Pamplona	Alta	in	the	1970s.			
						 Of	the	kindergarten,	primary	and	secondary	institutions	constructed	in	the	
area,	he	found	that	parents	often	provided	labour	and	made	up	for	construction	
materials	that	were	not	provided	by	the	government	for	additional	classrooms.		
Donations	were	a	necessity	for	the	completion	of	many	schools.		His	study	concludes	
that	the	combined	donations	of	the	state	and	philanthropists	are	“not	sufficient	to	
solve	the	educative	problems	in	the	zone,	but	they	are	sufficient	to	maintain	the	
population	in	a	clientalistic	attitude	toward	said	funds	and	agencies	(Riofrío	
1980:31).”		He	goes	on	to	criticize	the	lack	of	qualified	teachers	in	schools,	the	poor	
quality	of	instruction,	and	the	expectation	that	citizens	will	contribute	their	
resources	and	labour	to	make	up	for	state	and	private	deficits.	
						 His	assessment	of	state	public	health	institutions	—medical	posts	in	reality—	
in	the	area	are	equally	scathing	(Riofrío	1980:44–47).		Health	care	institutions	were	
underfunded	and	understaffed,	failing	to	meet	healthcare	benchmarks	for	the	
population	that	they	served.		The	root	causes	for	the	lack	of	funding	for	state	
institutions,	though,	is	only	hinted	at.		We	are	left	with	the	impression	that	the	
government	is	reneging	on	promises	or	unable	to	meet	a	swamping	demand.		Closer	
scrutiny	of	Riofrío’s	assessment	is	suggestive,	though.			
						 With	plans	to	bring	water	to	the	zone,	Riofrío	and	his	team	found	that	citizens	
were	shouldering	the	bill	for	the	installation	of	water.		He	denounces	state	
companies,	like	Electrolima,	for	awarding	contracts	to	bidders	without	public	
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solicitation.		Effectively,	citizens	were	being	asked	to	pay	for	public	infrastructure	
that	they	had	no	power	to	monitor	in	a	place	where	corruption	was	commonplace.	
						 Riofrío	went	on	to	describe	the	dynamic	that	had	existed	between	the	state	
and	Lima’s	barriadas	up	until	the	point	he	wrote	his	study	in	1980.		He	argued	that	
the	people	made	demands	on	the	state,	often	through	marches.		He	wrote:	
In	the	50s,	the	fight	was	for	housing	and	lots	in	the	sand	were	awarded.		Later	
the	invasion	of	lands	became	generalized	and	the	State	promised	to	help,	at	the	
same	time	that	it	repressed	them.		With	respect	to	this,	the	newspapers	at	the	
beginning	of	the	sixties	presented	a	rich	graphic	vision	of	the	demand‐
repression	[dynamic].		Simultaneoulsy,	the	Committee	of	Housing	(Junta	de	la	
Vivienda)	remodelled	old	barriadas,	offering	solutions	to	the	housing	problem	
and	the	police	evicted	invaders.	
When	the	obtainment	of	a	lot	became	an	accepted	mechanism	and	was	
recovered	by	the	bourgeois	as	a	“solution,”	due	to	the	lack	of	adequate	
housing,	the	population	demanded	minimum	living	amenities	for	their	
neighbourhoods:	schools	for	their	children,	medical	posts,	distribution	of	
water,	etc.		By	the	seventies,	the	magnitude	of	the	people	that	lived	in	
barriadas	overwhelmed	any	attempt	to	“donate”	and	“help”	whatever	school	
that	was	demanded;	and	the	barriadas	were	in	a	such	a	situation	that	they	
needed	services.		The	State	organized	the	population	on	a	large	scale	to	
generalize,	rationalize	and	bring	to	its	ultimate	consequence	communal	efforts.		
In	all	of	this	process,	the	population	has	demanded	more	than	the	State	could	
and	wanted	to	give,	obliging	the	State	to	give	political	support	—spectacular	
promises	accompanied	by	repression—	to	be	able	to	maintain	an	acceptable	
level	of	demands	(Riofrío	1980:80–81).	
	
						 The	massive	social	experiment	that	occurred	to	the	south	of	San	Juan	de	
Miraflores,	Villa	El	Salvador,	was	a	bold	step	that	the	government	took	in	organizing	
a	self‐supporting	district.		It	became	so	successful,	the	people	so	politically	
conscious,	that	the	State	was	forced	to	repress	their	demands,	to	pursue	community	
leaders,	according	to	Riofrío	(1980:82).		This	repression	would	reach	bitter	heights	
in	the	1980s	and	1990s	when	civil	war	broke	out	in	Perú.		Both	the	military	and	
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Sendero	Luminoso	murdered,	disappeared,	and	threatened	community	leaders	who	
refused	to	cooperate	with	their	particular	visions	for	the	nation	(Burt	2007).		These	
words	foreshadow	the	violence	that	would	be	released	upon	the	country	in	coming	
decades:	all	of	this	because	people	grew	tired	of	the	broken	promises,	false	hopes,	
abuse	of	authority,	and	constant	repressions.		
						 Anthropologist	Douglas	Uzzell	gave	a	perspective	on	the	bureaucracy	of	the	
1970s,	which	I	think	still	holds	true	to	this	day	(cf.	Huber	2008),	despite	ostensible	
moves	toward	transparency	and	a	focus	on	human	rights	(1974).		He	describes	the	
state	bureaucracy	as	a	black	box	play.		In	this	act,	cholos,	urbanized	rural	indigenous	
migrants,	make	demands	of	the	Creole	state	apparatus.		Lacking	resources	for	
bribes,	or	not	having	personal	contacts,	cholos	make	lengthy	solicitudes	in	eloquent	
language	to	receive	the	gracious	attention	of	bureaucrats.		Outcomes	are	
unpredictable	often,	ergo	the	black	box	analogy.		Fortunate	solicitors	may	have	a	
compadre	who	can	help,	or	maybe	they	manage	a	bribe,	and	in	some	cases	they	meet	
a	sympathetic	person.	
						 To	illustrate	his	point	Uzzell	considers	a	group	of	taxi	drivers	who	wanted	to	
gain	access	to	a	coveted	route	to	the	airport.		The	drivers	did	not	know	how	to	deal	
with	the	suspected	ministerial	connections	of	the	airport	manager	and	were	
unwilling	to	meet	his	demand	that	they	renew	their	fleet.		They	possibly	felt	that	he	
would	grant	access	for	some	sort	of	benefit	for	awarding	the	route	in	addition	to	his	
demand,	further	raising	the	cost	to	the	drivers.		A	political	alignment	with	the	
Velasco	regime	was	unwise	for	the	taxi	drivers	because	political	winds	are	often	
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unpredictable.		The	last	thing	they	needed	was	association	with	a	radical	political	
party	that	could	be	ousted	and	replaced	by	another	more	conservative	party.		As	a	
shot	in	the	dark,	they	wrote	a	letter	of	complaint	to	the	Ministry	of	Transportation.		
Fantastically,	when	it	appeared	that	the	government	would	eliminate	the	informal	
taxi	route,	the	letter	of	complaint	that	was	sent	to	the	Ministry	of	Transportation	
resulted	in	the	drivers	being	incorporated	into	another	route	that	had	only	a	few	
drivers.			
						 Uzzell	interprets	the	inability	of	the	incumbent	government	to	co‐opt	the	taxi	
drivers	as	a	testimony	of	their	ability	to	challenge	bureaucratic	plays.		It	is	
impossible	to	say	whether	the	government	submitted	to	them,	or,	whether,	
recognizing	the	power	of	unionized	drivers,	they	sought	to	diminish	their	power	by	
sanctioning	the	informal	drivers.		Uzzell	draws	attention	to	the	Law	of	Barriadas	
passed	in	1961,	claiming	it	as	a	similar	gesture	where	the	government	bends	to	
popular	demand,	attempting	to	gain	control	of	deviant	behaviour	by	condoning	it.			
						 The	case	here	is	germane	for	two	reasons.		It	shows	the	extent	to	which	formal	
institutions	work	as	a	toll	to	the	activity	of	common	citizens,	and	it	also	shows	how	
the	tactics	employed	by	the	people	are	picked	up	by	the	state	officials	and	turned	
against	them.		Uzzell	saw	this	as	a	potential	levelling	mechanism	for	cholos.		From	
my	ethnographic	work,	however,	it	is	hard	to	determine	where	this	wily	behaviour	
originates.		Interestingly	enough,	my	collaborators	were	almost	unanimous	in	
signalling	that	shady	dealing	was	often	initiated	from	above	and	that	they	were	
merely	adhering	to	the	rules	of	the	game.		This	negotiation	that	went	on	then,	and	
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likely	some	time	before	that,	and	that	still	continues	to	this	day,	adds	yet	another	
layer	to	the	complex	relationship	between	state	officials	—who	capture	the	state	
administrative	positions	for	personal	gain—	and	different	individuals	in	the	
populace.		One	wonders	how	far	such	a	relationship	affects	the	state’s	ability	to	
collect	taxes	for	public	services	and	whether	or	not	this	relationship	comes	to	bear	
on	the	provisioning	of	public	services.				
					 	As	for	philanthropic	efforts,	Riofrío	questions	their	efficacy	and	purpose.		
Intentions	aside,	because	people	can	have	good	intentions	and	still	work	against	the	
best	interests	of	a	population,	Riofrío	notes	the	tendency	of	projects	promoted	by	
OFASA,	USAID,	UNICEF	and	other	secular	and	non‐secular	groups	to	be	too	narrow	
in	their	focus.		This	creates	a	group	of	benefactors	who	become	desperately	
dependent	on	aid	for	their	communities.		He	also	questions	the	function	of	such	
projects.		For	him	they	are	used	to	mask	the	nefarious	effects	of	the	capitalist	system	
(Riofrío	1980:85–88).		The	behavioural	complex	described	by	Riofrío	is	referred	to	
locally	as	asistencialismo,	or	assistentialism.	
						 One	could	add	more	detail	to	the	sketch	given	by	Riofrío.		Philanthropic	
organizations	often	place	behavioural	expectations	on	the	community.		A	variety	of	
programs	establish	myriad	conditions.		For	instance,	some	groups	may	demand	an	
equal	contribution	from	the	community	for	projects	that	they	undertake.		An	
example	would	be	volunteer	organizations	that	come	to	build	stairs	or	other	public	
infrastructure	with	the	condition	that	the	community	raise	half	the	cost	of	materials	
and	participate	with	foreign	volunteers	that	gain	volunteer	capital	—a	formal	
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requirement	for	progression	in	their	studies.		Others	demand	a	nominal	fee	for	their	
donation.		An	example	of	this	would	be	organizations	that	build	temporary	wooden	
shacks	in	exchange	for	a	small	sum	of	money	and	the	labour	of	the	recipient	in	
constructing	the	home.		Conditions	like	maintaining	a	democratic	stable	and	
transparent	community	organization,	as	opposed	to	a	divisive	and	corrupt	one,	are	
favoured.		Groups	may	withdraw	aid	to	non‐compliant	sectors.		Monitoring	to	
ensure	compliance	with	philanthropic	organization	mandates	is	almost	always	
present.		The	techniques	employed	by	these	groups	is	not	unlike	that	described	by	
Schild	in	Chile	(Schild	2007).		She	noted	that	populations	are	often	corralled	into	
initiatives	that	are	mandated	by	funding	agencies	that	only	nominally	involve	a	
participatory	process.			
						 Indeed,	the	panorama	is	complex.		One	cannot	just	isolate	the	efforts	of	one	
group	because	the	municipal	government	and	central	government	ministries	often	
become	involved	with	events	that	are	promoted	by	philanthropic	organizations.		So,	
birth	control,	water	safety,	community	security,	child	rights,	campaigning	against	
alcoholism	and	domestic	abuse,	health	prevention	campaigns,	even	free	haircuts	
may	be	promoted	simultaneously.		It	is	not	uncommon	for	contradictory	messages	
to	coexist,	especially	when	it	comes	to	faith‐based	organizations	and	secular	
organizations.		Despite	their	differences,	philanthropic	and	state	collaborations	look	
to	create	a	particular	kind	of	subject,	whether	consciously	or	not,	because	they	are	
assigning	goals,	ideals,	and	behavioural	expectations	to	barriada	dwellers.		The	
participation	of	role	models,	local	middle	class	professionals	and	students,	or	
foreign	volunteers	adds	a	moralizing	layer	to	these	efforts.		One	is	led	to	believe	that	
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the	values	espoused	in	the	programs	being	promoted	are	a	requirement	for	social	
mobility.		Thanks	to	Riofrío	we	have	a	marker	for	when	these	behaviours	began	and	
how	they	operated	at	the	point	that	he	wrote	his	critique	of	development	practices	
in	Pamplona	in	the	1970s.		But,	as	we	saw	in	the	previous	chapter,	these	
interventions	were	underway	by	the	late	1950s	at	least	and	even	moreso	in	the	
1960s	with	the	Alliance	for	Progress	and	the	creation	of	the	Peace	Corps	and	its	
local	equivalents.				
						 At	the	end	of	the	1970s,	the	military	regime,	now	under	General	Francisco	
Morales‐Bermúdez	(1975–1980),	took	a	more	liberal	approach	to	housing,	in	the	
sense	that	it	decided	to	let	the	market	take	care	of	the	housing	needs	of	the	masses.		
SINAMOS	was	dismantled	in	1977,	two	years	after	Morales‐Bermúdez	came	to	
power.		Concessions	and	rights	won	in	the	1979	constitution,	after	protests	had	
brought	the	military	regime	to	the	negotiating	table,	were	a	resounding	victory	for	
social	progressives.		The	left	had	never	been	stronger	going	into	the	1980	elections.	
						 At	this	point,	it	is	worth	entering	into	a	short	exploration	of	the	1979	
Constitution,	which	was	hammered	out	between	representatives	of	APRA,	central	
political	parties	and	the	strengthened	democratic	left.		Article	10	of	the	Constitution	
stated	that	all	families	had	the	right	to	a	“decorous	home”.		Just	what	constitutes	a	
decorous	home	is	left	open	for	interpretation,	however	we	can	assume	that	the	
authors	were	conferring	the	right	to	enjoy	a	life	with	all	the	modern	amenities	
afforded	to	people	who	live	in	a	private	housing	project.		Here,	too,	are	inherent	
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ideals	about	what	kind	of	standard	of	living	people	ought	to	have	if	they	live	in	a	
modern	city.			
						 The	constitution	goes	on	to	discuss	the	right	of	families	to	housing,	food	and	
recreation	(Article	18).		It	was	important	to	add	that	laws	regulate	the	use	of	urban	
land	and	that	they	do	so	for	the	common	good	with	participation	of	local	
communities.		The	state	also	saw	a	role	for	itself	in	these	rights,	stating	that	it	would	
“promote	the	execution	of	public	and	private	urbanization	and	housing	programs.”		
It	did	not	stop	there.		The	state	promised	to	“support	and	stimulate	cooperatives,	
mutual	support	groups	and	mortgage	credit	for	self‐help	and	rentee	programs.		It	
even	vowed	to	give	tax	cuts	to	lower	construction	costs,	providing	interest	at	low	
rates	over	the	long	term,	a	promise	that	would	find	its	way	into	practice	with	the	
creation	of	the	Banco	de	Materiales,	or	Materials	Bank,	of	Belaúnde’s	second	
government	(1980–1985),	which	provided	building	materials	at	subsidized	interest	
rates	for	homeowners.	
						 Significantly,	the	constitution	obliged	private	property	owners	to	use	property	
with	social	interests	in	mind	(Articles	124	and	125).		The	operative	term	here	is	
interés	social,	as	opposed	to	the	common	good.		Common	good	is	often	interpreted	
by	courts	and	judges	quite	partially,	seeing	the	good	often	as	being	the	good	of	
commerce	and	growth	and	not	so	much	the	interest	of	groups	that	may	contend	
with	notions	of	public	good.		Public	good	seems	to	be	interpreted	in	a	similar	
fashion.		By	referring	to	social	interest,	the	Constitution	was	extending	a	right	of	
livelihood	to	all.		So,	if	one	belonged	to	an	indigenous	community	that	had	oil	
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beneath	their	land,	say,	they	would	have	legal	recourse	in	opposing	development	
projects.		In	the	case	of	Pamplona,	residents	could	invade	land,	even	private,	if	it	
could	be	argued	that	it	was	necessary	given	their	material	circumstances	and	their	
right	to	housing.		Like	liberal	values	such	as	equality	and	freedom,	the	right	to	land	
for	social	interest	is	frequently	used	to	demand	rights	that	are	withheld	in	practice.		
Upcoming	chapters	on	the	invasion	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada	are	an	illustration	of	
how	rights	extended,	even	when	rescinded,	can	be	used	to	make	demands	on	state	
authorities.		What	usually	happens	with	legislation	that	promotes	the	common	or	
public	good	is	that	the	interests	of	the	nation	—especially	enterprising	individuals	
and	groups—	is	held	to	be	in	the	best	interest	of	all.		This	is	an	obvious	stacking	of	
the	deck,	for	any	card	shark,	but,	apparently,	to	state	jurisprudence,	these	are	the	
rules	of	the	game,	at	present.13		
						 This	did	not	mean	that	everything	would	be	a	free‐for‐all.		The	Constitution	
also	reinforced	the	rights	of	property	owners.		If	their	lands	were	deemed	necessary	
for	social	interest	purposes,	property	owners	would	be	entitled	to	a	state	indemnity.		
This	act	nullified	the	right	enjoyed	in	the	previous	Barriada	Law	to	receive	market	
value	and	interests	on	their	lands.			
						 The	rights	of	particular	interest	groups,	that	may	not	be	in	agreement	with	
development	visions	being	proposed	by	financiers,	bankers,	corporations	and	
industrialists,	were	protected	openly	in	the	1979	constitution.		Yet,	at	the	same	time	
																																																								
13	The	obvious	folly	in	supporting	such	an	initiative	is	that	the	incumbent	political	and	economic	
system	risks	losing	its	credibility	with	the	public.		The	same	can	be	said	of	a	state	that	aligns	itself	
with	such	interests.		It	is	for	this	reason	that	Peruvian	analysts	have	been	speaking	of	a	crisis	in	
governability	ever	since	the	early	2000s	when	it	became	safer	to	speak	publically	about	such	matters	
again.	
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what	was	at	issue	was	not	so	much	the	end,	but	the	means,	once	again.		We	see	this	
in	the	interest	given	to	cooperatives	and	mutual	interest	groups.		In	1993	the	
neoliberal	Fujimori	government	would	eliminate	such	protections	under	the	guise	
of	protecting	the	right	of	free	enterprise.		To	this	day,	there	is	a	constant	struggle	to	
reclaim	the	guarantees	provided	by	the	previous	Constitution,	which	was	arrived	at	
through	a	democratic	process	(the	election	of	100	delegates	from	different	political	
parties).		The	2011	election	campaign	was	abuzz	with	talk	of	returning	to	the	1979	
Constitution.		Current	President	Ollanta	Humala	and	some	members	of	his	cabinet	
were	sworn	into	congress	in	the	spirit	of	the	1979	Constitution,	making	
controversial	reference	to	the	Constitution.			
						 This	issue	is	raised	frequently	in	disputes	over	public	consultations	for	
development	projects.		In	taking	away	clauses	that	referred	to	housing	and	the	right	
to	dignified	housing,	the	state	effectively	abrogated	rights	that	it	had	conferred,	
losing	credibility	in	the	eyes	of	a	large	sector	of	the	well‐informed	underprivileged	
class.		Later,	we	will	see	how	these	constitutional	changes	adhered	to	a	new	free	
market	principle	that	involved	the	opening	of	the	Peruvian	economy	to	foreign	
investment.		Such	an	opening	meant	that	constitutional	guarantees	had	to	be	given	
to	investors	to	raise	investor	confidence.		The	social	consequence,	though,	has	been	
neglected	and	I	conclude	that	Peru’s	recent	economic	success	has	overshadowed	
both	the	road	taken	and	the	social	cost	of	current	neoliberal	populism.		But,	let	us	
not	get	too	far	ahead	of	ourselves.		In	the	1980s,	academic	interest	turned	toward	
rediscovering	indigenous	culture	in	the	city	at	a	time	when	talk	of	other	paths	for	
Peru	were	in	the	making.		At	the	same	time,	academic	interest	in	evaluating	the	
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progress	being	made	in	Lima’s	barriadas	stayed	in	step	and	maintained	its	critical	
tone.	
						 Literature	of	the	time	period	does	much	to	highlight	the	emergent	
“contestatory	culture”	(Matos	2004[1984])	that	had	put	the	traditional	land	owning	
oligarchy	and	industrialists	in	checkmate.		There	was	every	indication	of	a	rising	
tide	that	could	not	be	stopped.	
						 During	the	1980s	in	Pamplona,	lands	settled	in	the	late	1960s	and	early	1970s	
were	becoming	more	consolidated	and	their	children	were	beginning	to	occupy	the	
second	and	third	floor	of	homes,	with	the	overflow	invading	state	land	adjacent	to	
many	sectors.		Yet,	not	all	homes	were	being	built	with	cement	and	bricks.		For	
some,	construction	was	at	a	more	measured	pace.		Sometimes	neighbours	worked	
together	to	build	their	homes.		All	these	efforts	were	still	insufficient	to	meet	the	
demand	for	housing	(Riofrío	and	Driant	1987).		But,	as	Lobo	revealed,	these	new	
alliances	in	a	new	place	were	not	free	of	their	intrigues,	with	trust	being	an	
impediment	to	community	based	construction	efforts	(Lobo	1982).		While	some	
areas	maintained	close	ties	with	sending	communities,	going	so	far	as	to	establish	
trade	networks	that	brought	local	produce	and	livestock	to	networks	of	paisanos14	
in	Lima,	other	groups	tended	to	pull	together	only	temporarily	to	make	a	new	life	in	
the	city	with	previous	class	relations	and	tensions	playing	out	in	the	city	(Gölte	and	
Adams	1987).			
																																																								
14	Countrymen	
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						 One	particular	group	of	Aymaras	from	the	Puno	region	studied	in	Pamplona	by	
anthropologist	Teófilo	Altamirano	found	that	migrants	were	maintaining	group	
endogamy	in	the	city	and	spatially	settling	in	the	same	area	(1988).		This	is	not	an		
	
Figure	8	Source:	Matos	2004	By	1981	we	note	here	that	areas	that	were	invaded	in	the	1950s	and	
1960s	had	become	consolidated	with	significant	horizontal	growth	occurring	along	massive	
extensions	of	state	land.		The	lower	large	polygon	is	Villa	El	Salvador.		We	can	see	Pamplona	
Alta	and	Baja	here	as	a	large	tongue	which	extends	into	the	hills	in	the	upper	part	of	Lima	
South.	
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uncommon	occurrence,	nor	is	it	a	representative	occurrence.		As	we	have	noted,	and	
Don	Malvinas	talks	a	bit	about	this,	people	tend	to	cyclically	invade	new	land.		Over	
time,	the	effect	this	has,	at	least	from	what	I	have	seen	in	Pamplona,	is	that	ethnic	
groups	intermingle	in	the	city.							
In	order	to	have	opportunities	in	Lima,	migrants	have	to	make	some	
adaptations	to	the	city.		Instead	of	being	proficient	in	Quechua	and	speaking	some	
Spanish,	more	people	are	forced	to	adopt	Spanish	as	a	first	language	or	second	
language	to	ensure	their	livelihood	in	this	new	environment.		It	was	not	uncommon	
to	see	the	children	of	even	first	generation	migrants	to	Lima	studying	a	European	
language	instead	of,	say,	Quechua.		One	would	be	very	hard	pressed	to	find	schools	
that	did	not	have	English,	French	or	German	in	the	curriculum,	even	in	the	state	
institutions.		Moreover,	newer	generations	of	children	eschew	the	value	attached	to	
physical	labour,	opting	for	careers	in	manufacturing,	tourism,	politics,	commerce,	
etc.	—the	type	of	professions	that	one	would	see	in	any	postmodern	city.		Mangin	
noted	this	drive	to	adopt	urban	practices	and	goals	in	his	early	work	in	Lima’s	
barriadas	in	the	1950s	and	1960s.			
						 The	danger	of	an	argument	that	migrants	are	maintaining	their	culture	and	
practices	in	Lima,	or	that	maybe	some	hybridization	process	is	at	work,	is	that	we	
ignore	the	signs	that	something	quite	different	might	be	occurring	in	the	city	with	
these	social	groups.		I	do	not	think	a	statement	like	this	is	controversial.		Cities	all	
over	the	planet	are	now	populated	with	people	whose	histories	and	previous	
practices	have	been	drastically	modified,	if	not	lost.		To	return	to	our	concepts	from	
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Williams	here,	we	should	be	aware	that	dominant	groups	—including	cross‐cultural	
interactions—	always	seek	to	absorb	elements	of	both	residual	and	emergent	
cultures	to	maintain	the	status	quo.		Following	Williams,	the	study	of	practices,	
interactions	between	different	social	groups,	and	the	goals	and	values	they	share,	
can	lead	us	to	more	carefully	discern	trajectories	that	may	be	shared	and	discern	
hegemonic	processes	at	work.			
						 Therefore,	despite	the	ostensible	anti‐systemic	posture	adopted	by	some,	their	
demands	may	turn	out	to	be	circumscribed	by	what	options	a	current	virtual	
ideological	hegemony	is	able	to	provide	as	life	projects.		I	would	not	go	so	far	to	
assert	that	these	barriadas	have	not	produced	their	own	culture,	more	like	cultures;	
however	I	argue	that	like	subcultures	in	Western	nations,	they	do	not	escape	the	
influence	of	larger	economic	and	political	projects	(cf.	Hebdige	1979).			
						 What	the	qualitative	work	on	barriada	culture	does	tell	us,	whether	one	be	
sceptical	or	optimistic	about	such	changes,	is	that	people	have	come	to	the	city	to	
seek	their	advancement,	whether	it	be	studying	to	get	a	degree,	or	opening	a	humble	
hamburger	stand	to	make	a	living.			Progress	is	relative	in	this	sense.		This	looseness	
gives	the	term	its	currency.		Lima,	despite	the	pessimistic	views	of	the	
underprivileged	at	times,	is	where	some	people	come	to	get	ahead.		For	it	to	have	
this	draw,	a	discursive	and	behavioural	counterpart	that	expresses	city	living	as	a	
viable	pursuit	in	life	exists.		People	tell	stories	about	the	city;	they	eulogize	it	in	
many	ways,	through	their	tragedies	and	comedies.		This	pursuit	of	progress	
generates	a	tension	with	residual	cultural	elements	that	admonish	redistributive	
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practices.		Legislative	changes	made	by	legislators	partial	to	neoliberal	market	
values	that	work	to	reduce	redistributive	practices	represent	a	direct	challenge	to	
senses	of	entitlement	that	previous	governments	have	created	and	indigenous	
traditions	value.		When	people	say	the	state	needs	to	do	more,	they	are	really	asking	
for	more	generous	redistributive	practices.							
						 What	anthropologists	were	able	to	tell	us	about	the	barriadas	from	the	1970s	
to	the	1990s	was	that	people	had	organized	their	own	economic	and	social	
networks	on	the	edges	of	progress,	maintaining	practices	that	existed	prior	to	their	
migration.		The	growth	of	the	city	depended	economically	and	politically	on	the	
battle	for	the	hearts	and	minds	of	the	masses	of	people	who	sought	a	home	and	
work.		After	the	1970s,	these	grassroots	political	organizations	became	key	players	
in	local	and	national	level	politics.		As	a	consequence,	masses	of	people	could	be	
organized	by	political	parties	vying	for	public	appeal,	looking	to	earn	voter	blocks,	
or,	on	the	contrary,	blocks	could	pressure	politicians	to	help	them	in	return	for	voter	
support.		The	options	were	much	richer,	if	we	remember	Uzzell.		The	field	continues	
to	be	complex	with	tactical	shifts	in	alliances	being	ever	present.			
						 The	1980s	were	volatile	for	Peruvians.		War	began	in	1980	when	a	group	of	
Sendero	Luminoso	soldiers	burned	ballot	boxes	in	Chuschi	on	May	17th	declaring	
the	commencement	of	their	armed	struggle.			From	this	incident,	the	fighting	
between	pro‐government	forces	and	insurgent	groups	would	rage	for	the	better	
part	of	two	decades.		These	events	splintered	Lima’s	barriadas	into	those	that	
supported	orthodox	economic	reforms,	factions	that	supported	democratic	non‐
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orthodox	socio‐economic	reforms,	and	forces	that	fought	for	revolutionary	change	
(divided	between	Sendero	Luminoso	and	MRTA).		In	short,	there	was	a	meltdown,	
no	matter	how	positive	changes	looked	at	the	beginning	of	the	1980s	(Manrique	
2002).	
						 In	the	midst	of	all	this	chaos,	municipalities	across	Peru	sprouted,	receiving	
government	transfer	payments	and	raising	their	own	income	through	taxation	
(although	the	Fujimori	government	would	re‐centralize	federal	transfer	payments).		
In	the	1980s,	leftist	parties	played	an	important	role,	especially	the	Izquierda	Unida,	
or	Unified	Left,	henceforth	UI.		The	municipal	administration	of	Alfonso	Barrantes	
(1984–1986)	is	emblematic	of	this	time	period	in	Lima.		Barrantes	is	credited	with	
opening	the	first	mothers’	clubs,	or	Vaso	de	Leche	programs	in	Lima	at	this	time.		
Collaborators	recalled	meeting	him	in	comedores	populares,	or	community	soup	
kitchens,	drinking	his	oatmeal	with	neighbours.		People	remember	the	
infrastructure	program	of	Barrantes.		Many	recalled	how	he	provided	machines,	
cement	and	engineers	to	build	the	stairs	in	the	neighbourhoods	of	Pamplona.		His	
municipality	also	gave	land	titles	to	many	squatters	in	Lima.		Collaborators	recalled	
paying	a	sum	to	receive	the	title	deed	to	their	homes.			
						 During	this	time	period	soup	kitchens	multiplied	and	NGOs	proliferated	that	
addressed	the	precarious	situation	of	barriada	dwellers.		This	period	marked	the	
beginning	of	a	veritable	NGO	boom.		Klarén	argues	that	charismatic	women	made	
incursions	into	politics	in	this	period,	due	much	in	part	to	their	involvement	in	
community‐based	politics.		He	traces	the	roots	of	this	political	insurgence	of	women	
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to	the	rise	of	liberation	theology	in	the	1970s	and	the	radical	community‐based	
politics	that	was	characteristic	of	this	period	(Klarén	2004:457–459).	
						 This	active	involvement,	through	public	works,	was	something	that	future	
political	parties	would	emulate	to	both	appeal	to	voters	and	demonstrate	that	they	
were	effective	in	their	administration	of	municipal	resources,	something	already	
attempted	by	both	Belaúnde	and	Velasco.		The	1980s	were	a	time	of	charismatic	
leadership	in	the	barriadas	of	Lima.		For	instance,	the	self‐administered	Villa	El	
Salvador	had	a	string	of	prominent	leaders	that	figured	regularly	in	the	media.			
						 Belaúnde’s	second	government	went	back	to	liberal	economic	reforms,	opting	
to	pursue	economic	restructuring	that	undid	the	reforms	of	General	Velasco	that	
swelled	the	size	of	the	state.		When	he	won	in	1980,	for	instance,	he	named	his	ex‐
housing	minister	in	his	first	government	Manuel	Ulloa	as	his	Prime	Minister,	who,	
with	a	team	of	Chicago	Boys	(students	of	economist	Milton	Friedman)	tried	to	
stabilize	the	Peruvian	economy.		The	intensification	of	violent	activities	by	Sendero	
Luminoso,	natural	disasters,	costly	infrastructure	programs,	and	political	clientalism	
resulted	in	the	failure	of	such	reforms	(Klarén	2004:451–455).		Later,	Fujimori	
would	pick	up	where	Belaúnde	had	failed,	incorporating	some	of	the	pro‐neoliberal	
figures	from	Belaúnde’s	government	(Durand	2010).			
						 The	misfortunes	of	Belaúnde	left	the	ground	open	for	both	APRA	and	the	UI	to	
make	an	incursion	into	politics.		Alan	García	and	APRA	entered	the	1985	election	
scene	with	a	strong	appeal	in	the	barriadas	and	rural	areas	of	Peru.		The	attempted	
orthodox	reforms	of	Belaúnde	did	much	to	raise	the	ire	of	these	groups	and	they	
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looked	to	populists	like	García	and	the	democractic	left,	at	least	on	a	municipal	level,	
to	quell	the	tide	of	economic	collapse.		While	the	UI	under	Barrantes	proposed	
nationalization	of	key	resources,	the	renegotiation	of	state	petroleum	contracts	and	
a	moratorium	on	areas	of	the	debt	along	with	the	nationalization	of	the	Central	
Bank,	García	correctly	read	the	trepidation	of	most	humble	voters,	the	middle	class	
and	businessmen,	favouring	an	approach	that	simultaneous	sought	to	appease	his	
lower	class	clients	and	stimulate	national	businesses	(Klarén	2004:456,463–
464,467).	
						 Despite	the	initial	successes	of	his	heterodox	economic	reforms,	like	favouring	
a	national	elite	of	businesses,	strategic	errors,	like	refusing	to	pay	the	debt	to	
international	lending	institutions	and	a	lethargic	bold	large	scale	national	
development	program,	led	the	Peruvian	economy	into	a	tailspin	by	the	end	of	the	
1980s	(Burt	2007).		By	the	end	of	the	1980s,	Peru	was	gripped	by	hyperinflation	
and	a	civil	war	that	looked	like	it	could	go	on	for	an	indefinite	period	of	time.		
Prospects	were	not	bright.		There	was	a	real	sense	that	traditional	political	parties	
and	democratically	elected	governments	had	failed	in	improving	the	lot	of	
Peruvians.		A	new	option	appeared	in	Peru,	one	that	can	be	seen	reflected	in	the	
seminal	work	of	Noble	prize	laureate	in	economics	Hernando	De	Soto’s	“other	path”,	
as	he	and	his	team	termed	it.		De	Soto’s	version	of	Peruvian	reality	is	encapsulated	in	
the	following	excerpt.	
Within	the	frontiers	of	Peru	more	than	one	country	exists.		There	is	a	
mercantile	country	that	until	the	present	day	they	try	to	reanimate	with	
distinct	political	forms	and	techniques,	but	it	already	shows	symptoms	that	the	
body	cannot	continue;	there	is	a	second	country	as	well,	that	of	those	who	in	
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anguish	look	for	solutions,	but	it	is	lost	between	destructive	objectives	of	
terrorist	violence	and	the	impractical	and	deficient	exhortations	of	
progressives;	finally,	there	is	a	third	country	that	constitutes	what	we	call	“the	
other	path”:	the	country	that	works	hard,	is	innovative	and	fiercely	
competitive,	whose	most	prominent	domain	is	informality	(De	Soto	1986:313).	
	
						 In	his	roughshod	interpretation	of	the	French,	British,	Spanish	and	Russian	
industrial	revolutions,	De	Soto	argues	that	the	informal	sector	played	an	
instrumental	role	in	the	development	of	liberal	democracies.		These	democracies,	he	
added,	were	an	improvement	on	a	former	redistributive	mercantile	model	whereby	
different	actors	like	merchants,	guilds,	cottage	industry	proprietors,	and	nobles	vied	
for	the	favour	of	the	monarchy,	who	normally	sought	to	control	commerce.		Free	
market	models,	therefore,	represented	an	improvement	on	the	previous	mercantile	
state	because	individuals	were	free	to	seek	out	their	opportunities	freely	and	
equally	without	unnecessary	state	intervention.			
						 De	Soto	leads	us	to	believe	that	informal	and	formal	businesses,	the	guilds,	and	
larger	business	owners,	merged	their	collective	interests	and	brought	about	a	new	
era	that	was	in	many	ways	the	next	stage	in	development,	the	unavoidable	march	of	
progress.		Once	again,	De	Soto’s	words	speak	for	themselves.		Here,	he	describes	the	
scene	in	the	aftermath	of	the	European	and	American	revolutions.		He	does	not	
extend	his	argument	to	the	rest	of	the	world	at	this	point,	however.	
In	effect,	the	countries	that	reduced	their	transaction	costs	and	adopted	rules	
that	permitted	the	use	of	the	creative	energy	of	their	citizens	–facilitating	
interdependence	and	specialization	between	them,	opening	access	to	property	
and	business	initiative,	reducing	barriers	produced	by	excessive	legislation,	
and	permitting	a	continuous	and	more	direct	participation	in	government	and	
the	formulation	of	rights‐	managed	to	transition	toward	distinctive	economic	
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market	systems	with	a	minimal	amount	of	violence	and	a	maximum	amount	of	
wellbeing.	
Good	law	confers	and	articulates	political,	economic	and	social	liberties,	those	
which	at	the	same	time	lead	to	a	growth	in	competition	and	the	possibility	to	
buy	alternatives	and	control	abuses	of	all	types	[he	is	referring	to	the	
intervention	of	monarchs	in	the	mercantile	economies].		The	discretion	of	
bureaucracies	is	reduced	like	this	and	law	and	economic	life	is	depoliticized,	
diminishing,	as	a	consequence,	the	power	of	redistributive	coalitions,	
corruption	and	dejection.		The	time	wasted	before	in	cultivating	contacts	and	
making	arrangements	to	get	paperwork	done	can	be	dedicated	now	to	
production.		In	adapting	to	a	dispersed	popular	business	class,	to	an	economy	
in	rapid	technological	evolution,	the	economy	and	the	State	recuperate	social	
validity.		With	this	one	can	minimize	informality,	control	violence,	and	
sensitively	and	gradually	attenuate	uncertainty	(De	Soto	1986:273–274).	
	
						 De	Soto’s	own	succinctness	often	works	against	him.		He	smoothes	over	the	
rough	spots	in	history,	for	instance,	downplaying	civil	wars	that	rocked	19th	century	
industrializing	nations.		So,	we	see	a	transition	from	clientalistic	state	intervention	
to	frictionless	trade	and	galloping	peace‐loving	prosperity.		De	Soto’s	rendition	of	
this	period	is	oneric	and	unreal.		De	Soto’s	culling	of	history	is	a	good	example	of	
what	Williams	referred	to	when	he	described	how	hegemonic	groups	go	about	
creating	selective	readings	of	history	to	legitimate	their	projects.		
						 Following	De	Soto’s	line	of	thinking,	Peru	in	1986	was	on	the	brink	of	a	
revolution	of	the	kind	that	Peru’s	European	counterparts	had	experienced.		The	only	
thing	that	remained	in	Peru’s	path	to	prosperity	was	its	onerous	legal	system,	a	relic	
of	past	governments’	capture	by	different	interest	groups:	large	property	owners,	
formal	entrepreneurs,	informal	vendors	and	trade	unions.		We	are	left	to	assume	
that	the	masses	fall	in	line	with	these	larger	conglomerates.		The	result	is	a	nation	
that	has	lived	through	the	struggle	between	a	right	that	has	sought	to	ensure	the	
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interests	of	a	small	oligarchy	and	a	radical	left	that	has	sought	to	make	the	state	“the	
largest	capitalist”,	according	to	De	Soto.		In	De	Soto’s	opinion,	both	“are	more	
worried	about	the	transfer	of	wealth	than	laying	institutional	foundations	for	its	
creation	(De	Soto	1986:292).”		It	only	stands	to	reason,	then,	that	having	exhausted	
its	options,	progress	lies	in	an	aspiring	informal	sector	merging	with	an	established	
group	of	larger	businesses.		If	the	government	would	recognize	this	potential,	Peru	
would	be	vaulted	into	the	league	of	developed	nations.	
						 For	De	Soto,	the	mercantile	state	has	impeded	the	enterprising	informal	sector	
with	its	anti‐business	law	making.		In	part,	his	selective	analysis	of	the	informal	
sector	(invasions,	street	vending	and	transportation)	recognizes	the	bureaucratic	
quagmire	described	by	Uzzell	and	the	consequent	frustration	of	some	
entrepreneurial	barriada	dwellers	in	realizing	their	economic	dreams.		
						 Years	of	redistributive	tactics,	where	state	laws	have	been	passed	to	favour	
different	groups	of	the	public	due	in	main	part	to	an	overly	powerful	executive	
power	(apparently	a	vestige	of	feudal	states	and	a	consequence	of	clientalistic	
political	networks),	have	led	to	the	formation	of	a	clientalistic	state	that	panders	to	
the	highest	bidder	or	strongest	lobby	groups.		For	neoliberal	economists,	planners,	
and	politicians,	the	solution	lies	in	providing	formal	property	titles,	easy	access	to	
credit,	laws	to	protect	businesses,	private	property	protections,	legal	streamlining,	
free	trade	agreements,	generous	and	controversial	mining	concessions,	and	
bureaucratic	decentralization.		Social	justice	is	part	of	the	program	too	with	
churches,	NGOs,	and	state	institutions,	trying	to	find	points	where	their	efforts	can	
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become	more	coordinated.		Ever	since	the	early	1980s	NGOs	have	flourished	in	
Peru,	replacing	much	state	run	aid	initiatives,	suggesting	that	this	vision	was	being	
put	into	practice	as	De	Soto	extolled	the	virtues	of	these	changes.	
						 De	Soto’s	proposals,	especially	his	notion	that	capital	was	locked	up	in	Peru’s	
untitled	properties	(De	Soto	2000),	were	not	without	local	criticism.		Riofrío	argued	
that	ever	since	the	state	recognized	invasions	in	the	1961	Barriada	Law	residents	
had	right	to	a	title	of	sorts.		Not	only	this,	but	in	agreement	with	observations	like	
those	of	Mangin	in	1960,	residents	rented,	sold	and	improved	on	their	lots	without	
clear	title.		Riofrío	expressed	concern	over	the	risk	of	allowing	residents	to	borrow	
against	their	homes	–the	result	of	years	of	sacrifice–	to	initiate	less	than	certain	
business	endeavours	(Riofrío	1990:90–115).			
						 On	a	larger	scale,	such	an	initiative	draws	barriada	dwellers	into	that	cycle	of	
debt	and	payments	so	common	in	developed	nations.		With	more	available	credit	
comes	more	consumption	and	people	constantly	striving	to	keep	up	with	changing	
consumer	trends	(Rouleau	2007).		Those	who	stand	to	gain	from	such	an	initiative	
are	mainly	corporations,	financiers,	banks,	and	to	some	degree	the	state	in	increased	
consumption	tax	revenues.		However,	the	benefit	to	small‐scale	producers,	
especially	when	it	comes	to	economies	of	scale,	is	preposterously	touted	by	De	Soto.			
						 What	De	Soto,	and	by	extension	the	Washington	Consensus15	and	all	its	
devotees	did	was	to	pitch	their	arguments	to	the	poor,	making	promises	based	on	a	
																																																								
15	Economist	John	Williamson	coined	the	term	Washington	Consensus	when	he	was	
asked	to	draw	up	a	list	of	discussion	points	for	a	conference	that	analyzed	whether	
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very	partial	reading	of	history.		In	light	of	our	discussion	on	self‐help	housing,	the	
strategy	of	touting	the	efforts	of	the	poor	while	looking	out	for	the	interests	of	
others	is	not	new.		What	would	be	new	is	the	groups	that	would	be	favoured	by	
these	changes.		Instead	of	eliminating	patronage	networks,	it	brought	their	activities	
to	a	level	of	insidiousness	not	seen	previously	in	Peruvian	history.	
						 Historians	Carlos	Conteras	and	Marcos	Cueto	discuss	the	changes	brought	
about	Alberto	Fujimori	(1990‐2000)	and	neoliberal	advisors	like	Hernando	De	Soto.		
Here,	I	will	limit	my	discussion	to	those	changes	which	most	directly	came	to	bear	
on	those	living	in	barriadas	or	the	working	class,	in	general.	
						 One	of	the	most	profound	changes	was	made	to	labour	legislation.		New	
legislation	favoured	the	flexibilization	of	labour.		What	this	meant	was	that	jobs	
became	less	stable.		New	service	providers	appeared	whose	job	was	to	contract	
labour	for	the	formal	sector,	instead	of	businesses	administering	jobs	like	cleaning,	
transport,	messengers,	security,	catering,	accounting,	etc.		The	idea	was	to	cut	jobs	
from	payroll	and	subcontract	these	positions	out	to	smaller	companies	that	would	
																																																																																																																																																																					
old	development	concepts	in	practice	since	the	1950s	had	been	replaced	by	a	newer	
model.		The	terminology	used	by	Williamson	was	not	without	some	misgivings		
(Williamson	2004).		Williamson	drew	up	a	list	of	ten	policies	for	discussion	at	the	
conference,	which	he	felt	were	part	of	this	shift	in	development	policy.		The	items	on	
the	list	were	as	follows:	fiscal	discipline,	reordering	public	expenditure	priorities,	
tax	reform,	liberalizing	interest	rates,	competitive	exchange	rate,	trade	
liberalization,	liberalization	of	inward	foreign	direct	investment,	privitization,	
deregulation,	and	property	rights.		After	coining	the	term	and	creating	his	list,	the	
conference	became	a	reference	point	of	what	he	termed	“ideological”	debate	over	
what	were	seen	as	global	patterns	in	policy	at	the	time	(Williamson	2004).		This	
casting	of	the	debate	as	an	ideological	one	positions	neoliberalism	as	an	objective,	
apolitical	position,	and	those	affected	negatively	by	such	reforms	as	being	
ideologically	motivated.					
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be	more	efficient	in	how	they	organized	their	labourers.		Similar	cuts	were	made	to	
government	institutions.		This	resulted	in	a	significant	weakening	of	labour	unions	
that	once	were	able	to	count	on	the	support	of	service	workers	in	larger	companies	
and	government	institutions	to	pressure	these	companies	and	the	government	for	
worker	rights	(Contreras	and	Cueto	2004:382–384).			
						 To	carry	out	De	Soto’s	prescriptions	for	increasing	the	amount	of	capital	in	the	
Peruvian	market	(point	ten	of	the	Washington	Consensus),	the	Fujimori	government	
created	an	arm	of	the	Ministry	of	Housing,	Construction	and	Property	Clearing	
called	COFOPRI	(Organismo	para	la	Formalización	de	Propiedad	Informal,	or	
Organization	for	the	Formalization	of	Informal	Property)	in	1996.		COFOPRI’s	
mandate	was	to	facilitate	the	titling	of	lots	in	the	country.		Up	until	2003	the	
organization	had	successfully	surveyed	and	titled	1.2	million	lots	(Field	2003).		
Nonetheless,	the	jury	is	still	out	on	whether	titling	has	led	to	more	access	to	formal	
credit	(cf.	Calderón	2011,	Kerekes	and	Williamson	2010).	
						 In	an	attempt	to	curry	voter	sympathies	in	popular	sectors,	Fujimori	used	
government	institutions	to	direct	public	funds	strategically	to	certain	areas	of	the	
country.		Klarén	describes	how	he	used	FONCODES	(Fondo	Nacional	de	
Compensación	y	Desarrollo	Social,	or	the	National	Fund	for	Compensation	and	Social	
Development),	nine	months	prior	to	the	1995	elections	to	dramatically	boost	
employment	in,	and	benefactors	from,	social	assistance	programs	in	some	of	the	
poorest	departments	of	the	country.		FONAVI	(Fondo	Nacional	de	Vivienda,	or	
National	Fund	for	Housing),	which	built	low	cost	housing,	schools	and	medical	posts	
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in	barriadas	and	more	isolated	settlements,	enjoyed	a	flood	of	projects.		Schools	
built	during	this	time	period	are	legendary,	as	was	the	lack	of	professors	to	fill	these	
schools	and	the	shoddy	construction	of	such	installations.		However,	the	impact	this	
initiative	had	was	remembered	to	this	day	by	my	collaborators	(many	of	whom	
were	supporters	of	Fujimori).		Klarén	goes	on	to	reveal	how	Fujimori	increased	food	
rations,	especially	to	children	through	PRONOAA	(Programa	Nacional	de	Asistencia	
Alimentaria,	or	National	Program	of	Food	Assistance).		Prior	to	the	election	
campaigns	he	made	visits	to	these	the	kitchens	of	this	program	to	boost	his	public	
appeal	(Klarén	2004:505–506).	
						 Political	scientist	Bruce	H.	Kay	gives	us	some	sense	of	how	Fujimori	managed	
to	afford	these	projects	and	the	political	organization	that	permitted	them	(Kay	
1996).		He	argues	that	money	for	these	visible	programs	originated	from	the	
extensive	privatization	of	public	sector	companies	and	a	reform	of	the	tax	system.		
Intelligently,	Fujimori	channelled	resources	to	regions	like	Puno	to	sway	public	
opposition	to	the	1993	constitution,	for	instance.		To	do	so,	he	had	to	divert	more	
decision	making	power	toward	the	executive	office,	to	counter	opposition	from	
different	municipalities.		This	led	to	a	personalistic	form	of	leadership	—one	where	
Fujimori	personally	intervened	in	public	works	and	could	attend	his	clients	directly.		
All	of	this	occurred	in	a	climate	of	intense	technocratic	intervention	in	the	
government.		Kay	reveals	that	social	spending	was	part	of	an	IMF‐condoned	
approach,	although	reluctant,	to	pacify	voters	for	the	1995	election	and	ensure	that	
economic	reforms	would	continue	(Kay	1996:68).		Social	spending	was	something	
that	previous	governments	had	recognized	as	a	necessity;	however,	through	the	
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inefficient	functioning	of	state	enterprises	and	ineffectual	tax	collection,	they	had	
never	been	able	to	pursue	social	spending	to	the	extent	Fujimori	would.		Perhaps	for	
this	reason,	Fujimori	gained	tremendous	appeal	among	a	sizeable	group	of	the	
general	population.				
						 Peruvian	sociologist	Francisco	Durand	meticulously	maps	out	the	connections	
between	international	corporations,	international	lending	institutions	like	the	IMF,	
the	World	Bank,	the	Inter‐American	Development	Bank,	financiers	and	the	
movement	of	their	technocrats	into	key	advisory	positions	in	Peruvian	governments	
from	1980	up	to	the	present	(Durand	2010).		He	details	who	benefited	from	the	
1993	constitutional	changes,	mainly	international	corporations,	and	who	lost,	
national	corporations	and	state	enterprises.		These	changes	were	very	much	an	
inside	job,	as	he	reveals,	and	one	that	we	will	see	articulates	with	personalistic	
leadership	and	calculated	interventions.		Given	the	condition	of	state‐owned	
businesses,	though,	privatization	was	the	only	solution	if	Fujimori	wanted	to	re‐
establish	ties	with	international	creditors	(Kay	1996).			
						 When	it	comes	to	assessing	what	was	done	by	Fujimori,	it	is	difficult	to	
disentangle	who	is	being	critical	because	they	had	their	own	political	and	economic	
interests	at	stake,	and	who	really	had	an	alternative	project.		David	Harvey’s	
analysis	of	neoliberalism	is	suggestive	(2005).		He	argues	that	these	reforms	were	
an	attempt	by	social	elites	around	the	world	to	recapture	power	that	had	been	lost	
through	the	adoption	of	Keynesian	state	reforms.		However,	Harvey’s	thesis	does	
not	really	explain	the	shift	in	the	share	of	the	economic	pie	noted	by	Durand	(2010).		
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In	the	Peruvian	case,	it	appears	that	neoliberal	advisors	and	Peruvian	politicians	
(not	just	Fujimori)	worked	to	allow	the	incursion	of	foreign	capital,	to	the	detriment	
of	the	local	oligarchy,	for	what	appear	to	be	personal	gains,	or	the	gains	of	a	
particular	political	parties	and	their	client	networks.		It	does	not	seem	that	social	
elites	were	merely	recapturing	power,	but	that	certain	elite	groups	were	working	
against	the	interests	of	other	groups	that	had	held	power	before	the	Peruvian	
market	was	opened	to	foreign	capital.		It	would	be	more	accurate	to	say	that	a	
reconfiguration	of	elites	was	at	work	where	some	definitely	lost	economic	power	in	
this	shift,	many	to	transnational	groups.							
						 Fujimori	also	managed	to	co‐opt	the	military	through	strategic	promotions	of	
officers	partial	to	his	political	party	(cf.	Cotler	and	Grompone	2000).		The	military	
became	actively	involved	in	promoting	his	Cambio	90	party	in	the	1995	elections.		
They	put	up	campaign	posters,	tore	down	opposition	posters	and	distributed	
notebooks	with	a	likeness	of	Fujimori	to	children.		In	many	ways,	the	military	and	
their	presence	safeguarded	the	defeat	of	Sendero	Luminoso,	giving	more	legitimacy	
to	Fujimori	(Kay	1996:77‐78).		
						 Amidst	all	of	the	political	turmoil	that	Peru	fell	into	during	the	eighties,	the	
solidarity	of	communities	became	apparent.			Father	Thomas	Burns	describes	the	
scene	in	the	1990s	in	Pamplona	(Burns	1994).		He	tells	how	on	a	daily	basis	people	
helped	one	another	through	these	trying	times.		Whether	it	was	organizing	
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picoronadas,16	having	compassion	for	a	sickly	neighbour,	forgiving	someone	for	
taking	food,	or	overcoming	infidelity,	Burns	gives	us	a	humane	account	of	how	
people	cooperated	in	the	face	of	hardship.		He	tells	how	despite	incidences	of	TB	and	
cholera	that	were	ever	present	during	this	time	period,	people	found	a	place	for	one	
another	and	forged	on	in	their	lives,	hoping	that	the	reign	of	terror	unleashed	by	
Sendero	Luminoso	would	abate.		
						 Accounts	like	that	of	Burns	are	not	isolated.		Anthropologist	Jeanine	Anderson	
revisited	Leoncio	Prado	(a	sector	in	Pamplona),	a	focal	point	for	Ríofrio’s	analysis	in	
the	1970s,	telling	the	story	of	how	Leoncio	Prado	was	formed	and	came	together	as	
a	community	(Anderson	2002).		The	tale	is	one	that	describes	the	challenges	of	
uniting	people	to	work	together	toward	common	community	goals.		It	gives	us	
insight	into	the	difficulties	faced	by	dirigentes17	to	keep	people	motivated	in	the	
community	and	details	the	involvement	of	the	state	and	other	philanthropist		
organizations	in	the	community	over	multiple	decades.		Her	work	also	documents	
the	material	progress	made	by	residents	and	the	active	involvement	of	almost	
everyone	in	the	community	association.		The	majority	went	from	reed	matting	
houses	to	brick	homes	in	the	decades	leading	up	to	the	publication	of	the	book.			
People	felt	a	real	sense	of	triumph	due	to	all	the	obstacles	that	they	had	overcome	
together,	however	they	also	lamented	the	recent	disintegration	of	the	initial	spirit	of	
camaraderie	that	had	existed	and	the	emerging	inequality	in	the	sector,	possibly	a	
																																																								
16	Picarones	are	a	pastry	that	is	deep	fried	and	served	with	a	sweet	syrup.		A	picorondada,	like	a	
pollada	(with	chicken),	is	habitually	done	to	raise	funds	for	the	medical	treatment	of	a	member	of	the	
community,	for	instance.		These	events	are	also	held	to	raise	funds	for	schools,	the	construction	of	
community	infrastructure,	or	for	other	unforeseen	expenses.	
17		A	dirigente	is	any	elected	community	leader	(they	can	be	in	charge	of	social	services,	public	works,	
sports	and	be	the	secretary	general	within	a	sector).			
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result	of	the	contradictory	values	espoused	by	liberal	individualism	and	the	real	
limits	to	who	and	how	many	can	prosper	in	a	liberal	economy.	
						 This	is	where	the	optimism	of	experts	seemed	to	dwindle.		Anderson	cites	
numerous	residents	who	describe	how	their	community	has	been	griped	by	
frustration	and	has	surrendered	to	the	vices	of	modern	urban	life.		Residents	relate	
how	drug	addiction	and	its	accompanying	culture	of	violence	and	counter‐violence	
has	become	a	scourge	in	their	community.		Many	of	the	second	generation	felt	that	
their	future	laid	elsewhere,	something	that	is	not	uncommon	given	the	growth	of	
Lima’s	barriadas.		In	the	next	section,	we	will	see	where	this	desire	led	some	of	
them.		One	cannot	help	but	feel	that	her	version	is	not	all	that	different	from	
Mangin’s	version.		The	changes	occurring	in	communities	throughout	Lima	are	very	
similar.		As	material	progress	is	made,	the	community	organization	that	
characterized	these	communities	is	lost.	
						 At	first,	people	organize	to	invade	a	piece	of	land.		Then	they	work	together	to	
build	roads,	lobby	clientalistic	states	(their	political	banner	seems	inconsequential)	
for	basic	amenities	(usually	making	some	form	of	payment	for	these	services),	build	
schools	and	medical	facilities,	build	recreational	facilities,	and	when	all	of	this	has	
been	accomplished,	the	community	organizations	begin	to	decline,	with	most	
residents	becoming	indifferent	to	their	activities,	or	seeing	their	activities	as	a	
nuisance.		In	time,	social	inequalities	emerge	and	new	divisions	arise	within	the	
community,	driving	more	prosperous	residents	to	envision	a	move	toward	more	
affluent	areas	of	Lima.		Barriada	dynamics	are	highly	complex,	to	say	the	least,	but	
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we	can	see	a	general	trend	toward	the	breakdown	of	community	organization	by	the	
end	of	the	nineties	and	probably	beforehand	in	other	communities.		Mangin	noted	as	
much	in	the	1960s	in	the	more	developed	sectors	he	observed,	leading	me	to	
conclude	that	such	an	occurrence	is	processual	and	cyclical.			
						 One	thing	we	cannot	lose	sight	of	is	that	for	many	development	is	best	seen	in	
the	building	of	schools,	the	installation	of	local	medical	clinics,	the	paving	of	dusty	
roads,	or	maybe	the	construction	of	soccer	pitches	for	recreation.		Coupled	with	this	
is	the	expectation	that	one’s	prospects	for	employment	or	social	mobility	improve.		
The	feeling	of	whether	these	expectations	are	met	or	not	is	mixed,	depending	largely	
on	individual	outcomes.			
						 Accompanying	material	change,	is	a	move	toward	favouring	modern	
behaviours	like	following	prêt‐a‐porter	fashion,	thinking	in	liberal	ways	about	
relationships,	and	enjoying	contemporary	leisure	activities	that	some	would	argue	
have	become	hegemonic	in	Peru	(Portocarrero	and	Komadina	2001).		In	this	sense,	
each	succeeding	generation	sets	a	higher	goal	from	what	they	consider	to	progress.		
Market	analysts	proclaim	Lima	as	a	city	that	now	belongs	to	everyone	and	herald	an	
era	where	everyone	can	and	will,	thanks	in	large	part	to	a	process	of	cultural	
homogenization,	enjoy	the	fruits	of	a	new	consumer	driven	Lima	(Arellano	and	
Burgos	2004).		Being	a	part	of	progress	often	means	renovating	one’s	ideas,	
changing	one’s	consumption	habits,	and	even	forgetting	cultural	legacies	that	do	not	
find	a	place	in	the	city.		The	successful	commercialization	of	ethnic	fashion,	ethnic	
music	and	ethnic	food	suggests	that	traditional	cultural	is	amenable	with	capitalist	
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development	to	some	extent;	however	the	focus	of	our	analysis	should	marry	a	
concern	for	changes	in	content	with	changes	in	practices.		
						 The	type	of	progress	promoted	by	De	Soto	is	quite	different	from	that	
demanded	by	communities.		Neoliberalization	argues	for	an	unrestrained	freedom	
of	enterprise	–an	era	where	the	state	ensures	that	laws	facilitate	commerce	and	
redistributive	practices	are	no	longer	a	part	of	state	processes.		To	some	degree,	De	
Soto’s	arguments	seem	reasonable;	however	when	one	looks	at	the	effects	of	his	
proposals	and	what	happened	in	practice	De	Soto	seems	to	have	advocated	for	the	
rights	of	corporations,	financiers	and	large	investment	consortiums.		Once	the	
Peruvian	market	was	opened,	what	restrictions	were	left	in	place	to	protect	small‐
scale	local	industrial	production?		Who	got	mining	concessions	where	billions	of	
dollars	have	been	invested?		The	critique	of	the	lack	of	a	trickle‐down	effect	has	
been	incessant	in	the	local	media.		De	Soto’s	proposal	recognized	the	
entrepreneurial	efforts	of	migrants,	the	hard‐earned	home	equity	they	managed	to	
accrue	and	used	these	efforts	to	legitimate	an	economic	shift	that	would	subject	
them	even	more	to	the	vagaries	of	market	forces,	placing	the	only	security	they	had,	
their	homes,	on	the	line	for	risky	business	ventures	in	an	intensely	competitive	local	
market	where	large	investors	and	corporations	would	also	be	given	the	right	to	free	
enterprise.		This	was	no	small	feat	and	required	much	more	convincing	than	just	the	
economic	proposals	of	neoliberals	as	we	will	see	in	the	next	chapter.	
						 As	Lima,	and	areas	like	Pamplona	have	become	more	consolidated,	the	
potential	for	more	profit,	for	the	incursion	of	capital	into	these	areas	becomes	all	the	
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more	enticing.		Locals	resist	municipal	attempts	to	repossess	land	bequeathed	to	
communities.		Don	Malvinas	and	his	community	were	fighting	to	retain	control	of	
state	land	that	they	had	been	allowed	to	use	for	a	community	centre.		Part	of	the	
land	had	been	used	for	a	parking	lot	to	generate	income	to	subsidize	a	soup	kitchen	
and	other	activities	in	the	centre.		The	municipality	argued	that	their	operation	was	
a	profit	making	operation	to	justify	expropriating	the	land,	no	doubt	to	sell	to	
commercial	interests	that	have	made	a	strong	incursion	into	San	Juan	de	Miraflores	
since	Alberto	Fujimori	and	his	advisors,	following	much	of	Hernando	De	Soto’s	
suggestive	text,	legislated	neoliberal	reforms.				
						 The	anthropological	take	on	frontiers,	especially	those	on	the	fringes	of	
civilization,	does	not	share	De	Soto’s	optimism.		In	various	ethnographies,	frontiers	
are	treated	as	fast	and	loose	places,	where	people	live	according	to	a	different	set	of	
rules	(cf.	Taussig	1986,	Ferguson	1999,	Brody	2000).		One	is	more	likely	to	see	
parallels	with	the	Wild	West,	making	one	wonder	if	the	problem	is	indeed	a	result	of	
bad	legislation	and	a	nefarious	political	culture.		
					Anna	Tsing	notes	in	her	ethnography	on	development	in	rural	Indonesia	that	
modernization	is	a	process	fraught	with	frictions.		She	describes	a	resource	frontier	
as:	
…deregulated	because	they	arise	in	the	interstitial	spaces	made	by	
collaborations	among	legitimate	and	illegitimate	partners:	armies	and	bandits;	
gangsters	and	corporations;	builders	and	despoilers.		They	confuse	the	
boundaries	of	law	and	theft,	governance	and	violence,	use	and	destruction.		
These	confusions	change	the	rules	and	thus	enable	extravagant	new	
economies	of	profit	–as	well	as	loss.	(Tsing	2005:27–28)	
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						 The	more	I	investigated	the	history	of	Pamplona	and	the	lives	of	people	who	
had	since	the	1950s	begun	en	masse	to	push	back	the	frontier	of	Lima,	the	more	I	
considered	the	city	as	a	space	with	multiple	frontiers,	something	like	Tsing’s	
resource	frontiers	in	that	their	growth	has	been	accompanied	by	much	confusion	
amidst	prospects	for	gain	with	their	occupants	often	having	to	navigate	between	
different	political	patrons	–from	both	the	left	and	the	right,	not	to	mention	land	
traffickers18	and	hucksters	of	all	sorts.		The	move	to	the	city	from	rural	areas	has	
long	been	an	object	of	anthropological	inquiry.		Indeed,	the	Americas,	especially	the	
developing	ones,	have	been	captured	in	a	number	of	ways.		There	has	been	no	
consensus	on	what	to	make	of	this	move.								
						 My	mind	goes	back	to	a	vegetable	vendor	who	I	asked	bluntly	why	she	had	
decided	to	come	to	live	in	the	sand.		Her	response	was	very	matter‐of‐fact.		She	
responded	that	she	knew	that	there	would	be	opportunity	in	this	new	place.		Where	
there	are	people,	there	are	commercial	opportunities,	she	surmised.		I	do	not	think	
that	her	reasoning	was	an	isolated	incident.		Judging	by	the	proliferation	of	informal	
vendors	and	service	providers,	many	had	the	same	idea.		So,	while	we	talk	about	
government	policies	and	external	forces,	we	need	to	be	aware	of	local	actors	who	
																																																								
18	Anyone	that	invades	a	piece	of	property	and	is	not	going	to	live	there	with	a	family	is	considered	to	
be	a	potential	land	trafficker.			Strict	conditions	are	placed	on	lot	owners	to	avoid	people	from	taking	
the	possibility	of	having	a	lot	away	from	more	needy	folk.		From	its	use	I	also	gathered	that	traffickers	
were	people	who	might	work	to	found	a	sector	then	charge	people	an	entrance	fee	to	have	a	lot	in	
their	sector.		In	a	more	general	sense,	traffickers	are	also	people	who	organize	invasions	of	private	
properties	so	that	the	land	can	be	wrestled	from	its	owner	then	sold	at	a	profit	by	those	who	have	
taken	possession	of	the	land.		I	met	people	who	had	moved	from	invasion	to	invasion.		Once	one	
invasion	became	formalized,	they	moved	to	another	one.		Many	property	owners	pointed	out	that	
this	was	a	means	of	accumulating	wealth	for	some	people.		It	seems	like	yet	another	way	of	
minimizing	one’s	risk	in	the	city	by	having	multiple	incomes	simultaneously.			
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are	navigating	the	sea	that	these	forces	stir	up,	trying	to	bring	home	a	catch	looking	
for	their	own	progress.			
					Now,	I	would	like	to	turn	toward	a	particular	study	of	a	land	invasion	that	
occurred	in	the	lead‐up	to	Fujimori’s	re‐re‐election	campaign	in	2000.			From	the	
previous	chapters,	I	think	my	reader	can	more	fully	appreciate	how	this	invasion	
may	bear	some	resemblance	to	or	vary	from	previous	ones.		What	I	believe	is	
intriguing	about	this	invasion	is	the	detail	available	for	the	sketch	I	have	given	of	
self‐help	housing	and	the	relationship	between	particular	actors.			
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Chapter 5 –The Nueva Rinconada   
	
	
A	photograph	of	the	Rinconada	in	October	of	2011.		This	shot	is	from	the	back	of	Zone	A.		Cerro	Mina	
is	behind	the	school	in	the	distance.		Sheet	metal	roofs	are	covered	with	dust	from	the	sandy	hills	on	
which	these	homes	are	built.	Photo:	Sandy	Simon	Torres	
	
Nunca	te	olvides	amigo	mío																																																																	Never	forget	my	friend	
Que	venimos	un	6	de	enero																																										that	we	all	came	one	6th	of	January	
Del	año	dos	mil	todos	venimos																																																																								of	the	year	2000	
Buscando	un	techo	para	nuestros	hijos																						Looking	for	a	roof	for	our	children	
Buscando	un	techo	para	nuestros	hijos																						Looking	for	a	roof	for	our	children	
Hoy	cumplimos	diez	años	de	lucha																											Today	we	celebrate	a	ten	year	fight	
En	este	pueblo	Nueva	Rinconada																													in	this	community	Nueva	Rinconada.	
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Primeros	meses	no	fueron	fácil																																											The	first	months	were	not	easy	
Porque	pasamos	hambre	y	frío																							because	we	endured	hunger	and	the	cold.	
De	poco	en	poco	llenamos	los	cerros																																	Little	by	little	we	filled	the	hills	
De	este	pueblo	Nueva	Rinconada																													of	this	community	Nueva	Rinconada.	
Ahora	somos	120	pueblos																																																		Now	there	are	120	communities		
Reconocidos	por	el	consejo																																																													recognized	by	the	council	
Reconocidos	por	el	consejo																																																													recognized	by	the	council	
Luego	nacieron	las	famosas	rondas																												Then,	the	famous	patrols	appeared	
Y	una	central	para	el	pueblo																					and	a	central	government	for	the	community.	
Frente	de	Defensa,	Nuevo	Pamplona																									The	Defense	Front,	New	Pamplona,	
Valle	Hermosa,	Villa	San	Juan																																													Beautiful	Valley,	Villa	Saint	John	
Minas	2000	y	la	zona	C																																																																					Minas	2000,	and	Zone	“C”	
Después	se	hizo	la	gran	marcha																																				After	the	big	march	was	organized	
A	todos	unidos	hacia	el	congreso																											everyone	united	to	go	to	the	Congress	
Para	pedir	nuestros	derechos																																																															to	demand	our	rights.	
Una	vivienda	para	nuestros	hijos																																																					A	home	for	our	children	
Una	vivienda	para	nuestros	hijos																																																					A	home	for	our	children	
Pido	un	aplauso	para	los	hombres																																		I	ask	for	an	applause	for	the	men	
Y	mujeres	de	gran	lucha																																																															and	the	women	that	fought.		
Alayo	Cota	y	XXX																																																							Surnames	and	nicknames	of	dirigentes	
El	Nino	Osorio,	Juana,	Velásquez	
Blanca,	Ester	y	Juanita	
Carmelo,	Moya	y	Montoya	
Jaque,	Vaquita	y	Lolita	
Y	el	gran	apoyo	del	Dr.	Robles																																				And	the	great	support	of	Dr.	Robles,	
Que	siempre	apoya	a	este	pueblo																											who	always	supports	this	community	
Hay	que	cantar,	hay	que	bailar																																												One	must	sing,	one	must	dance	
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A	todos	unidos	amigos																																																																				everyone	together	friends.	
Hay	que	gozar,	hay	que	brindar																One	must	enjoy	oneself,	one	must	say	cheers	
En	este	día	muy	especial																																																																						on	this	very	special	day	
~		Vida	Romero	
	
						 This	song,	which	was	sung	on	the	10th	anniversary	of	the	settlement	of	the	
Nueva	Rinconada,	and	sung	for	me	a	few	months	later	after	an	interview,	expresses	
a	sentiment,	but	also	an	interpretation	of	recent	events	in	what	is	known	within	
Pamplona	Alta	as	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		That	it	was	sung	after	ten	years,	as	we	will	
see,	is	very	significant	for	it	reflected	the	mistaken	belief,	and	perhaps	hope	of	many,	
that	after	ten	years	land	on	which	people	had	squatted	would	be	awarded	to	the	
squatters,	whether	as	a	result	of	a	statute	of	limitations	on	legal	processes	that	the	
land	had	become	mired	in,	or	a	state	intervention	in	favour	of	the	landholders.		Not	
all	agree	that	it	should	be	called	the	Nueva	Rinconada;	its	very	naming	denies	the	
simultaneous	existence	of	the	Industrial	Association	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada,	
hereafter	the	Association.		Like	the	duel	to	name	this	place,	Vida’s	song	represents	a	
tenacious	version	of	events	that	duels	with	other	equally	adamant	versions	of	
events	over	the	past	few	decades,	and,	signifies	for	her	a	struggle	that	has	lasted	ten	
years.		In	the	song,	it	is	apparent	that	many	people	had	to	endure	tough	conditions	
at	first	and	that	the	community,	thanks	in	large	part	to	a	number	of	charismatic	
figures,	managed	to	organize	themselves,	at	times	with	the	outside	assistance	of	
others	like	the	lawyer	Dr.	Robles.			
	 146
						 At	first	glance,	it	is	apparent	that	the	song	is	both	mnemonic	device	and	
explanation	for	why	people	moved	onto	private	lands	belonging	to	a	number	of	
property	owners,	who,	for	the	most	part,	bought	these	lands	with	their	hard	earned	
savings.		Most	of	the	owners	were,	like	many	of	the	people	here,	in	search	of	
progress	and	a	future	for	their	families	in	the	big	city.		Some	were	livestock	or	
agricultural	entrepreneurs,	or	country	folk	looking	to	recover	that	connection	with	
the	earth	that	had	been	lost	in	the	move	to	the	city	or	attempting	to	make	do	in	a	
way	with	which	they	were	familiar.	
					 For	those	who	took	possession	of	this	land,	the	land	was	an	empty	space,	a	
place	where	civilization	had	yet	to	take	hold.		Like	the	discourse	of	settlers	the	world	
over,	the	land	that	they	would	settle	upon	had	no	owners,	or	the	owners	would	be	
represented	as	derelict	in	their	duty	to	make	this	land	produce.		It	was	in	many	
respects	considered	terra	nullius.		The	main	difference	between	the	kind	of	
settlement	that	took	place	before	on	the	lands	of	indigenous	people	in	the	Americas,	
who	had	no	formal	system	of	land	ownership	like	that	of	the	contemporary	nation‐
state,	and	that	which	took	place	in	January	of	2000	in	this	sand‐skirted	rocky	valley	
in	Lima	is	that	the	land	that	would	be	settled	had	legally	recognized	property	
owners	and	the	settlers	were	the	masses	of	people	that	had	been	denied	a	space	in	
this	city,	in	this	country,	people	who	had,	for	the	most	part,	lived	tough	lives	fraught	
with	privations,	constant	change	and,	in	many	cases,	turbulent	pasts.		
						 The	settlement	of	this	land	also	reflects	a	pattern	of	do‐it‐yourself	
development	that	has	been	recognized	as	a	social	asset	in	Peru	since	the	1950s	at	
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least	and	can	be	associated	directly	with	processes	of	urbanization	that	saw	the	
rural	to	urban	ratio	in	Peru	inverted	in	the	later	half	of	the	20th	century	(see	
previous	chapters).		Curiously,	if	one	listens	to	people	here	enough,	their	main	
complaint	is	the	absence	of	the	state	and	the	inefficacy	of	state	representatives	in	
their	presence.		Hence,	their	capacity	to	help	themselves	is	a	product	of	both	the	
negligence	and	abuse	of	authority,	with	little	reason	to	celebrate.		Occupying	land	is	
a	tactic	(De	Certeau	1984)	that	people	deploy	consciously	to	gain	access	to	a	home	
and	land	that	they	fashion.		It	is	a	viable	option	to	the	nationally	and	internationally	
funded	housing	schemes	that	limit	the	space	and	creative	options	for	construction	
that	these	programs	offer	as	a	solution.		Occupying	land	allows	squatters	to	have	
control	over	the	space	they	make	and	the	amount	of	space	available	to	them.		That	
people	choose	to	squat	on	land	still,	despite	the	privations	they	must	endure,	
suggests	that	all	the	sacrfice	is	worth	it.			
					The	populist	views	of	presidents	and	parties	past	echo	through	to	the	present	and	
guide	much	state	and	non‐state	intervention	in	working	class	areas	of	Lima	and	
rural	Peru.		What	the	state	lacks	in	economic	resources,	the	people	are	expected	to	
contribute	in	kind,	usually	with	labour,	to	push	the	nation	toward	social	and	
material	progress.		One	cannot	help	but	notice,	as	well,	that	by	maintaining	people	in	
a	prolonged	state	of	self‐improvement	–awaiting	interventions	from	a	discontinuous	
and	partial	state–	a	relation	of	dependency	is	established	between	the	state	and	a	
sector	of	the	population	that	believes	the	state	ought	to	ensure	the	well	being	of	its	
citizens.		This	suggests	that	the	perceived	freedom	attained	in	squatting	works	as	a	
double	edged	sword	—it	gives	them	more	freedom	over	the	dwelling	they	produce,	
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however	it	also	means	they	must	rely	on	making	pacts	with	outside	political	actors	
to	meet	the	legal	requirements	necessary	for	formalizing	their	dwellings	and	getting	
access	to	public	utilities.		Many	of	my	collaborators	recognized	that	the	help	that	
does	come	must	be	paid	for,	that	it	comes	with	“strings	attached,”	and	that	“nothing	
is	free.”		This	recognition	is	the	product	of	decades	of	populist	interventions.		Many	
of	the	sympathetic	professionals	I	met	who	envision	a	more	just	nation	went	so	far	
as	to	argue	that	this	patronage	system	is	a	product	of	the	patrimonial	relationship	
that	emerged	during	the	colonial	period	and	persists	until	the	present.			
						 At	present,	it	is	simply	understood	that	if	a	law	is	passed	it	is	because	the	
incumbent	political	party	is	looking	to	benefit	its	clients,	and	that	it	expects	a	
payment	in	kind	from	its	clients,	be	they	rich	or	poor.		But,	the	incumbent	political	
party	can	just	as	easily	betray	those	clients	(either	deliberately	or	for	reasons	
beyond	its	control),	creating	a	sense	of	disappointment	among	the	people	(el	
pueblo).		The	same	holds	true	for	the	clients	of	the	state;	they	too	may	renege	on	
their	obligation,	i.e.,	not	vote	for	their	patrons.		This	complex	interplay	is	exposed,	to	
some	degree,	when	we	begin	to	analyze	this	property	dispute	and	will	form	the	
basis	of	a	more	in‐depth	analysis	once	we	have	discussed	what	I,	with	the	collusion	
of	my	collaborators,	have	been	able	to	piece	together	about	this	dispute.		Suffice	it	to	
say,	populism	is	much	more	complex	than	unscrupulous	politicians	duping	
disorganized	masses.			
						 I	argue	that	the	sweat	and	blood	of	the	people	seems,	for	some	at	least,	to	be	
an	infinite	wealth	that	can	be	channelled	against	all	obstacles,	sufficiently	great	to	
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form	the	foundations	of	empires.		Free	labour,	in	other	words,	like	the	silver	and	
gold	of	the	nation,	is	a	wealth	that	can	be	placed	at	the	disposal	of	the	state	and	
actors	who	have	the	gumption	and	vision	to	command	the	people.		We	should	not	
forget	that	the	frontiers	that	mark	the	expansion	of	cities	or	resource	frontiers	are	
part	of	a	political	vision	for	which,	and	because	of	which,	this	world	works.		The	
discursive	trick	here	has	been	to	turn	the	sacrifice	of	the	people	into	a	worthy	
sacrifice,	one	that	they	can	proudly	bear	so	that	the	nation	will	advance.		The	
redemption	of	the	poor,	then,	like	that	of	the	Indian,	rests	in	the	blood	and	sweat	
they	are	willing	to	shed	for	the	nation.19		But,	and	I	ask	this	very	seriously,	how	does	
such	an	agreement	come	about?		Is	it	an	untroubled	agreement?		What,	indeed,	is	
happening?		
						 This	struggle	to	have	something	to	call	one’s	own,	to	have	a	root	in	someplace,	
must	not	be	lost	sight	of	in	this	history,	and	must,	furthermore,	be	placed	within	its	
proper	historical	context.		It	is	what	gives	sense	to	this	unsettled	dispute.		The	
dispute,	I	would	add,	is	not	just	about	a	couple	hundred	landowners20	and	
thousands	of	squatters.		It	is	much	bigger	and	also	simpler	than	one	might	imagine.		
																																																								
19	In	his	second	essay	of	seven	that	sketch	the	social,	economic	and	political	life	of	Peru	at	the	
beginning	of	the	20th	century	José	Carlos	Mariátegui	makes	a	number	of	observations	about	the	
character	of	Republican	rule	that	resonate	with	this	current	study.		In	describing	the	“Indian	
problem,”	he	gets	into	a	polemical	discussion	of	the	abuses	of	the	Creole	class	that	are	pertinent	to	
our	discussion	here.		He	describes	how	Creoles,	in	their	laws,	extended	the	liberties	of	the	
revolutionary	movements	in	the	United	States	and	France,	but,	that	in	practice	the	new	governing	
class	was	much	more	rapacious	than	their	colonial	predecessors.		He	describes	the	redemption	of	
Indians	as	“demagogic	speculation	of	some	caudillos.”		Claiming	that	Creole	political	parties	had	
“enlisted	them	in	their	program,”	and	by	doing	so	they	had	“diminished	in	this	way	the	desire	to	fight	
for	their	demands.”	Guided	by	newfangled	liberal	principles,	the	task	of	Peruvian	state	was	to	
“elevate	the	condition”	of	the	Indians.	(Mariátegui	1985[1928]:44–49)		I	cannot	help	but	feel	that	the	
character	of	rule	that	Mariátegui	is	describing	is	not	so	different	in	quality	from	what	I	will	describe	
in	the	following	pages.			
20	Those	who	possess	clear	title	to	property.	
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When	we	begin	to	look	at	the	voices	of	people	and	the	actions	that	are	occurring,	
what	emerges	is	a	cry,	a	desire,	to	have	a	place	in	this	world,	to	be	worth	something,	
to	be	recognized	as	a	human	being	worthy	of	dignity	and	respect.		It	is	a	demand	for	
a	niche,	a	foothold,	from	which	one	can	either	securely	roost,	or	from	which	one	can	
reach	for	yet	another	perch.		Not	all	humans	are	conformists,	after	all.		This	is	the	
simple	part	because	all	humans	have	this	most	immediate	necessity.			
						 But,	why	they	should	desire	a	home	of	their	own,	good	education	for	their	
children,	financial	independence,	or,	on	the	contrary,	just	acquiesce	to	their	daily	
circumstances,	should	arouse	some	curiosity.		This	forms	part	of	the	renactment	of	a	
development	process	that	we	discusses	in	previous	chapters	whereby	people	squat,	
or	assigned	lots	that	they	slowly	build	homes	on.		The	Nueva	Rinconada	is	
remarkable	in	that	people	here	have	continued	this	tradition	of	building	one’s	home	
instead	of	opting	to	become	part	of	a	formal	public	housing	program.		What	we	
notice	here	is	a	gambit	of	lifestyles	and	life	histories,	all	coming	together	in	a	grand	
melange,	multiplying	in	complexity	over	time,	incorporating	residual,	emergent	and	
dominant	discourses	and	behaviours.		Possibilities,	reflected	in	people’s	narratives,	
are	constrained	and	abetted	by	their	social,	economic	and	political	circumstances.			
						 The	stage	on	which	this	cry	takes	place	is,	in	this	case,	a	tract	of	land,	the	
Nueva	Rinconada,	like	the	name	says,	a	corner,	in	the	hills	of	Lima.		The	bigger	
picture	is	that	this	case	represents	countless	lines	in	the	history	of	a	nation	of	
distinct	peoples,	a	social	network	and	a	family	has	fought	to	extend	their	sphere	of	
influence	and	maintain	the	structures	that	form	the	framework	of	the	particular	
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social	group.		We	have	already	seen	how	this	line	keeps	getting	pushed	back	
horizontally,	and,	from	the	picture	that	opens	this	chapter,	up	into	the	hills	that	
eventually	become	the	Andes.		This	interaction,	it	stands	to	reason,	involves	a	
negotiation	of	interests	in	a	complex	field.		Within	this	nation	many	fight	to	be	
regarded	in	the	same	light	as	those	who	are	the	privileged	members	of	the	nation.			
						 At	this	moment	in	history,	most	humans	are	driven	by	a	desire	to	progress.		
Just	what	that	progress	means	is	a	subject	of	great	interest	and	relevance	for	this	
case.		It	is	in	many	ways	the	driving	force	behind	the	actions	of	many	actors	these	
days.		Here,	as	we	saw	before	the	struggle	to	build	a	home	is	re‐enacted	with	a	new	
generation.		For	now,	I	would	like	to	discuss	the	political	context	of	the	incursion	of	
people	into	the	Nueva	Rinconada.	
The Re-re-election of Alberto Fujimori 
	
						 In	the	previous	chapter	I	talked	about	some	of	the	strategies	that	Fujimori	
used,	with	the	approval	of	international	financiers	and	neoliberal	pundits,	to	court	
voters	in	the	1995	elections.		For	the	following	interpretation	of	events	is	based	on	a	
selection	of	the	print	media	in	Lima	from	December	1999	to	March	2000.		As	the	
reader	will	see,	the	events	leading	up	to	the	2000	presidential	elections	had	a	lot	to	
do	with	what	would	happen	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		To	large	degree	the	historical	
context	gives	great	insight	into	what	happened	and	why.			
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					This	analysis	relies	on	two	opposition	newspapers,	Liberación	and	La	República,	a	
weekly	magazine,	Caretas,	as	well	as	one	of	the	chicha21	papers,	El	Chato,	to	
reconstruct	the	position	of	the	Fujimoristas.		My	decision	to	use	El	Chato	as	
representative	of	Fujimori’s	political	party	is	further	reinforced	by	a	conversation,	
taped	by	Vladimir	Montesinos	and	his	associates	of	the	now	defunct	National	
Intelligence	Service	(SIN)	in	1998	between	Montesinos	and	ex‐president	of	the	
Council	of	Ministers,	Víctor	Joy	Way,	discussing	their	use	of	the	so‐called	yellow	
press	to	continue	disinforming	the	public	in	the	lead	up	to	the	2000	elections,	
especially	the	public	in	barriadas.		Below	is	an	excerpt	that	was	printed	in	La	
República	in	February	of	2001.	
Montesinos:	For	how	much	do	they	want	to	sell?	
Joy	Way:	Alex	has	not	given	me	a	figure	(presumably	Alex	Wolfenson).		He	
said,	“Look,”	he	said,	“We	sell	between	90	to	80	thousand	El	Chinos	and	some	
60	to	70	thousand	Todo	Sport	[two	newspapers].”	
Montesinos:	Yes.	
Joy	Way:	He	even	said	to	me,	“I	can’t	live,	I	can’t	handle	it.		Everyone	pressures	
me,	the	opposition.		If	they	call	me	(intelligible),	I	am	afraid	all	day.	
Montesinos:	If	it	suits	us,	we	will	buy	it	next	year	[1999].		I	will	buy	it	for	SIN,	
but	as	a	front	organization.	
																																																								
21	Chicha	is	a	beverage	that	is	made	of	purple	corn	and	served	throughout	the	country	in	restaurants	
and	by	street	vendors.		It	is	also	a	musical	genre	that	fused	Andean	huaynos,	songs	that	bemoan	the	
condition	of	Andean	people	and	celebrate	their	folk	culture,	with	Colombian	cumbia,	upbeat	tropical	
rhythms	often	revolving	around	euphoric	encounters	of	young	and	old	adults,	becoming	highly	
fashionable	among	lower	class	migrants	in	the	1970s	and	1980s.		Chicha	press	refers	to	the	vulgar	
cheap	newspapers	that	are	sold	in	kiosks	throughout	the	country	for	a	fraction	of	the	cost	of	more	
“serious”	newspapers.		The	language	in	these	papers	is	colloquial.		Mainstays	of	this	type	of	
journalism	are	semi‐nude	videttes	(exotic	dancers)	on	the	cover	page,	or	last	page,	sensational	and	
inhumane	coverage	of	crime	stories	(the	bad	guys	usually	get	their	just	druthers	with	photos	of	
murdered	criminals,	sometimes	for	the	theft	of	a	house,	for	instance,	being	common),	sports	coverage	
(usually	soccer),	pro‐development	and	enterprise	stories	and	material,	and	usually	distorted	
politicized	interpretations	of	national	events	that	favour	incumbent	economically	liberal	parties.		
Canadian	poet	and	musician	Leonard	Cohen’s	line	“The	rich	have	got	their	channels	in	the	bedrooms	
of	the	poor,”	is	very	apt	here.		The	collocation	of	the	adjective	chicha	here	is	patronizing	and	
misleading.		It	masks	a	repudiation	of	vernacular	cultures	in	Peru.				
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Joy	Way:	Correct,	then,	I	can’t	(unintelligible).	
Montesinos:	Try	to	lower	it	as	much	as	you	can.	
Joy	Way:	It	is	that	he’s	interested	in	us	(unintelligible).	
Montesinos:	No,	no,	we	already	have,	we	have	five	newspapers,	we	have	four,	
is	that	right?		We	have	El	Chino,	El	Mañanero,	La	Chuchi,	El	Tío	and	El	Chato.		
Now	we	have	El	Chato.		We	have	eliminated	a	newspaper,	you	understand	me?		
Now	we	have	El	Chato.		So…	
Now,	we	are	not	owners,	but	we	finance	them,	the	four	of	them.		Now,	yes,	they	
are	men	of	El	Chino,	El	Chino	has	Todo	Sport	y	Todo	Sport	is	sports.		Todo	
Sport	sells	like	hell,	like	hell.		It	sells	because	it	is	soccer.		What	shit.	
…	
Montesinos:	No,	but	you	know	that	all	(unintelligible)	of	intelligence	has	its	
channel	and	its	newspaper,	that	do	not	appear	in	the	organization,	but,	fuck,	it	
keeps	up	the	bullshit.	
Joy	Way:	And	there	is	a	person	that	I	can	tell	to	buy	it.	
Another	man	present:	Crazy	Marsano.	
Montesinos:	No,	but	crazy	Marsano	is	not	suitable.	
Joy	Way:	No,	it’s	that	why,	if	we	can	pay	it,	so,	why?	
Montesinos:	(unintelligible)	I	buy	the	newspaper	here,	SIN	does	not	appear,	
but	I	buy	it,	put	an	idiot	as	front	man,	brother.	
(Anonymous	2001a:5)	
	
						 Movies	and	spy	novels	do	not	get	more	specific	in	the	detail	that	was	provided	
by	the	surreptitious	recordings	of	ex‐SIN	head	Montesinos.		What	is	important	here	
is	that	from	this	conversation	we	can	establish	without	a	doubt	that	journalists	were	
being	paid	to	toe	the	party	line,	and	that	there	was	a	deliberated	and	concerted	
effort	to	put	together	slanted	press	coverage	in	a	very	particular	way	that	would	
appeal	to	working	class	sectors	of	the	population.		Other	videos	showed	Montesinos	
bribing	television	stations	not	to	broadcast	opposition	campaign	advertisements	for	
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the	2000	elections.		The	release	of	these	videos	led	to	the	resignation	of	Fujimori	on	
November	17,	2000.		Most	middle	class	collaborators	I	have	known	over	the	years	
dismiss	this	sensationist	coverage	as	vulgar	and	inappropriate;	however,	if	one	
spends	time	in	working	class	areas	of	Lima,	these	papers	are	well‐read,	often	
passing	through	many	hands,	being	left	to	be	read	in	restaurants,	juice	stands,	and	
other	social	hubs.		
To	add	more	credibility	to	this	recording,	one	can	also	consider	the	defection	
of	a	number	of	ex‐workers	and	reporters	from	El	Chato	during	the	2000	election	
campaign.		In	the	February	1st	edition	of	Liberación	they	claimed	that	they	were	still	
awaiting	a	decision	on	a	court	case	for	the	violation	of	their	civil	rights.		Journalist	
Hugo	Borjas	was	threatened	for	making	the	case	public.		The	ex‐workers	claimed	
that	in	October	of	1999	the	newspaper	received	headlines	against	presidential	
hopefuls	Alberto	Andrade	and	Luis	Castañeda	from	the	beginning	of	1999.		For	this	
service	the	owners	received	a	total	of	$180,000,	$6,000	daily,	in	cash	(so	there	was	
no	paper	trail)	(Aylas	2000a:4).					
					Similar	to	the	scene	we	will	see	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada,	the	print	and	electronic	
media	function	to	distort	reality,	to	provide	contradictory	interpretations	of	current	
events	and	social	reality.		Not	only	this,	but	as	Peruvian	anthropologist	Carlos	Iván	
Degregori	explored	in	his	La	Década	de	la	Antipolítica,	Decade	of	Antipolitics,	this				
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A	typical	kiosk	where	newspapers	are	sold	in	Lima.		Kiosks	like	this	can	be	found	in	most	
municipalities,	although	the	range	of	material	varies	depending	on	the	location.		Here	we	see	a	kiosk	
in	a	pueblo	joven.		The	majority	of	papers	being	offered	here	are	50	cent	and	80	cent	papers,	which	
account	for	the	majority	of	sales	of	print	material	at	this	kiosks.	Photo:	Sandy	Simon	Torres	
media	project	was	well	in	place	by	1996	(Degregori	2001).		He	details	how	Fujimori,	
in	collaboration	with	his	henchman	Montesinos,	set	about	co‐opting	major	figures	in	
Peruvian	television	—like	opinionated	talk	show	host	Laura	Bozzo—	with	bribes.		
Degregori	observed	how	she	went	from	talking	about	domestic	disputes	one	day,	to	
a	focus	on	peace	in	Peru	the	next.		This	was	a	characteristic	spin	of	those	days,	
emphasizing	the	peace	that	Fujimori	had	restored	while	playing	on	fears	of	Sendero	
Luminoso	and	the	FARC	in	other	instances.		Stories	of	crime	or	social	deviance	were	
also	commonplace,	lending	credibility	to	the	authoritarian	tilt	of	the	regime	and	
demonstrating	to	the	public	that	his	rule	ensured	stability	and	justice.			
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						 By	the	end	of	the	1990s,	bastions	of	free	speech,	like	the	newspaper	El	
Comercio,	or	the	late	night	television	news	program	of	César	Hildebrandt,	proved	to	
be	a	thorn	in	the	side	of	the	Fujimori	regime	(Hildebrandt	resigned	prior	to	the	2000	
elections,	but	stayed	active	as	editor	in	chief	of	Liberación).		These	few	news	sources	
tried	to	dampen	the	din	of	the	yellow	press	and	numerous	state	controlled	national	
television	stations.		Although	they	would	eventually	fail	to	prevent	the	re‐election	of	
Fujimori,	they	did	reflect	a	growing	resistance	to	the	strategies	being	used	by	the	
Fujimori	regime	to	remain	in	power.			
						 The	previous	conversation	between	Montesinos	and	Joy	Way	was	not	an	
exaggeration	or	overstatement	of	what	the	government	was	capable	of	according	to	
accounts	like	those	of	the	ex‐head	of	the	Commission	of	Truth	and	Reconciliation	in	
Peru.		These	measures,	though,	tended	to	generate	public	opposition	with	marches	
and	vigils	in	front	of	compromised	television	stations	becoming	the	norm.			
						 Degregori	noted	how	during	the	election	campaign	of	2000	the	yellow	press	
and	their	electronic	media	mirrors	maintained	a	constant	and	orchestrated	
demolition	campaign	against	political	candidates	that	were	perceived	as	a	threat	to	
the	regime,	like	that	mentioned	of	political	opponents	Andrade	and	Castañeda.		
During	the	1997‐1999	period,	government	funding	of	advertising	on	national	
television	increased	by	109%,	while,	for	the	same	time	period,	advertising	by	the	
corporate	sector,	beer	companies,	banks,	soft	drinks,	detergents	and	shampoos	
dropped	from	between	38–52%	(Degregori	2001[2000]:120).		The	press	
maintained	that	they	were	not	allowing	opposition	politicians	to	buy	air‐time	
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because	they	would	lose	money	from	their	sponsors.		At	other	times,	token	spaces	
were	given,	it	seemed,	just	to	counter	these	allegations.						
						 Degregori	gives	an	expert	local	eyewitness	account	of	the	situation	of	the	
media	climate	at	the	time	of	the	2000	elections.		He	wrote,	
There	were	no	political	programs:	police	stories	opened	the	news,	followed	by	
“social	themes”;	paid	electoral	programming	was	not	even	allowed.		
Apparently,	the	objective	of	the	regime	was	the	depoliticization	of	the	
electorate,	the	classic	bread	and	circus,	because,	in	reality,	the	kidnapping	of	
open	signal	television	and	the	harassment	of	independent	media	was	part	of	a	
“political	re‐education”	or	perverse	authoritarian	politicization	[of	the	media]	
(Degregori	2001[2000]:117).	
	
						 In	what	follows	I	reconstruct	elements	of	this	compromised	media	coverage,	
bearing	in	mind	the	co‐optation	of	the	press	source	that	I	use,	and	the	simultaneous	
coverage	of	opposition	journalists	with	respect	to	the	invasions	occurring	in	the	
lead‐up	to	the	election	campaign	of	2000.			Compared	to	the	strategic	allocation	of	
state	spending	discussed	in	the	previous	section,	the	control	of	media	content	
discussed	here	represents	a	refinement	and	extension	of	state	and	security	attempts	
to	influence	the	population.		The	aftermath	of	these	politically	motivated	tactics	will	
be	explored	thereafter.		I	focus	on	three	months	specifically:	December,	January,	and	
February.	
						 December	was	a	decisive	month	for	Fujimori.		During	this	month	he	had	to	
respond	to	allegations	of	the	opposition	that	he	and	his	political	party	had	included	
two	million	people	on	the	electoral	roll	who	should	not	have	been	included.		On	this	
list	were	military	personnel	(the	military	and	police	are	not	allowed	to	vote	in	Peru),	
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police	officers,	thousands	who	had	passed	away	since	1984,	people	who	migrated	
from	one	area	of	the	country	to	vote	in	another,	and	others	who	had	emigrated	to	
foreign	countries.		Opponents	feared	that	these	ballots	would	be	cast	in	favour	of	the	
incumbent	President.		The	discovery	of	this	illegal	roll	led	opponents	and	civic	
activists	to	denounce	the	case	to	the	Jurado	Nacional	de	Elecciones	(National	
Electoral	Committee),	asking	for	the	withdrawal	of	Fujimori	from	the	2000	electoral	
campaign.			
						 The	pro‐Fujimori	press	claimed	that	the	case	was	against	his	re‐election,	or	his	
use	of	the	slogan	Perú	país	con	futuro	(Peru,	country	with	a	future),	omitting	the	
details	behind	the	opposition	to	his	re‐election.		The	case	was	to	no	avail	(his	party	
had	strong	support	in	the	National	Electoral	Committee)	and	Fujimori	continued	to	
run	as	the	representative	of	his	political	front,	despite	concerted	national	level	
protests	by	labour	unions,	teacher	unions,	health	care	worker	unions,	student	
unions,	opposition	political	parties,	mayors,	and	other	concerned	citizens.	
						 During	the	middle	of	January	2000,	slogans	for	Fujimori’s	party	appeared	
illegally	on	military	bases.		His	slogans	and	motifs	also	appeared	in	state	schools.		
Not	only	this,	but	the	military	sent	guards	to	ensure	that	these	slogans	and	motifs	
were	not	removed.		Newspapers	denounced	the	removal	of	opposition	political	
party	paintings	throughout	the	country,	with	common	instances	where	military	
personnel	painted	over	previous	paintings	with	Fujimori’s	slogans	and	motifs.		The	
use	of	state	resources	for	political	proselytization	was	forbidden	by	the	Peruvian	
Constitution.		This	obviously	did	not	matter,	though.			
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						 In	his	defense,	Fujimori	claimed	that	these	propaganda	efforts	were	
perpetrated	by	party	militants	that	were	beyond	his	control,	but,	obviously	
impressed	by	his	accomplishments.		El	Chato	reported	that	mayors	were	ensuring	
that	candidates	complied	with	ordinances	that	ensured	that	political	propaganda	
was	not	placed	on	public	institutions	or	on	walls	without	approval	of	property	
owners.		As	one	will	see,	Fujimori	always	maintained	deniability.			
						 Newspapers	like	Liberación	and	La	República	denounced	this	constant	
gerrymandering	for	months	leading	up	to	the	April	elections.		Recipients	of	
government	aid	were	told	that	they	had	to	help	in	his	campaign.		Soup	kitchens	kept	
a	portrait	of	Fujimori	to	remind	recipients	whom	they	could	thank	for	the	food	that	
they	were	eating.		During	the	time	of	my	research	a	portrait	of	Alan	García	could	be	
found	in	many	soup	kitchens.		Organizers	of	literacy	campaigns	were	told	that	they	
had	to	campaign	for	the	president,	or	they	would	be	fired,	and,	some	were.		One	gets	
the	sense	that	Fujimori	and	his	mafia	were	pulling	out	all	the	stop	signs	to	win	the	
2000	elections.			
						 Their	response	to	these	accusations	were	base	and	crude,	with	name	calling,	
like	referring	to	presidential	hopeful	Andrade	as	a	“pig,”	or	a	“pituco”22	being	
commonplace.		If	candidates	denounced	acts	of	intimidation	like	anonymous	threats	
or	someone	hurling	a	Molotov	cocktail	against	their	home,	the	pro‐Fujimori	press	
labelled	them	as	crazy,	or	suggested	that	such	actions	were	a	ploy	to	manipulate	
																																																								
22	This	is	a	denigrating	term	for	white	middle	class	Peruvians	who	put	on	a	stereotypical	affected	
attitude	of	superiority	over	working	class	Peruvians.		By	referring	to	Andrade	as	a	pituco,	the	editors	
of	the	yellow	press	were	implying	that	he	was	too	white	and	too	refined	to	be	a	candidate	of	the	
people.	
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voters.		Another	strategy	was	to	paint	the	opposition	as	populists	or	as	a	threat	to	
the	interests	of	the	informal	economy.		As	the	reader	will	recall,	De	Soto	played	
strongly	to	the	potential	of	the	informal	sector.		Mayor	Andrade	removed	street	
vendors	from	the	central	core	of	Lima	to	organize	this	commercial	centre.		Actions	
like	this,	however,	were	drawn	on	by	the	pro‐Fujimori	press	to	paint	Andrade	as	a	
threat	to	informal	businesses	throughout	the	city.		El	Chato	reporters	regularly	
made	improbable	claims	like:	Castañeda	called	mothers	who	volunteered	in	soup	
kitchens	burros,	or	donkeys	(donkey	are	idiots	in	Spanish),	or,	if	elected,	Andrade	
would	cut	all	aid	to	community	food	aid	programs.		They	went	so	far	to	refer	to	
Andrade	as	a	populist.			
						 Fujimori’s	government	used	the	yellow	press	to	promote	programs	that	
appeared	prior	to	the	election.		He	promised	school	bursaries	to	the	children	of	state	
workers,	the	police	and	military,	and	one‐time	payments	to	retired	people.		He	
announced	credit	programs	for	housing,	draws	for	free	houses,	draws	rewarding	
those	who	made	payments	on	housing	credits,	and	initiatives	to	supply	water	to	
those	without	water,	for	instance.		For	these	bursaries	and	one‐time	gifts	people	had	
to	sign	up	before	the	election,	with	the	expected	delivery	of	these	funds	coming	after	
his	election.		A	fervent	tour	of	public	inaugurations	was	also	part	of	the	backdrop	to	
his	campaign.		His	press	announced	the	securing	of	international	loans,	on	occasion,	
released,	just	as	chance	would	have	it,	prior	to	his	third	illegal	election	campaign.		
Ironically,	they	also	spoke	of	fiscal	transparency	and	laws	being	designed	to	
improve	it.		Promises	that	jobs	would	increase	for	urbanized	indigenous	migrants	
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were	interspersed	throughout	yellow	press	coverage.		By	all	appearances,	Fujimori	
was	a	busy	man,	busy	building	up	his	country.		
						 The	moral	element	of	the	Fujimori	press	coverage	was	critical	in	establishing	
his	legitimacy	with	the	populace.		As	Degregori	noted,	cases	that	would	arouse	
public	indignation	and	opinion	were	a	fixture:	the	rape	of	children,	shootings	of	
innocent	civilians,	crimes	of	passion,	drug	consumption	and	commerialization	and	
theft	were	recurring	themes.		The	public	could	also	enjoy	the	moral	backlash	of	
society	with	stories	that	featured	the	capture	of	thieves	of	all	ilk	(house	robbers,	
hucksters,	adulterers	of	products,	armed	robbers,	car	thieves,	etc.).			It	was	common	
to	see	morbid	photographs,	like	the	denuded	bullet‐ridden	body	of	a	thief	that	was	
murdered	by	a	homeowner	who	took	justice	into	his	own	hands.		The	country	was	in	
need	of	justice	and	Fujimori	guaranteed	that	it	would	be	given,	even	if	that	meant	
tolerating	acts	of	self‐retribution.		The	use	of	retributive	justice	was	a	key	feature	of	
the	public	approval	for	Fujimori	then	and	it	continues	to	be	a	strong	feature	of	his	
daughter’s	rhetoric.		David	Harvey	talks	about	neoliberal	reforms	in	the	United	
States	being	brought	in	with	an	appeal	to	personal	liberty	(2005).		In	Peru,	
neoliberalism	was	brought	in	amidst	calls	for	justice	and	order.	
						 Fujimori	was	remembered	by	collaborators	as	ruling	with	an	iron	fist	and	
showing	little	mercy	to	law‐breakers.		This	impression,	both	real	and	generated	by	
constant	media	coverage	that	showcased	these	activities,	led	many	to	reject	the	
stories	of	corruption	that	were	appearing.		Many	of	my	collaborators,	when	
confronted	with	my	claims	that	Fujimori	and	his	counterparts	were	a	corrupt	mafia,	
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responded	that	all	politicians	are	that	way	and	that	at	least	Fujimori	did	something	
for	the	people.		This	statement	should	be	taken	very	seriously	because	it	reflects	a	
generalized	cynicism	that	prevails	in	Peru.		It	also	speaks	another	truth	that	
opponents	of	Fujimori	do	not	easily	admit:	he	was	a	man	of	action.	
						 I	could	not	help	but	notice	the	corollary	to	all	of	this	negative	press	was	that	
people	had	a	very	low	opinion	of	their	compatriots.		It	was	common	to	hear	that	
people	in	Peru	had	a	lot	of	ingenuity,	but	for	the	wrong	things.		Or	that	what	Peru	
needed	was	a	good	dictator	again	to	put	people	back	in	their	place,	to	clean	up	the	
streets.		While	most	recognize	that	people	rob,	sell	drugs,	or	break	the	law	due	to	
economic	need,	there	is	also	a	harsh	intolerance	for	such	acts,	mostly	because	the	
majority	of	people	go	through	great	efforts	to	sustain	their	families	in	Lima	working	
long	hours	in	exchange	for	subsistence	level	wages.		Fujimori’s	press	coverage	
captured	the	issues	that	were	important	to	the	majority	of	the	public,	listening	
sympathetically	and	giving	people	the	retribution	that	they	sought.		It	also	astutely	
read	the	desire	for	progress	that	most	families	sought	in	not	only	Lima,	but	also	in	
the	provinces.		His	massive	infrastructure	programs	rightly	gauged	the	previous	lack	
of	investment	by	previous	governments	in	these	projects	(recall	the	self‐help	efforts	
discussed	by	Riofrío	in	Pamplona,	for	instance).			
						 It	was	common	practice	to	play	on	the	feeling	that	social	superiors	were	
holding	back	the	majority	and	that	through	the	construction	of	schools,	literacy	
programs,	the	distribution	of	free	school	materials	(with	political	slogans	and	
motifs),	etc.	Fujimori	and	his	supporters	were	working	toward,	as	their	2000	slogan	
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implied	“a	country	with	a	future.”		The	press	often	criticized	Andrade	as	looking	out	
for	the	interests	of	more	affluent	Peruvians,	alleging	that	he	had	no	intention	of	
safeguarding	the	interests	of	the	informal	economy,	the	backbone	of	the	Peruvian	
economy	by	the	estimation	of	these	sources.	
						 There	was	a	very	manly	side,	in	the	patriarchal	sense,	to	Fujimori’s	press.		The	
covers	of	the	yellow	press	unfailingly	featured	a	scantily	clad	woman	suggestively	
pushing	her	buttocks	toward	readers.		Supplements	on	sexual	positions	were	
promoted.		With	much	talk	of	the	sexual	exploits	of	videttes,	something	like	playgirls	
or	porn	stars,	came	the	promotion	of	the	only	true	game	for	men:	soccer.		Although	
the	Fujimori	government	created	the	Ministry	of	the	Woman,	the	pro‐Fujimori	press	
was	also	the	most	vociferous	proponent	of	the	denigration	of	women	and	the	
promotion	of	entrenched	male	chauvinist	attitudes.		Fujimori	managed	the	
economic	contradictions	in	his	government’s	program	by	surreptitiously	
encouraging	practices	that	he	condemned,	making	a	mockery	of	the	values,	like	
sexual	equality,	that	he	embraced	for	consumption	of	the	international	community.		
The	strategy	of	his	party	seemingly	was	to	please	everyone	despite	the	
contradictions	this	generated.			
						 A	form	of	neoliberal	impression	management	was	at	work	(Goffman	1958).		
The	idea	here	is	that	state	reforms	brought	in	by	the	Fujimori	government	curtailed	
union	strength	and	civil	rights	and	weakened	or	nullified	the	power	of	the	congress,	
senate,	press	and	judiciary	to	do	so.		To	keep	the	act	going,	Fujimori	used	an	
assortment	of	demagogic	practices	to	manage	the	real	impacts	of	his	policies.		Most	
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people	did	not	realize	that	Fujimori	was	using	public	funds	to	finance	his	almost	
wholesale	buy‐out	of	the	fifth	estate.		Schools	were	built	with	the	sale	of	state	
enterprises,	the	sale	of	national	resources	to	foreign	corporations	and	the	increased	
power	of	tax	collectors.		In	a	nation‐state,	some	of	these	measures	may	have	been	
favourable,	but	we	must	remember	that	when	schools	were	built,	roads	paved,	dams	
built,	etc.,	Fujimori	or	a	representative	of	his	party	was	almost	always	present	for	a	
photo	opportunity	and	these	inaugurations	often	had	preferential	coverage	in	the	
press.		This	personalization	of	public	offices	is	a	hallmark	of	Peruvian	politicians	of	
all	political	persuasions.		
						 When	we	consider	the	invasion	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada	we	have	to	put	it	
within	the	contradictory	universe	of	the	possible	at	this	moment.		The	invasion	of	
the	Nueva	Rinconada	was	one	of	the	first	to	be	reported	in	the	press	in	the	lead‐up	
to	the	elections.		However,	despite	its	size,	it	received	little	commentary	in	either	the	
opposition	or	pro‐Fujimori	press.		It	did	not	receive	the	media	attention	that	an	
invasion	of	similar	magnitude	that	occurred	on	January	27th,	2000	of	private	
property	in	Villa	El	Salvador	did	in	which	five	invaders	were	killed	and	dozens	
injured	by	thugs	hired	by	the	property	owners.		This	event	led	many	to	realize	that	
throughout	Lima,	and	even	outside	Lima,	people	were	becoming	emboldened	
enough	to	invade	private	property	and	land	set	aside	for	municipal	projects	like	
schools	and	parks.				
						 Martin	Pumar,	then	mayor	of	Villa	El	Salvador,	had	asked	for	police	
intervention	well	in	advance	of	the	planned	invasion.		The	Minister	of	the	
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Department	of	the	Interior	denied	receiving	such	correspondence	in	the	beginning,	
however	press	coverage	forced	him	to	acknowledge	that	he	had	received	said	
requests.		Fujimori	and	representatives	of	the	local	police	claimed	that	they	had	not	
intervened	or	deterred	further	involvement	to	avoid	bloodshed.		At	times,	it	looked	
like	the	government	turned	a	blind	eye.		Once	the	opposition	press	shone	a	spotlight	
on	the	invasions,	denouncing	them	as	a	vote‐for‐title	scheme,	the	police	became	
more	vigilant	suddenly,	evicting	would	be	invaders	throughout	Lima.		Martín	Pumar	
and	others	claimed	that	the	invasions	were	designed	to	damage	his	credibility	and	
by	extension	Fujimori’s	main	political	opponent	of	the	time	Andrade	and	Somos	
Perú.		In	calling	for	police	intervention,	the	pro‐Fujimori	press	made	Pumar	out	to	
be	an	enemy	of	the	people	and	their	desire	to	have	a	home	of	their	own.		This	left	the	
stage	open	for	Fujimori	to	play	saviour	to	the	masses.			
						 Fujimori’s	proponents	claimed	that	Pumar	and	Andrade	were	behind	the	
invasions.		They	had	encouraged	their	supporters	to	invade	because	they	wanted	to	
create	a	scandal	in	the	management	of	the	invasion,	i.e.,	deaths	of	invaders	and	
police.		Further	speculation	revealed	that	Andrade	wanted	to	benefit	his	friends	and	
family	in	the	relocations	he	and	his	political	allies	had	suggested	as	a	solution	to	the	
impasse	between	property	owners	and	the	squatters.		The	pro‐regime	press	accused	
Pumar	and	Andrade	of	wanting	to	play	saviours	in	proposing	a	solution,	mimicking	
the	opposition	critique	of	Fujimori	and	his	supporters.		The	solution	they	proposed	
was	eventually	criticized	as	being	ineffectual.		Unlike	the	opposition	press,	the	
claims	of	the	President,	Ministers	or	party	members	were	never	substantiated	by	
journalistic	investigations	among	invaders	and	almost	always	involved	speculation.		
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Opposition	journalists,	in	contrast,	often	did	investigative	work	and	would	
eventually	call	for	public	inquiries	into	the	invasions.					
						 Doing	what	it	claimed	its	opponents	had	in	mind,	the	government	finally	
announced	plans	to	form	a	special	agency	to	sign‐up	citizens	in	need	of	a	home	
called	Profam	(which	fell	apart	as	soon	as	Fujimori’s	government	collapsed	in	the	
later	half	of	2000),	so	that	political	agitators	could	not	take	advantage	of	the	needy.		
Critics	stated	that	the	program	was	an	election	ploy	to	gain	voter	sympathy.		The	
program	was	also	criticized	as	unrealistic	in	that	the	government	lacked	funding	to	
make	it	a	reality.		Others	pointed	out	that	the	government	already	had	an	organism	
whose	specific	task	it	was	to	address	the	housing	deficit	since	1996	called	COFOPRI.		
Analysts	claimed	that	this	organism	had	failed	to	take	such	actions	and	that	the	new	
program	masked	this	failure.		In	the	ten	years	that	Fujimori	had	been	in	power,	he	
had	provided	20,000	lots	with	basic	services	and	100,000	homes	to	meet	a	demand	
of	a	1.5	million	homes,	according	to	Jorge	Ruis	de	Somocurcio,	then	head	of	the	
Metropolitan	Institute	of	Planning	for	Lima	(Aylas:	2000b:3).		At	this	rate,	the	
housing	deficit	would	be	met	in	more	than	a	hundred	years.	
						 The	enrolment	of	household	heads	in	need	of	a	home	became	a	fiasco,	with	
high	schools	being	used	by	government	workers	to	sign	up	people	for	lots,	claiming	
that	they	had	a	computer	system	to	check	if	people	already	had	lots.		It	was	not	
uncommon	for	people	to	wait	in	lines	in	vain,	highlighting	the	impromptu	nature	of	
Profam.		Prominent	figures	from	the	Catholic	church,	opposition	politicians	and	
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experts	in	housing	issues	were	open	in	condemning	the	government	support	and	
denial	of	involvement	in	the	invasions.	
						 Under	public	pressure	to	resolve	the	standoff	in	Villa	El	Salvador,	the	
government	relocated	thousands	of	families	to	a	project	originally	begun	but	
abandoned	by	García’s	government	in	Ciudadela	Pachacútec	in	the	province	of	
Callao	(contiguous	with	Lima).		The	military	was	called	to	help	organize	the	
resettlement:	machinery	was	brought	in	to	create	roads,	hundreds	of	surveyors	
from	COFOPRI	drew	up	plans	hastily,	water	was	provisioned,	food	was	brought	in	
and	promises	were	made	for	the	prompt	granting	of	titles.		It	was	very	much	part	of	
the	pre‐election	spectacle	for	analysts	who	were	not	pro‐Fujimori	and	felt	
uncomfortable	with	the	use	that	the	government	was	making	of	the	real	need	people	
had	for	a	home.						
						 Monseigneur	Luis	Bambarén,	who	was	jailed	in	1971	by	ex‐Minister	of	the	
Department	of	the	Interior	Armando	Artola	for	promoting	the	invasion	of	Pamplona	
that	led	the	foundation	of	Villa	El	Salvador,	noted	how	the	allegations	by	Artola	that	
he	was	behind	them	reminded	him	of	what	was	happening	in	Villa	El	Salvador.		It	
would	later	be	demonstrated	that	Artola	was	responsible	for	the	incident.		
Bambarén	in	the	same	interview	noted	the	oddity	of	the	invasions	that	were	
occurring,	saying	that	never	before	had	people	invaded	private	property.		The	norm	
is	to	ensure	that	land	is	state‐owned	(Escobar	2000:33–35).		Fujimori	and	his	
ministers,	in	providing	a	solution	to	Villa	El	Salvador	and	in	repressing	other	
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invasions,	claimed	that	it	was	defending	private	property,	thus,	simultaneously	
reiterating	the	sacredness	of	private	property.		
						 The	celerity	with	which	people	were	relocated	and	basic	infrastructure	was	
installed	raised	suspicions	for	many	people.		From	accounts	like	that	of	Don	
Malvinas,	it	should	be	clear	that	infrastructure	comes	as	a	result	of	persistent	
solicitation	for	government	intervention	and	at	a	considerable	cost	to	communities.		
That	everything	came	together	so	quickly	in	Callao	was	highly	abnormal.		
						 Fujimori	had	failed	where	the	previous	governments	of	Belaúnde	and	García	
had	failed,	resorting	to	the	ineffectual	stand‐bys	of	previous	decades.		What	was	
needed	was	a	practical	solution	to	the	housing	problem	in	Lima.		COFOPRI	did	
manage	to	title	over	730,000	properties,	according	to	Ministry	of	Transportation,	
Communication,	Housing	and	Construction,	Alberto	Pandolfi;	however,	it	appeared	
at	times	that	the	titling	process	may	not	have	been	impartial	(Anonymous	2000a:2).		
Press	coverage	that	highlighted	various	cases	in	the	period	prior	to	the	elections	
revealed	that	COFOPRI	tended	to	be	strategically	titling	to	its	clients	at	times.		A	
number	of	interviewed	invaders	claimed	that	insiders	in	COFOPRI	had	promised	to	
grant	titles	if	they	invaded	lands.		There	were	those	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	who	
made	the	same	claim.	
					In	the	coverage	of	the	invasions,	a	number	of	common	arguments	can	be	cited.		In	
interviews	given	to	journalists,	invaders	often	claimed	that	land	was	not	being	used,	
perhaps	expressing	a	hope	that	previous	legislation	that	provided	grounds	for	
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expropriation	based	on	social	interest	may	have	motivated	these	invasions.		Many	
times,	they	had	been	informed	by	government	workers	(with	a	connection	to	the		
	
Source:	Caretas,	February	21,2000:13	This	political	cartoon	depicts	a	cynical	conversation	between	
two	old	men	discussing	Fujimori’s	suspected	gerrymandering	and	the	possibility	of	Fujimori	being	
behind	the	land	invasions	that	began	in	late	December	of	1999.	
regime)	that	lands	were	not	registered	or	that	owners	had	not	been	keeping	up	with	
property	taxes.		Others	argued	that	lands	were	not	being	put	to	use	and	proceeded	
to	destroy	evidence	that	property	owners	were	using	the	land.		Invasions	often	
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adopted	names	that	made	reference	to	the	President	and	President’s	political	party.		
In	many	instances,	it	looked	like	the	police	and	military	were	facilitating	the	
invasions	instead	of	protecting	private	property.		Many	invasions	were	organized	in	
advance	and	were	peculiar	in	targeting	land	earmarked	for	community	development	
or	belonging	to	private	groups.		In	many	cases,	journalist	noted	that	squatters	were	
prepared	to	pay	fair	market	value	of	the	abandoned	properties.					
						 Closer	scrutiny	and	an	analysis	of	legislation	passed	during	the	Toledo	era	
(2001–2006)	(the	amendment	to	Law	28687	in	particular)	explains	why	these	
arguments	were	being	made.		This	connection	slipped	press	coverage	of	the	time	for	
some	reason.		On	September	15,	1999	an	opportune	Executive	Order	032‐99‐MTC23	
established	the	conditions	for	a	reversion	in	state	lands	that	had	been	sold	or	leased	
to	private	individuals	or	groups,	for	any	use.		Land	could	revert	to	the	state	if	
agreements	were	cancelled,	judicial	rulings	did	not	favour	landowners,	lease	
agreements	expired	or	if	legal	sanctions	were	levelled	against	property	owners.		
These	conditions	allow	us	to	make	sense	of	claims	that	landowners	were	not	paying	
taxes,	that	land	was	abandoned,	etc.			
						 Not	only	did	the	order	establish	conditions	for	the	reversion	of	prior	state	
land,	but	it	also	established	favourable	statutes	of	limitations	on	legal	processes	
against	squatters.		Two	of	the	main	conditions	for	a	statute	of	limitations	whereby	
land	is	awarded	to	squatters	are	public	and	peaceful	occupation.		In	article	11	the	
law	states	that	even	if	force	was	used	to	gain	possession	of	lands,	from	the	initial	act	
																																																								
23	The	term	in	Spanish	is	Decreto	Supremo.		I	could	have	translated	it	as	Presidential	Decree,	however	
it	does	not	reflect	the	fact	that	it	was	the	Ministry	of	Transportation,	Communication,	Housing	and	
Construction	that	formulated	the	law.			
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of	violence	the	time	for	a	statute	of	limitations	against	squatters	would	begin,	
notwithstanding	any	acts	of	violence	to	dislodge	them.		Moreover,	even	if	charges	
were	pressed	against	squatters	or	legal	suits	initiated	against	them,	this	would	not	
change	the	impending	ten	year	statute	of	limitation	against	land	usurpation.		
Agricultural	lands	were	exempt	from	this	law,	so	it	was	directed	at	urban	expansion.		
						 Given	the	realistic	timeline	for	people	to	gain	title	and	basic	amenities	(I	have	
heard	of	cases	in	Pamplona	that	have	taken	up	to	fifteen	years),	this	executive	order	
placed	no	obstacle	in	the	path	of	squatters	who	could	get	a	foothold	on	private	
property.		It	assured	them	that	within	ten	years	the	land	would	be	theirs.		From	the	
perspective	of	most	people,	this	would	have	been	no	different	than	their	present	
reality.		It	is	important	to	note	that	eventually	all	parts	of	this	order	but	those	
dealing	with	reversion	were	rescinded	by	the	Toledo	government,	no	doubt	for	the	
contradictions	introduced	in	protecting	private	property	rights	and	the	implicit	
backing	it	gave	to	violent	land	expropriations	led	by	land	traffickers	and/or	political	
opportunists.	
						 Laws	like	the	above	did	much	to	encourage	invasions	of	private	property.		We	
will	see	in	what	follows	how	squatters	and	their	lawyers	often	attempted	to	make	
their	circumstances	conform	to	the	civil	code	and	legislation	passed	to	formalize	
informal	properties.		Economist	Robert	Webb	and	his	colleagues,	in	analyzing	
legislation	for	the	formalization	of	property	from	Prado	to	the	present,	concluded	
that	legislation	has	tended	to	support	informal	land	invasions	(Webb	et	al.	2006).		
Only	recently,	with	the	exhaustion	of	state	lands	in	many	areas,	has	this	implicit	
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support	led	to	increasing	confrontation	between	squatters	and	landowners.		Hence,	
we	ought	not	be	too	hasty	in	marking	a	distinction	between	Fujimori	and	his	
predecessors.		The	nearness	to	the	2000	elections	and	the	changes	that	were	made	
to	the	laws	do	seem	conspicuous	though,	highlighting	the	political	interests	that	
accompany	changes	to	property	legislation.	
						 It	seemed	that	for	every	allegation	that	the	opposition	made	against	Fujimori,	
he	was	able	to	make	the	same	allegation	against	his	opponents,	or,	at	least	generate	
counter‐information	that	made	any	allegation	dubious.		For	every	accusation	he	had	
a	plausible	response	that	the	media	he	had	bought	was	ready	to	write	or	broadcast.		
I	wonder	how	the	public	was	able	to	discern	what	the	truth	of	any	matter	was	with	
this	type	of	media	climate.		But,	if	we	accept	that	most	were	deceived,	we	
underestimate	the	intelligence	of	the	public	and	fall	into	that	tempting	patronizing	
fallback	where	society	takes	the	blame	for	the	abuses	of	its	leaders.		The	implication	
of	this	position	is	that	only	honest	leadership,	and	not	public	action,	will	lead	us	to	a	
better	condition.			
						 What	people	did	know	was	that	Fujimori	was	in	power	and	was	ready	to	
deliver	to	those	who	gave	their	allegiance	to	his	style	of	rule,	no	matter	what	the	
consequences	seemed	to	be.		From	what	most	people	could	tell,	and	he	reinforced	
this	constantly	through	his	discourse,	he	was	with	the	people	against	the	corruption	
of	past	governments	and	the	authoritarian	proposals	of	left‐leaning	dictatorships.		
In	practice,	though,	many	of	his	postures	and	the	practices	of	his	government	were			
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Source:	Caretas,	February	13,	2000:	4	This	cartoon	features	a	distrustful	old	man	discussing	
gerrymandering	and	the	use	of	schools	to	enlist	people	in	a	family	lots	program	(Profam).		The	man	
makes	a	snide	comment	at	the	end	saying:	“Then	they	say	that	the	government	doesn’t	pay	any	
attention	to	the	education	sector.”	
little	different	from	previous	governments,	especially	populist	gestures	to	curry	the	
support	of	the	informal	sector.		And,	he	was	effective	in	doing	this.		He	had	to	be	to	
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receive	such	tremendous	support.		Given	the	ends	he	and	his	cronies	had	gone	to	in	
order	to	stay	in	power,	it	may	not	have	been	wise	to	go	against	the	grain.		
Nonetheless,	contradictions	abounded	in	what	Fujimori	said	and	did	and	thousands	
were	complicit	in	maintaining	the	impression	that	this	complex	network	sought	to	
create.		In	hindsight,	Fujimori	toed	the	neoliberal	line	and	preached	a	populist	
refrain	excellently,	to	such	a	degree,	that	his	daughter,	Sofia	Fujimori,	was	just	
narrowly	defeated	by	Ollanta	Humala	in	the	2011	run‐off	for	the	presidency.			
							 I	would	now	like	to	turn	to	a	brief	discussion	on	the	context	of	this	research	so	
that	the	reader	might	get	a	better	sense	of	the	reasons	behind	the	fragmentary	
information	that	will	be	provided.		There	are	limits	to	the	accessibility	of	the	truth	
and	interesting	questions	about	truth	making	that	arise	when	one	considers	the	case	
of	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		I	also	want	to	take	this	opportunity	to	talk	about	the	
morality	of	doing	research	in	this	context	and	what	I	believe	should	be	the	position	
of	the	researcher	in	cases	similar	to	this	one.			
Versions of the Truth in the Nueva Rinconada 
	
						 The	line	between	moral	and	immoral	becomes	blurred	in	the	tale	of	the	Nueva	
Rinconada	—it	is	all	a	matter	of	perspective.		These	perspectives	have	become	
charged	due	to	competing	claims	for	the	same	land.		If	you	have	endured	a	life	of	
struggle,	hardship	and	privation,	this	is	a	story	of	the	heroic	struggle	of	the	majority	
of	Peruvians	who	fight	for	their	own	progress.		In	this	case	progress	is	attaining	a	
property	title,	basic	amenities,	and	access	to	public	infrastructure.		It	is	a	fight	for	
dignity,	to	quell	the	fire	of	resentment,	to	push	back	frustration	and	impotence,	to	
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strike	out	against	a	system	that	pits	all	against	all	and	bars	no	holds.		If	you	are	one	
of	the	few	that	managed	to	get	a	leg	up	on	others	—purchasing	some	land	that	
someday	might	become	a	windfall,	or	perhaps	would	allow	you	to	supplement	your	
income	with	yet	another	income—	this	is	a	story	about	how	a	few	unscrupulous	
politicians,	their	clients	and	professionals	swindled	you	and	the	ignorant	masses	out	
of	the	fruits	of	your	labour	and	your	livelihood.		It	is	a	story	of	how	the	law	was	
broken	and	how	the	law	has	prevailed	in	a	place	where	laws	are	enacted	by	and	
enforced	for	the	powerful.		Yet,	that	moral	line	that	is	based	on	dignity	and	respect	
re‐emerges,	popping	up	from	time	to	time,	despite	the	injunction	that	one	ought	to	
maintain	a	certain	position	no	matter	what	or	betray	the	cause.			
						 Due	to	the	contested	nature	of	this	story	it	is	very	unlikely	that	uncontested	
facts	will	ever	become	clarified.		This	might	seem	to	be	a	problem	for	the	
investigator	who	seeks	something	close	to	a	partial	truth	or	some	coherent	
narrative.			Yet,	as	time	passed,	I	began	to	realize	that	disinformation,	or	lack	of	
information,	or	murkiness	and	confusion	and	the	hope	for	progress	are	often	
bedmates.		I	felt	like	Kafka’s	K	trying	to	figure	out	how	to	get	into	the	castle,	meeting	
people	whose	behaviour	and	motives	evaded	me	much	of	the	time,	and	ever	so	often	
finding	myself	with	someone	who	I	would	desperately	cling	to	hoping	that	they	
would	somehow	help	me	decipher	my	surroundings	and	the	workings	of	these	
surroundings.		I	kept	wondering:	who	or	what	is	behind	all	of	this?			
						 The	following	is	by	consequence	and	probably	for	posterity	always	going	to	be	
a	partial	account.		If	anything,	this	account	sheds	light	on	the	politics	and	the	
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assumption	that	there	is	a	coherent	perspective	of	the	world	that	workers,	the	
middle	class,	or	the	elite	have.		Social	realities	are	lived	as	cacophonous	claims	on	an	
objective	truth	that	multiple	voices	convince	others	of	possessing.		It	reveals	that	
common	people	hear	varying	accounts	and	that	the	discrepancies	inherent	in	
different	accounts	are	part	of	the	everyday	life	of	most	people	who	live	in	Lima,	and	
most	likely	other	parts	of	the	country.		These	accounts	talk	to	one	another,	
responding	to	the	claims	that	different	positions	make	with	certain	actors	
possessing	more	nuanced	versions.		Being	informed,	from	this	viewpoint,	is	more	
about	the	tactical	expression	and	adoption	of	certain	discourses,	to	varying	degrees,	
than	about	the	origin	and	veracity	of	the	information	that	one	possesses.		In	general,	
those	who	are	more	aware	of	different	viewpoints	are	in	an	extremely	advantageous	
position	vis‐à‐vis	local	and	extra‐local	power	relations.			With	the	knowledge	and	
manpower	they	possess,	they	are	able	to	confuse	or	suppress	certain	viewpoints.		
Being	poor	in	many	senses	is	being	impoverished	about	the	knowledge	and	inner‐
workings	of	social	groups	that	seek	to	monopolize	and	traffic	(dis)information.		But,	
as	will	become	clear,	even	the	privileged	have	to	work	to	have	their	voices	heard.			
							 Figuring	out	what	is	the	truth,	thus,	is	about	gaining	a	more	accurate	sense	of	
the	field	of	possible	viewpoints	that	can	and	do	exist	within	a	certain	social	space,	or	
networks	of	social	relations.		It	involves	discerning	individual	and	group	motives,	
which,	as	will	become	apparent,	is	and	can	only	be	speculative.		The	more	
viewpoints	one	is	capable	of	seeing,	the	more	capable	one	becomes	of	interpreting	
information,	oral	and	written,	that	is	in	constant	circulation.		What	will	become	
apparent	in	the	history	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada	is	the	manner	in	which	information	
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can	be	suppressed	or	distorted.		At	the	same	time,	a	plurality	of	viewpoints	emerges.		
So,	unlike	situations	where	a	certain	discourse	becomes	hegemonic	because	of	
media	control	(cf.	Chomsky	and	Herman	1988),	what	we	see	occurring	in	the	Nueva	
Rinconada	is	a	proliferation	of	viewpoints	espoused	by	different	actors	with	
different	motives.		As	we	saw	in	the	previous	discussion	of	the	coverage	of	invasions	
of	this	time,	speculation	about	who	was	behind	the	invasions	and	why	they	occurred	
was	difficult	to	nail	down.		Paradoxically,	while	people	adhere	to	the	hegemonic	
depiction	of	progress	promoted	by	the	press,	they	simultaneously	disregard	press	
coverage	or	versions	of	the	property	dispute	that	do	not	favour	their	position.		
Official	positions,	in	this	context,	are	open	for	interpretation,	often	because	of	the	
tangled	promises	and	inabilities	to	deliver	on	those	promises.		To	give	an	example,	
while	there	are	instances	where	state	institutions	intervened	with	the	intention	of	
resolving	the	conflict,	or	legal	cases	ruled	in	favour	of	the	property	owners,	these	
events	are	frequently	underplayed	or	represented	as	cases	when	the	authorities	
were	bought	by	the	property	owners.			
						 What	emerges	is	that	behaviours	of	dirigentes,	property	owners	and	squatters	
are	understood	according	to	a	network	of	associated	behavioural	ascriptions.		Many	
leaders	complained	that	personal	appetites	had	destroyed	the	unity	of	people	in	the	
area.		Collaborators	spoke	of	a	virulent	form	of	egoism	that	led	leaders	to	turn	on	
their	people.		If	one	spoke	to	one	leader	of	a	sector	it	was	not	uncommon	to	hear	
another	criticize	them	for	being	authoritative,	using	their	position	for	personal	gain,	
or	being	incompetent	for	x	reason.		If	one	relayed	this	view,	the	response	was	that	
so‐and‐so	was	envious,	or	bitter	because	their	attempt	to	turn	their	position	into	an	
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opportunity	for	personal	gain	had	been	spoiled	by	them.		Ambitious	newcomers	
sought	to	unseat	community	leaders	because	they	suspected	that	they	were	stealing	
from	the	community,	or	that	if	in	power,	they	could	surely	do	better.		People	who	
invaded	land	marked	for	the	growth	of	another	community	called	those	who	
dumped	rocks	in	their	water	barrels	greedy	and	insensitive.		I	wondered	what	made	
this	moral	commentary	possible	and	I	also	noted	that	it	did	not	just	apply	to	the	
local	leadership	or	the	desire	of	some	to	have	a	lot	of	their	own.		Rather,	there	
appeared	to	be	a	moral	undercurrent	to	assessing	the	conditions	in	which	a	
particular	form	of	progress	has	been	occurring.		The	area	looked	more	like	a	
landscape	of	nuclei	that	were	all	vying	against	one	another	but	working	together	at	
times	to	improve	their	living	conditions.			
				 The	problem	of	distrust,	or	disconfianza,	is	one	that	is	a	result,	we	will	see,	of	a	
combination	of	deleterious	social	behaviours	like	greed,	ambition,	selfishness,	
boldness,	and	envy	to	name	some	of	the	more	prominent	behavioural	ascriptions	
that	are	ironically	either	normalized	or	touted	as	qualities	that	a	person	must	
possess	in	the	very	idiosyncratic	form	of	capitalism	that	has	taken	root	in	Lima	(I	
will	discuss	this	in	more	depth	in	the	last	chapter).		I	feel	that	there	is	a	strong	
correlation	between	the	particular	type	of	possessive	individualism	promoted	by	
liberal	and	neoliberal	economics	and	these	behaviours.		In	other	words,	there	is	a	
practical	base	to	these	moral	behavioural	ascriptions.		That	they	are	negatively	
viewed	suggests	that	there	is	a	foil	to	these	behaviours,	a	rejection	of	this	reality.		
This	is	a	critical	flaw	in	theories	about	the	culture	of	poverty	because	it	shows	that	
the	underprivileged	are,	contrary	to	the	belief	of	Lewis,	quite	moral	(as	his	own	
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ethnographic	material	demonstrates,	curiously	enough).		The	existence	of	a	darker	
underbelly	to	the	competitive	progress	promoted	by	liberal	and	neoliberal	
capitalism	tends	to	complicate	the	work	of	those	who	promote	self‐help	as	a	
solution	to	poverty	(recall	Mangin	and	the	co‐optation	of	Turner’s	ideas	around	
housing).		At	times,	it	looks	as	if	the	expectation	that	one	is	lying	works	to	generate	
situations	where	people	act	pre‐emptively,	thus	leading	to	evasive	behaviours	
(which	preclude	cooperation),	or	in	the	worst	case,	reactive	responses	(he/she	is	
surely	skimming	from	donations,	so	I	will	do	it	too).		It	seems	as	if	these	behaviours,	
or	the	belief	that	they	underlie	the	behaviour	of	others,	is	leading	to	a	fragmentation	
of	communities.		It	acts	as	a	complement	to	exhortations	that	people	ought	to	
manage	themselves	and	look	out	for	their	own	good.		Self‐regulation	is	not	only	
about	being	hygienic,	or	looking	for	the	best	choices	to	improve	one’s	odds	on	the	
job	market,	it	also	involves	a	myriad	of	other	behaviours	that	are	inimical	to	social	
communities	that	simultaneously	hold	equality	and	mutual	benefit	as	ideals.		
Looking	out	for	oneself	involves	an	ongoing	negotiation	of	individualistic	and	
community	demands.	
						 The	condemnation	of	envy,	egoism,	boldness	and	related	behaviours	represent	
a	ray	of	hope,	calling	into	question	more	hegemonic	liberal	notions	of	economic	
progress.			Discursively,	progress	was	understood	by	my	collaborators	as	referring	
to	having	a	home,	which	is	a	positive	and	practical	pursuit,	thus	making	it	appealing.		
Yet,	some	people	are	still	able	to	note	the	negative	impacts	of	a	more	individualistic	
pursuit	of	progress	that	tends	to	undermine	the	values	of	communities	working	
together	to	procure	land	titles,	services,	and	public	infrastructure.		This	complicates	
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Gramsci’s	notion	that	practical	experiences	of	social	classes	generated	a	practical	
consciousness	which	kept	them	passive	and	inactive	and	that	intellectuals	
possessed	a	theoretical	consciousness	that	ought	to	be	used	to	guide	oppressed	
classes.		The	existence	of	these	discourses	on	inimical	social	behaviour,	however,	
underscores	their	presence	as	a	part	of	current	social	practice	that	cuts	across	
classes	and	social	groups.		The	belief	that	things	could	be	different,	that	people	
should	work	together,	that	materialism	is	vacuous,	etc.,	is	the	hope	of	this	time.		It	is	
a	peoples’	theoretical	understanding.		Gramsci	was	correct	that	all	political	action	
for	change	must	be	rooted	in	an	ethical	field	and	that	these	would	lead	to	political	
action	(Gramsci	1971:333).			
						 It	therefore	becomes	of	significant	interest	when	this	desire	for	collective	
action	to	set	straight	the	social	ills	that	underprivileged	people	encounter	is	
absorbed	into	the	discourse	of	political	parties.		Political	parties	use	this	theoretical	
understanding	in	their	media	work	to	persuade	the	masses	that	they	are	fighting	
corruption,	crime,	etc.,	although	simultaneously	enact	legislation	which	ensures	
perpetuation	of	the	inequality	of	resource	distribution	and	opportunities	that	are	
generating	these	behaviours.		The	positive	valuation	of	self‐help	and	survival	
practices	in	the	informal	economy	are	two	ways	in	which	hegemonic	groups	and	
ideological	projects	like	that	of	neoliberalism	co‐opt	the	efforts	of	the	subaltern	into	
projects	that	work	against	their	interests.	
						 The	complexity	of	the	moment,	really	a	period	of	time,	made	me	think	about	
the	pieces	that	are	left	for	the	historian.		Official	history	misses	the	inside	or	
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backstage	of	what	people	decide	to	tell	the	journalist,	the	anthropologist,	or	how	to	
make	sense	of	the	pieces	left	behind.		The	interpretive	process,	as	I	will	discuss	
briefly,	is	one	in	which	an	ethical	position	must	be	taken	–we	either	bear	witness,	or	
we	omit	the	pieces	that	do	not	fit	our	political	agenda.		Trying	to	find	a	more	
“objective”	ground	is	anything	but	straight‐forward,	if	possible	at	all,	and	will	often	
entail	the	betrayal	of	those	we	encounter.		However,	the	researcher	should	work	
toward	mutual	understanding	and	balance,	to	use	that	privilege	of	being	able	to	
move	between	positions	to	give	insight	to	varying	positions,	to	generate	a	position	
of	aporia	whereby	actors	are	forced	to	reassess	their	assumptions	and	the	validity	of	
their	position	for	overcoming	intransigent	and	dehumanizing	positions.				
						 Despite	wanting	to	work	to	generate	trust,	it	was	hard	to	deny	the	
circumstances	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		Continued	manipulations	for	political	or	
personal	reasons	had	left	the	area	charged	with	much	rancour	and	distrust.		In	the	
Nueva	Rinconada,	many	of	my	collaborators	told	me	that	the	secret	service	had	sent	
spies	into	their	communities	to	figure	out	what	was	happening	and	who	was	leading	
the	people.		A	spy,	as	one	collaborator	pointed	out,	could	be	anyone,	even	the	
humble	peasant	woman	from	rural	Peru.		People	even	joked	that	I	could	be	a	spy.		
What	this	shows	is	that	even	if	one	wants	to	overcome	distrust	they	are	brought	
onto	the	local	stage	where	roles	and	motivations	seem	prescribed,	for	better	or	for	
worse.			
							 This	belief	is	well‐founded	because	in	the	beginning	the	landowners	infiltrated	
the	meetings	of	the	people	who	began	to	squat	on	their	lands.		I	was	shown	pictures	
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taken	of	local	dirigentes.		Many	of	the	charges	pressed	by	police	for	armed	robbery,	
or	land	usurpation,	were	a	result	of	spies	passing	information	on	to	landowners	and	
public	prosecutors.		Interviews	with	dirigentes	also	revealed	that	they	had	been	
gathering	intelligence	on	the	property	owners.		In	effect,	boundaries	between	
groups	were	permeable	membranes,	allowing	certain	information	to	pass	and	other	
information	to	become	trapped	in	vacuoles,	often	by	design.					
							 I	tried	to	contact	as	many	people	as	possible	to	compile	this	oral	history.		The	
major	obstacle	is	that	I	had	to	search	for	people	and	get	other	people	to	pass	along	
phone	numbers	of	people	with	whom	they	felt	I	should	speak.		Many	of	the	original	
dirigentes	had	disappeared	from	the	area,	left	the	country,	or	moved	to	more	
comfortable	areas.		Much	of	the	information	that	I	acquired	was	not	volunteered.		
Many	expected	that	I	had	some	previous	knowledge	of	what	had	happened.		In	order	
to	ask	a	question,	you	have	to	know	already	what	information	you	are	seeking.		
Much	of	my	time	was	spent	listening	to	people	in	casual	conversations	trying	to	
glean	clues	that	I	could	later	attempt	to	phrase	as	questions	or	comments	that	would	
illicit	clarification.		I	began	to	feel	that	the	oral	history	I	sought	to	compile	was	a	
fool’s	errand,	and	was	told	so	by	my	collaborators.			
							 To	get	to	the	point	where	people	trusted	me,	as	I	mentioned	previously,	I	had	
to	prove	that	I	was	really	on	their	side.		I	always	felt	that	information	was	being	
withheld.		In	hindsight,	though,	I	realize	that	each	person	had	their	version	of	events	
with	some	versions	being	more	elaborate	than	others.		Those	who	were	not	
politically	involved	were	often	hesitant	to	opine,	while	others	warned	me	to	be	
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careful	about	what	I	said	or	asked.		Yet,	I	was	often	told	that	there	was	no	personal	
danger	for	me.		It	was	hard	to	know	what	to	think	of	all	these	countervoices.	
						 The	most	common	position	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	is	that	of	the	majority,	
those	who	squatted	on	land	there,	despite	factions	that	may	have	existed	in	the	
beginning.			By	talking	to	the	landowners,	one	is	perceived	as	being	a	traitor.		Not	
until	I	was	wrapping	up	this	investigation	did	I	decide	to	search	for	the	landowners.		
In	fact,	this	will	be	the	first	time	I	have	expressed	what	I	think	about	the	situation	
openly.		Now	that	I	have	reached	a	point	where	I	can	no	longer	investigate	and	am	
forced	to	write,	I	must	make	an	assessment	that	is	fair	to	all	who	shared	their	views	
with	me.		How	does	one	be	fair	to	everyone?		Is	it	possible?	
					 The	answer	to	this	question	eluded	me	for	some	time,	however	by	chance	I	
happened	to	read	The	Brothers	Karamazov	by	Fyodor	Dostoyevsky	whereupon	a	
position	that	satisfied	me	was	presented	in	the	famous	speech	of	the	Elder	Zosima	in	
his	last	living	moments.		Zosima,	in	discussing	whether	one	human	has	the	right	to	
judge	another	human,	says:	
No	man	on	earth	can	judge	a	criminal	until	he	understands	that	he	himself	is	
just	as	guilty	as	the	man	standing	before	him	and	that	he	may	be	more	
responsible	than	anyone	else	for	the	crime.		Only	when	he	has	understood	this	
can	he	become	a	judge	(Dostoevsky	2003	[1880]:429).	
	
						 The	notion	that	we	are	all	responsible	to	some	degree	for	the	state	of	affairs	of	
this	world	is	a	theme	that	works	its	way	through	Dostoevsky’s	brilliant	snapshot	of	a	
Russia	in	the	process	of	defining	itself	as	a	modern	nation‐state	vis‐à‐vis	the	
civilizing	force	of	a	Europe	giddy	with	dazzling	material	and	political	changes.		We	
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are	all	placed	on	trial	at	the	end	of	the	novel.		It	is	the	trial	of	socialism,	monastic	life,	
the	Russian	aristocracy,	modernists,	the	peasantry,	the	hedonistic,	the	righteous,	the	
meek,	and	the	saintly.		The	verdict	is	really	left	unresolved,	befitting	for	a	
contemporary	world	that	still	has	to	understand	its	many	contradictions.		
Nevertheless,	by	accepting	that	we	may	all	share	some	degree	of	responsibility,	the	
possibility	is	opened	to	interrogate	everyone	as	being	somehow	complicit	in	the	ills	
of	the	contemporary	world.		Such	a	position	also	eliminates	the	political	
machinations	of	various	interest	groups	who	seek	to	impose	their	representations	
of	events,	in	many	cases	covering	abuses	of	authority	or	superficial	understandings	
of	certain	positions.		The	notion	of	universal	responsibility	invites	everyone	to	
reflect	on	their	degree	of	responsibility	in	a	conflict,	which	is	important	if	any	type	
of	reconciliation	or	emergence	of	a	more	complete	consciousness	is	to	occur.					
						 The	temptation	of	a	situation	like	that	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada	is	to	be	swayed	
by	the	material	conditions	of	the	people	living	in	the	area	and	fall	into	a	knee‐jerk	
apologetic	for	their	actions,	pitting	the	“good”	poor	against	the	“evil”	rich.		This	is	
what	Fujimori	and	his	supporters	did.		This	posture	gets	us	nowhere	in	
understanding	what	is	happening	and	how	we	might	go	about	changing	society	so	
that	things	could	be	more	just.		In	fact,	it	is	a	position	that	works	toward	continued	
social	injustice	occluding	the	contradictions	of	both	the	rich	and	the	poor.		It	is	a	
dehumanizing	stance,	in	short,	because	it	denies	the	humanity	of	both	groups	and	
forecloses	any	nuanced	understanding	of	what	happened	and	continues	to	happen.		
It	is	an	easy	way	out	and	only	results	in	the	prolongation	of	a	social	standoff.		
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						 As	soon	as	one	begins	to	pit	the	poor	against	the	rich	in	their	discourse,	or	
vice‐versa,	both	sides	retreat	into	their	trenches.		This	ineffectual	way	of	
communicating	differences	does	not	generate	conditions	where	each	side	may	
assess	their	degree	of	responsibility	in	problems	which	have	a	nefarious	effect	on	
one	or	the	other	party,	and	most	frequently	both	parties.		The	recent	Presidential	
elections	in	2011	and	the	posturing	of	privileged	groups	in	Lima	and	the	provinces	
against	the	south‐central	provinces	and	lower	income	sectors	of	Peru	brought	into	
bold	relief	the	social	rift	between	the	haves	and	have‐nots	in	Lima,	and	Peru	as	a	
whole.		The	existence	of	this	rift	makes	it	incumbent	upon	those	with	knowledge	to	
facilitate	understanding	and	take	action	in	a	way	befitting	to	their	circumstances.			
						 My	position	consciously	denies	the	Hegelian	slave‐master	dialectic	and	Marx’s	
derivative	notions	of	dialectical	materialism.		I	do	not	think	that	we	need	view	a	
slave	and	a	master	as	locked	in	opposition	and	that	the	only	exit	is	for	the	slave	to	
overthrow	the	master.		Such	a	view	is	famously	taken	up	in	revolutionary	doctrine	
(e.g.	Fanon	1952),	yet	we	must	question	it.		Such	a	prescriptive	solution,	however	
tempting,	is	overly	simplistic	and	is	not	based	on	the	possibilities	suggested	for	
change	in	a	complex	social	reality.		The	truth,	I	will	argue	at	this	moment,	is	that	
most	of	us	are	slaves	to	our	ambitions	or	drives	to	prosper.		The	drive	to	progress,	in	
other	words,	is	a	part	of	most	of	us,	and,	therefore,	must	be	seen	as	a	problem	that	
involves	all	of	us.		In	stating	things	this	way,	I	do	not	wish	to	downplay	the	very	real	
global	struggle	for	dignified	treatment,		Instead	of	defending	one	side	or	the	other,	I	
want	to	direct	my	attention	toward	what	does	not	allow	us	to	consider	one	another	
as	living	beings	equally	entitled	to	dignified	treatment.		
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						 The	following	account	uses	the	names	of	professionals	and	politicians	who	had	
a	position	of	authority	or	power	in	the	events	that	would	unfold	in	the	Nueva	
Rinconada	because	they	have	chosen	to	become	public	figures.		I	do	not	aim	to	indict	
individuals,	rather	I	seek	to	indict	cultural	norms	and	values,	drawing	constructive	
attention	to	the	circumstances	that	the	majority	of	Peruvians	endure.		
The	guiding	spirit	of	this	compilation	and	what	I	say	about	the	lives	of	people	
that	live	in	Pamplona	is	my	attempt	to	bring	about	some	understanding,	and	
hopefully,	the	possibility	for	empathy	and	reconciliation.		If	other	people	gain	insight	
or	encouragement	from	such	an	effort,	this	will	have	been	a	success	in	my	eyes.		Let	
us	look	at	the	Nueva	Rinconada	before	people	decided	to	move	there	en	masse.				
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Chapter 6 —The Invasion   
	
						 The	multiple	invasions	that	would	mark	the	incursion	of	waves	of	people	into	
the	Rinconada	had	to	start	somewhere.		People	had	to	organize	and	they	had	to	have	
a	reason	for	moving	into	this	area.		The	movement	should	not	be	seen	as	an	isolated	
event.		The	Nueva	Rinconada	was	one	of	many	invasions	that	were	purported	to	
have	been	condoned	by	Fujimoristas	near	the	re‐election	campaign	of	Alberto	
Fujimori	in	2000.		I	have	shown	that	Fujimori’s	campaign	politicized	the	invasions,	
providing	a	rapid	and	visible	solution	to	some	of	the	squatters’	requests	for	
government	intervention;	however,	others	like	those	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	were	
left	behind.							
						 In	San	Juan	de	Miraflores	the	representative	of	Fujimori’s	offshoot	party	
Vamos	Vecino	was	Adolfo	Ocampo.		He	entered	his	third	term	as	mayor	in	1998	and	
was	removed	in	2002	with	just	months	to	go	in	his	term.		The	charges	against	which	
he	had	to	defend	himself	were	financial	irregularities	and	embezzlement	of	public	
funds.		If	the	municipal	council	removed	the	mayor	on	these	grounds,	one	can	only	
imagine	what	the	inferiors	of	the	mayor	may	have	been	doing.		We	must,	therefore,	
place	the	invasion	within	the	context	and	practices	of	this	municipal	administration	
and	its	affiliation	with	practices	that	made	Fujimorism	synonymous	with	influence	
trafficking,	embezzlement	and	abuse	of	power.		The	degree	to	which	Mr.	Ocampo	
had	anything	to	do	with	the	invasion	is	open	for	speculation;	however,	I	will	attempt	
to	give	the	reader	a	sense	of	the	debate	that	surrounds	involvement	of	authorities	in	
	 188
the	Nueva	Rinconada.		A	certain	“murkiness”	remains	from	this	time	and	persists,	to	
some	degree,	to	the	present	moment.24			
					 At	the	same	time,	the	invasions	are	part	of	a	process	of	urban	growth	that	has	
really	existed	in	Lima	and	other	cities	since	they	were	founded	–they	are	part	of	that	
continual	search	for	new	opportunities	on	new	frontiers.		Many	people	came	for	the	
economic	growth	that	would	accompany	the	demographic	growth	that	occurs	with	
land	invasions.		The	frontier	of	the	city,	then,	like	many	frontiers,	is	recognized	as	an	
area	of	opportunity,	of	quick	fortunes	for	the	savvy.			
						 To	move	onto	the	lands	that	were	being	used	by	the	landowners	for	the	
purpose	of	raising	pigs,	among	other	agricultural	practices,	near	the	end	of	1999,	
people	had	to	organize	and	have	some	guarantee	that	there	would	be	political	
support	for	their	actions.		Locally,	people	would	have	known	that	the	area	was	
private	property	by	the	signage	that	surrounded	the	area	and	that	appeared	inside	
the	Nueva	Rinconada.		To	discourage	people	more	in	2000,	the	state	only	recognized	
land	invasions	until	1996	in	2000.		However,	as	I	have	discussed	previously,	
legislation	was	passed	that	made	invasions	of	private	property	attractive.		So,	we	
must	ask:	Why	did	people	decide	to	invade	those	lands?		Surely,	it	must	have	
seemed	risky.		The	reasons,	we	will	see,	certainly	crystallize,	however	they	are	far	
from	what	one	would	expect.		Reasons,	from	a	social	perspective,	are	multiple	and	
																																																								
24	Perhaps,	all	reality	is	like	that	to	some	degree	–only	partial	versions	of	some	larger	narrative	that	
binds	us	together	through	history.		Unfortunately,	reality	is	not	so	abiding.		Individual	narratives	
weave	in	elements	of	larger	narratives,	sometimes	contesting	certain	details,	sometimes	elaborating	
on	larger	narratives.		People	indicate	their	position	on	certain	political	and	social	issues	in	the	Nueva	
Rinconada	by	adhering	to	particular	narratives	or	eschewing	certain	elements.		
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cumulative	in	a	social	world	where	different	versions	of	events	simultaneously	
circulate.			
						 But,	to	have	reasons	we	must	have	voices.		In	this	section	I	use	the	voices	of	
many	fundadores25	and	others	to	piece	together	the	context	and	events	that	led	up	to	
the	multiple	invasions	of	December	31,	January	4,	5	and	later.			Let	us	start	with	the	
story	of	Doña	Maria.		A	stout	greying	woman	with	long	wavy	hair	and	brilliant	eyes,	
she	began	to	tell	me	her	story	after	I	helped	her	son	remodel	their	shack.		It	was	
drizzling	a	bit	when	we	started	the	interview.		Intrigued,	her	son	listened	as	he	
continued	to	put	things	away	behind	a	partition.							
						 Here	is	what	Doña	Maria,	one	of	the	original	organizers	of	both	the	1990	and	
2000	invasion	of	the	property	belonging	to	the	Asociación	Agropecuaria	de	la	
Rinconada	de	Ciudad	de	Dios	and	posterior	Asociación	Agropecuaria	Industrial	La	
Rinconada	(as	of	1994),	had	to	say	about	the	organization	of	the	initial	group	that	
would	successfully	gain	a	foothold	in	the	hills	of	lands	belonging	to	the	association	
in	January	of	2000.		She	talks	about	the	people	that	came	to	visit	her	fruit	stand	at	
the	time.			
D.M.:	People	came	to	complain.		They	said,	“I	have	no	land,	they	kicked	me	
out.”	And,	they	cried,	and	I	cried.	They	had	gone	everywhere.		“I	don’t	know	
what	I	will	do,”	a	women	who	came	before	said,	“The	rent,	for	a	month,	I	pay	
100,	100!?	I	don’t	know	how	I	am	going	to	pay	it,”	she	explained.		So,	I	went	to	
a	man	who	was	mayor.		I	can’t	say	the	name,	heh?		So,	I	said	to	him:	“We	want	
land	because	there	is	a	lot,	heh,	and	I	don’t	live	well	with	my	husband,	I	wish	I	
had	land,”		I	said	to	him,	“There	wouldn’t	happen	to	be	any?		And,	that	[land]	is	
for	us	to	enter.”		“Yes,”	he	said	to	me,	“Yes.”																					
																																																								
25	Fundadores	were	the	original	people	who	moved	into	the	area	and	were	instrumental	in	the	
organization	and	administration	of	the	communities	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada.			
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B.:	In	what	year	was	that?	
D.M.:	Ten	years	ago,	in	the	year	2000,	before	2000,	99,	that	was	in	99.	
B.:	During	Fujimori’s	time?	
D.M.:	From	the	time	of	Fujimori,	of	Ocampo,	Ocampo	was	mayor.		I	told	him,	
hey,	come	on,	I	told	him,	as	I	knew	where	he	lived…	
(Doña	Maria	(early	sixties),	Interview	recorded	on	May	23,	2010)	
	
						 From	here	Doña	Maria	jumps	back	in	time	to	1989	and	recounts	the	story	of	
how	she	delivered	flyers	and	signed	up	50	people,	the	majority	young	men,	to	
invade	lands	in	what	would	become	the	Rinconada,	which	at	the	time	was	partly	
state	land	and	partly	private.		Police	threw	her	in	jail	for	being	involved	in	the	
organization	of	this	invasion;	however	she	was	quickly	released	thanks	to	a	police	
major	who	took	her	age	into	account.		The	property	of	this	invasion	belonged	to	the	
Cotrina	family,	who	I	am	told	by	local	landowners	did	not	contest	the	squatters’	
presence	on	their	land,	eventually	losing	possession	ten	years	later	because	of	a	
statute	of	limitations	on	the	usurpation	of	land.		The	association	under	the	
leadership	of	Mr.	Gamarra	and	Mr.	Montalvo	took	no	action	against	such	incursions	
and	would	eventually	tell	assocation	members	that	they	had	to	give	up	the	lands	in	
compensation	for	remnant	lands,26	which	turned	out	to	be	one	of	many	fabrications	
																																																								
26	This	is	private	land	that	was	not	accurately	surveyed	due	to	the	use	of	an	optical	transit	as	opposed	
to	the	more	accurate	total	station	transits	that	came	into	use	more	recently.		It	has	become	the	source	
of	much	conjecture	with	some	dirigentes	arguing	that	property	owners	bribed	surveyors	to	enlarge	
their	lands,	thus	reducing	the	size	of	state	lands	for	which	squatters	could	be	conferred	free	land	
ownership.		I	consulted	with	an	independent	surveyor	to	see	if	a	10%	error	on	a	large	piece	of	land	is	
reasonable.		According	to	him,	the	margin	of	error	for	a	larger	piece	of	land	would	be	so	small,	that	
error	should	be	minimal.		Another	dirigente	clarified	what	had	happened	when	he	told	me	that	the	
original	lots	that	were	registered	did	not	contain	all	the	land	that	the	Association	had	bought	but	
referred	only	to	the	lots	that	were	surveyed.		Therefore,	the	remnant	that	remained	belonged	to	the	
Association	as	a	whole	and	could	be	sold	by	the	governing	body	or	legal	representative	of	this	body.		
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and	shady	dealings	in	which	the	two	would	engage	during	their	terms,	according	to	
local	lore.			
						 Later,	I	discovered	that	those	who	had	generated	this	rumour	were	
responsible	for	forging	documents	to	vacate	Mr.	Montalvo	as	the	President	of	the	
Association.		Once	in	power,	this	group	sold	lots	and	apparently	acquired	new	
properties	by	placing	their	names	on	titles	that	had	not	been	registered.		Mr.	
Montalvo,	according	to	other	collaborators,	is	the	most	knowledgable	and	honest	of	
the	association	presidents.		Such	partiality	is	quite	common	among	locals,	making	it	
very	difficult	to	discern	whose	truth	one	is	listening	to,	but,	at	same	time,	it	shows	
how	versions	of	events	tend	to	coincide	with	personal	and	larger	political	interests,	
which	are	anything	but	clear	to	most	who	are	not	generating	these	rumours	or	
positions.		It	does	seem	apparent	that	there	were	internal	divisions	within	the	
Association	that	worked	both	with	and	against	the	squatters	in	ways	that	are	far	
from	apparent	to	even	an	interested	outside	observer.		Many	told	me	that	things	had	
become	so	murky	here	because	of	the	desire	to	profit	and	control	land	in	the	area.		
Could	it	really	be	so	simple,	I	thought?		The	intrigue	in	the	Association	certainly	
added	another	layer	of	speculation.		Bearing	these	divisions	in	mind,	let	us	continue	
with	Doña	Maria’s	account	of	her	experience.			
						 Doña	Maria	was	one	of	the	organizers	of	the	invasion	in	1990	and	the	invasion	
in	2000.		Near	the	end	of	1999,	she	had	flyers	and	tickets	(the	type	where	one	half	
remains	with	the	person	issuing	the	ticket	and	the	other	half	is	given	to	the	person	
																																																																																																																																																																					
The	varying	accounts	of	where	this	remnant	originated	reflects	the	general	level	of	distrust	among	
the	population	here.		
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who	writes	their	name	on	the	ticket)	printed	up.		She	gave	some	young	women	
money	for	their	bus	fare,	instructing	them	to	go	to	Callao,	Villa	El	Salvador,	and	
Chorrillos	(a	province,	and	two	adjacent	districts)	to	deliver	flyers	in	places	where	
people	walked	(market	areas,	busy	junctions,	etc.)	for	people	who	needed	land.		The	
flyers	gave	information	on	the	place	and	time	that	people	would	concentrate	to	
make	an	attempt	at	entering	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		It	was	imperative	that	people	
coordinate	on	the	specific	date	because	as	Doña	Maria	stated:	“They	were	not	going	
to	permit	the	authorities	to	get	their	way,	being	that	there	was	so	much	land	thrown	
out	over	there	for	nothing.”			
						 The	idea	that	land	was	in	disuse,	or	was	simply	not	being	used,	was	sufficient	
reason	for	people	to	invade.		To	understand	this	sentiment,	we	must	put	the	
invasion	into	a	larger	historical	context.		As	the	reader	will	recall,	the	policy	of	
leaving	the	homeless	to	help	themselves	for	the	most	part	has	been	a	constant	since	
at	least	the	1950s	in	Peru.		After	promoting	it	for	decades,	then	implicitly	supporting	
it	through	legislation	that	grants	title	to	people	who	by	necessity	establish	their	
home	in	this	manner,	it	is	hypocritical	to	condemn	what	has	become	a	normalized	
means	of	making	a	living	and	having	a	space	for	one’s	family.		For	many,	land	that	
was	not	being	used	and	vast	was	propitious	for	settlement.		As	it	turned	out,	many	
more	people	arrived	than	were	anticipated,	between	300	and	500.			
						 How	a	humble	fruit	vendor	found	money	to	print	flyers,	tickets,	send	people	in	
buses,	etc.,	remains	a	mystery.		Yet,	if	public	accounts	of	previous	invasions	are	
considered,	the	modus	operandi	shows	various	commissions	organizing	an	invasion.		
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Doña	Maria	likely	belonged	to	the	propaganda	commission	whose	duty	it	was	to	
spread	news	of	the	invasion	without	drawing	official	attention,	although	she	does	
suggest	that	the	mayor	had	given	his	implicit	approval.		The	actual	date	of	the	
invasion	is	often	kept	secret.			
						 This	hypothesis	gains	strength	when	we	consider	news	coverage	of	the	
invasions	at	the	time.		In	a	report	on	the	rash	of	invasions	that	occurred	in	early	
2000,	journalists	Marco	Burga	and	Marianella	Ortiz	looked	for	the	reasons	why	
people	decided	to	invade	private	property	nationwide.		They	wrote:	
A	humble	settler	confirmed	that	neighbourhood	dirigentes	that	work	with	the	
government	signed	up	settlers	for	this	invasion	and	assured	them	that	the	
police	would	not	intervene	and	that	the	Comission	for	Land	Formalization	
[COFOPRI]	would	hand	over	their	title	deeds	because	the	property	owners	had	
no	documents	that	accredited	them	as	such	(Burga	and	Ortiz	2000:n/a).	
	
						 The	authors	go	on	to	reveal	that	landholders	were	told	that	if	they	wanted	to	
guarantee	their	title	deeds,	then	they	should	vote	for	Fujimori.		When	we	put	the	
invasion	into	its	context,	these	assertions	seems	likely.		There	was	a	tight	election	
race	and	the	opposition	was	trying	every	legal	manner	possible	to	disqualify	
Fujimori	as	a	candidate	and	denounce	his	mafia’s	attempts	to	win	a	third	
consecutive	election.			
						 In	such	a	political	climate,	it	was	necessary	to	maintain	a	low	profile.		What	we	
do	know	seems	to	confirm	suspicions	that	the	Fujimori	government	silently	
condoned	the	invasions,	and	it	seems	likely	that	people	with	channels	to	the	
administration	were	involved	in	the	invasion	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		From	
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accounts	on	both	sides	we	know	that	property	owners	awaited	the	entrance	of	the	
invaders	and,	as	we	will	see,	repelled	groups	a	number	of	times.					
						 With	the	help	of	flyers	and	promoters,	it	was	not	long	before	rumours	of	an	
invasion	spread.		The	movement	of	information	between	neighbours	is	one	of	the	
most	common	qualities	of	working	class	neighbourhoods	in	Lima.		If	you	did	not	get	
a	flyer,	then	a	neighbour	or	someone	in	the	market	passed	on	the	information	that	
there	was	going	to	be	an	invasion	on	the	31st	of	December.		In	reality,	there	were	
two	failed	attempts	before	the	successful	attempt	on	the	eve	of	the	6th	of	January.		
Most	of	the	people	who	would	invade	land	were	mere	marcadores,	or	land	stakers,	
who	risked	nothing	compared	to	the	intrepid	few	that	entered	the	night	of	January	
5.		The	presence	of	more	people,	however,	worked	to	bolster	the	strength	of	the	
invasion	and	deter	the	police	from	executing	eviction	orders.		Those	who	did	
participate	in	the	invasion	are	locally	venerated,	being	referred	to	as	fundadores,	or	
founders.		Many	of	those	who	I	tried	to	speak	with	about	this	history	were	
fundadores.		It	is	worth	noting	that	fundadores	often	gripe	about	the	ungrateful	
attitude	of	marcadores	and	those	who	have	bought	lots	from	traffickers,	or	weary	
landholders.		We	will	see	more	of	what	happened	near	the	end	of	December,	shortly.	
						 The	original	group	who	would	move	onto	the	land	was	by	no	means	in	the	
dark.		One	of	the	fundadores,	now	a	faithful	adherent	to	an	evangelical	sect,	
confessed:	
But	before	we	entered	we	saw	a	plan	here	that	the	municipality	[of	San	Juan	de	
Miraflores]	had	said	very	clearly,	that	they	were	not	up‐to‐date	with	their	
lands	[talking	about	land	taxes],	that	those	lands	were	thrown	out,	practically.		
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There	were		people	from	the	very	same	municipality	that	knew	that.		And	they	
have	entered	here	to	invade,	as	well.		People	say	the	mafia,	heh,	from	below.		
And	so	we	saw	the	plan	and	based	on	that	plan	we	entered	through	the	hill	on	
the	right	and	the	hill	on	the	left,	which	is	here.				
(Sonja	(early	to	mid‐fifties),	Interview	recorded	on	November	14,	2010)			
	
						 Here,	once	again,	we	have	one	of	the	original	roughly	300	who	managed	to	
enter	and	gain	a	foothold,	telling	how	they	had	inside	information	and	how	people	
in	the	municipality	had	provided	information	and	participated	in	the	invasion.		The	
part	about	landowners	not	paying	taxes	could	never	be	confirmed	because	when	I	
went	to	the	municipality	and	looked	for	records	from	years	prior	to	2010	I	was	told	
that	such	records	were	either	destroyed	or	in	the	hands	of	workers	and	officials	
from	previous	administrations.		Nobody	provided	any	evidence	that	taxes	were	not	
being	paid,	while	landowners	offered	to,	and	did	provide	receipts	to	demonstrate	
that	they	had,	in	fact,	paid	taxes.		Local	dirigentes	who	had	bought	their	land	instead	
of	placing	their	bets	on	the	promises	of	lawyers	with	dubious	intentions	
corroborated	the	legality	of	the	land	ownership	of	landowners,	as	well.		Such	leaders	
recognized	from	the	beginning,	after	going	to	the	public	registries,	that	the	
landowners	had	clear	title	to	the	land	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		Others	dirigentes	
lauded	those	who	bought	initially	for	their	pragmatism.				
						 That	workers	from	the	municipality	facilitated	the	invasion	and	became	
involved	is	believable.		One	local	counsellor	was	rumoured	among	dirigentes	to	be	
trafficking	lots	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	while	exercising	a	position	in	the	
municipality.		Many	of	my	collaborators	frequently	told	me	that	everyone	knew	that	
so‐and‐so	was	corrupt,	and	that	they	could	not	understand	why	people	believed	
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them.		The	blame	for	being	scammed,	then,	is	placed	solidly	on	the	solicitor.		The	
answer	to	their	bafflement	is	not	so	complex.		Some	professionals	and	leaders,	
unfortunately,	also	are	unscrupulous	professionals	who	possess	knowledge	that	
places	them	in	an	advantageous	position.		Knowledge,	experience	and	eloquence	
lead	people	to	trust	what	appear	to	be	people	in	the	know	and	people	committed	to	
the	people.		The	abundance	of	disinformation	(which	could	easily	be	
misinformation),	however,	makes	it	very	difficult	for	an	inexperienced	worker	with	
a	family	and	responsibilities	to	confirm	rumours.		They	may	not	even	know	that	so‐
and‐so	is	a	scoundrel	until	it	is	too	late.		Or,	perhaps	they	think	that	it	is	better	to	
have	a	scoundrel	on	one’s	side	if	one	is	going	to	deal	with	scoundrels.		Thus,	one	is	
forced	to	depend	on	those	who	possess	know‐how.			
						 One	gets	the	sense	that	while	this	behaviour	is	widely	condemned,	it	is	also	
colours	how	transactions	of	all	sorts	occur.		The	behaviour	alluded	to	above	is	what	
novelist	Mercedes	Cabello	de	Carbonera	decried	in	2000	among	public	servants	for	
“whom	public	affairs	are	seen	as	a	personal	patrimony	of	which	they	ought	to	take	
advantage.”		She	described	Peru	as	a	country	where	“…the	Minister	robs,	the	fiscal	
cashier	speculates,	the	deputy	sells	out	and	the	secretary	puts	her	price	on	her	
services.”	(Cabello	de	Carbonera	in	Huber	2008:59)		The	state	at	this	time,	and	to	
some	extent	now,	functions	as	what	has	been	termed	by	Deborah	Poole	as	a	
cleptocracy	(Poole	2000).		Analysts	concur	that	the	weakening	of	the	state	and	the	
elimination	of	political	opponents	during	the	Fujimori	era	allowed	his	mafia	to	
effectively	capture	control	of	the	state	(Tanaka	2005).			
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						 Ludwig	Huber	views	the	talk	around	corruption	as	a	discourse,	in	a	
Foucauldian	sense,	permitting	discussion	around	a	particular	theme	in	a	particular	
manner	for	a	specific	end	(Huber	2008:66–67).		This	argument	suggests	that	such	
talk	is	productive	in	the	sense	that	it	generates	certain	expectations	and	ideals	
around	what	would	be	effective	governing	principles.		Huber	draws	our	attention	to	
the	work	that	negative	characterizations	and	stigmas	have	on	populations	and	
nations;	they	work	to	elevate	the	privileged	and	occlude	the	means	by	which	such	
privilege	has	been	gained.		In	what	seems	like	a	rehashing	of	colonial	discourses,	the	
failure	of	developing	countries	is	the	result	of	their	inability	to	adopt	more	civilized	
behaviour	patterns.		The	failure	of	this	discourse	to	work,	though,	in	the	sense	that	it	
might	eliminate	corruption,	leads	Huber,	rightly,	to	consider	the	practice	of	
corruption	in	Peru.	
						 Huber,	in	looking	at	practices	in	the	education	system	in	Ayacucho,	found	that	
a	similar	pattern	holds	true	for	the	country	at	large.		Extensive	social	networks	were	
being	carried	over	into	institutional	practices	in	Peru.		So,	one	could	use	origin,	
friends,	relatives,	etc.,	to	gain	access	to	particular	people,	arriving	at	mutually	
beneficial	“arrangements”.		He	noted	that	the	practice	involves	a	high	degree	of	
social	dexterity	in	fixing	agreements	with	the	right	people.		He	argues	that	the	
division	that	might	exist	between	Weberian	bureaucracies,	that	separation	between	
a	private	and	public	sphere,	is	not	intact	in	a	place	like	Peru.		Unlike	the	older	
version	of	patronage,	neo‐patronage,	the	type	that	has	existed	since	the	early	1980s	
in	Peru,	sees	the	middle	class	and	bureaucracy	tending	patron‐client	networks	
(Huber	2008:137–145).	
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						 While	I	may	concur	with	Huber’s	view	that	a	cultural	approach	to	corruption	is	
necessary,	I	think	that	the	consequence	for	social	relations	and	the	public	who	must	
rely	upon	bureaucracies	throughout	their	lives	makes	a	moral	condemnation	
appropriate.		I	would	make	this	argument	in	the	context	of	developed	nations	as	
well.		When	one	considers	the	effect	that	informal	negotiations	have	on	the	trust	
that	people	place	in	their	dirigentes,	their	institutions,	or	their	local	politicians,	the	
behaviour	seems	beneficial	only	to	those	who	acquiesce	to	the	passing	patron‐client	
network	that	has	appropriated	public	institutions	for	its	benefit.		Such	practices	can	
only	contribute	to	the	political	fragmentation	of	the	public	sphere	and	loss	of	faith	in	
public	institutions	because	it	increases	cynicism,	distrust,	short‐term	tenuous	social	
connections,	opportunism,	etc.		These	values,	it	should	be	noted,	are	against	
commonly	held	notions	that	people	ought	to	work	together,	honesty	is	beneficial,	
etc.	reflected	in	the	daily	talk	of	subordinate	groups.		Much	of	the	confusion	and	
intransigence	seen	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	is	a	consequence	of	the	complex	
functioning	of	this	neo‐patronage	system.		Let	us	continue	with	the	history	of	the	
Nueva	Rinconada.					
						 Many	people	commented	that	they	were	unaware	that	the	landowners,	also	
known	as	the	chancheros,	or	pig	farmers,	owned	the	vacant	lands	in	other	parts	of	
the	area.		If	one	owned	land,	many	believed	one	ought	to	use	it,	otherwise,	it	was	
clearly	in	disuse	and	therefore	available.		This	belief	suggests	that	many	feel	that	
land	ought	to	be	used	for	social	purposes	if	it	has	no	other	productive	use,	an	
allusion	to	the	Constitution	of	1979.		This	belief	was	fed,	or	perhaps	generated,	by	
local	lawyers,	local	politicians,	and	dirigentes	for	motives	about	which	we	can	only	
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speculate.		The	legal	and	political	climate	of	the	time	may	have	led	many	to	believe	
that	there	was	a	hope	of	invading	the	lands	and	receiving	some	sort	of	state	
intervention	to	resolve	the	dispute	in	favour	of	the	squatters.		However,	it	is	hard	to	
deny	that	there	were	also	sentiments	of	indignation	behind	the	invasion.			Sonja,	one	
of	the	original	leaders	of	the	group	that	pushed	into	the	Nueva	Rinconada,	expresses	
the	sentiment	that	many	felt	at	the	time.	
And	they	said	that	this	settlement,	that	is	here	now,	this	hill	is	deserted,	that	
one	part	belongs	to	the	state	and	the	other	part	belongs	to	the	pig	farmers,	that	
have	bought	[the	land]	for	a	miserable	price	of	50	cents,	and,	they	are	taking	
over	the	rest	of	the	land	that	they	have	not	bought,	state	land.		And,	people	
passed	word,	those	that	don’t	have	land,	those	that	are	lodged	in	their	parents’	
house,	have	to	invade	the	hill,	heh,	so	that	we	can	live	there	because	the	pig	
farmers,	the	pigs	are	not	going	to	have	more	opportunity	than	us.		Those	pig	
farmers	there	have	a	house.		There	are	only	pigs	there.		There	is	a	lot	of	land,	to	
live	on.		I	said,	well,	I	don’t	have	somewhere	to	live,	so	I	decided	to	come.				
(Sonja,	Interview	recorded	on	November	14,	2010)			
	
						 At	first	glance	this	seems	sensible.		It	gets	more	interesting	when	one	reads	
papers	and	listens	to	the	press	coverage	when	it	comes	to	sentiments	like	that	cited	
above.		I	used	the	word	“indignation,”	whereas	the	noun	used	by	many	journalists,	
who	also	favour	the	new	neoliberal	Peru,	is	“resentimiento”27.		People	are	usually	
resentful	because	they	have	failed	in	the	game	of	social	climbing.		As	a	consequence,	
they	seek	to	undermine	the	successes	of	others.		The	noun	“envy”	would	also	work	
to	explain	the	behaviour	of	Sonja.		This	theme	recurs	frequently.		My	point	here	is	to	
question	why	it	could	not	be	seen	as	indignation,	frustration,	confusion	or	any	other	
combination	of	nouns.		The	process	at	work	is	not	dissimilar	from	that	described	by	
																																																								
27	Resentment.	
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Elaine	Scarry	in	her	explanation	of	what	allows	humans	to	wage	war	upon	one	
another,	or	what	allows	the	torturer	to	torture	another	human	being.		She	argues	
that	language	works	to	silence	or	dissimulate	the	suffering	of	another	human	being	
(Scarry	1985).		I	suggest	that	a	similar	process	works	in	the	media	and	social	
practice	to	numb	the	pain	and	indignation	of	social	inequality	in	Peru.28		
							 Eager	to	learn	more	about	why	people	had	invaded,	I	searched	for	Dr.	Manuel		
Robles,	one	of	the	original	lawyers	hired	by	the	squatters	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	to	
help	resolve	their	problem.		Lawyers	were	changed	on	numerous	cases	when	locals	
lost	faith	in	their	effectiveness.		The	following	excerpts	come	from	an	interview	with	
him	and	two	other	acquaintances	on	June	7,	2010.			
						 The	invasion	occurred	as	the	result	of	a	natural	process	of	expansion	in	Lima	
whereby	every	generation	children	of	people	who	have	invaded	land	look	for	their	
own	property,	according	to	Dr.	Robles.		He	explained	that	the	majority	of	people	in	
the	Nueva	Rinconada	are	from	Ayacucho,	displaced	during	the	recent	civil	war.		
Later,	in	a	document	that	was	prepared	to	request	public	investment	in	the	Nueva	
Rinconada,	I	noted	in	a	footnote	that	the	population	was	described	as	being	mainly	
comprised	of	Ayacuchanos	displaced	by	the	dirty	war.29		Dr.	Robles	recounted	how	
																																																								
28	A	meticulous	application	of	Scarry’s	ideas	would	yield	much	fruit,	especially	in	the	area	of	social	
discourse	around	poverty	and	social	inequality.	
29	Both	oral	testimony	of	original	squatters	who	participated	in	the	invasion	and	the	diagnostic	
surveys	of	the	population	conducted	by	PEBAL	(Dalguerre	2008,	Uriarte	2009)	reveal	that	the	
demography	of	the	area	is	complex.		Angela	Dalguerre’s	survey	of	a	sample	of	126	lots	of	a	sample	
size	of	1260	lots	found	that	59.3%	of	the	population	was	from	Lima,	whereas	Beltrán	Uriarte	survey	
of	649	households	found	that	29.6%	of	the	population	was	from	Lima	(including	Callao).		Once	again,	
even	with	numbers	it	is	hard	to	discern	objective	facts.		Locals	tell	me	that	there	are	people	from	
everywhere	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada,	which	was	illustrated	by	both	of	the	previous	surveys.		Some	
sectors	have	higher	concentrations	of	people	from	outside	of	Lima,	whereas	others	have	lower	
concentrations.		The	claim	that	people	here	were	displaced	by	the	dirty	war	is	true	to	some	degree.			
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the	lands	had	been	abandoned	and	that	the	original	conditions	to	upgrade	lots	with	
water,	electricity	had	not	been	met.		A	visual	inspection	conducted	by	the	
municipality	of	Lima	stating	that	only	10%	of	lots	had	been	in	use	in	1987,	also	
reinforced	his	claim	that	the	land	was	in	a	state	of	abandonment	prior	to	the	
invasion.		He	went	on	to	explain	that	in	January	of	2010	penal	cases	against	the	
original	invaders	had	been	archived.			
						 Later,	near	the	end	of	my	fieldwork,	when	I	began	to	talk	to	the	landowners,	
things	became	clearer.		In	2003,	the	initial	legal	demand	based	on	the	abandonment	
claim	had	been	dismissed.		The	legal	resolution	went	back	to	the	1973	registration	
of	all	the	lots	in	the	Association	by	the	Cotrina	family,	who	planned	on	developing	
the	area	but	were	unable	to	do	so	when	the	first	government	of	Alan	García	passed	a	
law	freezing	zonification	changes	in	1986.		The	title	was	legal	or	clear,	in	legal	terms,	
and	as	far	as	the	law	was	concerned	the	legal	claims	of	Dr.	Robles	had	no	weight.	
This	information	was	withheld	from	coordinators	and	households,	while	Dr.	Robles	
and	the	General	Secretary	for	Nuevo	Pamplona	at	the	time,	Velasquez,	continued	to	
attempt	to	extract	payments	for	a	legal	appeal	that	would	not	occur	for	roughly	two	
more	years.		This	stalling	to	share	the	legal	finding,	as	one	reads	in	the	minutes	of	
Nuevo	Pamplona,	generated	tension	with	the	group.		
Some	argue	that	land	may	be	granted	based	on	a	statute	of	limitations	on	the	
invasion,	but	this	argument	is	legally	untenable	too.		While	a	penal	case	has	a	statute	
of	limitations,	the	same	does	not	hold	true	for	a	civil	case,	according	to	property			
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Figure	9	This	is	a	scanned	copy	of	the	plan	that	was	registered	by	the	Cotrina	family	in	1973	in	
Bienes	Nacionales	(The	National	Trust)	and	the	Municipality	of	Lima.		Apparently,	copies	of	
the	map	disappeared	from	the	National	Trust.		Fortunately,	some	association	members	and	
the	municipality	had	a	copy	of	the	map	on	file	that	could	be	used	for	adjudication	purposes.		I	
was	told	in	the	municipality	that	this	map	forms	the	basis	of	all	claims	in	the	Rinconada.		It	is	
being	used	as	a	base	survey	to	determine	what	belongs	to	whom.		These	lots	and	their	
extensions	have	been	at	the	centre	of	the	struggle	in	the	area.		Local	landowners	say	that	the	
dispute	is	over	who	gets	the	profits	from	the	remnant	area.		Others	told	how	some	members	of	
the	association	ursurped	the	association,	introducing	more	socios	to	guarantee	their	position.		
It	is	alleged	that	they	erased	the	name	of	some	members	and	took	possession	of	others’	lots.		
Needless	to	say,	the	zone	is	mired	in	positions	like	these.		What	would	become	Zona	A	is	the	
area	east	of	the	road	in	the	upper	part	of	the	map.		Zona	B	corresponds	roughly	to	the	area	on	
the	west	side	of	the	road,	and	Zona	C	is	the	lower	area,	or	the	most	westerly	lots	on	this	map.				
owners.		Everyone	that	is	on	private	property	has	a	civil	case	still	pending	with	no	
statute	of	limitations.			
						 When	I	commented	on	such	information	to	my	collaborators	in	the	squatter	
group,	some	felt	that	they	had	been	duped	by	Robles	and	other	lawyers,	while	
others	boldly	declared	that	ten	thousand	families	against	a	hand	full	of	property	
owners	would	eventually	carry	the	day	because	the	landowners	were	few	compared	
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to	the	squatters.			Some	told	me	that	Dr.	Robles	had	been	sincere,	but	that	technical	
deficits	in	his	case	resulted	in	it	being	dismissed,	which	does	seem	plausible.		Others	
alleged	that	the	property	owners	had	bought	their	justice.		For	every	claim	made	by	
the	squatters,	there	was	a	counterclaim	being	made	by	the	property	owners.					
						 While	I	sympathized	with	the	squatters,	I	could	not	help	but	recognize	what	
might	be	interpreted	as	opportunism	on	the	part	of	some	lawyers	and	some	
dirigentes.		More	recently,	a	lawsuit	based	on	the	argument	that	property	in	the	
Nueva	Rinconada	is	superimposed	with	property	from	the	adjacent	district	of	Surco	
was	dismissed,	based	once	again	on	the	fact	that	the	disputed	property	sale	was	
registered	in	National	Assets.		Many	of	my	collaborators	explained	that	such	cases	
were	ways	of	extracting	money	and	hope	from	people	for	the	benefit	of	a	handful	of	
people	that	promote	these	law	suits.			
						 Authorities	from	the	Municipality	and	representatives	of	the	utility	companies,	
have	publicly	declared	that	the	land	in	the	area	is	mostly	private	property	and	that	
they	cannot	intervene	until	the	squatters	and	landowners	resolve	their	differences.		
Local	dirigentes	at	the	time	of	this	investigation	still	used	the	abandonment	claim	to	
support	their	possession	of	land	here	and	evoked	the	hope	of	state	expropriation,	
despite	the	first	case	being	dismissed	and	the	recognition	that	state	expropriation	
could	not	occur	in	instances	where	squatters	had	charges	pending	or	where	land	
had	been	illegally	occupied.		Given	the	ever‐changing	system	of	tort	law	in	Peru,	it	is	
easy	to	see	where	confusion	can	arise,	or	where	hopes	come	from	that	legislation	
may	be	modified	to	favour	the	squatters.							
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						 It	is	noteworthy	that	the	abandonment	claim	was	part	of	the	original	reason	
why	people	invaded	private	property	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		This	abandonment	
claim,	the	social	cost	of	evicting	squatters	(possible	deaths	on	both	sides),	as	well	as	
the	political	benefit	in	not	removing	people	provided	the	hope	that	many	squatters	
would	cling	to	in	the	initial	years	of	the	invasion.			
						 Adolfo	Ocampo	was	mayor	during	this	time	period,	and,	of	course,	had	access	
to	land	ownership	documents	and	knowledge	of	who	paid	land	taxes	in	the	
municipality.		He	could	have	clarified	many	of	the	contentious	points	surrounding	
the	invasion.		Doña	Maria,	however,	makes	specific	mention	of	a	visit	to	his	home	
and	his	explicit	approval	of	the	invasion.		It	is	impossible	to	know	what	his	
intentions	may	have	been	at	the	time.			
						 During	his	2010	campaign	I	witnessed	the	common	practice	of	inviting	closer	
members	of	his	campaign	to	his	home.		Other	collaborators	told	me	that	it	was	
understood	that	the	mayor	was	behind	the	invasion	and	had	given	his	implicit	
support	to	earn	votes.		Many	of	the	original	dirigentes	in	a	front	associated	with	
President	Fujimori	found	their	way	into	top	administrative	positions	in	his	present	
government.		It	is	doubtful	that	one	will	get	evidence	more	reliable	than	a	
participant	who	states	the	invasion	had	a	nod	of	approval	from	the	incumbent	
mayor;	but	the	theory	that	Ocampo	condoned	the	invasion	becomes	more	plausible	
because	in	2010	Ocampo	won	the	municipal	elections	thanks	in	large	part	to	the	
support	he	gave	to	finding	a	solution	to	the	problem	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada.			
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						 Another	dirigente,	Miguel	(early	sixties),	in	referring	to	the	time	period	after	
the	invasion,	remarked	that	people	from	his	community	were	brought	like	“rabbits”	
to	political	rallies	in	Fujimori’s	2000	election	bid	–a	practice	that	I	saw	repeated	
with	the	recent	APRA	government	with	a	rally	for	peace	in	November	of	2009.		He	
told	me	that	a	person	from	La	Molina,	one	of	the	most	affluent	neighbourhoods	in	
Lima,	showed	up	to	organize	people.		Miguel	continued	to	tell	me	that	everyone	was	
aware	of	the	game	they	were	playing,	but	it	was	the	result	that	they	were	after.		A	
collaborator	of	mine,	when	pushed	for	an	explanation	as	to	why	she	was	mobilizing	
people	from	her	sector	and	others	that	participated	in	a	government	workfare	
project	for	an	APRA	rally	for	peace,	explained	that	it	was	a	way	of	showing	her	
gratitude	and	acted	as	an	assurance	of	continued	assistance.		Conveniently	enough,	a	
bus	was	provided	to	mobilize	mostly	people	who	were	participating	in	a	
Construyendo	Perú	project	in	her	sector.		It	is	important	to	note	here	that	the	poor	
are	not	clients	out	of	ignorance,	but	more	out	of	necessity	–either	you	play	the	game,	
or	state	officials	pass	you	by.		Being	an	obedient	client	has	awards	that	go	beyond	
the	immediate	moment.		In	a	context	dominated	by	patronage,	dirigentes	also	accrue	
political	capital	with	such	gestures,	which	can	be	redeemed	in	their	sector	and	used	
to	trampoline	them	into	the	municipal	and	national	political	scene.		Such	practices	
start	from	the	top	and	work	their	way	down.		For	many	dirigentes	playing	this	game	
is	a	necessary	evil	if	they	want	to	make	improvements	in	their	sectors	or	get	
assistance	for	more	vulnerable	members	of	their	communities.			
						 Initially,	the	largest	conglomeration	of	sectors	adopted	the	name	“Perú	2000”	
in	an	attempt	to	court	Fujimoristas.		To	their	dismay,	the	famous	Vladivideos,	which	
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captured	Fujimori	and	Montesinos	bribing	politicians,	tv	personalities	and	
businessmen,	were	leaked,	leading	to	the	eventual	frustration	of	Fujimori’s	third	
unconstitutional	term	in	power.	
						 Oscar,	one	of	the	dirigentes	who	approached	Federico	Salas	for	help	explained	
that	the	Prime	Minister30	assured	him	that	he	was	going	to	speak	to	Fujimori	about	
their	situation	and	that	a	solution	would	be	found	on	a	Tuesday.		Martha	Moyano,	
sister	of	the	famed	activist	and	community	leader	María	Elena	Moyano,	was	
scheduled	to	visit	the	Nueva	Rinconada	that	week	on	Sunday.		In	the	interim,	the	
famous	Vladivideos	were	leaked,	effectively	closing	this	negotiation	route	for	good.		
Oscar	recalled	that	he	and	others	had	to	explain	to	the	community	how	their	
investment	in	the	paperwork	to	meet	the	Prime	Minister	had	been	in	vain.		Such	
disappointments	would	become	a	consistent	pattern	for	the	dirigentes	of	the	Nueva	
Rinconada,	slowly	eroding	their	credibility.		
						 Miguel	argued	that	the	incumbent	mayor	had	nothing	to	do	with	the	invasion,	
which	is	possible,	but	given	that	numerous	dirigentes	and	squatters	are	not	shy	
about	signalling	the	involvement	of	the	incumbent	authorities	at	the	time,	it	is	hard	
to	know	what	to	believe.		We	have	already	discussed	the	political	spectacle	and	
propaganda	opportunity	that	invasions	like	the	Nueva	Rinconada	provided	for	the	
Fujimori	regime	and	their	political	opponents.			
						 While	the	police	did	intervene	in	both	cases,	mainly	because	they	have	to	
attempt	to	dislodge	invaders	to	protect	the	constitutional	rights	of	property	owners,	
																																																								
30	Salas	was	Prime	Minister	between	July	28,	2000	and	November	21,	2000.			
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the	efforts	in	San	Juan	de	Miraflores	failed.		Landowner	and	squatter	versions	
concur	that	these	efforts	failed	because	the	landowners	were	humble	folk	from	the	
provinces,	whereas	in	a	controversial	case	in	Villa	El	Salvador	where	the	owners	
were	of	a	prominent	Peruvian	family,	the	Bustamantes,	a	political	solution	was	
found	as	we	saw	in	Chapter	5.		The	latter	effort	resulted	in	the	death	of	5	invaders.		
Nelly	Moscoso,	a	local	landowner,	in	the	same	article	alleges	that	a	local	councillor,	
Fabio	Menacho	Barrientos,	was	behind	the	invasion	of	her	property.		In	his	own	
defense,	the	councillor	states	that	he	was	not	in	Lima	when	the	said	invasion	took	
place.		He	claimed	that	the	municipality	had	sent	the	police	to	the	area	once	they	
were	alerted	that	the	invasion	had	taken	place.		He	goes	on	to	state	that	“the	
municipality	has	always	supported	the	president	of	the	Asociation	of	Agriculture	
Owners	of	the	Rinconada,	Ciudad	de	Díos,	in	judicial	statements,	the	levelling	of	
earth,	among	other	things	(Aylas	2000c:11).”		
						 The	municipality	had	been	so	helpful	that	the	president	at	the	time	of	the	
invasion	would	eventually	muster	up	the	courage,	once	Fujimori	was	out	of	power,	
to	publicly	accuse	Mr.	Ocampo	in	an	open	letter	dated	March	5,	2002,	which	ran	in	
the	local	popular	press	of	having	“by	order	of	his	bosses,	promoted	and	supported	
the	invasion	of	properties	(Montalvo	2002:n/a).”		Mario	Montalvo	Espinoza	is	much	
more	adamant	in	his	accusations	reiterating	in	various	forms	the	relationship	
between	Mr.	Ocampo	and	the	mafia‐like	populist	and	authoritarian	practices	of	
Fujimori	and	his	entourage.		He	goes	on	to	question	how	Mr.	Ocampo	managed	to	
escape	unscathed	despite	video	evidence	of	him	accepting	bribes.					
	 208
						 In	spite	of	all	the	testimony	to	the	contrary,	Miguel	and	others	commented	
how	Mr.	Ocampo	had	always	helped	the	poor.		Nonetheless,	there	are	groups	that	
openly	accuse	the	mayor	of	acts	of	corruption.		Local	priests	and	nuns	also	told	me	
that	Fujimori	backed	the	invasion	and	that	the	municipality	in	the	area	was	run	by	a	
mafia.		Anecdotes	of	ex‐workers	who	witnessed	daily	acts	of	corruption	abound	
locally.		A	slim	20%	of	people	in	the	municipality	pay	their	taxes,	compared	to	other	
more	transparent	municipalities,	like	Chorrillos,	where	up	to	80%	pay	their	taxes	
(Adolfo	Ocampo,	oral	communication	in	public	discourse	in	Nueva	Rinconada	on	
February	5,	2011).			
						 At	the	very	least,	the	mayor	was	aware	that	the	invasion	would	take	place	and	
took	no	action	to	prevent	the	event,	whereas	other	mayors,	particularly	Mr.	Pumar	
of	Villa	El	Salvador,	did	act	upon	such	information,	albeit	to	little	or	no	avail.		Mr.	
Ocampo	later	stood	to	gain	political	capital	from	the	certificates	of	possession	
(which	were	a	costly	45	soles	at	first)	that	he	would	emit	to	the	squatters	in	2002.		
Workers	in	the	municipality	were	involved	directly	in	the	orchestration	of	the	
invasion	and	in	succeeding	events	that	would	unfold	in	which	local	leaders	stood	to	
gain	from	having	one	foot	in	the	invasion	and	one	foot	in	the	municipality.		It	is	safe	
to	say	that	anyone	who	squats	on	private	property	is	in	for	an	almost	impossible	
legal	battle	to	wrestle	that	property	away	from	the	original	owners,	especially	in	an	
aggressively	neoliberal	political	climate.		But,	the	Fujimori	government	may	have	
generated	some	hope	with	legislative	changes	it	made	just	prior	to	the	early	2000	
invasions.		As	many	household	and	community	leaders	would	comment,	many	
people	make	a	living	off	of	the	suffering	of	people	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		This,	for	
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many,	is	really	the	criminal	and	reprehensible	part	of	local	politics	—using	the	
needs	and	aspirations	of	the	poor	for	personal	gain.							
						 Only	through	tremendous	persistence	did	I	get	to	speak	to	Adolfo	Ocampo,	Dr.	
Robles	and	some	of	the	other	original	dirigentes.		When	I	did,	they	were	by	no	means	
willing	to	provide	any	written	evidence	for	the	claims	that	they	made,	for	example,	
there	were	no	charges	against	the	community,	the	landowners	had	abandoned	their	
lands	and	had	no	claim	to	the	lands,	or	that	landowners	were	unscrupulous	and	set	
unreasonable	prices	for	the	sale	of	their	lands,	to	name	but	a	few	claims	that	were	
discredited	with	written	documentation	that	landowners	were	able	to	furnish	and	
confessions	of	squatters	and	dirigentes	that	had	grown	tired	of	the	opportunism	of	
their	peers,	professionals	and	politicians.			
						 When	I	did	get	to	speak	to	Mr.	Ocampo	(November	28,	2010)	he	described	the	
occupation	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada	as	a	natural	process	in	the	city	that	occurs	every	
5	to	10	years	when	youth	look	for	a	place	of	their	own.		He	explained	that	in	2000	
about	100,000	families	took	over	free	spaces	in	Lima	South.		Here,	we	note	a	parallel	
with	the	version	told	by	Mr.	Robles,	namely	that	the	event	was	spontaneous	and	
part	of	a	natural	process	of	urban	growth.			
						 The	response	from	private	property	owners	was	almost	immediate.		In	Villa	El	
Salvador,	many	of	the	families	were	relocated	to	Ventanilla	to	an	area	that	would	
become	known	as	Ciudad	Pachacútec.		The	explanation	that	I	was	given	for	the	
abandonment	of	people	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	was	that:	
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In	making	this	transfer	of	people	to	Ventanilla,	the	people	of	the	Nueva	
Rinconada	were	not	included	because	they	were	in	a	pocket,	in	a	little	hole,	in	
a	hole	of	sorts,	and	their	presence	was	not	noticed	practically.	
(Adolfo	Ocampo,	Interview	recorded	on	November	28,	2010)	
	
						 So,	somehow,	the	local	coordinators	who	pushed	invasions	across	different	
districts	and	had	links	with	Fujimori’s	party	had	no	knowledge	of	people	who	
remained	hidden	in	a	little	hole.		Somehow,	roughly	10,000	households	who	drew	
the	attention	of	the	media	from	the	beginning	were	barely	noticed.		When	it	became	
clear	that	these	people	were	there	to	stay,	after	unsuccessful	attempts	to	fend	them	
off	and	oust	them,	Mr.	Ocampo	decided	to	help	them	out	to	“avoid	misfortunes.”		He	
granted	certificates	of	possession	to	establish	that	people	were	living	on	the	land	in	
the	Nueva	Rinconada	and	attest	to	the	time	people	had	been	occupying	the	land	for	
future	negotiations	with	the	landowners.			
						 The	most	popular	mayor	in	the	short	history	of	San	Juan	de	Miraflores	has	
been	a	public	figure	unafraid	of	standing	shoulder	to	shoulder	with	the	poor	in	his	
municipality.		This	grassroots	approach	to	politics	has	allowed	him	to	garner	much	
support.		In	2002,	Mr.	Ocampo	marched	in	solidarity	with	the	people	of	the	Nueva	
Rinconada	to	extend	government	recognition	of	land	invasions	to	2004.		In	recent	
protests	for	the	extension	of	the	Agua	para	Todos	(Water	for	Everyone)	program	of	
the	APRA	government	in	February	of	2011,	Mr.	Ocampo	marched	with	those	
without	water	in	his	municipality.					
						 Mr.	Ocampo	revealed	later	in	the	interview	that	he	studied	law	and	repeatedly	
stated	that	the	state	has	a	vested	interest	in	protecting	private	property	for	both	
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national	and	international	reasons.		That	the	hand	of	Fujimoristas	was	behind	the	
land	invasions	and	that	the	timing	was	so	close	to	his	illegal	re‐election	is	highly	
conspicuous.		Right	after	the	invasion,	Fujimoristas	were	in	the	settlement	looking	
for	favours,	that	as	anyone	here	knows,	must	be	repaid	in	kind.		When	discussing	the	
present	predicament	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada,	Mr.	Ocampo	was	quick	to	blame	
unscrupulous	lawyers	who	worked	with	dirigentes	to	pull	the	wool	over	the	eyes	of	
locals.		He	distanced	himself	from	Fujimori	also,	saying	that	he	had	only	affiliated	to	
access	funding	for	his	district.			
						 Now,	Mr.	Ocampo	recognizes	that	the	only	solution	is	to	reconcile	with	
property	owners,	involving	state	institutions	like	COFOPRI	and	religious	
organizations	like	PEBAL,	to	ensure	that	people	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	pay	a	fair	
price	for	the	land	that	some	have	occupied	in	vain	for	over	ten	years.		Their	
continued	occupation	and	the	improvements	that	the	municipality	and	state	in	
conjunction	with	locals	have	made	in	the	form	of	roads	and	infrastructure	has	
appreciated	the	value	of	properties	since	the	invasion,	meaning	that	property	
owners	stand	to	gain	from	the	sacrifices	of	squatters	and	the	collaborative	efforts	of	
local	governments	and	the	state.		If	one	starts	to	think	about	who	stood	to	gain,	it	is	
hard	not	to	recognize	that	everyone	becomes	suspect.				
						 In	this	interview	Mr.	Ocampo	made	an	effort	to	generate	an	impression	of	
himself	as	a	man	of	integrity	among	wolves.		He	painted	himself	as	an	ex‐seminary	
student,	become	professor,	become	union	leader,	who	with	the	support	of	locals	
eventually	won	a	position	as	mayor.		For	joining	with	Fujimori,	for	practical	reasons,	
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i.e.,	getting	a	larger	budget	for	the	district,	he	has	become	persona	non	grata	for	
local	unions	and	various	groups	that	tend	to	share	a	sincere	interest	for	the	
improvement	of	living	conditions	in	the	southern	part	of	Lima.		Unions	in	general	
were	repressed	under	the	ten	years	of	Fujimori,	with	various	union	leaders	being	
killed.		That	one	can	go	from	being	a	union	leader	to	a	supporter	of	a	mafia	that	
made	populism,	extorsion,	bribes,	embezzlement	and	terror	into	everyday	practices	
certainly	raises	doubts	about	the	integrity	of	Mr.	Ocampo.		Nevertheless,	he	still	
enjoys	popular	support	for	his	grassroots	approach	to	local	politics,	being	
remembered	by	many	for	his	public	appearances	in	Pamplona.			
						 Having	studied	law	and	having	prior	experience	in	these	matters,	Mr.	Ocampo	
should	have	been	the	first	to	mobilize	a	preventative	response,	unless	due	to	the	
political	and	legal	climate	of	the	time	he	felt	that	the	squatters	would	carry	the	day.		
That	he	had	no	knowledge	of	the	invasion	is	unlikely	given	that	adjacent	districts	
were	tipped	off	in	advance	of	this	particular	wave	and	that	organizers	who	publicly	
promoted	the	invasion	have	stated	that	they	had	his	implicit	approval	and	that	
people	from	the	municipality	participated	in	and	provided	intelligence	to	the	
organizers	of	the	invasion.		It	is	no	wonder	that	cynicism	has	become	the	
predominant	view	of	most	Peruvians	when	it	comes	to	politics.		Let	us	take	a	look	at	
how	the	invasion	took	place.	
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Chapter 7 —Fighting for a Place to Call Home 
	
	
Figure	10	Source:	Donayre	and	Cumpa	2010	The	map	above	is	a	detailed	diagnostic	map	of	the	
legal	status	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		For	our	purposes,	we	can	see	the	location	of	Minas	2000	
and	the	sectors	that	split	away	from	it	jutting	out	to	the	west.		Perú	2000,	eventually	Nuevo	
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Pamplona,	consisted	of	sectors	that	were	south	of	Minas	for	the	most	part	in	the	lower	parts	of	
the	Nueva	Rinconada.		The	Frente	was	an	alliance	of	groups	that	were	mostly	in	the	northern	
half	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		Villa	San	Juan	is	located	on	the	western	slopes	of	the	hill	that	
separates	Zona	C	and	Zona	B	on	state	lands,	above	the	shaded	outline,	which	represents	the	
updated	perimeter	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada.	
	
						 The	history	of	Nueva	Rinconada	is	really	multiple	histories	of	different	
conglomerates	of	people	that	formed	different	groupings	within	this	space.		It	is	also	
the	individual	histories	of	people	from	Pamplona	Alta	and	the	rest	of	the	country	
that	were	brought	here	by	fortuitous	news	that	an	invasion	was	to	take	place.		At	the	
same	time,	political,	economic,	social	and	cultural	forces	come	together	here	to	
make	this	history	both	like	and	unlike	contemporaneous	and	prior	invasions.		What	
makes	this	land	taking	so	distinct	is	that	the	invasion	occurred	on	what	was	
disputably	private	land.			
						 As	we	will	see,	not	all	groups	were	certain	that	their	invasion	was	occurring	on	
state‐owned	land.		Some	might	argue	that	squatters	had	to	be	aware	of	what	they	
were	doing,	but	as	I	have	previously	shown,	the	months	and	time	around	the	
invasion	were	times	that	were	full	of	disinformation,	hopes,	and	political	currents	
that	inexorably	pushed	the	situation	to	a	head.	
						 As	it	turns	out,	the	invasion	was	really	multiple	invasions	that	in	the	end	
resulted	in	squatters	getting	a	foothold	in	the	area.		We	start	this	section	with	the	
experiences	of	Chico,	the	first	Secretary	General	of	what	would	become	Minas	2000.		
As	we	will	see,	Minas	2000	was	one	of	the	fronts	that	formed	after	the	initial	
invasion.		In	the	next	chapter	we	will	discuss	how	some	emblematic	communities	of	
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the	Nueva	Rinconada	came	together.		For	now,	let	us	turn	to	the	details	of	how	the	
invasion	occurred.	
										Chico	described	the	conditions	under	which	he	came	to	the	Nueva	Rinconada	
(Chico	(mid‐forties),	Interview	recorded	on	November	1,	2010).		He	remembered	
that	a	friend	told	him	that	people	were	invading	in	the	Rinconada.		People	planned	
on	invading	lands	that	were	empty,	that	were	not	being	used,	he	told	me.		At	that	
time,	what	is	now	Minas	2000	was	empty.		There	was	nothing	there,	and,	if	it	was	
private	property,	nobody	knew.		Not	only	was	the	land	empty,	but	Chico	did	not	
want	to	conform	(conformarse)	to	a	life	of	sharing	a	home	with	his	mother‐in‐law.		
The	negative	assessment	of	being	complacent	points	to	a	strong	social	prescription	
to	accumulate	wealth	in	Lima.		Chico’s	admission	illustrates	the	pressures	to	
overcome	one’s	situation	and	progress	in	the	city	and	the	work	needed	to	push	the	
horizontal	and	vertical	growth	of	Lima.	
						 This	version	is	inconsistent	with	other	versions	that	I	received	from	other	
founders,	like	Sonja,	who	stated	that	she	had	seen	plans	indicating	that	Minas	2000	
was	on	state	land.		It	could	reflect	a	cautious	attitude	or	perhaps	Chico	was	not	part	
of	the	inner	circle	that	was	promoting	the	invasion.		Minas	2000,	in	the	beginning,	
was	mostly	state	land.		This	fact	lends	credibility	to	what	both	Chico	and	Sonja	said	
(Figure	10	above	illustrates	this	fact).		Founders	of	the	state‐owned	portions	of	what	
was	Minas	2000	told	me	that	they	were	banished	from	the	group	to	what	was	called	
“the	hill.”		It	could	be	that	many	were	in	the	dark	at	the	beginning	and	that	if	there	
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were	maps	they	may	have	been	misread	or	people	may	not	have	known	where	to	
draw	the	line	that	separated	state	from	non‐state	land	on	the	ground.			
							 When	squatters	first	moved	into	the	Nueva	Rinconada,	they	decided	to	occupy	
a	prominent	flat	sandy	tongue	on	Minas	hill.		Many	of	the	original	squatters	told	me	
how	the	property	owners	had	only	occupied	the	lower	parts	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada	
where	the	main	road	was.		Before	this	took	place,	Chico	told	me	how	many	in	the	
area	were	unaware	that	the	first	attempt	took	place	shortly	after	Christmas	in	2009.		
By	the	31st	of	December,	he	recalled,	he	was	back	at	his	mother‐in‐law’s	home.		
Sonja,	another	participant	in	the	original	attempts	to	gain	entrance	into	the	
Association	lands,	told	me	that	on	the	31st	the	police	and	landowners	succeeded	in	
repelling	the	invaders.		Sonja	recalled	how	property	owners	were	armed	on	this	
occasion.		Dates	did	not	coincide	exactly,	but	an	unsuccessful	attempt	occurred	on	
the	30th	or	31st;	landowners	and	the	police	managed	to	remove	those	who	entered	
first	because	they	were	simply	not	numerous	enough	to	put	up	a	good	fight.		The	
reason	for	choosing	this	date	was	simple.		Many	of	the	police	would	not	be	on	duty	
or	less	likely	to	respond	to	dislodge	invaders.			
						 The	next	attempt	that	was	made	by	Chico	and	others	was	on	the	eve	of	January	
5th.		Two	groups	of	around	100–150	tried	to	take	the	sandy	hill	on	what	is	now	
Minas	2000.		One	group	broke	through	a	gate	around	the	bend	from	Valle	2000,	
while	another	group	came	in	from	behind,31	a	tactic	that	would	be	used	once	again	
the	following	evening,	however	with	approximately	double	the	numbers	of	the	first	
																																																								
31	I	do	not	have	a	map	that	provides	the	topographic	detail	of	the	area	overlaid	with	the	sectors	in	
what	is	the	Nueva	Rinconada	now.		The	details	here	will	make	more	sense	to	readers	who	live	in	the	
area	and	to	those	who	contributed	to	the	reconstruction	of	these	events.	
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attempt.		The	first	group	met	resistance	from	property	owners	above	who	fired	
rocks	with	slingshots	and	huaracas32.		In	the	morning,	a	contingent	of	riot	police	
arrived	to	remove	this	first	group.			
						 Not	to	be	deterred,	the	squatters	began	to	amass	forces	once	again	in	the	
football	field	of	Nazareno,	an	adjacent	sector,	which	served	as	a	staging	ground	due	
to	its	proximity	to	the	Association	lands.		Jenny,	a	collaborator	in	her	mid‐forties,	
recalls	the	unexpectedness	of	that	night.		She	and	a	group	of	her	friends	were	
playing	volleyball	in	the	street	near	her	parents’	home	in	Ollantay,	a	sector	in	
Pamplona	Alta,	when	her	neighbour	came	to	tell	her	that	they	were	invading	in	the	
Rinconada	and	that	they	needed	more	people.		Jenny	recalled	how	she	and	seven	
other	friends	quickly	got	ready	to	go	and	participate,	grabbing	their	clothing	and	
any	other	provisions	that	they	felt	they	would	need.		Other	single	friends	also	
decided	to	participate,	to	support	their	friends.		Not	only	did	single	childless	people	
go,	but	also	married	men	and	single	mothers.		Men	were	usually	sent	in	to	confront	
the	police,	however,	there	were	also	women	and	adolescents	present.		Jenny	
confessed	that	at	that	point	she	was	not	even	certain	where	the	Chanchería	was.33			
						 Jenny	described	the	atmosphere	and	the	emotions	of	that	night	in	the	soccer	
pitch.		Many	knew	that	there	would	be	a	fight,	so	some	people	were	drinking	in	the	
build‐up	to	the	invasion.		At	eight,	Jenny	recalled,	her	neighbours	knocked	on	the	
																																																								
32	A	sling‐like	weapon	that	is	loaded	with	a	rock	and	swung	around	one’s	head	before	the	rock	is	
released.		Such	weapons	appear	in	the	Spanish	chronicles	of	their	incursion	into	the	Inca	empire	and	
are	still	in	use	today.			
33		The	chanchería	is	a	local	name	used	to	refer	to	the	association	land	because	of	the	presence	of	
mainly.	
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door	to	see	if	she	would	go	with	them.		She	agreed.		She	described	the	scene	at	the	
pitch	as	follows:	
We	arrived	there	and	everyone	was	sitting	down,	and,	there	were	not	thirty	
people,	there	were	150,	200	people.		It	was	like	that,	a	lot	[of	people].		And	
after	a	man,	at	about	eleven	at	night	came.		We	were	sitting	around	and	we	
were	drinking,	supposedly	to	give	us	courage	because	we	didn’t	know	what	we	
would	face,	people	said,	drink,	drink,	people	said	that	and	everyone,	everyone	
had	drink,	not	a	person	was	not	drinking,	everyone	was	mustering	up	courage.	
(Jenny	(mid‐forties),	Interview	recorded	on	October	30,	2011)	
	
						 While	people	waited	they	drank	and	told	jokes.		The	air,	despite	what	would	
come,	was	one	of	levity	for	most.		Those	that	had	responded	to	the	local	call	for	
reinforcements	were	not	in‐the‐know.		It	appeared	to	Jenny	that:	
All	of	Nazareno,	the	sector	Nazareno,	yes,	knew,	because	they	had	entered	the	
first	time.		They	already	knew,	they	already	knew	who	the	chancheros	were,	
they	knew	against	whom	they	were	going	to	fight,	everything,	and,	I,	at	least,	
knew	nothing.	
											(Jenny	(mid‐forties),	Interview	recorded	on	October	30,	2011)	
	
						 So,	among	those	gathered,	there	was	a	group	of	older	men	and	women	who	
were	organizing	people	and	that	had	a	plan.		However,	Jenny	noted	that	nobody	said	
their	name	at	this	point.		From	the	interviews	I	conducted,	it	did	not	appear	that	
Nazareno	had	any	more	representation	than	other	sectors	in	Pamplona	Alta.		It	
seemed	to	me	that	the	majority	of	people	and	leaders	came	from	different	sectors	in	
Pamplona	Alta.		This	code	of	silence	or	of	using	nicknames	would	become	common	
practice	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada,	mainly	to	protect	community	leaders	from	acts	of	
retribution	by	property	owners,	squatters	and	land	traffickers.		The	measure	also	
protected	leaders	from	police	harassment	and	alleged	state	espionage.		Without	a	
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real	name,	many	leaders	avoided	being	charged	for	armed	robbery,	usurpation	and	
other	charges	that	were	levelled	against	other	leaders	of	the	invasion.	
						 At	this	point	youth	like	Diego,	in	his	early	twenties	at	the	time,	joined	the	
original	group	that	failed	to	enter	the	night	of	the	4th		(Diego	(mid‐thirties),	
Interview	recorded	on	November	7,	2010).		At	around	11p.m.	another	attempt	was	
made.		Diego	recalls	how	he	was	part	of	a	group,	one	that	came	from	behind,	from	
San	Gabriel	through	what	is	now	Cumbres	and	met	resistance	from	a	group	of	
property	owners	in	Torres,	at	the	entrance	of	what	is	now	Minas	2000.		Sonja,	as	
well,	was	part	of	the	group	comprised	of	women	and	adults	mainly	that	came	from	
the	hill.		She	described	how	she	came	with	her	sister	and	children.		One	of	her	
daughters	was	gestating	at	the	time.		From	below,	Chico,	with	a	group	of	men,	
recalled	how	they	broke	through	a	group	of	property	owners	who	were	defending	
the	entrance	below.		Eventually,	these	two	groups	would	meet	up	and	rout	the	
property	owners	who	had	set	up	a	defensive	position	around	what	is	now	Torres.		
Diego	recalled	how	there	was	another	struggle	below	after	the	confrontation	at	the	
entrance	to	what	is	now	Minas	2000.			
						 Jenny,	in	the	same	group	as	Sonja,	remembers	the	entrance	of	the	group	that	
circled	from	behind	differently.		According	to	her,	property	owners,	around	the	area	
mentioned	set	up	defensive	positions	around	fires	above	the	small	valley	that	is	
above	the	current	access	road	to	Minas.		From	these	positions,	they	lobbed	flaming	
tires	and	fired	rocks	at	the	groups	as	they	tried	to	enter	the	sandy	plain	at	the	foot	of	
Minas	hill.			
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						 Landowners	remember	the	confrontation	at	Torres	in	a	similar	way.		They	
claim	that	they	were	overwhelmed	by	a	numerically	superior	group	who	came	from	
above.		Contrary	to	the	versions	of	the	squatters,	they	claim	that	they	did	not	hurl	
flaming	tires,	but	that	this	tactic	was	later	used	against	landowners	to	set	fire	to	
makeshift	shacks	that	they	had	constructed	on	their	properties,	properties	that	
were	often	located	below	the	positions	of	the	squatters.																			
						 Sonja	remembered	how	her	group,	that	of	the	women,	lit	large	firecrackers,	
known	locally	as	ratas	blancas,	to	simulate	firearms.		So,	with	rocks	whizzing	by	the	
size	of	baseballs,	and	men	swinging	any	blunt	object	they	could	find,	the	battle	
ensued.		Many	alleged	that	property	owners	had	hired	local	delinquents	to	bolster	
their	numbers.		At	the	time,	the	association	had	over	500	members,	so	it	is	just	as	
likely	that	if	at	least	some	members	and	some	family	members	got	together	to	
defend	their	land	they	would	easily	make	up	a	force	of	a	few	hundred	without	
having	to	resort	to	contracting	delinquents.			
						 The	charge	that	landowners	hired	delinquents	could	be	a	counter‐accusation	
to	the	claim	landowners	make	that	squatters	are	nothing	but	delinquents.		There	
were	documented	instances	where	landowners	did	hire	goons	to	protect	their	lands.		
Villa	El	Salvador	is	a	case	in	point.		It	is	hard	to	say	really.		Nevertheless,	once	one	
talks	to	enough	people,	one	realizes	that	of	the	people	with	a	need	for	a	land	who	
entered	the	Nueva	Rinconada	there	were	elements	that	for	multiple	reasons	made	a	
living	at	times	from	anti‐social	behaviour.		If	we	define	a	criminal	act	more	broadly	
as	behaviour	inimical	to	the	social	group,	we	could	include	politicians,	landowners,	
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squatters,	lawyers,	doctors,	police	officers,	practically	everyone,	at	some	point	in	
their	life,	under	the	term	delinquent.		From	this	vantage	point	the	use	of	the	term	to	
denote	a	superior	moral	position	between	two	groups,	therefore,	leads	both	sides	to	
qualify	the	other	as	being	delinquents	or	criminal	in	some	respect	or	another.				
						 Both	Diego	and	Sonja	emphasized	in	their	interviews	how	there	was	an	
attitude	of	staunch	solemnity	among	squatters	that	night.		Diego	summed	up	his	
mindset,	“either	I	die,	or	they	kill	me.”			Sonja,	in	her	story	of	how	she	ended	up	in	
the	invasion,	recounted	how	she	had	just	been	evicted	from	a	place	in	Miraflores	
and	had	reached	a	point	of	desperation	where	“she	decided	to	risk	her	life,”	and	that	
of	her	children,	I	might	add.		The	decision	to	invade	was	not	taken	lightly.			People	
were	aware	that	they	might	be	killed	or	seriously	injured.		Those	who	did	
participate	and	clash	were	youth,	men	mostly;	however,	we	see	how	women	and	
adolescents	also	got	involved.		Diego	estimated	that	40–60%	were	young	single	
adults.			
						 That	some	of	these	youth	were	gangbangers,	or	people	of	ill‐repute,	is	well‐
known	locally.		In	a	way,	people	that	were	seasoned	fighters	were	needed	because	it	
would	come	to	blows.		That	some	of	these	people	were	gangsters,	no	doubt	gave	
some	comfort	to	those	who	had	little	to	no	experience	in	hand‐to‐hand	combat.		
Then,	they,	like	their	neighbours,	were	looking	for	a	place	to	call	their	own,	
reminding	us	that	the	label	delinquent	is	often	a	dehumanizing	reduction.					
						 To	rationalize	this	bold	move	from	a	middle	class	perspective	makes	no	sense.		
After	listening	to	the	testimonies	of	many	different	squatters,	it	becomes	clear	that	
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many	of	these	people	had	been	on	the	move	throughout	their	lives	or	lived	in	
crowded	living	spaces	with	in‐laws,	siblings	and	their	children.		As	children	of	
people	who	had	fought	for	their	land	and	endured	countless	hardships	and	
humiliations	in	Lima,	this	was	the	continuation	of	a	fight	for	personal	dignity.		
Dignity	here	is	strongly	connected	to	having	a	piece	of	land	and	a	home	for	one’s	
family,	not	to	mention	an	opportunity	to	improve	the	chances	of	their	children	in	
overcoming	their	relative	material	poverty.		People	told	me	about	how	they	lived	in	
even	more	harrowing	conditions	in	rural	areas	of	Peru.		The	Nueva	Rinconada	was	a	
normal	rite	of	passage	for	many	people,	if	not	an	improvement	for	many.		Not	only	
did	one	find	the	meek,	but	there	were	also	land	traffickers	and	others	who	saw	
opportunity	in	the	confusion	and	naivety	of	many	of	the	youngsters	that	decided	to	
invade.		As	the	saying	goes:	“In	muddy	waters,	one	catches	many	fish.”		It	was	not	
just	about	taking	a	piece	of	land	from	private	property	owners,	then.		In	the	context	
of	successive	land	invasions,	this	event	is	a	people’s	struggle	to	have	something	of	
their	own	in	a	city	that	is	running	out	of	space	to	provide	everyone	this	opportunity,	
in	a	city	that	if	one	has	nothing	one	is	at	the	whim	of	someone	who	makes	a	profit	at	
your	expense.		It	is	either	you	or	them,	and	if	it	is	not	you,	then	it	will	be	someone	
else.		So,	people	were	left	with	a	tough	choice	and	the	implicit	approval	of	the	mayor	
and	the	central	government	if	they	managed	to	gain	a	foothold.	
						 Once	the	flat	plain	on	Minas	2000	was	taken,	squatters	quickly	marked‐off	the	
space	for	their	homes	in	an	improvised	manner,	using	rocks	and	whatever	they	had	
handy	to	mark	the	limits	of	their	lots.		Some	marked	off	larger	spaces	than	others.		It	
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was	a	free‐for‐all,	according	to	Chico	and	others.		The	savviest	people	took	corner	
lots	and	properties	near	the	main	thoroughfares,	a	collaborator	observed.	
						 No	sooner	had	they	taken	possession	of	the	hill,	than	the	press	arrived.		Jenny	
recalled,	much	to	her	amazement,	how	a	reporter	in	high‐heels	followed	her	group,	
dodging	flaming	tires	and	taking	refuge	in	pigsties	with	her	and	her	cohorts.		Around	
4	or	5	a.m.	on	the	sixth,	when	it	became	apparent	that	the	police	were	amassing	
below	to	attempt	to	dislodge	the	squatters,	the	press	retreated	hastily.		We	should	
not	assume	that	the	press	were	there	merely	for	their	daily	quota	of	human	misery.		
Compassion	has	an	unusual	way	of	opening	spaces	for	expression.		Sonja	told	me	
how	she	used	some	airtime	on	this	evening	to	announce	the	news	of	the	invasion	
and	to	rally	the	support	of	more	people	from	Pamplona	Alta.		This	is	what	she	
remembered	saying	to	the	reporter:	
I	felt	so	much	courage	and	pain	because	police	were	beating	us	and	I	didn’t	
have	anywhere	to	live	and	it	came	from	my	heart	when	I	said:	“Listen	
everyone,”	because	I	knew	that	they	were	listening	to	me	on	television,	on	the	
radio,	I	said,	“Listen	people	of	Pamplona.	Come	and	fight,	here!	Help	us	
because	we	are	the	sons	and	daughters	of	Pamplona	Alta.		We	want	land	and	
we	don’t	have	a	place	to	live.	Mothers,	fathers,	if	you	are	listening,	come.	Help	
us	fight	and	let’s	fight	because	the	police	are	mistreating	us.	There	is	a	war	
here.”	
(Sonja	(mid‐fifties),	Interview	recorded	on	November	14,	2010)		
		
						 Helicopters	carried	in	police	officers,	according	to	Sonja.		Diego	recalled	
armoured	troop	carriers	and	mounted	police.		The	police	were	decked	out	with	
typical	riot	gear	—helmets,	fibreglass	shields,	armour	and	batons.		This	was	not	
going	to	be	pleasant	for	anyone.		They	made	their	way	up	to	what	is	presently	Alto	
	 224
Progreso.		Another	collaborator,	Chico,	remembered	how	women	filled	blankets	
with	rocks,	like	they	do	in	faenas34,	to	be	transported	to	defensive	positions	that	the	
squatters	had	taken	up	on	Minas.		Jenny	recalled	how	police	chased	down	some	of	
the	invaders,	beating	them.		When	the	police	began	lobbing	tear	gas,	fate	would	
intervene,	as	it	does	in	many	battles,	in	favour	of	the	squatters.		That	day,	like	many	
days	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada,	a	strong	wind	blew	across	Minas	2000	toward	Alto	
Progreso,	effectively	returning	the	tear	gas	back	toward	the	police.		While	many	
were	ready	with	water	soaked	rags,	the	gas	ended	up	blowing	back	in	the	face	of	the	
local	police.		Squatters	—led	by	people	like	Chico,	Sonja,	Diego,	and	Jenny—	quickly	
recognized	this	advantage	and	took	the	hills	above	the	police,	showering	them	with	
the	rocky	debris	that	littered	the	face	of	the	hill	that	overlooked	the	police.			
						 The	police	retreated	to	regroup	near	where	the	present	market	is.		Apparently,	
they	had	run	out	of	tear	gas.		Chico	and	others,	recognizing	that	they	would	most	
likely	try	again,	collected	themselves	for	one	final	push,	and	miraculously	the	police	
were	routed.		People	were	wounded	on	both	sides,	and	some	of	the	invaders	were	
captured	by	the	police.		Many	of	my	collaborators	did	not	glorify	the	violence	of	this	
day.		Nobody	talked	about	the	force	they	used	or	the	wounds	that	they	suffered	on	
this	day.		More	important	in	the	recountings	was	the	struggle	of	invaders	to	enter	
the	Nueva	Rinconada	and	their	eventual	triumph,	a	triumph	that	would	be	short‐
lived	before	a	new	reality	would	set	in.	
																																																								
34	Community	work	projects.	
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						 What	must	be	noted	in	the	recounting	of	events,	no	matter	the	perspective,	is	
the	tendency	to	emphasize	the	violence	or	counter‐violence	of	the	opposing	group,	
while	downplaying	or	omitting	the	violence	of	one’s	own	group.		We	will	see	this	
pattern	time	and	again.		What	is	extraordinary	about	the	instances	of	physical	
violence	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	is	the	naturalness	with	which	they	occurred.		
Violence	in	many	ways	became	an	accepted	means	for	both	the	squatters	and	
landowners.			
						 That	violence	can	be	so	banal,	so	accepted,	is	telling.		However,	it	must	be	
remembered	that	the	ordinary	lives	of	the	squatters	are	fraught	with	daily	acts	of	
violence	and	aggression.		Being	a	labourer,	or	working	for	someone	much	of	one’s	
life,	or	being	of	modest	origins	in	Lima	is	anything	but	a	warm	experience	—men	
and	women	are	exposed	to	verbal	attacks	in	the	form	of	insults,	injustices	in	the	
workplace,	and	a	general	lack	of	respect	on	the	streets	of	Lima.		To	a	lesser	degree,	
those	in	more	privileged	positions	also	receive	their	share	of	daily	aggressions,	yet	
they	are	on	a	lower	scale	and	less	frequent.		The	pains	of	the	privileged	are	different:	
they	long	for	achievement,	suffer	from	work	related	stress,	cope	with	a	competitive	
work	environment,	become	isolated	due	to	work	taking	over	different	areas	of	their	
social	life,	etc.		The	pains	of	the	privileged	are	the	pains	of	the	so‐called	modern	
world.			
						 The	Nueva	Rinconada,	in	some	ways,	mimicks	the	discursive	interaction	that	
occurs	between	people	here	and	their	wealthier	peers.		On	one	side,	one	has	the	
haves,	some	good	and	some	not	so	good,	cultured,	refined,	disciplined,	scrupulous,	
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and	individualistic;	on	the	other	side,	one	has	the	have‐nots,	uncultured,	uncouth,	
impulsive,	dirty,	lascivious,	hedonistic,	down‐to‐earth,	garish	and	vulgar.		It	seems	to	
restate	the	civil/barbaric	binary	that	marked	colonial	endeavours	throughout	the	
world.		This	narrative	surges	through	the	discourse	of	different	collaborators	on	
both	sides	of	the	dispute.		This	binary	is	constantly	being	restated	and	challenged,	
sometimes	it	is	even	reversed,	thus	challenging	the	simple	binaries	that	even	I	
employ	here	to	mark	a	contrast	in	groupings.		For	the	moment,	we	need	to	bear	this	
trend	in	mind,	to	see	how	it	plays	out	throughout	this	text.			
						 Not	only	do	binaries	shift	or	switch,	discourses	can	be	dropped	at	times	or	
called	into	question;	but	that	does	not	ignore	that	the	discourse,	as	a	part	of	its	
social	environment	is	omnipresent	and	enduring	in	its	enunciation.		It	becomes	us,	
or	we	become	it.		Discourse	between	haves	and	have‐nots	is	complemented	in	the	
behaviour	of	people.		Discursive	postures,	then,	reflect	real	world	postures	in	most	
cases,	permitting	certain	behaviours,	condemning	others	as	out	of	place,	making	
certain	behaviours	visible	and	invisible.		However,	the	options	of	non‐action,	or	
different	action	always	exist.		Yet,	as	all	who	have	witnessed	the	woodenness	of	
class	or	racial	stereotyping,	the	dissonances	that	begin	to	appear	in	lived	realities	
result	in	people	recognizing	the	make‐shiftness	of	social	roles.		The	discourse	of	the	
civil	versus	the	uncivil	persists	because	as	Raymond	Williams	observed,	hegemony	
is	a	project,	a	“sense	of	reality”	and	as	such	it	never	rests	on	its	haunches	(Williams	
1977:110).	
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						 I	started	the	story	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada	with	the	version	of	the	landowners	
very	deliberately	because	I	wanted	to	emphasize	that	they	were,	and	could	have	
easily	been,	many	of	those	who	invaded	the	Association	lands.		From	listening	to	the	
accounts	of	the	squatters	we	get	the	impression	that	violence	against	this	group					
—those	who	made	it	in	the	city—	was	justifiable	because	they	were	behaving	in	
ways	that	were	antisocial,	or	harmful,	toward	the	greater	needs	of	the	masses.			
						 A	grounded	theoretical	consciousness,	channelled	into	localized	politically	
motivated	action	materializes	in	the	invasion.		The	possible	relationship	of	this	
event	to	the	populist	gestures	of	Fujimori’s	government	is	suggestive	of	how	the	
indignation	of	underprivileged	groups	can	be	directed	against	others	to	support	
larger	ideological	projects	that	go	against	their	interests.		So,	while	an	opening	of	
sorts	was	generated	for	such	an	event,	the	event	in	its	larger	frame	works	against	
the	interest	of	squatters	in	that	their	actions	enable	a	group	of	legislators,	
economists,	financiers,	and	politicians	to	reinforce	a	larger	project	that	further	
incorporates	these	squatters	into	a	system	where	they	are	still	at	the	bottom	of	the	
pile.		Nevertheless,	the	squatters	do	satisfy	their	desire	to	have	a	relative	share	of	a	
progress	that	is	meaningful	to	them.					
						 At	this	point,	I	would	like	to	highlight	that	the	relationship	between	those	who	
do	not	have	and	those	who	have	is	charged	with	a	constant	tension	that	plays	out	in	
the	everyday	lives	of	people	—from	the	lack	of	respect	shown	to	maids,	trade	
workers,	and	service	workers	throughout	Lima	(even	what	were	once	barriadas)	to	
discrimination	shown	toward	the	children	and	grandchildren	of	migrants	to	Lima	in	
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the	more	exclusive	leisure	areas	of	Lima.		The	daily	acts	of	disrespect	and	the	
disparities	that	people	perceive	in	their	lives	are	the	fuel	of	violent	outbursts	like	
the	taking	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada	and	its	popular	support.		They	are	playing	out	the	
struggle	of	the	masses,	assuming	roles	in	this	particular	event:	invaders	vs.	property	
owners.		This	dynamic	quickly	slides	into	a	more	general	binary	of	privileged	decent	
people	vs.	the	people,	the	barrio.			
						 I	never	got	the	police	versions	of	this	day.		However,	what	is	known	is	that	
most	police	are	reluctant	to	participate	in	such	evictions	because	of	the	inherent	
danger	to	them	as	well.		Either	way,	the	police	come	out	looking	like	goons.		As	the	
local	police	Major	explained	to	me,	what	really	comes	to	bear	is	the	social	cost	of	
such	evictions.		If	the	cost	is	high,	if	there	is	going	to	be	human	loss,	the	police	will	
usually	retreat.		Personal	calculation	is	involved	as	well.		How	many	police	officers,	
most	with	family	members	of	their	own	who	have	invaded	at	one	time	or	another,	
are	going	to	risk	their	life	against	people	that	could	easily	be	children	of	their	
neighbours	or	friends	of	their	families?		Because	a	crime	was	being	committed,	the	
police	had	to	be	there,	whether	they	liked	it	or	not.		Given	the	do‐or‐die	attitude	of	
the	squatters,	a	less‐than‐easy	terrain	to	negotiate,	and	a	loss	of	momentum	from	
the	start,	it	is	reasonable	to	assume	that	the	police	decided	that	it	was	simply	not	
worth	it	that	day.			
						 The	squatters	felt	that	the	only	reason	that	the	police	appeared	to	evict	people	
was	because	the	landowners	had	paid	them	to	be	there.		Otherwise,	why	would	the	
police	respond?		This	reflects	two	popular	perceptions	of	law	enforcement	in	Peru:	
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the	general	attitude	that	justice	almost	always	has	a	price	on	it	and	the	lack	of	
presence	of	police	when	they	are	really	needed.		If	the	police	appeared,	they	were	
there	to	defend	the	interests	of	the	wealthy	–in	this	case,	the	association	of	
landowners.		The	squatters	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada,	as	we	will	see,	often	took	
responsibility	for	policing	their	communities.		If	police	presence	was	required,	many	
collaborators	told	me	how	they	often	had	to	pay	for	the	gasoline,	often	highly	
inflated,	so	that	the	police	would	come.		A	combination	of	corruption	and	lack	of	
financial	support	for	law	enforcement	are	at	work.		Law	enforcement,	like	health	
care,	public	administration	and	education,	suffers	from	a	chronic	lack	of	funding.		
The	result,	not	surprisingly,	is	that	public	workers	“charge”	the	public	to	
supplement	their	incomes	or	compensate	for	the	lack	of	funding	to	perform	their	
jobs.		This	results	in	a	cynical	attitude	toward	public	sector	workers.		This	cynical	
attitude,	in	turn,	leads	to	a	general	lack	of	cooperation	and	suspicion	of	those	in	
almost	any	advantageous	position.		Such	an	attitude	is	generalized	and	has	many	
inimical	consequences,	as	we	will	see.	
						 After	the	trouncing	of	the	police	on	the	morning	of	the	6th	of	January,	the	
sluices	were	opened	and	thousands	rushed	into	the	Nueva	Rinconada	to	occupy	
available	open	spaces.		Chico	estimated	that	there	were	easily	20,000	people	there	
within	the	next	two	days.		At	present,	the	population	is	just	shy	of	28,000	(Oral	
communication,	Daniel	Corzo,	Municipality	of	Lima,	October	22,	2011).		It	must	be	
borne	in	mind	here	that	the	hills	have	been	terraced	and	new	areas	settled	on	hill	
faces	since	the	beginning.		According	to	many	accounts	it	was	cramped	living,	at	
first.	
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						 The	next	step	after	managing	to	fend	off	the	police’s	attempt	to	dislodge	the	
squatters	occurred	at	different	moments	throughout	the	area	without	any	
overarching	attempts	to	organize	all	the	squatters.		What	emerges	is	a	space	where	
multiple	nuclei	form,	some	attempting	to	incorporate	other	smaller	nuclei	and	other	
nuclei	opting	to	maintain	their	distance	from	the	two	large	fronts,	as	we	will	see.			
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Chapter 8 —Founding of the Fronts and Creation of 
Communities 
	
						 In	this	chapter	we	will	see	what	happened	when	people	began	to	arrive	in	
large	numbers	after	the	squatters	pushed	back	police.		We	will	look	at	the	
experiences	of	two	larger	fronts	and	one	outlying	sector	in	their	initial	moments	to	
capture	the	overall	panorama	of	the	area.		The	first	front	is	Minas	2000	and	the	
Defense	Front.		They	ostensibly	formed	in	response	to	the	pretentions	and	initial	
abuses	of	another	front,	Perú	2000.		Perú	2000	sought	the	patronage	of	Alberto	
Fujimori’s	government	shortly	after	the	invasion.		Our	third	outlying	sector	is	Villa	
San	Juan,	which	was	located	on	private	poverty	and	maintained	its	distance	from	
both	of	these	larger	fronts.	
						 The	tensions	between	the	two	fronts	produces	an	account	of	the	conflicts	that	
arise	when	patronage	networks	reach	into	local	communities.		They	also	point	to	the	
excesses	that	can	be	committed	by	clients	of	patrons	when	a	network	is	in	a	position	
of	political	ascendency.		The	authoritarian	rule	of	Fujimori	was	one	of	fear,	and	
intimidation.		It	was	a	time	when	vigilante	justice	was	condoned.		We	see	how	
unchecked	undemocratic	rule	leads	to	excesses	at	even	the	community	level	in	the	
case	under	consideration	here.		The	behaviour	of	many	leaders	and	the	fronts,	
especially	Perú	2000,	must	be	placed	into	this	context.	
	 232
						 In	this	section	the	reader	should	note	behaviour	that	could	be	part	of	an	
individualism	particular	to	Perú	but	is	consistent	with	that	implicit	in	self‐help:	a	
rugged	individualism	with	a	no‐holds	barred	desire	to	improve	one’s	status	within	
the	city.		Many	households	here,	no	matter	which	front	they	belonged	to	in	the	
beginning,	seemed	to	endure	a	fierce	struggle	of	positioning	within	the	area	to	earn	
a	lot	in	whatever	sector	they	were.		It	was	not	uncommon	to	move	multiple	times	
before	finding	a	home.		This	competitiveness	is	not	without	its	socially	divisive	
accompanying	force	of	distrust.		From	the	account	given	here	it	appears	that	trust	is	
in	short	supply.	
	 Although	we	can	note	a	strong	element	of	individualism	within	these	
communities,	we	cannot	ignore	an	intense	satisfaction	among	people	when	they	talk	
of	their	collective	successes	as	a	community.		Community	work	projects	are	social	
moments,	with	much	commraderie	at	a	leisurely	work	pace.		The	improvement	of	
their	homes,	the	construction	of	roads,	stairs,	soccer	pitches,	and	community	
centres	are	all	proudly	remembered	as	moments	when	people	worked	together,	
helping	one	another.		This	cooperation,	as	the	reader	will	recall,	was	fondly	
remembered	in	Don	Malvinas’s	story	as	well	as	the	work	of	Janine	Anderson	(2002).		
What	is	significant	here	is	that	we	see	that	the	seeds	of	individualism	were	present	
at	the	time	that	unity	was	most	strongly	promoted	as	a	solution	to	common	
problems.		So	long	as	there	were	common	shared	goals,	people	worked	together,	
indicating	that	being	a	community	is	a	practice,	a	habit,	something	that	people	are	
because	they	do	something	together.		Community	leaders	often	complained	that	
people	were	becoming	too	confortable,	even	though	most	communities	did	not	have	
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sewage,	running	water,	and	individual	connections	to	a	power	grid.		That	minimal	
level	of	confort,	or	what	is	needed	to	feel	that	one	has	made	an	improvement	in	their	
circumstances	is	highly	complex	and	relates	to	individual	histories	and	philosophies	
about	life.	
						 For	each	of	the	fronts	I	provide	a	history	of	how	these	communities	came	
together	initially,	relying	on	both	leaders	and	representative	households	to	describe	
the	character	of	the	development	that	occurred.		Minas	2000	receives	the	most	
detailed	attention	because	that	is	the	area	where	I	had	most	of	my	contacts.		After	
studying	its	formation	I	realized	that	the	pattern	of	administration	in	Minas	2000	
was	not	different	from	that	found	elsewhere	in	the	area.			
						 As	communities	formed,	people	were	counted,	plans	drawn	and	statutes	
drafted	by	lawyers.		In	this	sense,	communities	adhere	to	a	degree	to	prevailing	laws	
that	apply	to	all	citizens.		The	extent	to	which	these	laws	reflect	a	hegemonic	vision	
of	how	people	ought	to	behave	is	open	for	debate.		We	do	note,	though,	behaviours	
conducive	to	the	well	being	of	families,	especially	the	normative	nuclear	family.		
Non‐compliance	with	established	rules	that	admonished	people	to	cooperate	in	the	
building	of	infrastructure	in	community	work	projects	called	faenas35,	participate	in	
community	assemblies	and	adhere	to	behavioural	codes	was	grounds	for	being	
																																																								
35	Faenas	are	mandatory	community	work	projects.		The	hills	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada	are	alive	with	
work	groups	on	Sunday	mornings.		This	is	how	much	of	the	community	infrastructure	is	built.		
Through	constant	toil	households	build	their	own	communities,	with	some	occasional	outside	aid.		
Each	household	typically	sends	a	representative,	however	there	is	a	lot	of	flexibility	in	the	application	
of	this	mandate.		People	often	opt	to	pay	fines	instead	of	doing	their	faena	on	Sundays.		Others	
grumblingly	carry	about	their	duty.		And,	then	there	are	others	that	make	the	most	of	the	moment,	
joking,	ribbing,	and	enjoying	the	work.		Needless	to	say,	such	community	work	projects	do	a	lot	to	
promote	community	morale	and	interaction.		These	work	projects	and	rites	of	passage,	birth,	
baptism,	marriage,	and	death	are	occasions	where	community	interaction	is	intense.	
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purged36	from	the	community.		Therefore,	there	was	a	strong	moral	element	to	the	
type	of	community	that	emerged	in	the	area.		Although	it	does	not	come	out	in	this	
chapter	strongly,	there	was	also	a	progressive	element	to	the	communities.		They	
welcomed	outside	interventions	from	NGOs,	state	institutions,	church	organizations,	
philanthropists	and	non‐affliliated	volunteers.		Formal	aid	is	contingent	upon	each	
sector	submitting	a	register	of	inhabitants	and	having	their	community	council	
approved	by	the	local	municipality.37		Leadership	styles	vary	depending	on	the	
personality	and	experience	of	the	Secretary	Generals	of	sectors.		In	many	ways,	
community	councils	worked	to	ensure	the	collective	good	of	their	communities,	
utilizing	available	resources	and	disciplining	populations	toward	achieving	what	
original	leaders	thought	to	be	an	ideal	community.		The	character	of	this	community,	
free	of	illict	drugs,	adulterers,	etc.	seems	to	be	an	ideal	based	on	Christian	values	and	
practical	experience	(many	sending	communities	were	experiencing	a	problem	with	
drug	use	at	the	time	among	local	youth).			
						 Juliet	Erazo	explored	the	complex	negotiations	that	occurred	between	
community	leaders	in	the	Napo	region	of	Ecuador	among	Kichwa	groups,	noting	that	
leaders	often	embraced	modernization	projects	as	a	means	of	protecting	their	
communities.		They	adopted	new	notions	of	community	that	went	beyond	more	
localized	kinship	groups	as	a	survival	tactic,	absorbing	elements	of	state	
																																																								
36	I	use	the	word	“purge”	as	a	translation	for	the	Spanish	depurar.		The	sense	of	purging	as	removing	
undesirable	elements	from	a	political	group,	or	a	cleansing	of	impurities,	seems	appropriate	to	the	
referent	behaviour	we	see	here.			
37	Observers	from	the	municipality	are	requested	to	ensure	that	the	election	of	the	electoral	
committee	and	the	council	is	fair	and	free.		Attendance,	however,	is	voluntary,	and	as	cases	suggest,	
intimidation	can	be	used	to	dissuade	households	from	voting.		Election	results	may	be	boycotted	if	
incumbent	community	council	does	not	hand	over	incorporation	papers	(libro	de	actas).		This	is	also	
a	requirement	for	the	registration	of	a	community	council	in	the	municipality.							
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governmental	practice	to	pragmatically	ensure	the	continuity	of	their	communities	
Erazo	2010).		Given	the	historical	context	of	self‐help	already	discussed,	there	
appears	to	be	no	explicit	accommodation	being	made	for	traditional	livelihood	
practices	of	individuals	of	multiple	decent	by	the	community	councils	that	I	studied.		
The	difference	with	these	community	councils	is	that	they	are	not	attempting	to	
protect	a	livelihood	or	a	deeper	existential	connection	to	the	land	that	they	are	
occupying.		People	are	here	because	they	have	more	or	less	(with	some	tensions,	of	
course)	accepted	notions	of	individual	progress.	
						 In	the	beginning,	the	formation	of	fronts	was	useful	to	achieve	certain	ends,	
but	the	fronts	eventually	fell	apart	with	each	sector	choosing	to	pursue	its	own	path.		
Fronts	may	not	have	formed	without	the	expansionistic	tendencies	of	Perú	2000	
and	its	self‐designation	as	the	central	committee.		People	were	generally	distrustful	
of	this	autocratic	tendency.		An	analysis	of	Minas	2000	and	the	Defense	Front	and	
the	tension	between	councils	and	households	suggest	that	rejection	of	overarching	
governance	strategies	was	not	unique	to	Perú	2000.		The	larger	groups,	despite	the	
advantage	of	allowing	larger	movements	of	people	to	make	collective	demands,	lost	
momentum	due	to	a	loss	of	credibility.		Smaller	sectors	were	under	the	impression	
that	they	could	work	more	effectively	without	the	need	for	having	larger	governing	
bodies	that	required	financial	support,	demanded	labour,	and	added	another	layer	
of	bureaucracy.		It	appears	that	generalized	sentiments	of	distrust,	envy,	and	viveza	
worked	in	many	ways	to	generate	these	attitudes.		
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						 Even	at	the	level	of	individual	sectors	there	is	a	degree	of	distrust	toward	
community	councils.		This	distrust	is	not	isolated	to	the	exercise	of	power	within	
communities,	but	seems	to	be	external	to	communities,	generalized	throughout	
Lima.		The	enterprising	subject	who	seeks	its	own	advancement	in	a	complex	urban	
field	appears	to	be	undermining	practical	recognition	of	the	value	of	communities	
working	toward	common	goals.		The	Nueva	Rinconada	suggests	that	the	
indifference	that	seems	to	affect	older	communities	in	Pamplona	where	basic	
amenities	and	infrastructure	have	been	built	seems	to	be	present	at	all	stages	of	
growth.		Let	us	look	at	the	formation	of	communities	throughout	the	Nueva	
Rinconada	to	get	a	better	sense	of	these	relationships	and	patterns.						
Minas 2000  
	
						 The	history	of	Minas	2000,	if	it	were	a	book	or	movie	rendition,	could	start	
with	the	history	of	a	particular	man,	a	charismatic	man,	a	respected	man	by	local	
testimonies.		While	women	certainly	did	exercise	roles	as	community	leaders,	the	
beginnings	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada	saw	men	assume	key	leadership	roles	initially.		
Women	were	frequently	cast	in	supporting	roles	as	social	assistants	and	press	and	
assembly	secretaries.		This	made	sense	to	many	because	the	realm	of	women	often	
pertains	to	the	household	or	the	well‐being	of	the	family	and	community.		Men,	on	
the	contrary,	are	charged	with	building	things,	exercising	authority,	and	disciplining	
—the	typical	roles	of	a	patriarch.		If	a	woman	does	assume	a	primary	leadership	role	
in	the	community	she	is	often	expected	to	be	heavy‐handed,	or	risk	being	perceived	
as	indecisive,	or	worse,	weak.		That	said,	a	surprising	range	of	personality	types	
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complicates	this	characterization,	and	group	leadership	often	depends	on	the	
constituency	and	particular	history	of	each	sector.		At	present,	now	that	things	have	
become	more	settled,	it	is	not	uncommon	to	see	women	as	the	leaders	of	sectors	of	
over	200	households.		But,	in	the	beginning,	when	violent	confrontations	or	the	
threat	thereof	between	squatters	and	property	owners	were	commonplace,	men	
were	at	the	forefront	of	the	leadership	of	the	zone.		Let	us	get	back	to	one	of	the	men	
that	moved	people	in	the	beginning	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		We	have	already	been	
acquainted	with	him	in	the	previous	chapter.		What	we	see	here	is	his	trajectory	to	
becoming	one	of	the	most	instrumental	leaders	in	the	history	of	the	Nueva	
Rinconada.	
						 Why	start	the	history	of	the	sector	with	a	particular	man?		That	particular	man	
happened	to	speak	up	at	the	right	time	and,	as	we	will	see,	take	the	right	actions.		
His	story,	is	not	unlike	that	of	many	who	would	move	to	the	Nueva	Rinconada	and	
find	something	there	for	which	to	fight,	to	find	something	to	which	they	could	
belong	to	and	see	grow,	like	a	plant	becoming	stronger	and	more	and	more	resilient	
with	passing	days.		What	is	interesting	about	this	case	is	the	humility	of	this	man.		
What	makes	him	a	leader,	as	he	states,	as	many	state,	is	the	ability	to	speak	for	
others,	to	detect	what	is	on	their	minds	and	not	be	afraid	to	state	it	with	confidence,	
and	perhaps	with	some	stage	play.		But	being	a	leader	is	not	based	on	gumption	
alone.		It	requires	an	ability	to	organize,	to	dialogue	with	authorities,	to	navigate	the	
corrupt	minefield	of	relations	between	one’s	community	and	professionals	and	
politicians,	to	quell	disputes,	to	control	dissident	elements	within	one’s	community,	
and	to	possess	the	wisdom	to	deal	with	every	case	of	misconduct	imaginable	within	
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one’s	community.		In	short,	it	is	much	more	than	just	speaking	up	at	the	right	
moment.				
						 Chico	Villanueva	was	born	into	a	family	of	seven	children	(Chico	(mid‐forties),	
Interview	recorded	on	November	1,	2010).		His	parents,	like	those	of	many	I	have	
met,	are	not	from	Lima	–his	mother	is	from	Apurimac	and	his	father	is	from	Puno.		
He	was	the	youngest	and	only	boy	among	the	children.		In	the	early	hours	of	the	
morning,	he	recalled,	he	used	to	accompany	his	mother	to	the	slaughterhouse	to	buy	
chicken	intestines,	which	they	would	sell	in	the	local	market.		While	in	elementary	
school	and	high	school	he	worked	in	the	mornings	plucking	and	cleaning	chickens.		
He	would	eventually	sell	chicken	after	a	brief	stint	in	the	military,	while	he	was	
stationed	to	active	duty	in	Lima.	
						 After	finishing	his	military	service,	when	Chico	had	his	first	child,	he	decided	
that	he	needed	more	steady	employment	and	the	possibility	of	having	a	better	life.		
So,	he	started	to	hang	around	carpenters,	slowly	picking	up	the	trade	by	helping	one	
master	or	another.		Before	he	knew	it,	he	was	taking	on	his	own	jobs.		His	home,	
with	sturdy,	well‐crafted	wooden	windows,	hinted	at	his	dexterity	in	shaping	wood.		
A	week	prior	to	my	interview	with	Chico,	I	came	looking	for	Chico	to	see	if	I	could	
interview	him.		I	came	across	him	and	a	group	of	men	building	a	swimming	pool	on	
his	balcony.		It	must	have	been	the	first	swimming	pool	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		It	
boasts	an	excellent	view	of	Lima’s	sand	coated	rocky	coast,	from	a	promontory	that	
looks	out	onto	beautiful	pink	and	orange	sunsets	on	clear	days	in	Lima.		Possibilities	
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like	this	make	building	one’s	home	much	more	attractive	than	living	in	a	
government	modular	apartment	complexes.						
						 Chico	told	me	that	as	a	secondary	school	student	he	began	to	take	an	interest	
in	leading	people.		In	the	last	year	of	secondary	school	he	played	an	instrumental	
role	in	many	of	the	fundraising	events	for	their	graduation	trip.		Chico	thrived	off	of	
challenges	then	and	seems	to	have	carried	through	with	this	tendency	over	the	
years,	gaining	experience	along	the	way.		For	Chico,	leading	people,	“Is	something	
that	comes	naturally.	Being	a	dirigente	is	something	that	you	carry	inside,	it	is	
something	that	drives	you	maybe,	so	that	in	a	certain	moment	you	act.”	As	he	talked,	
I	noticed	a	glint	in	his	dark	eyes	and	a	broad	smile	on	his	face,	as	if	reminiscing	of	
some	inspired	speech	he	may	have	given	in	a	public	assembly.		While	others	may	
have	ideas,	dirigentes	are	people	who	stand	up	and	speak	their	voice	without	fear.		It	
should	be	pointed	out	that	there	are	dirigentes	who	started	out	timid	but	that	over	
time	they	gained	confidence	in	themselves	and	found	the	courage	to	say	what	is	on	
the	tip	of	everyone’s	tongue.		I	saw	him	speak	in	one	of	the	sector	meetings.		He	was	
very	efficient,	patient	and	stern	when	he	needed	to	get	things	in	order	and	maintain	
a	steady	momentum	in	the	meeting.		When	I	was	around	he	was	asked	to	lead	sector	
meetings	to	help	the	community	organize	paperwork	for	a	water	project	currently	
being	proposed	for	the	Nueva	Rinconada.	
						 Chico	remembered	how	he	spent	three	days	alone	after	the	police	retreated.		
His	sisters	and	wife	would	eventually	find	him.			It	was	common	at	this	point	for	
spouses,	relatives,	or	parents	to	bring	food	and	provisions	for	those	who	had	to	stay	
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and	keep	watch	over	their	holding.		He	explained	that	it	was	necessary	to	have	a	
constant	presence	at	first	or	face	forfeiting	one’s	lot.		A	number	of	my	collaborators	
told	me	how	they	started	selling	food	or	other	goods	so	that	they	could	have	an	
income	while	keeping	a	vigilant	eye	on	their	lot.		In	the	midst	of	this	general	
instability,	it	occurred	to	him	that	what	ought	to	be	done	was	to	enumerate	the	
people	that	were	present	and	to	draw	up	some	kind	of	a	plan	of	those	already	there.		
						 Chico	recalled	how	he	and	others	began	to	organize	Minas	2000,	which	
initially	had	about	1600	people.		Others	place	this	number	as	high	as	1700.		Some	
groups	gave	their	group	a	letter,	while	others	opted	for	names	like	the	7th	of	January,	
the	4th	of	January,	or	Villa	María.		A	typical	group	numbered	around	thirty	to	forty	
lots,	with	each	lot	belonging	to	a	household.		At	first,	it	was	necessary	to	organize	
quickly	because	the	more	organized	and	bigger	association,	Peru	2000,	was	
gobbling	up	smaller	independent	groups.		
						 Chico	was	elected	the	coordinator	of	his	group.		A	General	Secretary	was	
elected	after	thirty	days;	however,	he	proved	ineffectual,	so	it	was	agreed	that	
another	election	be	held	with	most	coordinators	agreeing	to	support	Chico	instead	
of	another	more	radical	candidate.38		It	is	important	to	note	that	Chico	was	never	
acting	alone	and	that	he,	like	many	of	the	leaders,	was	being	advised	by	older	
people,	professionals	or	people	with	previous	experience	as	dirigentes.		Leading	a	
sector	is	very	much	a	tradition	that	has	emerged	here	in	Lima,	a	tradition	that	is	the	
product	of	a	particular	relationship	between	the	Peruvian	state	and	its	multiplicity	
																																																								
38	I	have	said	thirty	days	here	because	according	to	Ethel,	the	current	Secretary	General	of	a	reduced	
Minas	2000,	there	was	a	provisional	directiva,	or	council,	elected	to	draft	up	the	statute	of	the	group	
during	the	first	thirty	days.		
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of	peoples	that	have	met	here	in	Lima	in	search	of	progress.		This	tradition	works	as	
a	counter	to	hegemonic	processes	in	Lima	in	that	it	allows	communities	to	organize	
and	make	demands	of	the	municipal	and	central	government.		However,	as	Jaime	
Joseph	notes,	this	fragmentation	of	social	demands	into	sectorial	demands	upon	
municipal	and	central	government	bodies	is,	in	reality,	a	dispersion	of	the	effective	
power	of	barrio	institutions	to	generate	a	collective	sense	of	identity	and	challenge	
to	the	neoliberal	project	in	Peru.		He	shows	that	consumption	spaces,	like	malls,	
theatres,	and	shopping	areas,	have	come	to	replace	the	type	of	political	demands	
that	were	being	made	in	public	spaces	in	the	70s,	80s,	and	90s	(Joseph	2005).		As	we	
move	into	our	analysis	of	the	history	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada	we	will	see	how	
collective	forces	retracted	into	competing	sectorial	demands.		Moreover,	such	a	
process	of	land	development	has	resulted	in	the	emergence	of	a	public	sector	and	
professional	corps	who	feed	off	the	uncertainty,	lack	of	knowledge,	trust	and	hopes	
of	the	poor,	generating	a	vicious	cycle	of	distrust,	hopelessness	and	further	social	
fragmentation.	
						 Oscar,	one	of	the	coordinators	who	initially	came	to	support	his	sister,	told	
how	things	were	in	those	first	days.		He	remembered	that	things	were	a	practical	
chaos.		However,	thankfully,	he	had	some	idea	of	how	one	might	proceed	due	to	his	
experience	in	student	politics	in	the	university.		He	and	other	students	had	done	
important	things	in	Villa	El	Salvador,	so	he	had	some	understanding	of	how	to	
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organize	an	asentamiento	humano39	and	how	an	assembly	ought	to	work.		He	
explained	that	when	he	spoke,	people	listened	to	him.			
						 Eventually,	he	was	elected	coordinator	for	his	manzana40.		In	the	first	general	
assemblies	he	claimed	that	it	was	his	mission	to	form	a	neighbourhood	organization	
and	to	try	to	articulate	with	other	invasions	that	had	occurred	in	Lima	South.		In	the	
first	general	elections	he	and	Chico	had	to	decide	who	would	lead	Minas	2000.		He	
stepped	down	because	he	was	both	afraid	and	had	no	idea	how	he	would	manage	
the	roughly	1700‐2000	people	that	had	come	to	live	in	Minas	2000.	
						 During	the	first	month,	a	lawyer	helped	to	draft	up	the	founding	act	and	
statute	of	Minas	2000.		The	statute	of	an	asentamiento	humano	details	everything	
from	the	political	processes	of	the	community,	to	the	rights	and	responsibilities	of	
both	dirigentes	and	squatters.		Grounds	for	evicting	squatters	are	also	outlined.		
Common	grounds	for	punishment,	censure,	or	eviction	are	chronic	violation	of	
statute	responsibilities	and	duties,	trafficking	lots,	embezzlement,	seditious	acts	
against	elected	bodies	(creating	divisions	within	the	sector),	assaulting	other	
squatters	and	committee	members,	antisocial	conduct	(consumption	of	illicit	drugs,	
rape,	criminal	activity,	etc.).		For	now,	the	reader	should	bear	in	mind	that	there	are	
legal	grounds	for	warning,	fining,	censure	and	expulsion	or	relocation	and	that	the	
duties	and	responsibilities	of	squatters	has	a	tremendous	influence	on	the	character	
of	growth	of	communities	in	the	area.			
																																																								
39	Literally,	a	human	settlement.		This	is	the	current	legal	designation	for	lands	that	have	been	
squatted	upon.		There	are	also	associations,	which	have	a	different	administrative	organization	and	
different	legal	benefits	when	dealing	with	the	state.	
40	Block.	Manzana	is	a	block	in	a	sector,	group,	or	association.		They	are	usually	given	a	letter	and	
sometimes	a	number.	
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						 Minas	2000	was	organized	into	different	manzanas,	or	blocks	of	roughly	20‐40	
squatters.		Each	manzana	had,	and	still	has,	a	coordinator,	but	manzana	social	
assistants,	auditors41	and	spokespeople	may	be	elected	depending	on	the	
circumstances42.		While	other	sectors	or	conglomerations	opted	for	a	surfeit	of	
organization	for	groups	of	20‐40	squatters,	Minas	opted	for	a	minimal	number	of	
dirigentes	for	these	smaller	groups,	according	to	Chico.		The	asentamiento	humano	
had	the	standard	Secretary	General,	Sub‐Secretary	General,	Secretary	of	Acts,	
Secretary	of	Organization,	Social	Assistant,	Secretary	of	Press	and	Propaganda,	
Secretary	of	Economy,	Secretary	of	Culture	and	Sports,	Secretary	of	Defense	and	
Communal	Works,	Auditor(s)	and	Vocal(s).		The	idea	here	is	that	representatives	of	
the	manzanas	would	meet	regularly	with	the	General	Secretary	and	more	
specialized	dirigentes.		For	larger	marches	or	projects,	like	zoning	changes	for	the	
whole	area,	representatives	for	the	larger	asentamiento	humanos	are	often	elected	
to	preside	on	commissions,	which	must	report	back	to	the	group	in	General	
Assemblies	or	coordinator	meetings	depending	on	the	sensitivity	of	the	issue.			
						 The	maximum	power	in	the	sector	was	and	still	is	the	General	Assembly	of	
households,	although	in	practice	the	power	of	the	assembly	depends	tremendously	
on	the	willingness	and	ability	of	the	community	leaders	to	transmit	information	to	
the	community	and	include	them	in	the	decision	making	process.		The	problem	here	
is	one	faced	by	democratic	governments	on	a	larger	scale	in	Peru	and	elsewhere.		
																																																								
41	The	term	used	is	fiscal	in	Spanish.		The	duty	of	a	fiscal	is	to	supervise	community	work	projects	
ensuring	that	people	participate,	be	present	for	when	donations	are	received	and	distributed,	
witness	evictions,	investigate	cases	of	corruption	in	the	community,	etc.			
42	This	person	is	called	a	vocal	in	Spanish.		Their	duty,	according	to	a	typical	statute,	is	to	preside	over	
commissions	formed	in	committee	meetings,	acts	as	substitutes	for	absent	Secretaries,	or	represent	
the	asentamiento	humano	in	public	and	private	gatherings.	
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Collaborators	commented	that	the	problem	in	the	area	is	that	everyone	wanted	to	
be	a	dirigente	and	that,	as	in	national	politics,	personality	politics	had	become	all	too	
common.		When	speaking	of	infrastructure	in	the	community,	dirigentes	often	
proclaimed:	“I	did	x,	or	I	brought	x	group,	etc.”,	lending	some	weight	to	this	
assessment.		In	community	work	projects,	people	worked	begrudgingly,	at	times,	
under	the	surveillance	of	their	leaders	and	designated	auditors.		Dirigentes	
confessed	that	they	wanted	to	be	like	benevolent	caudillos	and	often	spoke	in	terms	
of	“their”	people.	
						 The	idea	of	community	is	not	like	that	described	in	analyses	of	community	
organization	in	Ecuador	(Erazo	2010,	Colloredo‐Mansfeld	2009)	where	there	is	a	
process	of	imagining	of	the	kind	described	by	Benedict	Anderson	(1983).		The	
notion	that	Spaniards	brought	corruption	to	Peru,	that	things	were	different	before	
colonial	contact,	is	certainly	widespread.		However,	the	articulation	of	these	
sectorial	organizations	to	a	larger	political	organization	that	has	a	counter‐vision	for	
development	or	the	nation	is	absent	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		We	will	see	how	
sectorial	organizations	do	not	coincide	and	that	they	often	link‐up	with	different	
political	parties	depending	on	the	political	sympathies	of	their	directive	body.		The	
presence	of	governmental	strategies	to	enumerate	populations	and	the	disciplining	
of	households	does	seem	to	be	present	and	mainly	accords	with	dominant	notions	of	
how	one	ought	to	behave	in	a	city,	but	due	to	the	presence	of	many	migrants	or	
descents	of	migrants	from	the	Andes,	values	placed	on	diligence,	community,	and	
honesty	prevail.					
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						 Being	a	dirigente,	because	of	the	time	involved	in	following	papers	and	
arranging	deals	with	shady	bureaucrats,	is	not	immune	from	the	general	culture	of	
patronage.		(Dis)information	trafficking	is	common.		For	example,	particular	
dirigentes	(a	minority	it	should	be	noted)	generate	confusion	in	the	area	by	charging	
the	population	to	obtain	copies	of	sections	of	legal	cases	that	they	claim	to	be	the	
magic	bullet	to	the	legal	problems	between	landowners	and	squatters.		The	entire	
context	of	the	case	is	excluded	or	information	is	selectively	photocopied	so	that	
clauses	that	contradict	the	pages	copied	are	excluded.		The	credibility	of	these	
opportunists	is	beginning	to	wane	though.		The	abusive	and	dishonest	behaviour	of	
some	community	leaders	has	generated	distrust	among	common	folk.																																																																
						 Usually,	there	is	some	flexibility	in	posts,	with	special	commissions	being	
formed	for	certain	tasks.		Since	the	purpose	of	the	asentamiento	humano	is	to	work	
toward	consolidating	a	community,	commissions	are	often	formed	to	get	surveys	
done,	approach	companies	for	water	and	electricity,	get	titles	of	possession	or	
ownership,	work	on	special	infrastructure	projects,	etc.		The	process	of	gaining	title	
to	land	and	enjoying	amenities	is	very	much	a	do‐it‐yourself	project	with	local	
dirigentes	having	to	administer	every	step	of	the	process.		If	that	is	not	enough,	
asentamientos	humanos	are	often	responsible	for	maintaining	order	in	their	
communities,	as	well.		
						 From	the	beginning	it	was	prohibited	to	call	dirigentes	by	their	full	names.		The	
preference	was	for	people	to	use	first	names	or	nicknames.		Chico,	as	a	further	
measure	of	protection,	kept	the	minutes	of	group	meetings	with	him	at	all	times.		
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Chico	confessed	that	nobody	knew	where	he	worked	and	that	when	he	had	to	slip	
away	to	work	he	took	a	different	route	every	time.		It	was	rumoured	that	he	was	a	
giant	man.		He	chuckled	as	he	recalled	this	rumour.		When	other	dirigentes	from	
below	finally	met	him	they	were	surprised	that	he	only	measured	about	160cm.		The	
only	people	who	were	aware	of	the	identity	of	leaders	were	community	members.		
However,	even	people	in	the	community	may	have	been	confused	because	leaders	
were	often	accompanied	by	bodyguards	or	entourages.		There	was	an	effective	code	
of	silence	when	it	came	to	dealing	with	inquiring	outsiders	for	two	reasons:	to	avoid	
being	charged	by	property	owners,	and	to	avoid	being	classified	as	a	subversive	
element	by	state	spies.							
						 Chico	and	others	described	the	community	in	the	beginning	as	being	
comprised	of	all	sorts	of	people	—people	who	had	families	and	worked,	single	
young	men	and	women,	career	criminals,	land	traffickers,	party	animals,	drug	
addicts,	etc.		These	categories	often	overlapped.		While	many	had	come	from	
Pamplona	Alta,	there	were	other	families	from	other	adjacent	districts	and	as	far	
away	as	the	province	of	Callao.		There	were	single	adults	of	different	ages,	but	the	
overwhelming	majority	were	young	adults.		There	were	people	from	the	different	
jungle	departments	of	Peru.		There	were	people	from	the	North,	South,	and	people	
from	the	various	departments	in	the	Andes.		There	were	1st,	2nd	and	3rd	generation	
migrants	to	Lima.		The	Nueva	Rinconada	was	a	mosaic	from	the	beginning,	and	
many	of	the	approximately	140	groups	of	people	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	at	present	
reflect	this	diversity.		If	people	were	in	need	of	a	home	for	themselves,	or	for	their	
children,	they	came.		From	the	descriptions	given	of	the	community	in	the	
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beginning,	it	is	evident	that	from	the	beginning	those	who	had	families	were	
concerned	about	making	this	a	place	for	their	children.		
						 While	the	community	organized,	people	had	to	set	about	attending	to	more	
practical	needs.		Many	of	the	founders	that	I	spoke	to	told	me	how	they	slept	those	
first	months	under	a	piece	of	reed	matting	folded	in	a	u‐shape.		Locals	referred	to	
these	improvised	shelters	as	tortuguitas,	or	little	tortoises.		Many	of	my	
collaborators,	who	were	founders,	told	me	what	it	was	like	at	first	with	their	
children.		At	night,	they	slept	in	the	sand	with	little	to	no	protection	from	the	
elements.		When	the	light	rains	began	in	May	or	June	it	became	necessary	to	erect	
walls	and	use	a	tarp	as	a	roof.		There	were	mites	that	caused	scabies	in	children	and	
adults	and	fleas	that	incessantly	bit	people	in	their	sleep.		Many	founders	told	me	
stories	about	sand	fleas,	which	burrow	into	one’s	skin	to	lay	their	eggs	and	have	
been	known	to	cause	gangrene	in	severe	cases.		There	was	no	water	or	nearby	
markets	for	those	who	lived	in	the	hills.		Electricity	was	a	luxury	that	many	would	do	
without	for	the	first	years	in	the	area.		There	were	no	roads	for	transportation	in	the	
hills.		The	only	road	was	the	principal	road	that	led	into	the	invasion	below.		Public	
latrines	were	built	in	the	surrounding	hills	or	designated	areas	within	communities.			
						 Needless	to	say,	much	needed	to	be	done	and	because	much	of	the	Nueva	
Rinconada	was	on	contested	land,	the	state	and	municipal	government	had	to	be	
careful	about	the	support	they	gave	to	the	communities	that	were	forming	for	fear	of	
a	legal	backlash.		Dirigentes	would	make	valiant	efforts	under	trying	circumstances	
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to	bring	people	together	to	organize	the	area,	despite	the	occasional	excesses	
committed	in	the	first	years.	
						 The	social	worker	of	Minas	2000	in	the	beginning,	and	present	General	
Secretary,	told	me	that	a	study	conducted	by	the	National	Institute	of	Nutrition	in	
2000‐2001	of	the	nutrition	of	the	children	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada	found	that	75%	
of	children	were	malnourished.		The	area	gained	a	lot	of	media	attention	for	the	
wretched	conditions	under	which	people	lived.		Locals	in	the	area	recalled	how	
PEBAL	under	Father	Escribá	sent	donations	of	food	to	the	malnourished	people	in	
the	area.		Many	complained	that	the	Jesuit	institution	stopped	giving	such	direct	
support	to	the	communities	here,	however,	as	conditions	changed,	the	efforts	of	the	
organization	turned	more	toward	projects	that	would	help	the	community	improve	
the	quality	of	life	in	the	area.		For	instance,	PEBAL	took	over	administration	of	the	
soup	kitchens,	offered	night	classes	and	vocational	training	for	adults,	encouraged	
environmental	projects	(environmentally	friendly	latrines,	water	capture	projects,	
tree	planting	on	slopes,	etc.),	cistern	truck	monitoring	to	ensure	that	water	was	
potable	for	human	consumption,	provided	training	and	educational	programs	for	
local	leaders,	generated	awareness	of	social	problems	like	violence	against	women	
and	children,	offered	medical	and	orthodontic	attention	at	modest	rates,	and	acted	
as	a	bridgehead	channelling	volunteers	and	donations	into	the	community.		It	would	
be	difficult	to	say	that	PEBAL	is	strictly	dedicated	to	creating	modern	consumers,	or	
self‐regulating	subjects.		Their	activities	are	both	practical	and	at	times	geared	
toward	creating	historically	conscious	leaders	who	are	informed	how	the	state	
operates	and	what	options	are	available	for	bringing	about	local	change.			
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						 And	if	scarce	state	support	and	public	health	issues	were	not	enough,	there	
was	the	constant	threat	of	being	evicted	by	the	landowners.		Diego	recalled	very	
clearly	how	those	in	Minas	2000	organized	night	watches.		Each	manzana	had	to	
designate	three	people	for	three	two‐hour	watches	that	began	at	midnight.		Even	
though	such	watches	were	mandatory,	some	paid	young	adults	to	do	their	watch	for	
them,	something	that	often	occurs	with	faenas.		Other	collaborators	told	me	how	
they	used	to	drink	on	night	watch	or	how	many	a	romance	started	on	these	nights.		
Many	things	happened	in	the	evenings.		Collaborators	often	told	me	stories	of	
encounters	they	had	with	spirits,	who	they	believed	were	real	people.		Others	told	
me	that	duendes	or	elves	came	in	the	evenings	and	played	with	children,	sometimes	
absconding	with	them	to	local	caves.		Still	others	told	me	how	jinetes	or	men	on	
horseback	wandered	the	area.		There	were	stories	of	the	Llorona,	a	virgin	in	white,	
who	was	spotted	frequently.		There	were	also	stories	of	the	Viuda	Negra,	a	woman	
garbed	in	a	black	dress,	who	brought	misfortune	to	those	with	whom	she	came	into	
contact,	particularly	men.		While	some	swore	that	they	had	paranormal	encounters,	
others	scoffed	at	such	tales.		I	will	write	more	of	the	paranormal	later.		
						 Aside	from	the	obvious	lack	of	infrastructure	in	the	area,	there	was	the	serious	
problem	of	overcrowding.		The	truth	of	the	matter	is	that	families	were	living	on	3m	
by	3m	plots	of	land	near	the	beginning.		Having	lots	this	small	is	not	legal.		The	
minimal	required	size	for	a	lot	at	the	time	was,	and	still	is	90m?.		Because	much	of	
the	planning	has	been	done	on	an	empirical	basis,	or	with	the	help	of	inexperienced	
or	careless	professionals	on	occasion,	minimal	legal	requirements	for	lot	plans	are	
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not	met	to	this	day.		As	one	can	imagine,	the	movement	necessary	so	that	a	crowded	
area	meets	spatial	requirements	means	that	some	people	have	to	be	relocated.	
						 Another	part	of	frontier	living	were	faenas,	or	community	work	projects.		
Chico	explained	that	for	the	first	two	years,	almost	every	Sunday,	Minas	2000	had	
faenas.		The	main	road	that	leads	into	the	community	was	built	by	people	bringing	in	
stone	by	hand.		On	a	typical	Sunday	morning	the	area	was	alive	with	household	
members	working:	people	chiselling	and	prying	at	the	rocky	hillside,	chains	of	
people	passing	rocks	along	to	be	deposited	in	piles,	people	raking	rocks	and	
separating	sand,	and	people	digging	latrines.		If	that	was	not	enough,	Sonja	and	
Diego	recalled	how	almost	every	day	people	were	convened	to	discuss	advances	and	
plans	for	the	community.		It	was	exhausting	and	stressful.		Most	people	in	the	Nueva	
Rinconada	work	six	days	a	week,	usually	working	a	half‐day	on	Saturday.		Whatever	
free	time	people	had	was	being	consumed	fixing	up	their	lot,	participating	in	faenas,	
and	participating	in	night	watches.		People	effectively	worked	seven	days	a	week	for	
the	first	two	years.		No	matter	how	hardy	a	person	one	was,	this	was	tough	going	
and	it	certainly	took	a	heavy	toll	on	these	pioneers.		
						 Oscar,	one	of	Chico’s	coordinators,	was	charged	with	investigating	the	legality	
of	the	invasion.		He	went	to	National	Assets	and	found	out	that	much	of	the	area	had	
clear	title.		Many	detractors	emerged	at	this	point,	people	with	experience	in	
invasions;	yet	he	persisted	saying	that	the	land	had	been	abandoned.		He	consulted	
many	lawyers.		Here	is	what	he	had	to	say	about	his	search	for	a	lawyer.	
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The	first	thing	I	did	was	to	begin	to	look	for	lawyers	that	would	advise	me.		
Unfortunately,	there	are	lawyers	and	there	are	lawyers.		There	are	lawyers	
who	like	to	live	[the	life]	and	others	that	like	to	say	the	truth.		Many	lawyers	
told	me	that,	no,	here,	the	only	way	out	was	a	commercial	transaction.		The	
only	thing	to	do	was	to	buy	and	sell.		But,	sometimes,	one,	because	of	
(unintelligible),	that	does	things,	seeing	the	desire	of,	if	people	do	not	have	
enough	money	to	eat,	to	buy,	[thinks]	that	there	must	be	a	solution.		So,	we	
looked	for	a	lawyer	and	sadly,	sometimes,	when	one	is	a	new	dirigente,	one	
likes	to	listen	to	the	siren.		“Yes,	one	can,	this	is	state	land.”	[referring	to	
lawyers	that	said	it	could	be	done].		So	we	started	working	there.	
			 (Oscar,	Interview	recorded	on	November	21,	2010)				
	
Oscar,	though,	recognizing	the	necessity	of	people	at	the	time,	felt	that	if	people	had	
no	money	to	eat,	then	they	surely	had	no	money	to	buy	the	property	they	were	
living	on.		The	claim	that	many	were	unable	to	buy	their	lots	in	the	area	was	the	
most	controversial	claim	in	the	past	and	continues	to	be.		Many	of	my	collaborators	
told	me	that	this	was	the	case	for	some;	however,	most	could	buy	their	lots	if	the	
payments	were	not	too	onerous.		The	problem	is	receiving	credit	and	having	
zonification	changes	in	place	so	that	banks	will	lend	money	to	people	to	build	
homes.			
						 Oscar	went	on	to	tell	how	they	went	on	to	hire	a	series	of	lawyers;	however,	he	
was	careful	not	to	mention	who	brought	the	lawyers,	who	the	lawyers	were,	or	why	
they	were	so	frequently	changed.		By	choosing	to	take	a	path	against	the	advice	of	
most	lawyers,	i.e.,	to	buy	the	land	from	the	landowners,	the	community	would	
expose	itself	to	all	types	of	hucksters	that	promised	the	solution	to	their	woes.		Time	
after	time,	the	same	would	occur,	not	only	with	lawyers,	but	with	surveyors,	
politicians,	engineers	and	other	advisors	to	the	communities	here.			
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						 To	complicate	matters	further,	some	dirigentes	will	bribe	professionals	or	act	
as	their	shills,	sometimes	unknowingly,	making	it	extremely	difficult	for	squatters	to	
know	who	or	what	to	believe.		That	said,	most	dirigentes	and	households	ask	around	
when	they	undertake	any	project	in	their	community,	so	it	is	always	possible	to	
discover	graft.		What	does	not	seem	to	disappear,	though,	is	a	general	air	of	
suspicion,	or	distrust.		What	seemed	like	a	chance	at	getting	ahead,	rent	free,	would	
turn	into	an	expense	in	ways	that	were	not	only	monetary.			
						 Oscar	did	know	that	if	they	were	to	have	any	chance	at	all	they	would	have	to	
try	to	form	an	asentamiento	humano	to	receive	state	support.		Politicians	told	
representatives	from	all	groupings	this	much.		From	the	beginning,	it	was	
recognized	that	if	there	was	to	be	a	solution,	it	would	be	a	political	solution.		As	
already	mentioned,	leaders	approached	Federico	Salas,	Prime	Minister	for	Mr.	
Fujimori’s	government	at	the	time	of	the	invasion,	who	promised	to	resolve	their	
problem	and	said	that	he	would	talk	to	the	President	about	the	matter.		Martha	
Moyano	was	programmed	on	a	Tuesday	to	visit	the	Nueva	Rinconada	on	the	same	
Sunday;	however	between	Tuesday	and	Sunday	the	first	vladivideo	—filmed	footage	
of	the	President	and	his	security	advisor	Vladimiro	Montesinos	bribing	media	
figures,	business	owners	and	executives	and	politicians—	was	leaked.		The	meeting	
never	occurred.		This	incident	would	presage	a	series	of	interventions	that	would	
bear	no	fruit,	despite	ostensible	intentions	to	find	a	solution	to	the	land	conflict.		I	
will	discuss	a	number	of	successful	and	unsuccessful	attempts	to	capture	political	
attention,	later.			
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						 To	be	an	asentamiento	humano,	it	was	crucial	to	get	roads	built	so	that	water	
trucks	could	bring	water	into	the	different	areas	of	the	hills	where	access	roads	
were	absent.		Although	Mr.	Ocampo	sent	machinery	to	help	build	roads,	he	did	not	
send	engineers,	according	to	local	collaborators.		Many	of	the	plans	that	were	
originally	drawn	up,	were	drawings	made	by	members	of	the	community	who	
claimed	that	they	knew	what	they	were	doing.			The	improvised	nature	of	much	of	
the	area	has	had	far	reaching	consequences,	as	we	will	discuss	later.		
						 It	was	also	imperative	to	begin	work	on	defining	public	infrastructure	like	
parks,	recreational	areas,	daycares,	meeting	halls	(which	often	served	for	welfare	
services	like	soup	kitchens),	and	to	begin	to	think	about	how	the	area	would	grow	to	
accommodate	people	that	would	have	to	be	purged	to	make	way	for	public	
infrastructure.		Due	to	the	improvised	nature	of	the	area,	there	are	innumerable	cul‐
de‐sacs,	narrow	passages,	roads	that	are	too	narrow	and	homes	built	in	places	that	
are	precarious.		Growth	of	the	communities	in	the	area	has	been	a	process	of	
constant	organization	and	reorganization.		
						 The	routine	and	initial	conditions	were	gruelling.		If	one	can	imagine	waking	
up	everyday	during	the	week	at	5	or	6	in	the	morning	to	go	to	work,	and	then	not	
getting	home	until	8	or	9	in	the	evening.		In	the	evening,	you	may	have	had	to	audit	
your	group,	attend	meetings	until	the	early	morning,	or	perform	guard	duty,	
depriving	you	of	needed	rest.		The	trip	to	work	is	often	made	in	cramped	buses	that	
can	take	as	long	as	two	hours	in	some	cases.		If	you	are	lucky,	you	work	locally.		It	is	
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no	wonder	that	people	in	Lima	always	seemed	so	fatigued	to	me	at	first,	or	that	I	
would	always	see	people	dozing	during	the	day.			
						 Let	us	imagine	the	basic	amenities,	in	the	beginning.		The	water	that	you	do	
have	is	not	fit	for	consumption,	unless	it	is	boiled,	and	the	little	water	that	you	do	
have	is	stored	in	plastic	containers	that	you	have	to	lug	up	the	hill	from	a	central	
distribution	point	below.		Many	collaborators	brought	water	from	a	family	home	in	
the	mini‐buses	and	medium‐sized	buses	that	entered	the	invasion.		If	you	were	not	
lucky	enough	to	be	present	when	water	was	being	distributed,	you	were	out	of	luck	
for	the	day.		Having	access	to	water	was	and	still	is	a	luxury.		Having	a	water	truck	
pass	by	one’s	shack,	at	present,	is	a	dream	compared	to	the	initial	conditions	when	
water	trucks	could	not	enter	the	hills.		Any	food	that	you	have	on	hand	is	lugged	up	a	
sandy	slope.		Nowadays,	at	least	there	are	stores	where	you	can	buy	basic	provisions	
on	the	days	that	you	cannot	make	it	to	a	larger	market.		If	you	need	to	use	the	
bathroom	you	have	to	walk	a	distance	and	often	share	it	with	others.		From	not	
eating	properly,	children	die	of	lung	infections.		Adults	and	children	who	were	
weakened	by	harsh	living	conditions	became	more	susceptible	to	tuberculosis.		
Conditions	were	tough,	and	still	are	to	some	degree.		This	was	not	like	living	in	a	
rural	area	with	a	water	source	nearby	or	a	constant	supply	of	fresh	food	from	fields	
and	livestock,	and	it	was	not	like	living	in	one’s	parent’s	home	below	where	people	
had	access	to	basic	amenities.		People	made	sacrfices	like	this	for	a	future,	to	have	a	
home	of	their	own.		It	no	wonder	that	progress	has	such	a	poignant	meaning	for	
some	people.		These	sacrifices	are	what	gives	the	term	its	saliency.			
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						 If	this	was	not	enough,	those	enforcing	the	statute	were	merciless	when	it	
came	to	infractions.		Diego	and	Sonja	told	me	how	if	you	had	three	faults	you	were	
removed	from	the	sector,	no	questions	asked.		At	night,	auditors	were	charged	with	
knocking	on	people’s	door	to	see	if	someone	was	sleeping	in	their	shelter.		If	you	did	
not	show	up	for	a	meeting,	or	did	not	participate	in	a	faena,	auditors	took	note.		The	
main	thing,	as	Rodriguez,	another	manzana	coordinator,	explained	was	that	
someone	had	to	be	present	in	one’s	lot	and	fulfil	the	duties	and	responsibilities	of	
the	household.		Failure	to	do	so	resulted	in	one	being	purged.		Obviously,	families	
had	a	certain	advantage	because	it	was	much	easier	for	someone	to	be	present	or	
represent	the	lot.		
						 Needless	to	say,	those	that	hung	on	had	a	strong	commitment	to	the	
community.		There	was	an	effort	to	eliminate	people	who	were	there	to	possess	lots	
that	could	easily	be	sold.		Just	imagine	how	one	with	a	family	having	to	endure	
disease	and	privation	felt	about	opportunists	who	felt	they	could	appear	once	in	a	
while	or	slip	away	once	in	a	while	to	sleep	in	a	place	with	amenities,	eat	in	a	
comfortable	place	or	enjoy	easy	access	to	transportation	and	bear	no	obligation	to	
participate	in	the	community.		On	paper,	land	trafficking	in	many	sectors	was	
grounds	for	being	purged.		In	practice,	as	we	will	see,	things	were	different.		
Measures	were	tough,	many	dirigentes	argued,	because	they	wanted	people	who	
lived	in	the	community	and	who	were	committed	to	building	a	community.		Others,	
particularly	those	who	were	not	dirigentes,	claimed	that	dirigentes	did	not	live	by	
the	rules	that	they	set	and	that	the	rules	often	served	as	a	pretext	to	relocate	people	
	 256
so	that	their	lots	could	be	sold.		The	lazy,	the	meek	and	the	weak‐at‐heart	quickly	
disappeared,	or	were	forced	to	less	accommodating	lots.	
						 The	suspicion	was	always	there	that	dirigentes	were	abusing	their	authority,	
but	people	did	not	speak	openly	about	such	things	for	fear	that	they	could	be	purged	
if	they	opposed	dirigentes.		Sonja	elaborates	more	on	this	sentiment:	
…there	were	auditors,	there	were	coordinators,	there	were	treasurers,	
everything,	but	there	was	also	a	great	theft	of	money,	as	all	dirigentes	have	that	
custom.		But,	sometimes,	not	all	dirigentes	are	the	same,	but	most,	they	say,	
yes.		But	me,	it	never	interested	me	whether	they	stole	or	not	because	I	said	
what	I	wanted	was	to	live	here.	Nothing	more.	Let	them	leave	me	alone	[I	said],	
and,	I	started	living	here.	
(Sonja,	Interview	recorded	on	November	14,	2010)	
	
While	most	felt	that	they	were	at	the	mercy	of	the	wiles	of	dirigentes,	necessity	
seemed	to	prevail.		I	suspect,	that	as	Sonja	stated,	most	just	wanted	to	be	left	in	
peace	and	have	a	place	to	live.						
						 In	the	beginning,	because	there	was	a	negative	element	in	the	community,	i.e.	
drug	users	and	drug	traffickers,	thieves,	gangsters,	etc.,	the	rules	were	tough.		
Otherwise	people	would	become	unruly,	many	of	the	original	dirigentes	explained.		
Discipline,	especially	with	the	threat	of	evictions	at	any	moment,	had	to	be	
maintained.		Another	concern	was	to	demonstrate	that	people	in	the	area	were	law‐
abiding	citizens	who	were	there	because	they	needed	a	home	for	their	family.		
External	aid	is	dependent	on	one’s	ability	to	convince	aid	organizations	that	a	
community	is	cohesive.		Evidence	to	the	contrary	could	be	harmful	for	the	desire	to	
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have	the	government	and	non‐government	organizations	intervene	in	the	area.		To	
some	extent,	cohesion	was	an	external	disciplinary	measure,	but	it	was	also		
attractive	for	leaders	who	wanted	to	ensure	that	the	momentum	of	the	initial	spirit	
of	the	invasion	was	maintained	due	to	the	amount	of	work	that	needed	to	be	done.		
As	many	would	say,	“En	la	unión	está	la	fuerza.”43				
						 Alcohol	was	even	banned	for	the	first	years	because	on	the	weekends	people	
were	getting	into	brawls	and	people	were	being	hurt.		Local	police	told	Chico	that	he	
had	to	establish	order	in	his	community,	otherwise	they	would	have	to	be	present	
more	in	the	area.		The	families	in	the	area	demanded	some	repression	of	what	he	
referred	to	as	“antisocial”	elements	in	the	community.			
						 Chico	told	me	that	he	and	other	men	in	the	community	waited	in	the	evenings	
for	those	who	smoked	drugs	to	light	up	in	the	hills,	then	followed	them	back	to	
where	they	lived.		Eventually,	through	careful	investigation	they	discovered	people	
in	the	community	that	were	dealing	drugs.		Chico	was	threatened	for	removing	
these	elements.		He	and	other	dirigentes	were	frequently	reported	to	the	local	police	
and	on	more	than	one	occasion	he	was	charged	and	had	to	hire	legal	counsel	to	
defend	himself.		People	did	not	go	easily.		Fortunately,	he	recalled,	nobody	knew	
where	he	worked,	or	where	he	lived,	and	nobody	ever	successfully	carried	through	
with	their	threats.			
						 After	the	first	year,	the	central	committee	began	to	draw	up	lots	and	decide	
where	more	permanent	roads	would	go.		The	preference	for	those	who	would	stay	
																																																								
43	In	unity	there	is	strength.	
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was	given	to	squatters	who	had	families	and	those	who	had	made	regular	
contributions	to	the	community.		Those	who	were	single,	conflictual,	or	those	who	
had	a	number	of	warnings	were	pushed	to	the	frontiers	of	Minas	2000,	being	forced	
to	occupy	rocky	hills,	requiring	more	work	to	clear	lots,	build	retaining	walls	and	
build	access	roads.		
	 	
Two	men	breaking	up	rock	that	has	been	pried	and	sledge‐hammered	out	of	the	hill.		Usually,	a	
retaining	wall	is	built	first,	then	rock	is	tumbled	out	from	beside	the	wall	to	form	the	base	of	a	road.		
Many	of	the	access	roads	have	been	built	in	this	fashion.		Men	often	do	the	heavier	work	like	that	
shown	above.		Excess	rock	is	being	broken	up	to	be	taken	away	in	dump	trucks.	Photo:	author	
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						 In	my	walks	through	the	Nueva	Rinconada,	I	got	to	know	people	in	quite	
divisive	communities.		The	explanation	given	to	me	for	one	case	by	a	municipal	
authority	with	much	experience	in	the	area	was	that	the	community	had	a	strong	
element	which	had	been	purged	from	other	communities.		In	many	other	cases,	
there	was	a	power	struggle	between	newer	squatters	—who	had	bought	lots	from	
people	who	had	grown	tired	of	the	sacrifices	demanded,	or	been	relocated	to	
expanding	zones	of	communities—	and	older	groups	of	squatters.		Practically	every	
asentamiento	humano	of	the	140	here	has	a	story	to	tell.			
	
Women	here	work	passing	stone	the	size	of	a	football	along	a	chain	to	a	collection	point	where	a	
tractor	will	load	the	rock	into	a	truck.		Women	place	smaller	stone	in	empty	rice	bags	to	carry	to	
different	points	where	fill	is	needed.		While	men	may	join	in	chains	like	those	shown,	they	tend	to	
prefer	heavier	tasks.		Areas	rich	in	stone	like	that	shown	above	give	stone	to	sandy	areas	so	that	they	
can	build	retaining	walls	or	put	stone	down	on	their	roads	so	that	vehicles	do	not	sink	into	sandy	and	
fine	sediment	that	becomes	muddy	in	rainy	months	of	the	year.	
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						 Diego	was	one	of	the	single	young	men	who	became	a	pioneer	of	an	offshoot	of	
Minas	2000	that	would	later	become	Gardenias.		Having	seen	maps	of	the	proposed	
growth	of	Minas,	he	knew	where	future	roads	would	go	and	also	the	important	fact	
that	this	was	state	land.		At	first,	he	recalled,	they	were	still	considered	a	manzana	of	
Minas	2000,	and	therefore	had	to	participate	in	faenas	for	Minas	2000.		Many	of	the	
youth	in	the	budding	community	became	disgruntled	because	they	noticed	that	
those	from	the	more	established	areas	of	Minas	2000	were	refusing	to	help	them	
open	a	connecting	road	that	would	eventually	wrap	around	to	connect	to	San	
Gabriel	(an	adjacent	sector	in	a	neighbouring	municipality).			
						 When	they	finally	made	the	decision	to	try	to	secede	from	Minas	2000,	
squatters	from	Minas	2000	came	to	evict	them.		Not	to	be	intimated	easily,	a	handful	
of	young	men	and	women	stood	ready	to	fight	with	a	numerically	superior	group	
from	Minas	2000.		When	the	confrontation	came	to	blows,	the	two	sides	stood	down	
not	wanting	anyone	to	be	severely	hurt	or	killed.	
						 This	scene	was	repeated	below	in	Quebrada	when	a	group	of	about	100	people	
invaded	lands	that	Minas	2000	had	set	aside	for	its	own	growth.		Diego	recalled	how	
a	large	group	of	roughly	500	descended	on	those	that	had	taken	possession	of	land	
earmarked	by	Minas	2000.		The	two	sides	clashed;	however	the	leaders	quickly	
called	off	the	dispute,	fearing	that	someone	would	be	killed	and	they	would	be	held	
responsible	for	the	death	of	one	of	the	invaders.		Elvira,	one	of	the	members	of	this	
original	group	in	Quebrada,	recalled	the	situation.			
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…when	Minas	2000	saw	a	few	people,	Minas	2000	came	wanting	to	boot	us	off	
the	land,	saying	that	they	were	founders	and	that	they	had	the	option	to	
occupy	the	land	and	that	we	didn’t.		And,	we	started	to	fight	amongst	us	for	the	
land,	until	the	courageous…and	we	fought	here.	We	fought.	They	got	a	hold	of	
us	with	sticks,	with	their	hands,	and,	like	that	the	boldest	(más	vivos)	started	to	
take	command	as	dirigentes,	to	manipulate	us,	the	novices	that	knew	nothing,	
and	they	sent	us	to	fight…	
(Elvira	(mid‐fifties),	Interview	recorded	on	November	25,	2010)	
	
Elvira	goes	on	to	relate	instances	where	her	group	had	to	confront	the	police	again	
in	yet	another	attempted	eviction	that	occurred	in	August	of	2001.		She	is	also	
making	reference	to	the	constant	depuraciones,	or	purges,	that	occurred	in	the	first	
years	of	the	area	where	people	were	often	removed	if	they	did	not,	or	could	not	be	
present	constantly.		She	was	a	social	worker	for	the	first	ten	years	of	the	Nueva	
Rinconada,	so	she	had	the	sensitivity	and	position	to	know	what	was	happening	to	
her	people.		Her	job	was	to	know	who	was	around	and	what	kind	of	social	problems	
existed	in	the	area.		She	listened	to	people	and	she	felt	their	pain.		Elvira,	from	my	
experience	with	her,	was	never	one	to	bow	down	before	anyone	and	openly	spoke	
her	mind.		She	embodied	the	sentiment	of	a	collaborator	who	when	speaking	of	the	
importance	of	being	frank	commented:	Más	vale	una	colorada	que	vivir	toda	la	vida	
amarilla	(A	redfaced	person	is	worth	more	than	living	life	yellow).		She	was	a	tough	
woman	who	held	her	own	against	whomever.	
						 According	to	the	local	police	major	and	collaborators	from	other	sectors	that	
were	offshoots	or	formed	by	people	occupying	lands	beyond	current	settlements,	
this	is	a	common	occurrence.		Many	communities	view	adjacent	lands	as	theirs	by	
right.		Such	land	may	be	sold	to	people	who	want	to	enter	the	group	to	cover	
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administrative	costs,	or	in	some	cases	for	suspected	personal	benefit	of	dirigentes,	
although	the	later	is	usually	stipulated	as	grounds	for	removal	from	the	community.		
						 Another	common	ground	for	staking	claim	to	adjacent	land	is	to	meet	state	
requirements	for	green	spaces	in	an	urban	space.		Just	how	rocky	hillsides	will	be	
considered	useful	green	space	remains	a	mystery,	but	from	what	I	could	surmise	it	
seemed	like	a	widespread	practice.		Reserving	land	this	way	has	the	additional	
advantage	of	limiting	the	size	of	the	community,	thus	reducing	the	necessity	to	
engage	in	community	work	projects	to	cut	roads	into	hillsides,	or	build	concrete	
stairs	for	an	ever‐expanding	sector.		There	is	a	practical	limit	to	the	sacrifices	that	
households	are	willing	to	make	for	others.			
					 In	talking	to	dirigentes	in	Pamplona	Alta,	I	came	across	similar	cases	where	
squatters	had	invaded	lands	marked	for	the	growth	of	certain	sectors,	lands	
destined	for	the	children	of	squatters.		A	certain	tension	emerges	between	those	
who	have	established	themselves	and	newcomers	who	seek	the	same	standard	of	
living:	access	to	basic	services,	roads,	sidewalks,	stairs,	multi‐storied	concrete	
homes,	to	name	a	few	of	the	common	features	most	sought	after.		One	person’s	
prosperity	is	often	perceived	to	jeopardize	the	advancement	of	another	person.		
This	dynamic	would	play	out	on	a	larger	scale	during	the	first	years	of	the	area.		
Minas 2000 and Nuevo Pamplona     
		
						 As	Minas	2000	grew,	so	too	did	another	group	in	the	lower	parts	of	the	Nueva	
Rinconada,	Peru	2000,	later	Nuevo	Pamplona.		It	quickly	became	clear	to	the	
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coordinators	of	the	different	manzanas	of	Minas	2000	that	groups	below,	groups	
that	they	argued	moved	in	after	their	bold	engagements	with	landowners	and	the	
police,	were	organizing	independently	without	so	much	as	a	concern	to	consult	
them.		Chico	remembered	that	they	found	out	that	the	group	below,	Peru	2000,	had	
called	elections,	excluding	different	groups	that	had	not	affiliated	with	them,	like	
Minas	2000.		In	a	general	assembly,	a	president	was	elected	to	represent	the	Nueva	
Rinconada,	to	represent	Minas	2000.			
						 Shortly	after	receiving	the	news,	Chico	and	the	24‐odd	coordinators	of	Minas	
2000	and	their	auditors	descended	to	talk	to	those	who	were	organizing	this	new	
group.		Peru	2000	proposed	that	Minas	2000	incorporate	with	this	group,	a	
proposal	that	was	refused	by	Chico	on	the	grounds	that	his	group	had	1600	
households	and	that	it	was	unfair	and	preposterous	to	suggest	that	his	group	have	
the	same	representation	as	groups	that	numbered	20	or	40	households.			
						 Chico	noticed	that	they	had	many	older	dirigentes	who	were	helping	to	
organize	younger	people.		One	man	said	that	everyone	had	to	buy	the	lots	because	
most	of	the	area	was	private	property.		Chico	and	his	coordinators	decided	that	they	
would	boycott	Peru	2000	and	formed	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		Chico	and	his	Vice	
General	Secretary,	Oscar,	began	to	note	that	Peru	2000	was	using	coercion	to	force	
smaller	groups	to	join	them.		Oscar	explained	that	in	March	of	2000	the	Frente	de	
Defensa	de	la	Nueva	Rinconada,	hereafter	the	Defense	Front,	or	Front,	which	at	one	
time	had	up	to	35	affiliated	asentamientos	humanos,	emerged	as	a	response	to	the	
abuses	of	Peru	2000.	
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						 That	Peru	2000	governed	with	a	tight	fist	is	evident	in	the	press	at	the	time.		In	
a	march	on	Congress	to	demand	state	intervention	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	from	the	
Fujimori	government,	the	interaction	between	protestors	and	a	journalist	for	the	
newspaper	República	is	telling	(Anonymous,	2000b:27).		One	of	the	protestors	
confessed	anonymously,	for	fear	of	repraisals,	that	they	were	obliged	to	participate	
in	the	protest	or	they	would	lose	their	land.		When	one	of	the	protestors	told	the	
journalist	that	Oscar	Mendelius	—one	of	the	public	notaries	for	the	Fujimori	
government—	had	done	the	paperwork	for	their	association	he	was	quickly	silenced	
by	others.		The	result	of	this	protest	was	a	meeting	with	representatives	of	COFOPRI,	
who,	according	to	landowners	interviewed	by	El	Comercio	(Anonymous,	2000d:a8),	
promptly	informed	them	that	the	land	legally	belonged	to	the	Association.		Despite	
this	unambiguous	information,	curiously,	the	legal	struggle	for	the	area	was	just	
beginning,	and	would	persist	for	years	to	come.		
						 It	should	be	mentioned	at	this	point	that	sanctions	are	frequently	levelled	
against	households	that	do	not	send	a	representative	to	public	protests.		The	fines	at	
the	time	I	did	my	research	could	reach	as	high	as	200	soles.		Most	people	with	a	
family	are	easily	able	to	send	someone.		Most	of	the	marches	have	women	and	
children,	which,	as	many	point	out,	has	been	an	appreciable	deterrent	to	violence	
and	a	strong	reason	for	leaders	to	ensure	that	they	have	permission	to	march.			
						 Many	collaborators	lamented	the	taming	of	marches.		In	the	past,	many	
recalled,	they	blocked	traffic	and	defied	police	orders.		This	made	for	a	powerful	
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point	in	their	opinion.		The	purpose	of	a	march,	according	to	many	collaborators,	is	a	
last	ditch	effort	to	gain	state	concessions	or	state	attention.			
						 This	fact	is	frequently	avoided	in	mainstream	press	coverage	of	protests.		The	
general	reaction	of	the	press	is	to	criticize	the	government	for	not	using	repressive	
measures	against	the	protests,	or	for	not	using	enough	dialogue,	depending	on	the	
political	position.		The	reality	in	Peru,	like	many	developing	countries	with	natural	
resources	and	a	majority	of	the	urban	population	living	in	less	than	dignified	
conditions,	is	that	protests	have	become	a	common	feature	of	daily	life.		
Negotiations	with	the	state	have	particular	histories	that	are	further	complicated	by	
political	parties	seeking	to	incite	problems	for	incumbent	governments.		From	the	
ground,	at	times	it	looks	like	political	parties	are	constantly	looking	for	ways	to	gain	
the	votes	of	the	general	populace,	even	if	this	means	using	people’s	necessities	to	get	
into	or	remain	in	power.					
						 Another	noteworthy	feature	of	protests	is	that	most	citizens	have	a	vague	idea	
why	they	are	marching	and	are	frequently	unsure	who	called	the	march.		Much	of	
the	organization	of	marches	comes	from	the	top	of	an	organizational	pyramid	that	is	
closed	to	all	but	the	most	senior	leaders	of	popular	organizations	and	political	
movements.		In	general,	incumbent	political	parties	rely	on	grassroots	dirigentes	to	
mobilize	the	masses	with	alliances	being	anything	but	predictable	and	transparent.		
The	nexus	between	political	parties	and	marches	is	often	blurry,	leading	many	to	
speculate	about	who	is	behind	the	frequent	marches.			
	 266
						 In	the	marches	above	and	in	the	context	of	invasions	that	took	place	in	Lima	
South	in	the	early	months	of	2000,	many	suspected	the	Fujimori	government	of	
organizing	the	marches	to	generate	a	pre‐election	spectacle	that	would	generate	
political	capital	for	the	incumbent	government	reluctant	to	relinquish	the	reigns	of	
power.		During	the	Toledo	government	(2001‐2006)	Toledistas	suspected	that	
Apristas	were	mobilizing	people	from	asentamientos	to	agitate	the	social	situation.			
Due	to	the	top	down	command	structure	of	popular	organizations,	one	is	always	
looking	for	someone	behind	the	masses.		However,	as	we	will	see,	this	does	not	
mean	that	people	do	not	have	valid	reasons	to	mobilize.		These	are	instances	where	
collective	needs/desires	tend	to	coincide	with	political	projects.																																	
						 What	is	evident	on	the	ground	is	that	many	sectors	decide	whether	they	will	
participate	in	the	marches,	with	some	refusing	if	they	do	not	see	the	point	of	the	
march,	or	they	do	not	see	that	police	permission	is	granted.		The	possibilities	to	
resist	the	injunction	to	mobilize	one’s	people	was	much	more	difficult	in	larger	
groupings	like	Nuevo	Pamplona	because	they	can	and	did	resort	to	strong	arm	
tactics	against	non‐compliant	groups.		In	hindsight,	many	collaborators,	after	not	
achieving	the	result	they	expected,	griped	about	being	used	by	politicians	to	push	
laws	through	congress,	because	marches	are	one	way	of	demonstrating	to	Congress	
that	an	issue	is	public	and	therefore	in	need	of	attention.	
						 When	it	comes	to	marches	and	protests,	dirigentes	of	different	persuasions	can	
agree	on	certain	issues,	mobilizing	their	people	for	a	collective	good.		That	said,	
many	can	refuse	to	participate	if	they	see	obvious	political	manipulations	from	
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above	to	mobilize	people	for	partisan	reasons.		Needless	to	say,	figuring	out	what	is	
occurring	in	any	march	or	protest	necessitates	an	insider	knowledge	of	those	
convoking	the	march	and	their	less	than	clear	relationships	with	Peru’s	political	
parties,	which	are	incessantly	vying	for	more	representation	in	municipal,	regional	
and	national	governments.		Let	us	return	to	the	explanation	for	how	the	Defense	
Front	emerged.							
						 A	defining	local	political	incident	occurred	around	March	of	2000.		In	Villa	La	
Paz,	one	of	the	asentamiento	humanos	in	the	lower	part	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada,	a	
high	school	friend	of	Oscar’s	approached	him	for	help.		She	explained	that	the	
coordinator	in	her	group	was	threatening	to	remove	her,	burning	her	shelter.		He	
also	learned	that	the	central	committee	of	Peru	2000	was	charging	quotas	of	3,	5	
and	up	to	10	soles	a	week.		Others	said	that	this	amount	was	less	however,	there	
was	a	general	consensus	that	excessive	quotas	were	being	charged	and	that	the	
money	was	not	being	put	to	effective	use.		People	saw	little	progress	in	their	
material	circumstances	for	the	money	that	they	were	paying	and	there	was	a	strong	
suspicion	that	dirigentes	were	embezzling	funds,	although	this	could	not	be	proven.		
Reports	of	a	mob	that	numbered	as	many	as	500,	others	said	200	to	300,	of	people	
in	balaclavas	that	went	around	at	night	burning	people’s	shelters	were	circulating,	
as	well.		That	this	was	a	common	practice	with	Nuevo	Pamplona	(formerly	Peru	
2000	as	one	will	recall)	is	reflected	in	their	assembly	minutes	where	reference	is	
made	to	the	use	of	balaclavas	and	medical	supplies	for	the	eviction	of	landholders,	
although	the	usual	numbers	were	probably	far	more	modest	and	organized	than	the	
incident	mentioned	here.			
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						 Chico,	Oscar,	and	the	other	coordinators	agreed	to	intervene	on	the	behalf	of	
those	who	were	being	bullied	by	the	central	committee	of	Peru	2000.		When	the	
mob	of	masked	vigilantes	appeared	to	burn	huts	in	the	friend’s	community,	word	
was	sent	to	Minas	2000.		Quickly,	each	coordinator	rallied	5	people	to	aid	those	
below.		Diego	stated	that	a	group	of	about	a	hundred	faced	a	numerically	superior	
group	of	200–300.		Oscar	stated	that	1000	confronted	a	numerically	inferior	group	
of	500.		The	conflict	apparently	ended	with	the	group	from	Minas	telling	Mr.	Flores,	
the	Secretary	General	of	Peru	2000,	to	stay	away	from	people	who	were	not	part	of	
his	association	and	to	stop	trying	to	force	those	that	were	not	part	of	the	association	
to	join.			
						 The	anecdote,	despite	the	discrepancy	in	details,	is	still	pivotal	in	shifting	
attitudes	toward	Perú	2000’s	draconian	tactics.		Oral	historian	Alessandro	Portelli	
argues	that	such	descrepencies	are	due	more	to	the	narrative	that	collaborators	
seek	to	establish	and	that	we	should	not	fixate	on	exact	dates	or	numbers	(Portelli	
1991).		In	this	case	collaborators	are	emphasizing	the	abuses	that	were	occurring	
under	Peru	2000	in	the	beginning	and	the	need	to	intervene.		The	incident	provided	
the	raison	d’être	for	the	formation	of	another	grouping	of	asentamientos	humanos	
that	would	form	the	basis	of	a	rivalry	that	would	endure	throughout	the	first	four	to	
five	years,	after	which	time,	we	will	see,	both	alliances	collapsed	due	to	a	general	
loss	of	credibility	of	the	dirigentes	of	these	larger	fronts	in	the	area.		To	some	degree,	
these	same	lines	exist,	with	charismatic	figures	of	Peru	2000	enjoying	a	preferential	
position	with	the	repeat	mayor	Mr.	Ocampo,	who	is	a	member	of	a	Fujimori	splinter	
group,	Cambio	Radical.			
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						 After	this	incident,	it	was	agreed	that	Oscar	would	continue	to	be	the	Vice	
General	Secretary	of	Minas	2000	under	Chico,	however	he	would	also	go	below	and	
to	other	asentamientos	humanos	to	form	a	buffer	alliance	against	the	expansionistic	
Peru	2000.		Oscar	would	eventually	be	elected	as	the	Secretary	General	of	the	
Defense	Front,	a	position	he	would	maintain	until	2004.		Oscar	recalled	that	he	had	
the	support	of	a	number	of	excellent	dirigentes	during	the	years	he	led	the	front,	
some	of	whom	would	go	on	to	careers	in	labour	unions	or	national	politics.			
						 It	is	worth	remarking	here	that	municipal	politics	often	is	a	springboard	to	a	
career	in	politics.		This,	in	part,	explains	the	contradictory	nature	of	many	dirigentes	
who	claim	their	interest	as	vocation	and	at	the	same	time	aspire	to	something	more,	
sometimes	losing	sight	of	their	social	obligations	to	their	community.			
						 It	is	likely	that	many	begin	innocently	enough,	but	over	time,	when	they	see	
new	possibilities,	start	to	wander	from	a	path	that	may	at	one	time	have	been	a	
calling	rooted	in	the	betterment	of	a	particular	community.		As	the	old	adage	goes:		
knowledge	is	power.		We	need	not	view	such	ambitions	so	negatively.		After	learning	
about	how	community	politics	works,	many	no	doubt	feel	that	they	can	represent	
the	demands	of	other	communities	on	a	broader	level.		Negative	talk	about	leaders	
who	have	greater	ambitions	might	be	yet	another	example	of	envy.			
						 When	I	tried	to	press	many	dirigentes	for	reasons	people	become	corrupt,	
many	responded	that	things	are	that	way	here.			No	matter	how	innocent	one	is,	the	
political	culture	here	leads	one	to	adopt	immoral	practices	like	influence	trafficking,	
bribing,	embezzlement,	raqueteering,	etc.		I	began	to	wonder	if	all	democratic	
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governments	function	in	this	way	and	if	the	insight	I	had	here	was	due	to	both	the	
privilege	that	being	a	white	man	in	Peru	afforded	me	and	the	relative	impunity	for	
acts	of	corruption	in	Peru	which	allow	these	acts	to	become	more	flagrant.	
							 Regardless	of	personal	ambitions	and	the	abuses	of	some	of	his	coordinators,	
much	progress	was	made	during	the	existence	of	the	Defense	Front.		Like	the	
organization	of	Minas	2000,	the	sectors	that	would	become	part	of	the	Front	were	
represented	in	a	central	committee.		If	there	were	excesses,	something	that	Oscar	
does	not	deny,	it	was	out	of	his	hands.		If	people	were	evicted,	auditors,	
coordinators,	and	others	were	present,	and	everything	was	done	publicly	according	
to	the	internal	rules	of	each	sector.			
Similar	to	Minas	2000,	the	sectors	in	the	Front	controlled	the	hours	that	
people	could	drink	in	an	attempt	to	discipline	the	population.		People	were	evicted	if	
they	were	active	delinquents,	if	they	refused	to	pay	fees	(I	will	discuss	what	these	
fees	entailed	briefly),	if	they	were	of	“doubtful	origin,”	if	they	did	not	live	in	their	
shacks,	or	if	they	refused	to	participate	in	faenas.		Oscar	told	me	that	if	one	missed	
three	faenas	—every	Sunday	in	the	beginning—	they	were	removed.			
While	measures	sound	drastic,	many	of	my	collaborators	told	me	how	they	
were	purged	numerous	times.		Others	told	me	that	this	often	occurred	because	
dirigentes	were	trafficking	their	lots,	although	it	seemed	to	me	that	in	many	cases	
they	were	making	room	in	what	were,	at	first,	crowded	conditions.		If	I	asked	
dirigentes	what	happened,	they	would	tell	me	that	they	acted	according	to	the	rules	
of	their	sector	and	that	the	money	they	charged	for	newcomers	was	used	to	cover	
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expenses	that	households	were	not	willing	to	cover,	like	paying	architects	for	plans.		
To	complicate	matters	further,	around	40–50%	by	local	estimates	—higher	in	
sectors	that	are	in	less	accessible	areas—	of	the	population	has	sold	off	lots.		It	is	not	
hard	to	recognize	incredibly	complex	patterns	of	movement	within	the	area.		This	
makes	it	hard	to	really	pin	down	who	is	a	trafficker	and	who	is	not.		Many	sectors	
tried	to	remove	people	who	were	not	living	in	their	homes	because	there	are	people	
who	supplement	their	income	renovating	lots	to	sell,	moving	around	constantly.		As	
one	can	imagine,	many	were	suspects	from	the	beginning.		
The	preference	in	many	sectors	was	for	people	from	the	provinces	of	Peru.		
People	from	the	provinces	are	often	viewed	as	possessing	more	integrity	and	being	
willing	to	make	the	sacrifices	necessary	in	settlements	that	are	built	with	the	labour	
and	financial	contributions	of	households.		The	difference	with	many	of	the	people	
from	the	provinces,	from	what	I	could	glean,	was	that	they	had	lived	in	worse	
conditions	and	were	prepared	to	work	all	day,	every	day,	to	see	an	improvement	in	
their	situation.		Rural	living	is	not	like	urban	living	where	one	expects	breaks,	
holidays,	and	adjusts	their	rhythm	to	that	of	the	urban	labour	market.		People	who	
come	from	a	rural	background	are	perceived	as	being	willing	to	cooperate	and	
knowing	how	to	work	—values	which	seem	Andean	in	character.			
City	dwellers,	as	many	collaborators	who	are	dirigentes	would	complain,	are	
conformists;	they	do	not	want	to	do	anything,	they	expect	everything	to	come	to	
them,	and	they	expect	it	to	be	free.		This	attitude	often	came	from	urbanized	2nd	or	
3rd	generation	migrants,	suggesting	that	social	progress	is	conceived	as	a	cross‐
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generational	project.		Years	of	populist	practices	have	had	a	clearly	negative	impact	
on	communities,	but	I	suspect	that	the	individualism	and	a	sense	of	entitlement	that	
are	so	strongly	promoted	in	contemporary	cities	are	just	as	responsible	for	the	
unwillingness	of	many	to	work	with	others	for	the	betterment	of	their	community.		
From	the	perspective	of	those	who	live	in	a	sector	with	their	family,	making	
sacrifices	to	see	that	things	improve,	the	last	thing	one	wants	is	to	have	people	who	
show	up	to	make	money	from	selling	a	lot,	or	who	complain	about	having	to	do	
things	that	are	for	the	benefit	of	all.		It	is	downright	maddening	and	frustrating	for	
many	to	have	selfish	people	like	this	in	a	community.		The	injunction	is	to	work	
together.		Due	to	the	circumstances	of	the	invasion,	working	as	a	community	could	
be	just	as	much	the	continuity	of	a	self‐help	ethic	as	it	could	be	an	Andean	ethic.		The	
two	likely	converge.														
Fortunately,	up	until	2003–2004,	there	was	cohesive	leadership	and	the	desire	
to	work	together	to	improve	conditions	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	and	make	ground	
on	the	legal	problems	the	squatters	faced.		Oscar	remembered	how	people	from	
below	helped	to	build	the	road	that	now	connects	the	lower	part	to	sectors	in	the	
farthest	corner	of	the	area.					
He	told	me	how	at	one	time,	prior	to	what	seems	like	a	general	loss	in	interest	
in	the	Fronts	in	2004–2005,	there	was	a	general	plan	of	how	to	proceed	with	
resolving	the	problems	in	the	area,	a	roadmap	of	sorts,	which	disappeared	after	
2003.		After	that,	he	noted,	there	was	a	“lack	of	leadership,”	and	a	“lack	of	
commitment”.		From	what	I	could	piece	together,	the	results	of	a	study	done	by	
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COFOPRI	in	2002‐2003,	a	legal	finding	in	favour	of	the	landowners	in	2003,	land	
trafficking,	very	public	cases	of	embezzlement	in	Nuevo	Pamplona,	abuses	of	
authority,	exhaustion,	successes	in	changing	legislation	and	political	cynicism	all	
worked	to	undermine	the	unity	that	existed	at	the	beginning.		Oscar	lamented	that	
nowadays	dirigentes	“do	not	want	to	commit”	and	that	“everyone	wants	to	do	things	
their	way.”		He	went	on	to	tell	me	that	he	“underestimated	the	bureaucratic	
obstacles,	personal	appetites,	and	that	political	appetites	would	be	so	small‐minded	
(mezquino)	as	to	leave	people	in	a	state	of	abandonment.”		For	now,	I	will	say	that	
Oscar’s	views	are	typical.		There	is	a	sense	of	frustration	among	local	leaders	when	it	
comes	to	working	together.			
Oscar	claimed	that	the	Front	sent	their	papers	to	COFOPRI	when	the	study	was	
done	to	reconcile	with	the	landowners.		The	problem	for	them	was	that	the	
landowners	had	revalued	their	property	following	the	presence	of	people	in	the	
area.		Most	squatters	felt	this	was	unfair	and	that	landowners	sought	to	benefit	from	
their	misery.		For	landowners,	the	squatters	had	received	their	just	druthers	for	the	
suffering	they	had	caused	them.		The	issue	was	complicated	further	by	the	fact	that	
some	had	larger	families,	or	were	single	mothers,	who	could	not	pay.		Many	had	the	
false	expectation	that	the	land	would	not	cost	anything,	a	view	that	is	not	difficult	to	
imagine	given	the	fact	that	land	has	since	the	1940s	in	Lima	been	given	away	
“freely”	to	squatters.		People	were	left	disillusioned.		Some	groups	did	manage	to	
reconcile	with	the	landowners	though.		Others	resisted	for	reasons	that	one	can	only	
speculate	about.			
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Locals	suspect	that	many	professionals,	politicians	and	community	leaders	
make	a	living	off	the	continued	problems	of	people	in	harrowing	living	conditions.		
One	cannot	also	help	but	notice	that	landowners	too,	who	are	legally	entitled	to	
receive	current	market	values	for	their	properties,	stand	to	gain	from	any	delays.		
Speculations	about	who	gains	and	why	are	abundant,	needless	to	say.			
At	this	point	I	would	like	to	bring	to	bear	the	testimony	of	a	couple	that	lived	in	
one	of	the	sectors	in	the	front.		This	is	the	case	of	only	one	sector,	but	it	gives	a	sense	
of	what	happened	in	even	the	Front.		One	will	notice	that	the	impression	of	people	
here	is	not	so	different	from	Minas	2000	and	that	it	only	differs	in	degree	from	the	
excesses	that	were	being	committed	by	Peru	2000/Nuevo	Pamplona.	
Collaborators	from	Quebrada	2000,	one	of	the	sectors	that	would	opt	to	
become	part	of	the	Defense	Front,	described	their	very	particular	experience	of	
being	in	a	sector	which	belonged	to	the	Front.		Johnny	and	Maria	are	a	couple	in	
their	mid‐thirties	with	three	children	who	came	and	planted	their	flag	one	day		
“because	they	are	Peruvians	and	they	needed	a	place	to	live.”		Johnny	makes	
minimum	wage	as	a	labourer	for	a	jeweller,	while	his	wife	is	a	recycler.		This	is	how	
they	describe	their	experience	with	dirigentes:	
											J:	There	are	also	a	lot	of	people	that	take	avantage	of	the	situation…	
										M:	They	take	a	lot	of	money	from	the	people.	
J:	They	take	advantage	of	the	situation,	they	take	advantage	of	those															
people.	They	know	how	to	organize	something	more	or	less,	get	groups	
together	and	they	have	a	bit	of	leadership.	Those	people	take	advantage	
of	the	situation	a	little	more.	They	organize	themselves,	and	on	account	
of	that	they	work	also.	They	make	the	asentamiento	advance	through	
solidarity	(asociación).	
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											(Johnny	and	María,	Interview	recorded	on	May	30,	2010)	
	
One	should	not	be	too	hasty	to	categorize	dirigentes	as	being	completely	
corrupt.		Even	those	who	did	engage	in	dubious	practices	managed	to	bring	some	
material,	social	and	political	benefit	to	their	community,	as	Johnny	surmises.		This	
excerpt	really	hits	home	on	a	particular	truth	about	grassroots	leadership	in	Lima:	
those	who	possess	know‐how	take	advantage	of	their	knowledge	to	organize	people	
for	multiple	ends.		Taking	people’s	money	and	leaving,	trafficking	land,	pretending	
to	have	lawyers,	etc.,	are	considered	acts	of	viveza.		This	does	not	stop	them	from	
happening	though.		Most	leaders,	however,	do	the	best	they	can	given	their	
circumstances.		Notions	of	corruption	seem	overstated,	and,	as	I	already	stated,	
more	likely	part	of	a	generalized	emotional	economy	that	has	taken	root	in	
conditions	of	uneven	development.			
Using	privileged	knowledge	for	personal	gain,	and	the	magnification	of	its	
pervasiveness,	is	common	throughout	Lima.		Collaborators	who	migrated	from	the	
provinces	of	Peru	often	use	a	metaphor	of	contagion	to	describe	how	one	becomes	
infected	with	Creole	behavioural	patterns.		My	hunch	is	that	this	behavioural	
contrast	is	a	commentary	on	the	shift	to	a	possessive	and	socially	mobile	individual	
with	its	attendant	socially	reprehensible	behaviours	–envy,	egoism,	dishonesty,	etc.		
Its	naming	certainly	has	very	interesting	implications.		It	is	as	if	a	part	of	people,	
what	I	have	linked	to	Gramsci’s	theoretical	understanding,	is	rejecting	practices	to	
put	one	ahead	of	others	to	gain	some	relative	degree	of	progress	at	the	expense	of	
others	however,	it	is	not	finding	an	outlet	in	the	community	to	become	normative.		
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The	personalism	—modelled	on	the	behaviour	of	Peru’s	larger	political	parties	
according	to	my	collaborators—	noted	by	dirigentes	to	be	the	impediment	to	
collaborative	action	is	what	prevents	this	collective	will	from	becoming	a	reality.		
When	collaborators	talk	of	their	acceptance	of	this	behaviour	just	as	long	as	they	are	
being	left	alone,	they	seem	to	be	resigning	themselves	to	an	inescapable	reality.		
There	is	nevertheless	a	rejection	(look	again	at	what	Sonja	and	Johnny	and	Maria	
had	to	say).					
Despite	being	a	normalized	practice,	it	receives	widespread	condemnation	and	
repudiation.		Governments	throughout	the	past	thirty	years	or	so	and	popular	
insurrections	like	that	of	Sendero	Luminoso	and	MRTA	have	been	fueled	by	a	sense	
of	indignation	that	arises	from	the	impotence	people	feel	in	almost	everyday	
interactions.		I	will	have	more	to	say	on	this	matter	later.	
Johnny	and	María	continued	to	tell	me	about	their	experience.		I	paraphrase	
here,	their	words	becoming	my	words.		They	explained	that	once	everything	had	
been	organized	these	dirigentes	then	began	to	ask	for	money	for	various	things.		
They	told	them	that	they	had	to	fight,	but	they	did	not	fight.		They	asked	for	money	
for	lawyers,	and,	as	it	turned	out,	they	did	not	have	lawyers.		They	took	advantage	of	
people,	grabbing,	3,	4	lots,	then	they	sold	these	lots.		Apparently,	they	had	given	
money	for	lawyers,	plans,	and	other	administrative	processes,	only	to	find	out	no	
progress	had	been	made.		“Wherever	one	is,	there	are	land	traffickers,”	explained	
Johnny.		It	is	hard	not	to	hear	the	frustration	in	people’s	voices	and	the	
diappointment	in	their	eyes	in	moments	like	this.		But	the	only	option	people	like	
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Johnny	and	María	have	is	—like	the	refrain	in	superficial	talk	shows,	media	
spectacles	and	bourgeois	charity	drives	implores:	seguir	adelante	or	to	continue	
forward.		It	is	hard	not	to	become	cynical	in	such	circumstances.			
Similar	to	testimonies	in	Minas	2000,	Johnny	and	María	and	others	in	their	
sector	told	me	how	evictions	were	quite	common	at	first.		One	really	had	to	make	
sacrifices	if	they	wanted	to	hold	on	to	their	lots.		The	two	tell	me	that	the	majority	of	
people	in	their	sector,	including	the	Secretary	General,	have	sold	their	lots.		Not	
many	of	the	original	founders	are	left.		Faced	with	having	to	purchase	their	lots	or	
face	eviction	by	the	adjacent	association,	Johnny	regrets	not	having	sold	his	lot	
earlier.		At	least	this	way	he	would	have	received	some	money	for	his	efforts	here.		
Now,	he	has	to	pay	the	association.	
As	I	did	in	the	case	of	Minas	2000,	in	the	case	of	Quebrada,	I	went	to	the	ex‐
association	president,	Herman,	to	ask	what	had	happened	with	Quebrada	2000.		He	
explained	that	Quebrada	and	another	sector	that	joined	with	the	Defense	Front	in	
the	beginning	had	agreed	with	his	sector	to	buy	the	land	from	the	Association.			
When	I	asked	him	why	they	chose	this	route,	he	told	me	that	in	his	experience	as	a	
dirigente	before	he	had	contact	with	a	lawyer	in	the	Barrantes	government	in	the	
mid‐80s	in	Lima.		When	he	found	out	that	his	workers	had	invaded	in	the	Nueva	
Rinconada,	he	decided	to	accompany	them	and	try	to	help	people	out,	recognizing	
that	there	were	many	hucksters,	charlatans	and	political	dirigentes	that	had	moved	
into	the	area.		As	a	general	contractor,	he	had	intimate	knowledge	about	how	a	city	
is	built	and	what	type	of	logistical	and	administrative	tasks	are	involved,	which	he	
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felt	he	could	share	with	his	workers	and	their	families.		His	friend,	a	lawyer,	gave	
him	unambiguous	advice.		Due	to	the	constitutional	changes	of	1993	during	the	
Fujimori	government,	state	expropriation	of	land	for	social	interests	was	no	longer	a	
reality.		The	reality	was	that	the	newly	defined	public	interest	that	the	state	
defended	gave	equal	consideration	to	property	owners	and	their	rights	as	it	did	to	
people	who	decided	to	squat	on	their	lands.		His	friend	advised	him	to	save	his	
money	and	buy	the	land	immediately.44	
What	I	discovered	is	that	Quebrada	and	Nueva	Esperanza	reneged	on	their	end	
of	the	bargain,	choosing	to	go	the	route	of	state	reversion	of	private	property	based	
on	the	abandonment	argument	being	proposed	by	a	number	of	lawyers.		Herman	
explained	that	these	lawyers	probably	miscalculated	their	case	because	they	were	
unable	to	find	the	original	plans	of	1973	in	National	Assets.		Landowners	alleged	
that	the	document	had	been	stolen	with	the	intent	of	destroying	the	only	evidence	
that	the	land	had	clear	title.		This	hypothesis,	however,	does	not	coincide	with	what	
Oscar	and	others	discovered	in	their	investigations	and	the	advice	that	many	voices	
seemed	to	be	proclaiming	from	the	beginning,	including	Herman	himself,	that	
people	had	no	option	but	to	buy	the	property	because	it	had	clear	title.			
Herman	told	me	that	Oscar	had	sent	people	to	invade	the	lands	that	his	
association	had	purchased	from	the	Association.		He	also	recounted	the	story	of	how	
Mr.	Flores	and	a	group	of	masked	men	had	shown	up	in	his	sector	to	threaten	him	in	
																																																								
44	This	legal	advice	seems	peculiar	given	the	changes	that	Fujimori	made	to	legislation	before	his	
2000	election	campaign.		However,	there	may	be	a	recognition	of	Herman’s	lawyer	that	neoliberalism	
would	never	put	special	interests	or	community	interests	above	private	property	and	large	
investment	interests.	
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the	beginning.		The	assembly	minutes	of	Nuevo	Pamplona	verify	that	Herman	was	
considered	an	enemy	of	the	invasion	and	believed	to	be	in	cahoots	with	the	
landowners.		Time	has	redeemed	Herman	though,	revealing	that	his	intentions	were	
in	line	with	the	laws	that	govern	the	country,	at	least.		Whatever	lots	he	may	possess	
in	his	sector	have	been	bought	and	his	current	activities	in	the	construction	of	a	
market	are	transparent.		While	some	talkers	in	his	sector	complain	about	faenas,	
which	is	a	feature	in	all	sectors,	the	efficiency	and	solidarity	of	his	sector	is	
materially	manifest	and	sets	this	sector	apart	from	all	others	in	the	Nueva	
Rinconada.		Due	to	their	decision	to	buy	their	property	from	the	landowners,	they	
have	qualified	for	state	support	in	infrastructure	and	social	programs.			
Transparent	leadership	and	tangible	results	for	the	money	that	people	have	
contributed	has	led	to	a	degree	of	trust	in	the	association,	something	not	seen	in	
other	sectors	where	different	groups	compete	for	control	of	sectors.		For	this	reason,	
Herman	has	gained	both	the	respect	and	the	hatred	of	the	leadership	in	the	area.		
Many	of	my	collaborators	commended	his	realism.		A	few	others	were	very	critical	
of	him,	but	mostly,	as	I	came	to	realize,	because	he	was	aware	of	their	excesses	and	
misdeeds	in	the	area.		A	number	of	people	with	whom	I	spoke	told	me	that	Hermann	
had	evicted	people	who	could	not	pay	the	fees	that	the	association	was	asking.		The	
aim	here	in	defaming	Herman	was	to	generate	confusion	about	the	veracity	of	his	
statements,	statements	which	undermined	the	credibility	of	many	of	my	
collaborators	and	which	he	could	substantiate	with	documentation,	a	reputation	
which	spoke	for	itself	and	actions.		
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At	this	point,	I	turn	to	the	general	history	of	Perú	2000,	or	at	least,	as	in	
previous	cases,	what	I	could	manage	to	piece	together.		While	I	managed	to	
interview	many	people	for	the	history	of	this	sector,	there	were	gaps	in	what	people	
remember	and	a	marked	diversity	in	how	they	recalled	certain	events.		I	will	
attempt,	therefore,	to	bring	in	other	voices	to	give	another	perspective	on	these	
events.			
Perú 2000  
	
The	best	place	to	start	with	Perú	2000	is	probably	with	the	first	president’s	
version.		Mr.	Flores,	due	to	the	negative	impression	that	many	of	the	people	had	
generated	about	him	in	the	area,	was	keen	to	set	the	record	straight.		Mr.	Flores	
recalled	how	he	and	his	brother	were	watching	the	news	and	they	saw	a	television	
report	in	the	evening,	around	7,	on	channel	2,	that	showed	footage	of	people	
invading	in	the	Rinconada.		He	saw	this	was	on	3rd	of	January.		He	and	his	wife	and	
two	children	were	living	in	their	mother’s	home	in	Pamplona.		His	brother,	who	I	
assume	was	close	in	age,	was	also	living	with	his	mother.		The	images	of	the	
television	and	the	desire	to	get	out	of	their	parent’s	home	and	have	a	home	of	their	
own	spurred	the	two	brothers	into	action.		The	two	quickly	came	to	an	agreement	to	
go	and	invade.	
From	what	collaborators	from	Minas	2000	had	to	say,	the	report	of	people	
invading	would	have	occurred	early	on	the	6th	of	January,	and	not	the	third.		When	I	
mentioned	to	other	collaborators	that	Mr.	Flores	had	claimed	that	he	arrived	on	the	
third,	many	of	the	other	collaborators	laughed	and	said	that	he	was	confused.		His	
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group,	they	claimed,	appeared	after	others	had	fought	against	the	police.		They	were	
mere	marcadores	who	showed	up	after	the	hard	work	had	been	done.		Returning	to	
Portelli’s	notion	of	narrative	intentionality,	Mr.	Flores,	in	arguing	for	his	presence	in	
the	beginning,	may	have	been	trying	to	say	that	he	always	stood	with	people	in	the	
Nueva	Rinconada.		While	Mr.	Flores	may	not	have	been	present	in	the	intial	group	
that	fought	with	the	landowners,	his	presence	was	instrumental	in	Peru	2000	from	
the	beginning.	
Mr.	Flores	recalled	that	he	and	others	leading	people	at	the	time	started	to	
make	a	list	of	people	in	front	of	the	soccer	pitch	in	the	sector	Nazareno	in	Pamplona	
from	where	other	collaborators	told	me	that	the	invasion	was	staged.		This	space	
would	accommodate	10	lots	at	present	of	the	standard	90m?.		There	were,	
according	to	his	calculations,	240	people	in	their	u‐shaped	reed	huts.		Photographs	
from	the	local	press	show	that	these	shelters	were	covered	with	tarp	in	some	cases;	
however	in	the	summer	months	of	January	and	February	this	measure	would	not	
have	been	necessary.		It	would	be	necessary	in	the	following	months	though.			
On	the	following	day,	when	they	managed	to	get	people	organized,	Mr.	Flores	
was	elected	the	coordinator	of	his	sector.		After	he	was	elected,	he	and	the	other	
coordinators,	either	that	day	or	the	next,	called	a	secret	meeting	in	the	parking	lot	
for	the	P1,	a	local	bus	line	in	Pamplona.		The	meeting	was	secret	because	they	did	
not	want	any	problems	with	the	landowners.		An	election	committee	was	formed	by	
a	man	who	had	entered	the	invasion	with	“political	intentions”	from	below.		
Someone,	he	could	not	recall	who,	nominated	him	as	one	of	the	candidates	for	the	
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Secretary	General	of	the	association	that	they	were	planning	on	forming.		He	had	
been	a	dirigente	in	a	particular	club,	winning	the	debating	competition	four	times.		
On	account	of	his	oratory	skills,	he	was	elected	to	lead	the	newly	formed	group	and	
was	willing	to	learn	as	he	went,	recognizing	that	he	was	a	neophyte	when	it	came	to	
organizing	invasions.		In	the	same	meeting,	the	rest	of	the	representatives	were	
elected.	
At	this	point,	the	group	was	not	so	large,	mainly	incorporating	groups	around	
the	soccer	pitch	of	Nazareno.		When	the	group	numbered	around	1800,	he	and	his	
dirigentes	agreed	that	they	would	collect	1	sol	to	begin	the	paperwork	process.		He	
asked	for	this	amount	because	he	did	not	know	very	much	about	the	paperwork	and	
the	costs	that	they	would	incur.		Shortly,	he	realized	that	he	would	have	to	go	to	the	
local	police	station	to	ask	for	support.		He	said	the	following	about	this	relationship:	
“I	met	some	police,	it	is	not	possible	to	say	their	names,	because	I	always	
contributed	some	money	to	them	so	that	they	supported	us	with	any	problem.”	
(Interview	with	Mr.	Flores,	recorded	on	December	1,	2010)		
Eventually,	to	register	people	with	Perú	2000	they	charged	2	soles	for	each	
person	of	a	population	that	reached	about	3,800.		Doing	the	math,	Mr.	Alaya	figured	
that	his	administration	had	only	managed	to	collect	12,000	soles.		Here,	there	are	
glaring	discrepancies	in	the	general	narrative	of	the	zone.		Many	collaborators	told	
me	that	the	group	was	charging	5,	10	soles	from	the	beginning	to	register	and	that	
payments	were	frequent.		I	would	like	to	draw	my	reader’s	attention	to	how	this	
group	nominated	itself	the	central	committee	of	the	zone.		After	listening	to	the	
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history	of	other	sectors,	it	becomes	clear	that	no	one	sector,	or	groups	of	sectors,	
should	have	had	the	right	to	declare	itself	the	central	grouping.		Many	of	my	
collaborators	maintained	that	Perú	2000	had	ambitions	to	control	the	whole	zone	
from	the	beginning.		The	interview	with	Mr.	Flores	is	clear	that	the	group	projected	
itself	from	the	beginning	as	the	representative	body	of	zone	“A”	of	the	invasion.		
From	the	histories	of	both	Minas	2000	and	the	Defense	Front,	we	can	see	a	
generalized	resistance	to	the	pretensions	of	Perú	2000.			
The	Constitution	for	the	group	was	written	up	by	the	Public	Notary	Medelius	
—the	notary	of	the	Fujimori	government	as	the	reader	will	recall—	on	February	9,	
2000	and	the	final	document	was	emitted	on	February	14.		The	name	on	the	
Constitution	was	“The	Central	Association	of	Settlers	Peru	2000”.		The	consensus	
among	many	of	the	people	that	I	interviewed	from	this	grouping	was	that	the	
decision	to	appeal	to	the	Fujimori	government	in	choosing	this	name	and	in	sending	
people	to	Fujimori	rallies	was	to	receive	the	support	of	his	government.		Gestures	
like	this	are	commonplace	because	squatters	have	recognized	that	if	they	want	
government	support	they	have	to	play	along.		Key	figures	from	Perú	2000,	like	Mr.	
Flores,	continue	to	maintain	loyalties	to	Mr.	Ocampo	at	present.			
Those	who	are	not	part	of	this	group	are	quick	to	point	out	the	relationship	
between	the	past	and	incumbent	mayor	and	dirigentes	from	this	front.		The	
municipality,	it	was	pointed	out	to	me,	has	been	in	the	hands	of	the	same	group	of	
people	since	Mr.	Ocampo	entered	with	Fujimori.		The	string	of	recent	mayors	
between	his	administration	in	1999	to	the	present	have	been	ex‐functionaries	in	his	
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municipality,	or	those	of	his	predecessors.			The	same	political	group,	openly	
accused	of	acts	of	corruption,	keeps	a	hold	on	the	municipality	due	to	the	
fragmentation	of	local	elections.		Populist	tactics	involve	keeping	a	stable	core	of	
dirigentes	and	their	clients	in	place.			
Public	infrastructure	projects,	which	always	bear	the	name	or	mark	of	the	
incumbent	mayor	(blue	and	yellow),	are	given	as	evidence	that	recent	governments	
are	more	effective.		Inaugurations	of	retaining	walls,	sidewalks,	stairs,	soup	kitchens,	
public	giveaways	and	medical	campaigns	give	people	the	sense	that	populist	tactics	
are	reflective	of	larger	positive	changes.		Nonetheless,	very	few	people	recognize	
that	increased	spending	since	the	1990s	has	been	an	outcome	of	the	recovery	of	the	
Peruvian	economy	and	the	increase	in	the	government	budgets	and	access	to	
international	loans	since	then,	thanks	in	large	part	to	neoliberal	restructuring.			
The	actual	operation	of	the	sectors	in	Perú	2000	was	not	so	different	from	that	
of	Minas	2000,	the	Defense	Front	and	Villa	San	Juan	(another	important	large	sector	
in	the	beginning).		As	Juliana,	a	dirigente	from	one	of	the	sectors	in	the	grouping	
explained	to	me,	the	statute	of	each	group	was	designed	to	get	rid	of	those	people	
who	had	no	intention	of	living	in	the	area	and	who	hoped	to	traffic	their	lots	(Juliana	
(mid‐forties),	Interview	conducted	on	August	30,	2010).		She	and	others	in	her	
sector	told	me	how	many	people	left	because	of	the	proximity	of	the	parents’	place	
below.		Those	who	were	not	living	there	permanently	were	removed.	
Within	Perú	2000	there	was	a	group	that	went	around	at	night	looking	for	
people	in	their	homes.		If	nobody	answered	the	door	they	would	enter	to	see	if	there	
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were	signs	that	people	were	living	in	their	shacks.		Many	people	were	removed	or	
relocated	at	this	time.		I	talked	to	two	members	of	this	group	who	told	me	that	the	
first	years	were	gruelling	because	of	duties	like	this.		Imagine	having	to	work	the	
next	day	after	knocking	on	doors	and	having	to	evict	people	after	you	worked.		
These	were	tense	times,	indeed.		One	sometimes	sees	family	members	and	extended	
family	members	occupying	different	lots.		If	one	could	live	up	to	the	obligations	that	
each	sector	demanded,	mainly	a	constant	presence	and	involvement	in	faenas,	
problems	would	not	arise.			
One	of	the	differences	with	Peru	2000,	which	had	many	sectors	in	the	lower	
parts	of	zone	“A”,	was	the	constant	threats	they	faced	from	the	police	and	
landowners.		Although	numbers	vary	depending	on	who	one	speaks	to,	they	
received	the	brunt	of	charges	levelled	at	the	invasion.		Somehow,	landowners	
infiltrated	the	organization	and	managed	to	get	the	names	of	many	of	the	dirigentes.	
Many	people	told	me	that	the	police	constantly	harassed	them.		A	number	of	
collaborators	claimed	that	the	police	often	entered	without	eviction	notices	and	
lobbed	tear	gas	into	different	sectors.		These	low	level	annoyances	kept	people	alert	
throughout	the	first	years.		Alvin,	a	food	vendor	and	shopkeeper	in	one	of	the	
sectors	of	Perú	2000,	told	me	that	in	the	first	months	he	and	his	wife	and	children	
barely	slept.		People	were	constantly	worried	about	being	evicted.		One	gets	the	
sense	that	common	people	like	Alvin	were	caught	between	abusive	dirigentes	and	
property	owners	keen	to	regain	their	property	or	make	conditions	so	uncomfortable	
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that	people	would	want	to	leave.		Herman	remarked	that	relocations45	were	often	
veiled	attempts	to	remove	passive	elements	from	sectors.		Lots	were	then	sold	to	
newcomers,	or	those	who	were	cast	out	were	forced	to	inhabit	the	hills	or	enter	
other	sectors.			
One	such	occasion	marks	the	narratives	of	people	from	Peru	2000.		Juliana	and	
others	told	me	how	she	was	detained	in	one	such	intervention	that	occurred.		
Juliana	maintained	that	she	returned	one	Sunday	and	saw	30	riot	police	in	one	of	the	
sectors	that	belonged	to	Perú	2000.		Police	had	been	called	in	because	neighbours	
were	trying	to	purge	one	of	the	squatters,	according	to	other	witnesses.		Curious	to	
see	what	was	happening,	she	got	closer	and	noticed	a	female	police	officer	who	had	
been	wounded.		Concerned	for	the	welfare	of	the	officer	she	and	another	friend	
accompanied	the	police	officer	in	a	minibus	to	see	a	doctor.		The	female	police	
officer	pulled	her	gun	and	brought	her	in	to	the	police	station.		She	was	charged	with	
aggravated	robbery	and	resisting	arrest	among	other	charges.		She	claimed	that	5	
landowners	were	behind	the	charges.		One	member	of	the	group	was	released	
almost	immediately.		In	the	end,	she	and	another	man	were	held	for	seven	months	
while	collections	were	made	to	hire	lawyers	to	get	them	out	of	jail.		The	judge	
released	them.			
																																																								
45	Reubicaciones	in	Spanish.		Because	people	initially	settled	in	a	rough	manner	and	on	smaller	plots,	
people	had	to	shuffled	around	and	reordered	when	a	surveyor	was	hired.		Room	had	to	made	for	
roads,	or	lots	enlarged.		A	selection	process	was	involved	here	where	families	and	those	who	were	
more	prominent	in	the	community	tended	to	be	favoured	over	single	people	and	more	problematic	
elements	within	the	community.		Herman	is	making	allegations	that	the	practice	involved	some	
victimization.		I	tried	to	get	access	to	police	files	of	statements	that	people	who	were	unjustly	
removed	would	have	made	to	the	police,	however	I	was	denied	access	to	this	documentation.		I	have	
relied	on	testimonies	of	squatters.		When	I	talked	to	people	from	all	areas	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada,	
there	seemed	to	be	a	consensus	that	there	was	abuse	everywhere	in	the	beginning.		But,	moreso	in	
Perú	2000.	
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A	neighbour	of	Juliana’s	explained	that	the	aforementioned	group	of	police	had	
been	repelled	and	that	they	had	left	a	female	officer	behind.		Juliana,	according	to	
him,	helped	the	police	officer,	placing	a	tourniquet	on	the	officer’s	leg.		Everyone	
agreed	to	bring	her	to	the	nearest	medical	post.		Once	the	officer	was	free	of	the	
tumult	of	people	and	on	her	way	to	the	medical	post,	she	got	up	and	assaulted	
Juliana,	giving	the	opportunity	for	the	other	man	to	escape.		Her	neighbour	told	me	
that	she	was	picked	up	by	police	in	the	evening.		The	police	gave	her	a	beating	and	
accusing	her	of	being	a	terrorist.			
When	I	asked	others	outside	of	Peru	2000	about	what	happened	that	day,	I	
was	told	that	three	police	officers	came	to	investigate	an	eviction	that	day.		At	this	
time,	Perú	2000	did	not	allow	police	into	the	area.		This	goes	against	versions	that	
police	were	constantly	harassing	squatters.			When	these	police	officers	came,	they	
were	kidnapped	under	orders	of	Juliana	and	the	others	that	were	picked	up.		A	
conflagration	broke	out	when	a	group	of	riot	police	returned	to	rescue	their	missing	
comrades.		
From	the	versions	given	above,	one	can	see	that	there	are	many	multiple	
narratives.		While	Juliana	claims	that	she	was	held	at	gunpoint,	her	neighbour	claims	
she	was	picked	up.		She	claims	that	the	police	officer	was	left	behind,	while	others	
not	in	Perú	2000	told	me	that	they	had	kidnapped	some	officers	from	the	first	group	
of	officers	sent	to	investigate.		Like	much	of	the	history	of	this	area,	versions	vary.		
Each	narrative	undoubtedly	has	motives	which	guide	it,	however	when	an	outsider,	
or	even	someone	within	the	area	is	confronted	with	multiple	versions	of	events,	
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nobody	knows	which	version	to	favour.		The	alliance	to	narrative	versions,	then,	
seem	to	reflect	political	alliances	in	the	area:	alliances	whose	history	people	may	not	
fully	understand.					
My	attempts	to	get	documentation	from	the	local	police	department	about	
evictions,	investigations,	and	incidents	like	that	involving	Juliana	were	denied	by	
Captain	Luna.		I	did	however	get	a	number	of	documents	that	attested	to	the	fact	
that	eviction	notices	were	being	processed	as	early	as	March	of	2000.		Other	
property	owners	showed	me	their	eviction	notices.		It	is	plausible	that	any	attempts	
to	carry	out	these	notices	had	been	misconstrued	by	dirigentes	on	private	property	
who	were	keen	on	maintaining	the	story	that	landowners	had	abandoned	the	land	
and	that	they	did	not	have	clear	title.		The	commonly	held	belief	that	landowners	
were	bribing	the	police,	believable	due	to	the	common	practice	of	accepting	and	
requesting	bribes	in	the	police	force,	gives	some	weight	to	the	idea	that	leaders	were	
withholding	information	about	the	legal	reality	that	undergirded	the	charges	against	
leaders	of	the	squatter	group	and	the	eviction	orders	that	were	being	served.				
According	to	Alvin,	a	sense	of	“desperation	and	fear”	pervaded	his	sector.		This	
excerpt	from	Alvin	and	his	wife	Marisa	gives	a	concise	and	eloquent	vignette	of	what	
life	was	like	for	him,	his	wife	and	his	two	daughters	in	the	beginning.		This	section	is	
representative	of	the	sentiments	among	squatters,	especially	those	in	Perú	2000.			
A:	One	couldn’t	sleep	because	at	any	moment	the	police	were	going	to	come	to	
evict	us.	Sometimes	neighbours	came.	Sometimes	there	were	conflicts	
between	neighbours.	One	couldn’t	rest	because	one	was	afraid	because	at	any	
time	they	could	beset	you	with	sticks	and	stones.	
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After	a	few	months,	though,	Alvin	told	me,	things	settled	down,	“nothing	
happened”.		He	confirmed	that	people	did	not	always	go	quietly.		But,	usually	those	
who	did	not	come	to	sleep	or	maintain	their	shacks	were	those	that	were	purged.		
What	they	did	was	to	dismantle	their	shacks	and	remove	them	from	their	lots.			
He	exclaimed,	“What	things	hasn’t	one	seen	here?”		Sometimes,	he	told	me,	
“another	neighbour	grabbed	all	the	money	and	disappeared	with	all	the	money	and	
sometimes	with	all	the	money	that	neighbours	had	given	them,	other	neighbours	
picked	up	their	things	and	went	to	other	lots.”		“There	was	no	lack	of	gente	viva	
(bold	people),”	in	those	times.		“We	have	suffered	a	lot,”	Alvin	told	me,	his	eyes	
intense,	and	his	voice,	now,	strong	and	poised.			
If	that	was	not	enough,	the	landowners	sometimes	blocked	the	cistern	trucks	
that	brought	water	into	the	area.		Alvin	and	his	wife	have	always	prepared	food	for	
people	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada,	so	they	were	very	sensitive	to	the	sporadic	
shortages	of	water.		When	this	happened,	he	told	me,	they	were	forced	to	go	below,	
to	the	entrance,	or	to	their	family’s	homes	to	bring	water	in	plastic	gasoline	
containers.		Others	told	similar	stories	about	not	having	water.	
Alvin’s	description	of	the	initial	conditions	was	not	limited	to	material	
deficiencies,	but	also	tended	to	trace	out	social	problems.		Some	of	the	youth	that	
used	to	be	gangsters	are	not	anymore,	he	explained.		They	are	married	now.		They	
have	their	partners.		“It	seems	that	youth	are	changing,”	he	opined,	a	sense	of	hope	
in	his	voice.		“Before	it	was	terrible,”	he	told	me,	“when	you	came	walking	from	
Arguedas	(the	market	at	the	entrance	to	the	area),	by	the	entrance	to	Lomas	(above	
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in	Minas	2000),	there	they	got	a	hold	of	you	and	they	stripped	you	of	your	shoes,	
they	stole	your	money,	and	on	top	of	that	they	beat	you	and	they	left	you	like	that.		
Those	youth	were	bad	(de	mal	vivir),	gangsters.		Now,	there	is	none	of	that.”	
Talk	about	crime	was	always	hard	to	get	straight.		Most	agreed	that	things	
were	much	better	than	the	beginning.		Yet,	the	danger	of	muggings,	especially	at	
night	in	the	narrow	passageways	and	dark	streets	of	the	area,	was	still	very	possible.		
Many	warned	me	not	to	walk	by	certain	areas	at	night	because	youth	loitered	
around	these	areas	and	robbed	locals.		There	were	a	number	of	hotspots.		The	
market	still	remained	a	hotspot,	according	to	the	local	police	station.		One	thing	that	
always	creates	an	environment	for	thefts	is	commerce.		The	busy	areas	of	Pamplona	
are	always	the	most	dangerous.		Most	thefts	that	I	heard	of	were	muggings	and	pick‐	
pocketing.		Like	most	cities,	there	are	always	areas	where	drugs	are	sold,	as	well.		
Armed	assaults	on	markets	or	cars	was	another	common	occurrence.		A	lot	of	
friends	complained	of	break‐ins,	some	of	them	being	armed	break‐ins.		I	think	it	
would	be	hard	to	find	a	person	who	has	not	been	assaulted,	robbed	or	conned.		It	is	
part	of	daily	life	here,	and	another	reason	that	distrust	is	so	pronounced	in	Lima.			In	
Lima	many	claim	that	the	law	of	the	jungle	rules.		This	goes	a	long	way	in	explaining	
why	neoliberalism	relied	more	heavily	on	a	tough	on	crime	and	societal	degradation	
discourse	in	Peru	coupled	with	an	implicit	approval	of	vigilante	justice.		
Alvin	remembered	that	living	conditions	were	terrible.		People	did	not	have	
cisterns.		People	went	to	the	bathroom	where	they	could	and	there	was	no	water.		
Flies	that	were	already	present	because	the	pig	excrement	migrated	to	human	
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excrement.		The	intense	sun	and	arid	winds	kicked	up	dried	excrement,	mixing	it	
with	the	dust	and	sand	that	settle	on	practically	everything	in	the	area.		People	
burned	their	garbage	in	the	best	cases;	however	in	many	cases,	and	this	is	still	true,	
garbage	is	left	at	pick	up	points.		Dogs	often	feed	off	of	this	garbage	strewing	it	
about.		The	smell	of	excrement,	urea,	and	garbage	mixed	with	the	smoke	from	burnt	
tires	that	pig	owners	used	to	heat	pig	slop.		Carpets	of	flies	ravenously	looked	for	
their	next	meal.		I	remind	the	reader	that	people	had	to	eat	with	these	carpets	of	
flies.			Thankfully,	though,	things	have	improved.		Now,	there	are	fewer	flies.		Like	
many	of	my	collaborators,	he	told	me	how	children	suffered	from	smallpox,	
bronchial	infections,	stomach	infections,	insect	bites	and	fungal	infections.			
Most	people	have	cisterns,	indeed.		But	these	fill	up	over	time	and	there	really	
have	been	no	provisions	to	ensure	that	human	waste	does	not	infiltrate	the	soil	and	
rock	out	of	which	these	cisterns	are	carved.		Most	fixes	here	are	short‐term,	spur	of	
the	moment.		What	becomes	more	and	more	apparent	from	descriptions	like	this	is	
the	extremes	to	which	people	were	willing	to	go	to	have	a	home	of	their	own.		Add	
to	these	conditions	the	stress	of	possibly	losing	your	space.					
Marisa	told	me	at	this	point,	“Sometimes,	we	though	to	ourselves,	we	would	
think,	we	are	crazy	to	tolerate	this.”		“So,	why	did	you?”	I	asked,	keen	to	understand.		
Alvin	answered	this	question.	
A:	Before	we	lived	in	my	parent‐in‐law’s	place.		There,	my	in‐laws	made	life	
impossible	for	us.		They	came	from	Huancayo	sometimes.		Because	of	that	we	
wanted	to	move	out,	to	avoid	problems.		Because	one	has	to	look	for	
something	that	belongs	to	them.		If	you	going	to	be	there	and	[the	house]	does	
not	belong	to	you,	one	person	comes,	another,	the	family	comes,	the	in‐law,	the	
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brother	and	they	cause	problems.	So,	to	avoid	that	you	look	for	your	own	
house.		This	way	everyone	has	rights	in	the	house.		
		
I	tried	to	get	the	two	back	on	to	the	subject	of	what	things	were	like	in	the	
beginning.		This	time	around,	Alvin	is	much	more	unambiguous	in	his	condemnation	
of	the	behaviour	of	his	neighbours.		
B:	Did	you	suffer	when	you	got	to	the	invasion?	
A:	Yes,	of	course,	the	dust,	the	darkness,	the	fright,	the	violence,	the	fear	of	
confrontations	between	neighbours,	because	sometimes	the	group	moved	
from	here	to	there.	Because	of	this	they	used	to	fight	for	lots,	for	money	from	
lots.		They	waited	for	the	night	to	take	people	out	of	their	shacks.	Sometimes,	
because	people	did	not	return	home	to	sleep,	they	kicked	them	out	of	their	
shacks,	burned	their	reeds.		They	used	to	divide	amongst	them	the	stuff	from	
inside	the	shacks.		People	are	abusive.	
B:	What	did	people	do	to	avoid	this	problem?	
A:	We	watched.	What	could	we	do	against	so	many	people.		If	you	did	
something	they	kicked	you	out.	Therefore,	the	way	to	hold	on	was	to	always	be	
here.	
B:	The	people	that	did	not	stay,	was	it	because	they	had	houses	in	other	places,	
or	because	they	had	family	[elsewhere]?	
A:	In	the	majority	of	cases	it	is	because	they	are	accustomed	to	living	in	their	
father’s,	their	mother’s,	their	mother‐in‐law’s	place.	They	do	not	want	to	
suffer,	so	they	said:	It	is	better	that	I	go.		And	others	worked	far	away	and	they	
did	not	arrive	at	the	start	of	the	assemblies	two	or	three	times	and	they	kick	
them	out.			
B:	So	it	was	not	possible	to	raise	one’s	voice	against	neighbours	when	they	
were	evicting	people?	
A:	You	couldn’t	say	anything	because	if	you	did	they	would	kick	you	out	too,	all	
of	them.	
B:	So,	you	had	to	get	along?	
A:	After,	we	withdrew	from	the	group	[referring	to	Nuevo	Pamplona].	We	are	
independent.	We	aren’t	with	anyone	because,	in	the	first	place,	the	land	had	
owners	and	it	was	not	acceptable	that	they	mistreated	us	that	way	when	we	
had	to	pay	for	the	land.	It	was	not	state	land.	If	one	wants	to	buy	and	the	
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contributions,	everything	that	one	gave	was	for	the	benefit	of	the	council,	
because	the	land	is	going	to	cost	one,	it	is	not	like	state	land.	It	doesn’t	cost	
anything.	You	don’t	have	to	pay	any	additional	fees.	But,	us,	we	have	to	buy	our	
land	if	we	want	to	be	an	owner,	to	build.	We	bought	4	years	ago,	and,	if	we	
didn’t	do	it	before	it	was	because	we	were	led	astray	by	bad	advice.	But,	after	
talking	among	ourselves,	we	found	out	who	the	true	owner	was	and	we	bought	
from	him	because	we	wouldn’t	like	it	one	day	if	people	came	and	another	came	
and	wanted	to	take	possession	of	everything	without	buying	it.	
	
						 Alvin	told	me	that	they	purchased	100m?	of	property.		Some	of	the	other	
neighbours	have	not	bought	their	property	because	“they	think	that	land	will	revert	
to	state	land	and	the	land	will	be	free.”		Alvin	feels	that	they	made	the	right	decision	
in	purchasing	their	lot,	saying	this	about	the	expectation	that	the	state	intervene:	“it	
is	not	like	that,	how	many	years	have	already	gone	by	and	nothing?”	
For	those	who	claim	that	people	cannot	pay,	that	landowners	are	unwilling	to	
negotiate	terms	of	payment	and	the	like,	Alvin’s	case	demonstrates	that	people	with	
a	little	store,	who	sell	food	to	neighbours,	can	afford	to	buy	their	lots	on	terms	that	
are	sensitive	to	their	economic	situation.		The	same	is	true	for	most	people	here.		
Alvin	wraps	up	our	conversation	on	this	note.	
They	are	in	the	air	practically.		They	don’t	have	any	document,	but	we	do,	yes.	
We	paid	$40	per	square	metre,	with	special	accomodations,	not	in	cash,	we	pay	
monthly.	We	don’t	like	to	lie,	less	before	God.	
(Alvin	and	Marisa	(mid‐fifties),	Interview	conducted	on	November	25,	2010)	
	
This	last	part	is	probably	the	most	devastating	for	many	of	the	dirigentes,	
politicians,	lawyers,	charities	and	others	who	lived	off	the	needs	of	people	here.		
However,	we	should	not	be	too	quick	to	romanticize	the	innocence	of	the	
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downtrodden.		The	anti‐values	that	poverty	generates,	out	of	the	desperation,	out	of	
the	frustration,	out	of	the	indignation,	out	of	the	anger,	out	of	the	sadness,	out	of	the	
neglect	that	proliferates	here	has	turned	neighbours	against	one	another	and	the	
landowners.		Not	only	these	sentiments,	but	a	peculiar	mixture	of	traits	present	for	
many	since	the	Spaniards	came	to	Peru:	dishonesty,	opportunism,	ruthlessness,	
entitlement,	disdain,	distrust	and	indifference	make	for	a	powerful	cocktail,	with	
spiritually	devastating	consequences.			
I	want	the	reader	to	dwell	on	one	of	the	last	things	Alvin	says	about	buying	the	
land	because	one	day	they	would	not	want	someone	to	come	and	take	over	what	
they	have	without	buying	it.		That	is	what	has	happened	here.		Those	migrants	who	
came	to	Lima	and	managed	to	progress,	or	had	a	generous	patron,	came	across	this	
land.		It	does	not	get	more	complicated.		Then,	along	came	a	government	that	saw	an	
opportunity	in	supporting	people	in	what	in	2000	was	a	common	practice	spanning	
decades.		The	only	problem	was	that	abundant	state	land	was	now	so	far	away	from	
the	city	cores	that	settlers	set	their	eyes	on	private	land.		Once	it	became	a	fait	
accompli,	the	area	became	mired	in	internal	disputes.		The	complexity	of	the	
circumstances	here	bring	out	the	best	and	worst	of	people	simultaneously.	
Against	all	the	odds,	amidst	all	the	injustice,	the	area	has	steadily	improved.		I	
think	that	there	is	a	mixture	of	hope	and	reality	in	this	sentiment;	yet	things	
certainly	have	changed	and	will	continue	to	change.		If	people	have	not	built	homes,	
a	younger	woman	in	her	sector	explained	to	me	one	day,	it	is	because	people	here	
do	not	have	land	deeds	yet.		If	it	were	not	for	this,	many	people	below	would	be	
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building	homes	like	in	the	exemplary	association	Alto	Progreso.		What	has	kept	
people	from	advancing	is	the	legal	deadlock	here.	
Near	the	end	of	2001	some	of	the	members	of	Mr.	Flores’s	inner	circle	began	to	
have	moral	misgivings	about	the	things	they	were	seeing.		Mr.	Romero,	a	friend	of	
Mr.	Flores,	claimed	the	final	straw	for	him	occurred	when	after	a	march,	he	and	a	
group	of	other	dirigentes	went	out	to	eat	and	drink	with	the	money	of	the	squatters.	
Against	the	wishes	of	many	who	did	not	want	to	tarnish	the	reputation	of	the	
leadership	in	the	area,	a	commission	was	formed	to	investigate	Mr.	Flores	and	his	
administration.		In	his	defense,	as	one	would	expect,	Mr.	Flores	discredited	the	
commission	saying	that	the	landowners	were	behind	the	commission,	that	he	
naively	paid	more	for	certain	expenses	and	that	for	bribes	that	he	had	to	pay	he	
obviously	was	not	given	a	receipt.		I	talked	to	a	number	of	the	members	of	the	
commission	who	all	separately,	without	consultation,	repeated	the	same	story.		They	
had	tracked	down	many	of	the	receipts	that	Mr.	Flores	had	provided	and	found	that	
he	was	overcharging	for	services	rendered,	receipts	were	forged	or	there	were	no	
receipts	for	money	that	had	been	spent.		In	the	end,	there	was	a	difference	of	
anywhere	between	20,000–30,000	soles	that	could	not	be	accounted	for.			
The	abuses	that	many	squatters	spoke	of	—namely	being	forcefully	removed	
for	not	paying	fees	or	breaking	settlement	rules	then	having	one’s	shack	either	
burned	or	dismantled—	were	verified	by	people	within	and	outside	of	the	group.		It	
appears	that	things	reached	a	breaking	point	when	in	October	of	2001,	Mr.	Flores	
resigned.		Marco,	one	of	the	more	active	coordinators	in	Nuevo	Pamplona	told	me	
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that	the	problem	with	the	original	dirigentes	was	that	they	were	not	traffickers	so	
much	as	they	wished	to	be	caciques,	or	chiefs.		Their	attitude	was:	“If	you	do	not	pay,	
I	kick	you	out,	if	you	do	not	go,	I	burn	your	hut.”		This	was	the	general	impression	of	
the	leadership	of	Perú	2000	throughout	the	area.		
After	the	scandal,	the	decision	was	made	to	change	the	name	of	the	association	
to	Nuevo	Pamplona,	and	following	the	advice	of	the	government	authorities,	change	
the	association	to	an	asentamiento	humano	so	that	the	group	could	access	
government	programs	and	infrastructure	funding.				
Despite	the	scandals	that	occurred,	and	this	is	remarkable,	Mr.	Flores	and	his	
brother	continued	to	have	a	presence	in	the	government	of	Nuevo	Pamplona.		Mr.	
Flores	in	his	interview	was	very	frank	about	the	lawyers	and	dirigentes,	that	despite	
being	told	that	the	land	had	clear	title	in	2003,	they	continued	to	argue	that	there	
was	a	statute	of	limitations	that	would	come	into	effect,	that	the	land	was	
abandoned,	that	the	state	would	expropriate	the	land,	that	the	state	would	give	
landowners	land	in	another	area	of	the	country	to	compensate	them,	etc.		When	
asked	why	they	continued	to	push	these	arguments	he	responded:	
Because	the	love	for	politics	always	makes	one	deceive	people,	saying:	“No!	
There	will	be	a	statute	of	limitations	on	the	case	against	us!	No!	Land	will	
revert	to	the	state!”	Therefore,	the	love	for	politics	of	those	people	that	simply	
looked…	they	talk,	talk,	even	bring	documents,	to	lie	to	people.		
(Interview	conducted	on	December	1,	2010	with	Mr.	Flores)	
	
What	is	interesting	about	the	minutes	for	Nuevo	Pamplona	is	that	Mr.	Flores	is	
a	constant	critic	of	those	who	want	to	continue	that	legal	process.		He	stated	on	a	
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number	of	occasions	that	the	only	solution	for	those	on	private	property	is	to	
reconcile.		One	does	not	know	what	to	think.		Motives	become	murky	for	most	
people	trying	to	make	sense	of	these	different	voices.			
When	this	appears	to	be	recognized,	Nuevo	Pamplona	falls	apart.		They	
attempt	to	reform	in	2005	to	begin	to	meet	with	representatives	of	the	landowners	
to	reconcile	their	differences,	however	nothing	comes	of	it.		Landowners	have	
showed	me	letters	where	they	were	approached	by	squatters.		Some	people	
managed	to	reconcile	with	the	property	owners	at	this	point;	however	a	significant	
number	still	have	a	dispute	with	the	landowners.		The	number	with	unresolved	
cases	does	not	allow	the	area	to	formalize	and	receive	state	and	outside	
intervention.		Because	those	groups	mired	in	legal	disputes	below	cannot	resolve	
those	disputes,	basic	infrastructure	that	must	pass	through	the	lower	area	cannot	be	
completed,	meaning	that	those	above	cannot	get	these	essential	services	either.		In	
2007,	Nuevo	Pamplona	reformed	again,	yet,	once	again,	the	organization	fizzled	out.		
Each	side	accused	the	other	of	not	wanting	to	negotiate.		It	appears	that	Mr.	Flores	
may	have	been	telling	the	truth.		Some	of	the	collaborators	whom	I	felt	were	being	
sincere	told	me	that	things	did	not	change	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	because	nobody	
wanted	them	to	change.	
I	thought	a	lot	about	this	opinion.		Everyone	gains	as	long	as	the	problem	
persists,	everyone,	except	those	who	have	to	live	here	with	their	families.		Property	
prices	will	continue	to	rise,	dirigentes	continue	to	charge	fees	for	paperwork	and	
legal	cases,	lawyers	continue	making	their	promises	(to	both	sides),	politicians	keep	
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promising	to	bring	about	change	in	the	area,	NGOs	keep	helping	people	improve	
their	lives	with	the	same	information	being	recycled,	unscrupulous	professionals	
charge	naïve	dirigentes	for	plans	that	are	not	properly	done,	campaign	after	
campaign	descends	on	people	in	the	area	bringing	in	temporary	aid	for	votes	
(everyone	here	understands	who	sent	the	aid)	and	government	programs	to	build	
infrastructure	are	incessant.		The	longer	people	stay	like	this,	the	more	dependent	
they	are,	the	better	it	is	for	everyone	except	them.		If	things	were	to	change,	it	would	
be	the	beginning	of	something	new	and	unfamiliar,	a	lot	of	people	who	benefit	
would	lose	their	source	of	income.		
Before	finishing	this	section	on	the	history	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada,	I	would	like	
to	add	the	view	from	one	of	the	sectors	that	was	almost	entirely	on	state	land	from	
the	beginning.		It	tends	to	reinforce	much	of	what	Herman	from	the	sector	that	
decided	to	buy	their	land	in	the	beginning	had	to	say	about	groups	below	on	private	
property.			
The View from Above, the View from Villa San Juan 
	
The	story	of	Villa	San	Juan,	could	start	with	Don	Ramón	(Don	Ramón	(mid‐
fifties),	Interview	conducted	on	October	23,	2011).		He	told	me	how	he,	as	the	eldest	
among	his	siblings,	was	encouraged	by	his	parents	to	look	for	land	for	his	family.		In	
many	ways,	looking	for	land	and	upgrading	that	land	has	become	a	rite	of	passage	
for	many	people	in	Lima.		There	is	a	sense	of	shame	if	one	stays	at	home.		Nothing	
speaks	more	resoundingly	about	having	achieved	something	than	a	home	of	one’s	
own.		Don	Ramón	confessed	that	his	brother	and	his	partner	first	came	to	look	for	
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land	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		When	asked	about	who	promoted	the	invasion,	Don	
Ramón	is	not	hesitant	about	saying	that	Mr.	Ocampo,	the	incumbent	mayor,	was	
responsible.			
What	really	led	to	him,	his	brother	and	a	group	of	young	men	who	played	on	
his	soccer	team	ending	up	in	what	is	now	Villa	San	Juan,	was	a	bit	of	chance.		At	first,	
they	tried	to	join	with	people	below	in	Tres	Reyes.		Unfortunately,	there	was	not	
much	space,	so	people	told	them	to	move	on	to	an	empty	space.		Don	Ramón	told	me	
that	they	were	aware	that	the	lower	part	was	private	property.		The	decision,	then,	
to	go	to	higher	ground	was	motivated	by	their	desire	to	avoid	the	problems	that	one	
would	face	on	private	property.	
When	they	got	up	into	the	rocky	hills,	there	was	a	tarp	and	maybe	1,	2,	3	
people.		On	a	Saturday,	which	would	have	been	January	8,	2000,	they	began	digging.		
Don	Ramón	was	a	mason,	so	he	had	a	good	idea	about	how	to	lay	out	lots	and	what	
kind	of	work	was	necessary	in	clearing	a	lot	and	building	a	home.		This	made	him	a	
person	with	valuable	knowledge	at	first	and	a	desirable	leader.	
On	Sunday,	they	had	a	meeting.		At	this	time,	there	were	five	people	in	total,	
including	his	brother.		I	am	assuming	that	he	was	counting	the	number	of	lots	and	
their	representatives	here	because	he	does	not	mention	his	brother’s	wife.	
At	about	the	same	time,	land	traffickers	nearby	called	people	asking	for	ten	
soles	to	join	their	group.		They	claimed	that	COFOPRI	was	going	to	help	them,	a	
rumour	that	was	prevalent	in	other	invasions	at	the	time,	as	one	will	recall.		Don	
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Ramón	was	surprised	by	this	information,	as	they	had	only	been	there	a	few	days	
and	already	this	group	was	claiming	that	they	had	support.			
On	Monday,	Don	Ramón	came	home	from	work	and	found	that	his	reed	hut	
had	been	moved	farther	above.		When	his	brother	returned	from	work,	he,	his	
brother	and	a	helper	called	the	neighbours	together.		He	told	others	that	he	had	a	
soccer	team	that	could	help	out.		He	started	to	question	the	authority	of	this	group	
that	had	taken	it	upon	themselves	to	charge	others	and	organize	the	area.		He	asked	
who	had	elected	them,	if	they	had	a	statute,	etc.,	and	it	turned	out	that	they	had	
nothing.	
By	Monday,	in	the	evening,	there	were	22	people.		That	night	they	bought	
candles	and	nobody	slept.		They	stayed	up	all	night	making	a	plan,	a	drawing	of	how	
they	would	organize,	no	doubt,	but	something	that	was	informed	by	Don	Ramón’s	
experience	as	a	mason.		The	next	day	they	decided	to	go	to	the	municipality	with	
their	plan	in	hand.		The	other	group,	a	group	of	bus	drivers,	was	good	at	organizing,	
but	they	had	no	idea	about	how	to	draw	up	plans	or	what	might	be	involved	in	such	
manners.		They	knew	how	to	organize	and	how	to	manage	themselves	because	they	
were	land	traffickers,	he	surmised.	
It	was	not	long	before	Don	Ramón	suspicions	were	confirmed.		Monday	in	the	
evening,	most	likely	sensing	some	resistance	on	the	part	of	Don	Ramón,	a	father	and	
his	four	sons	came	to	look	for	Don	Ramón.		Despite	the	help	of	his	brother,	they	split	
his	head	open.		They	had	to	respond	quickly,	or	lose	the	initiative.		A	group	of	Don	
Ramón’s	then	went	at	10	in	the	morning	when	the	family	was	sleeping	and	relocated	
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the	group	below.		They	told	them	that	they	knew	they	were	traffickers	because	they	
looked	to	extort	payments	out	of	people.		Don	Ramón	and	his	group,	in	contrast,	
were	willing	to	do	things	without	charging	money	because	they	needed	a	place	to	
live.			
By	Thursday,	there	were	about	seventy	lots.		At	this	time,	January	13,	2000,	
Mr.	Flores	called	his	first	assembly	below.		His	group	openly	questioned	who	had	
elected	Mr.	Flores.		Because	they	were	on	state	land,	they	managed	to	have	a	good	
reason	to	avoid	being	a	part	of	Perú	2000.		The	advice	of	another	dirigente,	who	had	
made	a	career	out	of	going	from	invasion	to	invasion,	also	helped.		This	neighbour	
told	Don	Ramón	to	avoid	signing	anything	with	Perú	2000	and	to	refuse	to	give	any	
payments	to	the	group.	
Don	Ramón	told	me	how	Perú	2000,	later	Nuevo	Pamplona,	abused	their	
authority.		They	removed	people	and	moved	new	people	into	areas	on	land	that	did	
not	belong	to	them.		In	other	words,	they	were	forcing	people	off	land	and	most	
likely	receiving	payment	to	place	people	on	the	lots	where	other	people	had	been	
forcefully	removed.		What	is	more,	they	charged	protection	fees	and	told	people	that	
the	land	would	revert	to	the	state.		“People	opened	their	eyes,”	Don	Ramón	told	me	
when	asked	why	the	fronts	fell	into	disarray.			
The	picture	that	emerges	as	we	move	around	the	area	is	that	there	were	
multiple	nuclei	of	people	trying	to	form	small	sectors.		From	the	perspective	of	Don	
Ramón	we	get	an	idea	that	many	of	those	who	were	organizing	were	not	always	
doing	so	with	the	intention	of	consulting	their	neighbours.		There	must	have	been	
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quite	a	mixture	of	people,	and	not	always	people	who	wanted	to	work	in	a	
transparent	and	inclusive	manner.		Some	of	these	sectors	then	opted	to,	or	were	
forced	to	join	one	of	the	bigger	fronts.		Some	sectors,	which	numbered	more	than	
200	lots	on	state	land,	like	the	case	of	Villa	San	Juan	and	Valle	Hermosa,	managed	to	
avoid	being	incorporated	into	the	larger	fronts	in	the	beginning.			
Something	that	was	pointed	out	to	me	by	more	scrupulous	collaborators	is	
that	many	of	the	original	dirigentes	of	the	big	fronts	at	the	beginning	either	moved	
out	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada,	or	many	of	them	moved	into	newer	sectors	in	the	hills.		
The	newer	sectors	in	the	hills	were	on	state	land,	therefore	there	was	no	need	to	
buy	the	property.		The	skills	and	knowledge	that	many	of	these	now	seasoned	
dirigentes	had	acquired	could	be	used	to	organize	these	new	sectors	and	in	some	
cases	provide	a	livelihood.		Many	of	my	collaborators	decried	this	practice.		Some	of	
the	leaders	moved	to	state	land,	though,	to	focus	on	their	jobs	and	families	and	avoid	
problems	with	their	previous	sectors.		Being	a	dirigente	consumed	the	lives	of	many	
of	the	original	leaders.		Many,	especially	after	it	became	clear	that	their	fight	was	in	
vain	tired	and	moved	on.		
						 Trying	to	provide	a	balanced	account	of	the	first	two	years	in	the	Nueva	
Rinconada	is	a	difficult	task.		The	preceding	account	is	based	mainly	on	the	
perceptions	of	locals	and	less	on	my	interpretations	of	events.		I	have	attempted	to	
provide	an	account	that	privileges	the	families	that	put	the	safety	and	well‐being	of	
their	families	at	stake.		By	doing	so	this	account	has	had	to	ask	hard	questions	about	
the	behaviour	of	all	people	here	at	the	beginning.		Dirigentes	had	a	privileged	
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position	when	it	came	to	setting	the	tone	for	the	initial	environment	that	emerged.		
There	were	without	doubt	excesses	and	abuses	of	authority.	
						 This	account	does	not	judge	the	behaviour	of	people	in	positions	of	authority	
as	much	as	it	tries	to	ask	if	all	this	was	really	necessary.		There	were	sectors	that	did	
decide	to	buy	the	property	from	the	beginning,	thus	avoiding	many	of	the	purges	
and	relocations	that	occurred	in	other	areas.		We	cannot	say	what	should	have	been	
done,	but	we	can	note	the	effects	that	a	harsh	stance	had	on	the	vast	majority	of	
people	in	the	area	who	were	enduring	privations	and	less	than	ideal	living	
conditions	because	they	needed	a	place	to	live.			
						 I	have	been	critical	of	Mr.	Ocampo	because	he	could	have	worked	to	avoid	the	
stand‐off	that	existed	in	the	beginning.		He	may	have	had	some	hand	in	promoting	
and	condoning	the	invasion	at	the	beginning.		At	the	very	least	there	is	enough	here	
to	cast	doubt	on	his	assertion	that	this	was	a	natural	part	of	urban	growth.		The	legal	
and	political	climate	created	by	Fujimori	and	his	government	may	have	emboldened	
people	to	risk	the	invasion	in	the	first	place	and	created	a	hope	that	a	political	
intervention	on	the	part	of	Fujimori	would	have	led	to	a	quick	solution.		We	will	
never	know	whether	this	would	have	occurred.		What	we	do	know	is	that	people	
were	left	to	fend	for	themselves	for	the	most	part.		This	is	the	dark	side	of	self‐help	
and	the	lack	of	a	housing	policy	that	recognizes	the	need	for	accessible	housing	for	
each	new	family	in	Lima.		I	wonder	if	politicians	and	leaders	who	were	not	living	in	
this	area	would	have	been	willing	to	take	their	children	and	expose	them	to	the	
trials	and	tribulations	that	many	of	those	had	to	face	in	this	area.		Most	of	the	
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evidence	that	I	provide	here	is	based	on	testimonies	and	circumstantial	evidence.		
My	hope	is	that	the	experiences	of	people	here	will	serve	to	support	the	need	for	the	
Peruvian	government	to	address	the	housing	issue	in	Lima	and	the	country	as	a	
whole.		By	continuing	to	condone	self‐help	housing	the	national	and	local	
governments	are	implicitly	enabling	the	abuses	of	authority	and	improvised	nature	
of	settlements	like	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		Surely	there	must	be	a	more	peaceful	way	
to	accommodate	the	growing	number	of	people	who	cannot	buy	a	home	formally.		
People	deserve	to	live	with	dignity.		They	should	not	have	to	wait	for	handouts	that	
make	political	clients	out	of	them.	
						 As	much	as	I	urge	state	intervention	in	this	case,	we	must	recognize	that	the	
Nueva	Rinconada	is	a	result	of	an	implicit	state	policy	and	a	particular	type	of	
intervention.		People	choose	to	live	in	places	like	the	Nueva	Rinconada	and	build	
their	homes	for	a	multiplicity	of	reasons.		This	self‐reliance,	even	in	forms	of	
governance,	is	a	response	to	larger	governance	practices	of	municipalities	and	the	
state	when	it	comes	to	providing	housing	options	to	the	working	class	in	Peru.		In	
the	previous	narratives	a	lot	of	the	darker	side	to	the	first	years	of	the	history	of	
Nueva	Rinconada	was	revealed.		The	next	chapter	will	talk	more	of	the	high	points,	
those	moments	where	differences	were	put	aside.					
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Chapter 9 —Working Together Toward a Common Cause 
	
						 Despite	the	evident	antagonism	between	Peru	2000	and	the	Defense	Front,	
there	was	still	a	desire	to	work	together	toward	common	goals.		Both	groupings	and	
at	least	4	other	larger	groupings,	Zona	“C,”	Minas	2000,	Valle	Hermosa	and	Villa	San	
Juan	had	decided	that	they	would	opt	for	a	political	solution	to	the	land	dispute	in	
the	lower	part	of	Zone	“A,”	Zone	“B,”	and	Zone	“C”.		Although	sectors	like	Valle	
Hermosa	and	Villa	San	Juan	were	predominantly	located	on	state	land	they	had	a	
common	interest	in	seeing	the	land	dispute	below	resolved	because	public	services	
and	infrastructure	below	would	benefit	them,	as	well.		Here,	the	unifying	thread	was	
material	need,	more	specifically	a	land	title	and	access	to	basic	amenities.		It	was	not	
a	larger	Pan‐indigenous	imaginary	of	the	sort	seen	in	the	neighbouring	countries	of	
Bolivia	and	Ecuador.		This	lack	of	a	visionary	project	beyond	that	proposed	by	the	
mass	media	is	what	distinguishes	demands	on	the	state	made	by	these	new	sectors	
in	Lima.					
						 Just	as	sectors	worked	together	to	achieve	common	political	goals,	which	
invariably	dealt	with	material	aspects	of	the	development	of	their	communities,	they	
cooperated	on	security	in	the	area.		In	this	chapter	we	will	look	at	two	different	
ways	in	which	communities	secured	themselves.		The	first	were	the	rondas46	that	
the	community	organized	in	the	evenings	to	guard	against	land	evictions	in	the	area.		
The	rondas	served	to	maintain	community	unity	against	landowners	who	at	the	
																																																								
46	Literally	rounds	that	people	make	at	night	usually	to	ensure	the	safety	of	their	community.			
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beginning	had	intentions	of	legally	evicting	squatters.		The	result	of	numerous	failed	
eviction	attempts	was	to	embolden	squatters	and	further	cement	ties	between	
sectors.		The	second	way	that	communities	secured	their	place	was	to	police	
themselves.		While	such	self‐policing	may	be	due	to	a	lack	of	funding	for	adequate	
professional	policing,	it	does	not	on	its	own	serve	as	a	spectacle	to	capture	public	
attention	to	make	appeals	about	inclusion	as	has	been	suggested	in	Cochabamba,	
Bolivia	(Goldstein	2005).		In	the	context	that	we	consider	people	started	policing	
themselves	because	of	legitimate	concerns	for	their	safety,	a	need	to	have	squatter	
settlements	regarded	as	progressive	and	orderly	places,	and	finally	as	a	means	of	
legitimating	the	existence	of	community	based	councils	and	the	development	that	
they	promoted.		
						 Oscar	recalled	how	he	and	others	worked	together	to	form	a	commission	for	
the	formalization	of	asentamientos	humanos	in	Lima	South,	which	had	
representatives	from	the	adjacent	districts	of	Villa	Maria	and	Villa	El	Salvador.		
Their	first	march	on	Congress	occurred	on	February	19,	2001.		The	press	referred	to	
the	march	as	the	“Pamplonazo”	—a	play	on	the	word	Pamplona.		The	superlative	in	
this	case	refers	to	the	apparent	inability	of	the	police	to	manage	the	protestors,	
making	the	situation	into	an	intractable	problem,	that	was	once	again	associated	
with	the	place	name	Pamplona	where	most	of	the	protestors	originated.		It	is	also	a	
reference	to	the	land	invasion	in	Pamplona	that	resulted	in	the	death	of	a	local	and	
the	relocation	of	settlers	to	Villa	El	Salvador	in	1971.		
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						 Around	four	in	the	morning	protestors	began	to	concentrate	around	Atacongo	
bridge,	a	bridge	that	crosses	the	Panamerican	highway	and	marks	the	entrance	into	
San	Juan	de	Miraflores	and	adjacent	districts.		Police	riot	squads	were	dispatched	to	
break	up	a	blockade	that	formed	at	this	point	with	a	number	of	protestors	being	
apprehended.		Instead	of	discouraging	the	march,	people	walked	from	here	to	the	
main	Expressway	in	the	commercial	core	of	Lima,	Javier	Prado.		After	blocking	
traffic	here,	they	continued	toward	congress	where	a	representative	delivered	a	
letter	to	Valentín	Paniagua’s	advisor47,	demanding	the	delimitation	and	legalization	
of	their	properties	and	the	eradication	of	pigs	in	the	zone.		The	demands	suggest	
that	those	from	the	Nueva	Rinconada	had	a	strong	presence.			
						 In	an	article	that	appeared	in	the	local	paper	Ojo,	the	headline	read:	March	
finishes	in	looting,	fights,	and	carnival.		The	picture	is	a	contrast	to	the	headline	
because	to	a	sympathetic	eye	what	it	shows	is	a	group	of	people	having	a	water	fight	
after	an	exhausting	march	in	the	final	month	of	a	Limeño	summer.		Onlookers	smile	
at	the	group	that	is	soaking	one	another.			The	result	of	this	march,	as	Oscar	recalls,	
was	a	meeting	with	a	representative	of	Congress	who	advised	them	to	form	an	
asentamiento	humano	as	this	would	give	them	access	to	government	programs.		This	
strategy	worked	fine	for	sectors	in	the	area	that	were	on	state	land,	however	those	
sectors	that	were	on	private	property	could	not	receive	support	due	to	the	legal	
backlash	that	might	occur.		The	state	does	not	have	a	mandate	to	develop	land	that	
is	private	and	it	cannot	provide	state	services	on	private	property.		Other	
																																																								
47	Paniagua	was	the	interim	president	after	Fujimori	fled	the	country	in	November	of	2000.		He	
stayed	in	power	until	Alejandro	Toledo	took	office	on	the	July	28,	2001.	
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organizations	equally	saw	the	aid	they	could	offer	in	contested	sectors,	although	the	
more	practical	solution	has	been	to	offer	services	and	programs	in	sectors,	or	parts	
of	sectors	that	are	on	state	land.	
						 The	following	day,	COFOPRI	made	public	statements	to	the	effect	that	the	
property	to	which	they	were	demanding	title	had	legal	owners.		A	curious	position,	
if	one	recalls	the	executive	order	that	outlined	the	conditions	for	reversion	and	the	
statute	of	limitations	in	favour	of	land	invasions	passed	by	Fujimori.		From	this	
meeting	they	realized	that	the	fight	for	the	land	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	would	have	
to	be	a	political	struggle.		At	the	time	the	invasions	that	occurred	in	places	like	the	
Nueva	Rinconada	could	not	recognized	by	the	state.		Lands	could	only	be	formalized	
that	had	been	invaded	until	December	31,	1996.		Protestors,	on	this	occasion,	
evoked	article	968,	no.	4,	of	the	Civil	Code,	which	states	that	land	reverts	to	the	state	
when	property	has	been	abandoned	for	more	than	twenty	years.		The	hope	here	was	
that	the	state	would	intervene,	awarding	the	land	to	the	squatters	based	on	the	
assertion	that	the	Association	had	abandoned	much	of	the	land	in	the	area.		With	the	
invasions	in	Villa	El	Salvador	we	saw	how	squatters	claimed	the	property	of	
landowners	there	was	abandoned	too.		Both	of	these	incidents	together	suggest	that	
squatters	and	their	leaders	were	aware	of	the	legal	possibility	of	making	an	
argument	for	reversion	based	on	abandonment.		The	only	problem	is	that	most	
property	was	not	abandoned	and	many	parts	had	been	in	use	when	the	invasions	
occurred.						
	 309
						 After	various	marches	on	Congress	and	probably	other	related	government	
ministries,	the	commission	managed	to	pressure	the	government	into	passing	law	
28391,	which	approved	the	formalization	of	markets	and	properties	invaded	until	
December	of	2001,	on	November	11,	2004.		This	was	a	resounding	victory	for	the	
fronts	and	one	that	almost	all	spoke	of	proudly.		It	was	the	crowning	achievement	
for	Oscar,	who	claimed	an	instrumental	role	in	the	process	to	change	legislation.		
Interestingly	enough,	his	counterpart	in	Nuevo	Pamplona,	Mr.	Flores,	claims	that	it	
was	he	who	was	responsible	for	getting	the	area	involved	in	initiatives	to	see	the	
government	push	forward	the	date	for	legal	recognition	of	land	invasions.		To	the	
dismay	of	many,	though,	while	the	law	opened	the	possibility	for	titling	new	
invasions	and	outlined	the	provisioning	of	basic	services,	the	legal	system	and	
politicians	seemed	reluctant	to	violate	the	rights	of	the	landowners.				
						 On	March	15,	2006	the	Toledo	government	would	make	another	gesture	to	
recent	land	invasions,	pushing	back	the	date	for	formal	recognition	until	December	
31,	2004,	enacting	a	law,	28687,	which	further	clarified	the	procedures	for	the	legal	
recognition	and	delivery	of	basic	services	to	invasions.		Whether	the	land	was	state	
land	or	land	that	the	state	would	have	to	expropriate	at	market	value,	sectors	were	
required	to	register	all	lot	owners,	hand	over	surveys	of	the	community	(the	state	
would	do	surveys	if	communities	had	not	done	so),	and	meet	the	requirements	for	
urban	residential/small	business	or	workshop	zoning	if	they	wanted	land	titles.		
Under	this	law	municipalities	were	forbidden	from	offering	service	to	sectors	where	
land	had	another	designated	use.		As	such,	the	municipality	of	San	Juan	de	
Miraflores	was	bound	in	the	aid	it	could	provide	to	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		In	fact,	it	
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would	not	be	until	later	2011	that	the	area’s	main	road	was	cleaned	up	by	the	
municipality	after	a	long	period	where	the	municipality,	particularly	under	
Edilberto	Quispe	(2007–2010)	kept	a	low	profile	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada.	
						 This	article	on	state	expropriations	entered	the	spotlight	during	the	
government	of	Alan	García	in	February	of	2009.		With	law	29320	the	government	
described	the	conditions	under	which	state	expropriation	could	occur,	who	could	
initiate	the	process,	what	kind	of	prices	would	be	paid	for	the	land	expropriated,	etc.		
Despite	all	the	media	hype,	expropriation	has	been	a	feature	in	legislation	since	the	
original	Ley	de	Barriadas	discussed	previously.		The	Nueva	Rinconada	and	other	
settlements	mobilized	during	this	time	period	to	put	pressure	on	the	Congress	to	
pass	the	law	thinking	that	it	would	benefit	them.		Debate	was	intense	in	the	press.		
Opponents	to	the	law	argued	that	it	would	send	false	signals	to	those	in	need	of	land,	
or	that	it	would	encourage	land	traffickers	to	invade	private	property.		Proponents	
argued	that	it	would	help	to	end	a	legal	deadlock	in	many	areas	where	private	
property	had	been	invaded.	
						 In	the	end,	the	law	of	expropriation	was	not	the	compassionate	gesture	it	was	
expected	to	be.		Owners	were	entitled	to	a	5%	damages	fee	and	could	demand	fair	
market	value	for	their	properties,	something	that	was	seen	as	being	unfair	by	many	
who	had	invested	their	time	and	energy	in	upgrading	private	properties	and	
increasing	the	value	of	their	property	with	their	presence.		Landowners	who	did	not	
want	to	sell	found	the	law	to	be	unfair,	as	well.		The	law	proved	too	general	for	cases	
like	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		Seen	from	the	perspective	of	those	in	need	of	land,	it	
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meant	that	they	would	have	to	pay	fair	market	value	plus	damages	for	any	property	
that	they	decided	to	invade.	
						 Marches	were	not	limited	to	pushing	through	legislation	that	would	legally	
recognize	new	asentamiento	humanos.		During	the	last	months	of	the	García	
government	a	massive	march	was	organized	to	extend	the	Agua	para	Todos,	Water	
for	Everyone,	program	initiated	by	the	García	government.		With	the	new	municipal	
laws	and	land	formalization	laws	passed	by	Toledo,	it	was	not	necessary	to	have	a	
title	deed	to	have	access	to	basic	services.		The	only	thing	needed	was	a	certificate	of	
possession	emitted	by	a	municipality.		Lands,	however,	that	were	mired	in	legal	
disputes,	like	the	Nueva	Rinconada,	were	not	likely	candidates	for	such	a	proposal.		
Nonetheless,	the	possibility	that	a	solution	would	be	found,	along	with	a	desire	to	
work	in	solidarity	with	others	that	lacked	this	basic	service	led	many	from	the	
Nueva	Rinconada	to	participate	in	a	march	that	could	have	possible	future	benefits	
for	their	community.	
				 The	cooperation	of	the	fronts	was	not	limited	to	the	political	sphere.		They	
worked	together	to	defend	the	area	on	a	number	of	occasions	from	attempted	
evictions.		After	an	attempt	to	evict	people	after	three	months,	a	number	of	
collaborators	told	me	how	they	made	a	brigade	to	combat	eviction	attempts,	
assigning	particular	duties	to	different	sectors	in	the	area.		Minas	2000,	for	instance	
was	charged	with	blocking	the	main	road	into	the	area	once	police	contingents	were	
detected.		Family	members	that	had	contacts	in	the	police	force	or	courts	provided		
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Protestors	converge	on	the	Peruvian	congress	around	noon	on	May	20,	2010	to	ask	the	government	
to	guarantee	that	the	Agua	para	Todos	program	is	continued	in	the	next	government.		A	tentative	
agreement	was	signed	by	politicians,	agreeing	to	continue	the	program.		Marches	like	this	are	one	
way	that	people	make	their	needs	felt	by	politicians.	Photo:	author					
information	regarding	the	progress	of	eviction	orders.		Some	collaborators	told	me	
that	they	bribed	local	police	to	relay	information,	at	times.	
						 In	August	of	2001	a	contingent	of	about	500	police	brazenly	moved	into	the	
area	to	evict	tens	of	thousands	of	squatters.		It	is	uncertain	whose	bravado	may	have	
sent	them	on	this	errand.		Needless	to	say,	the	effort	was	easily	repelled,	but	marked	
the	narratives	of	households	in	the	area.		Many	told	me	how	tear	gas	bombs	were	
fired	haphazardly	among	people’s	shacks.		Mothers	often	told	me	how	their	children	
had	inhaled	tear	gas	and	nearly	choked	to	death.		Other	mothers	told	me	how	they	
defiantly	blocked	the	main	entrance	with	their	children	when	police	tried	to	force	
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their	way	into	the	settlement.		For	many,	this	was	further	evidence	that	landowners	
had	paid	off	the	police	to	intervene	on	their	behalf.		One	cannot	help	but	notice	that	
these	interpretations	work	to	occlude	the	fact	that	eviction	attempts	were	the	
culmination	of	legal	processes	where	landowners	had	beseeched	the	state	to	
enforce	the	law	and	their	inalienable	right	to	property.		Despite	legislation	that	
seemed	to	favour	the	squatters	in	some	ways,	landowners	were	able	to	find	legal	
sympathy	for	their	cause	as	well,	especially	after	Toledo	set	straight	tort	laws	so	that	
they	would	not	put	private	property	at	risk,	or	punish	landowners	in	disputes	with	
others	for	possession	of	their	land.		Judges	also	favoured	private	property	owners.	
						 Another	event	that	marked	the	narratives	of	squatters	was	the	eviction	
attempt	of	landowner	Oscar	Rivera.			Zaida	Zumudio,	a	reporter	for	La	República,	
wrote	that	Oscar,	with	the	backing	of	two	hundred	hired	thugs	set	about	carrying	
out	the	eviction	order	himself	when	local	police	and	public	prosecutors	refused	to	
carry	out	the	judicial	order	(Zumudio	2001).		Oscar	contended	that	his	force	was	
really	much	smaller.		Locals	tell	me	that	they	responded,	defending	people	who	
were	being	forcefully	evicted	from	their	homes.		According	to	the	local	police	station	
captain,	property	owners	frequently	take	justice	into	their	own	hands	because	the	
police	are	reluctant	to	get	involved	due	to	the	“social	cost”.			It	is	not	uncommon	for	
police	officers,	squatters,	property	owners	and	others	to	die	in	such	confrontations.		
For	people	who	are	in	possession	of	land	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	this	incident	is	
frequently	recalled	to	support	the	view	that	property	owners	have	abused	the	rights	
of	locals,	resorting	to	the	use	of	force	to	back	their	claims.		What	is	omitted	from	
squatter	versions	of	this	event	is	that	the	Rivera	brothers	were	bound,	tortured	and	
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forced	to	repent	publicly	for	their	actions.		This	has	only	led	to	a	marked	resentment	
and	contempt	on	the	part	of	the	Rivera	family.			
						 Attempts	to	forcefully	evict	squatters	mark	the	narratives	of	locals	reinforcing	
claims	that	they	are	the	victims	of	unscrupulous	landowners	who	seek	nothing	but	
to	profit	from	their	suffering	and	sacrifices.		These	main	events	punctuate	low	
intensity	violence	like:	insulting	one	another,	bragging	that	one	side	is	going	to	carry	
the	day,	stone	throwing,	vandalism,	death	threats,	anonymous	phone	calls,	legal	
injunctions,	etc.		Both	sides	sling	counter	accusations	that	the	other	hired	gangsters	
to	terrorize	them.		Both	landowners	and	squatters	in	various	areas	have	been	
granted	legal	restraining	orders	against	each	other.			
						 The	result	of	various	attempts	to	evict	the	squatters	has	been	a	tenuous	peace	
between	the	police	and	the	squatters.		Oscar	(the	community	leader)	told	me	how	a	
certain	police	commissioner	told	them	that	the	police	would	stay	out	of	the	area	if	
they	managed	to	control	the	violence	in	the	area.		By	violence,	the	commissioner	
was	referring	to	the	drunken	brawls	that	broke	out	on	the	weekends	in	the	first	year	
or	two	of	the	invasion.		This	was	the	reason	why	many	sectors	adopted	strict	rules	
on	the	consumption	of	alcohol,	infidelity,	theft	and	any	other	imaginable	type	of	
anti‐social	behaviour.		The	idea	was	to	create	a	safe	environment	for	families	and	
create	the	impression	that	the	area	was	populated	by	law‐abiding	citizens	who	were	
there	because	they	had	a	legitimate	need	for	their	families.		Nonetheless,	these	
efforts	speak	just	as	much	about	the	social	prejudice	that	those	who	live	in	areas	
that	were	invaded	lack	values	and	morals	as	they	do	the	need,	if	one	is	seeking	
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political	solutions,	to	counter	such	views	that	are	dominant	in	the	overwhelming	
majority	of	local	press	coverage	and	viewpoints	of	more	privileged	citizens	in	Lima.			
						 Just	as	squatters	were	united	against	external	threats,	they	became	united	
against	internal	threats.		Peaceful	occupation,	incidentally,	is	a	requirement	for	legal	
statutes	of	limitations	on	land	invasions.		The	need	to	counter	prejudices	and	legal	
motives	aside,	these	efforts	brought	about	a	modicum	of	peace	for	some	time,	
suggesting	that	views	that	some	forms	of	violence	can	be	reduced	by	community	
policing	are	correct.		However,	the	character	of	this	peace	is	worthy	of	more	
scrutiny.		Here,	once	again	we	see	the	state	delegating	something	that	should	be	its	
responsibility	to	the	public.		As	people	take	over	the	responsibility	for	policing	their	
own	communities,	people	work	to	ensure	that	certain	behaviours	are	curbed.		
Excessive	drinking,	drug	trafficking,	domestic	disputes,	unruly	children	are	often	
disciplined	by	locals	in	ways	that	make	sense	to	their	communities.						
							 Local	patrols,	called	rondas	vecinales,48	have	been	instituted	in	the	area	since	
around	August	of	2003	as	part	of	a	state‐sponsored	initiative	to	increase	policing	in	
communities	without	having	to	allocate	more	money	to	state	policing.		While	they	
might	serve	as	a	deterrent	for	local	crime,	they	do	little	to	deal	with	the	root	causes	
of	delinquency.		A	typical	patrol	consists	of	anywhere	from	20	to	30	volunteers	who	
accompany,	in	reality,	run	amuck	ahead	of	the	officer,	harassing	local	gangs	of	local	
																																																								
48	A	ronda	vecinal	is	a	program	initiated	by	the	national	police	to	recruit	community	members	into	
the	police	force.	Joint	patrols	are	done	on	the	weekend	to	help	prevent	crime	by	having	a	presence	in	
the	community.		The	program	bears	vestiges	of	the	ronda	campesina	of	the	dirty	war,	save	now	
people	are	being	mobilized	against	the	evils	of	society.	
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youth	and	down‐on‐their‐luck	drug	addicts	and	homeless	people.		What	is	worse	is	
that	some	of	the	volunteers	are	given	bludgeons	to	mete	out	on	the	spot	justice.			
						 After	accompanying	people	on	a	routine	patrol	I	tried	to	talk	to	participants	
about	what	happened	the	night	before.		My	argument	was	that	repressive	acts	did	
little	to	address	the	issue	of	substance	abuse	or	gang	formation	among	local	youth.		
The	response	I	received	was	that	these	people	deserved	what	they	got	because	they	
were	robbing	people	who	came	home	late	at	night	from	work.		For	many,	the	only	
thing	that	addicts	understand	is	a	good	beating.		What	becomes	clear	from	this	stiff	
stance	is	that	legal	impunity	coupled	with	a	reality	where	muggings,	break‐ins,	pick‐
pocketing,	assaults	(armed	and	unarmed)	are	the	norm	has	led	locals	to	take	the	law	
into	their	own	hands,	often	with	the	complicit	approval	of	law	enforcement	officers.			
						 My	collaborators	told	me	of	incidents	where	they	managed	to	capture	thieves	
in	the	sector.		Punishments	range	from	severe	beatings	to	being	buried	to	one’s	neck	
in	sand,	beaten	and	having	one’s	hair	shaved	off.		Usually,	culprits	are	given	a	stern	
warning	never	to	show	their	face	again,	or	the	consequences	will	be	worse	the	next	
time	around.	
						 What	should	be	noted	here	is	that	community	justice	is	a	practice	that	has	
been	state	sanctioned	since	the	founding	of	most	sectors.		It	is	a	social	institution	
that	is	part	of	the	statutes	of	the	sectors	that	emerged	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		It	
would	be	worth	investigating	if	this	self‐policing	has	been	condoned	since	the	
Peruvian	state	decided	to	permit	informal	land	settlements	as	a	development	model.		
The	majority	of	the	mainstream	press	capitalize,	in	a	literal	and	figurative	sense,	on	
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incidents	where	community	justice	gets	out	of	hand	to	represent	less‐privileged	
social	members	as	brutish,	uncivilized,	lawless,	unruly,	and	therefore,	in	need	of	
instruction	and	guidance.		These	stories	along	with	stories	that	relate	the	excesses	of	
jealous	spouses,	merciless	criminals,	daring	assaults,	etc.	provide	the	justification	
for	non‐state	and	state	interventions	in	the	area.		The	stories	also	work	to	divert	
public	attention	away	from	the	social,	economic,	and	political	causes	of	such	illegal	
or	immoral	incidents	and	the	violence	used	to	curtail	certain	behaviours.			
						 Justice	as	meted	out	by	local	communities	tends	to	bear	resemblances	to	
observations	of	community	justice	in	Otavalo,	Ecuador.		Anthropologist	Rudi	
Colloredo‐Mansfeld	noted	the	tendency	of	community	councils	to	exact	their	own	
justice	before	handing	criminals	over	to	state	authorities	(Colloredo‐Mansfeld	
2010).		Such	acts	of	justice	combine	moral	reprobation	and	beatings,	reflecting	long	
held	Andean	values	and	practices	for	dealing	with	moral	transgressions.		Indigenous	
communities	in	Andean	Ecuador	respond	to	traditional	Inca	values	like	those	
contained	in	the	expression:	Ama	kulla,	ama	llula,	ama	shua	(Don’t	be	lazy,	don’t	lie,	
don’t	steal).		Inasmuch	as	acts	of	justice	work	to	legitimate	community	values	and	
hierarchies	and	reinforce	the	limits	of	communities,	these	acts	of	justice	also	
highlight	social	tensions	that	have	arise	due	to	the	uneven	development	of	rural	
Ecuador.		Afterall,	not	everyone	is	being	punished	and	those	often	doing	the	
punishing	are	aware	that	social	inequality	is	at	the	core	of	many	crimes	committed	
against	individual	property.		
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						 Similarly,	communities	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	enact	their	own	form	of	justice.		
This	is	not	the	anti‐systemic	practice	that	some	local	analysts	would	make	it	out	to	
be.		While	it	may	take	on	indigenous	cultural	components,	the	role	assumed	by	
sectors	to	judge	criminals	and	to	dissuade	such	acts	is	consistent	with	the	
governance	strategies	available	to	community	councils.		Many	are	acting	within	the	
statute	of	their	communities.		Their	justice,	therefore,	is	one	that	is	common	
practice.		The	police	tend	to	leave	these	cases	in	the	hands	of	communities,	however	
they	will	intervene	if	witnesses	come	forward	looking	for	justice.		In	practice,	as	
police	explained	to	me,	many	are	reluctant	to	testify	against	thieves,	drug	traffickers,	
etc.	because	of	not	wanting	to	become	the	target	of	revenge	or	unwanted	attention.		
Acting	as	a	community	to	exact	justice	is	a	safer	option	for	many	because	no	
individual	bears	responsibility	for	punishment	and	the	punishment	itself	is	seen	as	
an	impersonal	transgression	of	social	norms.					
						 The	range	of	issues	selected	for	community	intervention	is	extensive.		
Community	members	or	social	workers	can	talk	to	partners	in	cases	of	infidelity,	
urging	a	peaceful	and	diplomatic	solution.		Social	workers	in	the	community	can	
suggest	cases	where	the	state	ought	to	extract	children	from	abusive	situations.		In	
the	case	of	local	delinquency,	sectors	can	threaten	problematic	households	with	
eviction.		Thieves	who	are	caught	can	be	captured	and	punished	by	communities.		
Over	time,	though,	the	application	of	harsh	moral	punishments	has	relaxed.		Seeing	
people	purged	is	a	rarity.		Those	who	disturb	the	community	are	more	likely	to	be	
spoken	to	by	sector	authorities.		In	some	instances,	families	may	be	evicted	if	they	
are	a	known	negative	element	in	communities.		This	recent	relaxation	of	strict	
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enforcement	of	sector	rules	is	a	result	of	the	convergence	of	Andean	values	with	
urban	working	class	value	systems.		In	time,	in	fact,	if	the	trend	continues	locals	will	
petition	to	have	a	local	police	station	built	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		So,	unlike	rural	
Ecuador,	there	is	a	desire	to	have	communities	policed	by	trained	state	law	
enforcement	officers.		Delegating	these	tasks	to	local	communities	seems	like	a	
temporary	fix,	one	that	is	due	to	a	lack	of	funding	of	local	law	enforcement.								
						 At	this	point	it	should	be	clear	that	people	who	forge	out	onto	the	frontier	of	
the	city	are	highly	organized,	are	generally	principled	and	seek	to	improve	their	
situation	in	the	city,	sacrificing	their	well‐being	to	live	in	areas	without	basic	
amenities.		What	I	would	say	at	this	point,	in	response	to	many	critics	who	fixate	on	
what	they	deem	to	be	anti‐social	behaviour	of	popular	sectors,	is	that	adhesion	to	
rules	or	to	upper	middle	class	principles	is	not	possible	for	someone	who	lives	in	
these	areas.		This	does	not	constitute	an	inversion	in	morals,	or	a	lack	thereof,	as	
many	commonly	argue,	but,	rather	a	different	set	of	social	prescriptions	for	how	one	
ought	to	behave	in	an	environment	that	has	emerged	over	the	decades	in	Lima.			
						 While	this	may	constitute	a	habitus	of	sorts	(Bourdieu	1984),	it	is	one	that	is	
constantly	being	reconstituted	with	the	interactions	that	occur	between	people	in	
the	Nueva	Rinconada	and	outsiders	of	all	sorts:	missionaries,	state	workers,	and	
NGOs.		Interactions	really	go	beyond	physical	space	for	many	here,	with	the	mass	
media	playing	a	significant	role	in	the	development	of	certain	imaginaries.		We	must	
not	forget	the	everyday	interactions	of	people	who	live	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	and	
work	in	more	privileged	areas	of	the	city.		Creating	a	community,	then,	is	not	just	
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about	making	sure	that	plans	are	drawn	up,	public	amenities	brought	in,	etc.		It	is	in	
reality	a	totalizing	project,	a	complete	realignment	of	people’s	energies	and	
practices.		Instead	of	the	state	assuming	responsibility	for	this	process,	citizens	are	
being	asked	to	act	on	themselves,	disciplining	themselves.		The	logic	of	self‐help	has	
been	extended	to	the	realm	of	community	security,	in	other	words.	
						 If	we	consider	the	history	of	Pamplona	and	that	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada	as	a	
larger	history	perhaps	solidarity	is	not	the	correct	term	to	use	at	all.		There	seems	to	
be	an	injunction	to	work	together	on	one	hand,	but	on	the	other	hand	people	
compete	to	improve	their	economic	and	social	standing.		The	landowners	were	for	
the	most	part	of	the	same	extraction	as	the	squatters.		We	need	to	ask	what	made	it	
possible	for	people	to	view	those	who	had	managed	to	have	more	land	as	an	object	
of	community	retribution.		How	was	it	that	their	rights,	having	played	by	the	same	
rules	as	others,	became	the	object	of	an	organized	movement	to	usurp	the	land	that	
they	possessed?	
						 This	question	makes	me	think	of	a	joke	that	I	was	told	numerous	times	when	I	
commented	on	the	divisiveness	of	locals.		The	joke	goes	something	along	these	lines.		
One	day	a	man	went	to	buy	fish	from	the	dock.		He	noticed	that	there	were	two	pails	
of	crabs,	one	with	a	lid	and	the	other	without	a	lid.		Intrigued,	he	asked	the	
fishmonger	why	one	had	a	lid	and	the	other	did	not	have	a	lid.		The	fishmonger	
explained	that	the	pail	without	the	lid	contained	Peruvian	crabs,	while	the	pail	
without	the	lid	contained	Chilean	crabs.		The	punchline	of	the	joke	was	not	apparent	
to	me,	so	I	asked	for	an	explanation.		I	was	told	that	the	pail	with	Peruvian	crabs	did	
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not	require	a	lid	because	when	one	of	the	crabs	reached	for	freedom,	the	other	crabs	
pulled	the	crab	back	into	the	pail.		The	Chilean	crabs,	in	contrast,	had	to	be	
contained	because	they	were	likely	to	work	together	to	free	themselves	of	their	
container.		This	joke	is	also	a	commentary	on	the	social	tensions	that	emerge	when	
some	people	manage	to	improve	their	economic	situation.		It	goes	without	saying	
that	some	elements	in	communities	work	against	more	progressive	elements	in	
their	communities.		The	discursive	practices	of	envy,	gossip,	viveza	reflect	a	rich	
discussion	on	inter	and	intra	community	tensions	stirred	up	by	new	opportunities	
for	social	advancement	in	the	city.	
						 In	the	context	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada	those	who	had	managed	to	get	more,	to	
get	ahead,	were	being	pulled	back	down	by	those	who	sought	to	get	a	home	of	their	
own.		This	analogy	echoes	De	Soto’s	claim	that	the	Peruvian	state	has	been	plagued	
by	redistributive	policies.		The	Nueva	Rinconada	provides	us	with	a	case	study	of	
what	seems	to	be	a	tension	that	plays	out	at	various	levels	in	Peruvian	society	and	
that	we	can	see	reflected	even	in	state	policy,	if	one	recalls	the	intent	of	much	
legislation	to	simultaneously	appease	the	general	desire	for	progress	and	
simultaneously	protect	the	rights	of	those	who	manage	to	gain	an	advantageous	
position.			
						 Now,	I	would	like	to	turn	to	an	exploration	of	what	kind	of	a	discursive	world	
emerged	to	complement	the	physical	intractability	of	the	situation	in	the	Nueva	
Rinconada.		We	will	look	at	the	different	narratives	and	mythology	of	squatters	and	
the	narratives	of	landowners	to	understand	what	kept	the	two	sides	apart.	
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Chapter 10 —Maintaining Narratives of Good and Evil 
	
Like	most	stories,	the	story	of	how	people	came	to	the	Nueva	Rinconada	comes	
to	involve	the	casting	of	figures	in	particular	roles.		As	we	will	see,	there	is	a	
particular	representation	about	the	place	that	existed	before	people	entered	into	the	
area	on	January	6,	2000	and	afterward	for	some	time.		Simultaneously,	there	is	an	
equally	adamant	version	of	events	espoused	by	the	squatters.		In	many	ways,	these	
narratives	work	as	a	justification	for	acts	that	I	am	certain	go	against	the	beliefs	of	
almost	everyone	in	the	area.		But,	before	we	get	to	the	household	version	of	events	
that	gradually	came	together,	I	would	like	to	start	with	the	story	of	the	landowners.			
As	one	goes	over	the	details	of	the	landowner	version	of	events,	one	comes	to	
realize	that	the	two	versions	have	been	in	constant	dialogue	with	one	another,	each	
codetermining	the	other.		These	narratives	tended	to	work	against	the	resolution	of	
the	conflict	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	because	in	adhering	to	a	morally	exclusive	
narrative	each	side	forecloses	the	possibility	for	a		more	complete	consideration	of	
the	events	that	have	occurred	in	the	area	and	their	meaning.		This	chapter	is	an	
effort	to	determine	what	keeps	both	sides	from	seeing	each	other	as	equals	and	
what	keeps	people	divided	in	what	appears	to	be	only	a	localized	conflict.		Many	of	
my	collaborators	and	acquaintances	from	outside	the	Nueva	Rinconada	told	me	that	
what	I	was	seeing	and	hearing	was	more	than	the	story	of	some	small	corner	of	
Lima;	it	was	Peru	in	a	nutshell.	
						 In	this	section	I	focus	on	the	narrative	that	has	formed	around	the	position	of	
the	property	owners	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		The	one	striking	feature	of	their	
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narratives	is	that	their	histories	are	not	unlike	those	of	the	squatters.		Many	share	
the	same	modest	origins,	although	their	success	in	the	city	is	one	that	others	have	
not	shared.		The	tension	between	those	who	have	improved	their	economic	
situation	is	similar	to	that	observed	by	Rudi	Colloredo‐Mansfeld	with	his	work	in	
the	Ecuadorian	Andes	during	the	present	neoliberal	era	(1999,	2009).		Perhaps	the	
tensions	here	reflect	a	belief	that	wealth	ought	to	be	more	equitably	distributed	to	
others,	who	if	they	have	not	been	the	owners	of	property	or	business	have	
contributed	to	the	accumulation	of	wealth	of	the	owners.		The	desire	to	have	a	home	
of	their	own	is	understood	by	the	majority	of	property	owners.		The	obvious	bone	of	
contention	is	that	squatters	had	to	take	property	that	the	landowners	had	worked	
hard	to	obtain	to	fulfil	their	desires	for	home	ownership	and	social	progress.		The	
progress	of	landowners	had	come	to	be	viewed	as	an	inefficient	obstacle	to	the	
progress	of	squatters,	who	could	put	the	land	of	landowners	to	more	productive	and	
socially	beneficial	use.		
						 Many	of	the	property	owners	felt	that	the	squatters	were	prolonging	the	
standoff	because	many	of	the	property	owners	were	elderly	and	that	the	hope	of	the	
squatters	rested	in	the	belief	that	the	property	owners	would	tire	and	give	in	to	the	
demands	of	the	squatters.		This	was	something	that	was	unacceptable	to	many,	
although	some	because	of	their	understanding	of	the	difficulties	faced	by	many	had	
decided	to	sell	to	squatters	with	realistic	payment	options.		Due	to	the	violence	of	
the	original	incursion,	though,	many	vowed	to	fight	to	the	bitter	end,	claiming	that	it	
was	their	right	to	dispose	of	their	property	as	they	wished.			
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						 What	the	discourse	around	the	conflict	seems	to	suggest	is	that	the	gains	of	
some	become	the	grounds	for	others	to	seek	out	retribution.		The	insistence	that	the	
property	here	was	gained	fairly	reflects	a	belief	common	among	those	who	have	
gained	an	advantageous	foothold	throughout	their	years	of	hard	work	and	sacrifice.		
Such	a	view,	however,	denies	that	most	people	worked	the	same	long	hours	that	
these	property	owners	had,	as	well.					
						 At	times	property	owners	referred	to	the	leaders	of	the	squatters	as	common	
delinquents	that	had	spurred	on	naïve	people	in	need	of	a	home	for	their	own	
personal	gains.		Others	suggested	that	the	political	parties,	Perú	2000	and	APRA,	
had	encouraged	squatters	as	a	means	of	gaining	political	capital.		Other	owners	
suggested	an	alliance	had	been	struck	between	the	incumbent	mayor	at	the	time	and	
the	president	of	the	Assocation	of	the	time.		Other	property	owners	suggested	that	
still	other	property	owners	had	conspired	to	usurp	the	presidency	of	the	Association	
after	the	invasion	to	expropriate	the	lots	of	other	owners.		The	intrigues	between	
property	owners	further	complicated	the	scenario.		Let	us	turn	to	the	narratives	of	
some	of	the	property	owners	to	get	a	sense	of	their	position.			
						 Like	most	places,	the	Nueva	Rinconada	has	a	previous	life,	one	of	
provincianos49	raising	pigs	in	the	verdant	valley	of	what	was	the	Agricultural	
Association	of	Ciudad	de	Díos.		Time	passed	and	Pamplona	grew.		What	started	off	
																																																								
49		To	be	a	provinciano	is	to	hail	from	the	different	departments	of	Peru.		People	in	barriadas	are	
more	likely	to	self	identify	as	provincianos,	as	opposed	to	being	a	Limeño.		This	is	not	clear‐cut	though	
and	the	identification	is	often	downplayed	when	in	the	presence	of	people	that	no	longer	look	
nostalgically	upon	provincial	life.		Second	and	third	generations	are	even	less	likely	to	say	that	they	
are	from	the	provinces.		There	is	an	implied	foil	that	falls	something	along	the	lines	of	the	
Creole/Cholo	dichotomy.		Behaviourly	speaking,	there	is	great	overlap	between	groups	that	are	
provincial	and	urbane	in	their	self‐	identifications.				
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as	a	distant	enclave,	clinging	to	an	old	lifestyle	would	finish	at	the	centre	of	an	
ongoing	claim	for	living	space.		The	landowners	have	a	story	to	tell,	just	as	much	as	
the	squatters	do.		Their	story	is	one	in	which	they	worked	hard	to	acquire	property	
in	the	area.		Theirs	is	often	a	story	of	toil	and	sacrifice,	two	things	with	which	all	
landholders	and	people	in	Pamplona	are	familiar.		For	those	who	raised	livestock,	
this	was	a	land	that	they	only	partially	occupied	because	they	did	not	have	money	to	
develop	the	area	more.		Nevertheless,	some	families	poured	money	into	the	building	
of	infrastructure	for	their	enterprises	and	invested	time	and	money	into	researching	
agriculture	products	that	would	flourish	in	the	damp	wind	blown	hills	of	Pamplona.			
					Before	the	invasion,	explained	Omar	Riveras,	a	local	landowner,	people	raised	
pigs	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	before	the	1960s	in	a	very	informal	manner.		When	the	
government	decided	to	auction	the	land	that	these	pig	farmers	had	been	using,	the	
association	of	these	farmers	and	some	independent	buyers	bought	up	the	lands	in	
July	of	1968.		In	1973,	a	plan	was	drawn	up	to	urbanize	the	zone	by	one	of	the	
prominent	families	in	the	area,	however	in	1987	a	Municipal	Resolution	by	the	
Municipality	of	Lima	froze	all	zoning	changes	in	Lima.	
						 Despite	the	best	efforts	of	lawyers	and	dirigentes,	various	legal	suits	initiated	
by	squatters	over	the	past	ten	years	have	been	dismissed	by	various	courts	and	
judges	based	on	one	fact	alone	–the	land	has	clear	title.		From	the	perspective	of	
landowners,	their	position	is	a	legally	embattled	one,	but	one	that	has	stood	the	
trials	of	various	attempts	to	dispossess	them	of	what	they	feel	is	theirs.		
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						 Omar,	recalling	his	impression	of	the	area	as	a	youth	commented:	“the	area	
around	the	hills	was	virgin,	and	with	the	light	rain	that	there	was,	everything	
became	very	green.”		He	told	me	about	how	one	could	spot	owls	and	how	the	area	
was	completely	open.		He	and	his	brother,	he	recalled	triumphantly,	split	the	hill	
behind	their	property,	clearing	much	debris	and	building	a	number	of	complexes.		
These	complexes	would	be	partially	destroyed	during	a	conflict	that	ensued	when	
he	and	his	family,	unsuccessfully,	with	the	backing	of	an	eviction	notice,	attempted	
to	remove	squatters	from	the	land	on	January	16,	2001	(see	Chapter	9	for	squatter	
version	of	event).		For	his	efforts	to	recover	his	family’s	patrimony	Omar	brandishes	
a	scar	across	his	forehead	and	slurs	his	words	occasionally	through	partials	that	
replace	teeth	that	were	knocked	out	from	multiple	blows	to	the	head	during	his	
failed	eviction	attempt.		
						 A	number	of	my	collaborators,	those	who	were	not	property	owners,	also	
recalled	how	they	or	their	family	members	came	to	feed	pigs	in	the	Nueva	
Rinconada	during	their	youth.		The	area	was	in	use,	but	mainly	to	raise	pigs.			People,	
for	the	most	part,	lived	below	in	areas	where	water	trucks	and	services	would	
eventually	be	provided.		Eventually	infrastructure	and	surveillance	would	be	placed	
in	the	zone	to	prevent	theft	and	to	make	the	task	of	raising	animals	easier.		If	people	
did	not	use	all	of	their	land	or	did	not	fence	it	all,	it	was	because	they	lacked	the	
capital	to	do,	many	explained.			
						 Mrs.	Maria	Torres	and	her	family,	like	many	families,	came	to	Lima	in	search	of	
a	better	life.		Her	father,	a	livestock	dealer,	felt	housebound	in	Lima	and	jumped	at	
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the	opportunity	to	have	a	piece	of	land	in	Lima	where	he	could	raise	livestock.		
Maria	remembered	that	her	father	was	one	of	the	first	in	the	area	before	the	
Asociación	Agropecuaria	existed.		She	remembered	how	her	father	organized		
			
	
A	photograph	of	some	contemporary	(2011)	pig	stys	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		Note	the	smoke	
emanating	from	stall	in	the	background.		People	live	amid	the	noxious	fumes	of	tires	used	to	heat	pig	
slop.		Photo:	Sandy	Simon	Torres			
other	livestock	raisers	to	build	a	provisional	road.		While	her	father	was	clearing	
land,	she	recalled,	he	was	bitten	by	a	poisonous	snake.		She	assured	me	that	she	had	
the	medical	record	to	prove	it.		Her	father’s	property	is	now	two	contiguous	sectors.		
The	remnants	of	one	of	the	buildings	on	her	property	is	now	the	soup	kitchen	for	
this	sector.			
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						 At	around	the	time	of	the	invasion,	her	family	had	planted	1500	cactuses	that	
they	hoped	to	infest	with	cochinilla	worms.		The	family	had	built	concrete	walls	
around	the	plants	and	had	paid	a	security	guard	to	watch	over	the	plants.		People	
who	occupied	her	lands	threatened	the	security	guard,	saying	that	they	would	harm	
his	family	if	he	did	anything.		Maria	gave	me	a	police	statement	that	reported	that	
there	were	900	plants	that	were	on	her	property	at	the	time	of	the	invasion.		Now,	
there	is	barely	a	trace	of	what	was	there	before.		In	order	to	support	their	initial	
argument	that	the	land	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	was	abandoned,	many	of	the	
previous	structures	were	demolished	and	buried,	or	taken	over	by	squatters.		
Videos	taken	by	Mrs.	Torres	document	this	gradual	transformation	of	her	property.	
						 Another	property	owner,	Mrs.	Olga	Contreras,	told	me	how	her	stalls	were	
overtaken	and	her	pigs	killed.		Her	family	was	unsuccessful	in	stopping	people	from	
overtaking	her	lands.		Accounts	of	pigs	being	killed	were	common	among	my	
neighbours	while	living	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		It	was	part	of	the	conflict	at	the	
beginning.		As	we	will	see,	the	property	owners	unsuccessfully	attempted	to	repel	
the	groups	of	squatters	that	amassed	near	the	end	of	1999	to	take	over	their	
properties.		It	did	not	matter	that	the	land	had	belonged	to	them	because	from	the	
beginning	the	initial	dirigentes	worked	to	vilify	the	attempts	of	the	property	owners	
to	legally	regain	their	property	and	generate	a	general	narrative	that	legitimated	the	
original	invasion	on	grounds	of	social	need	and	unproductive	use	of	the	Association	
land.			
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						 Many	squatters	told	me	how	the	landowners	contracted	local	gangs	and	the	
police	to	harass	them.		There	must	have	been	some	truth	to	these	claims	because	
watches	were	organized	to	protect	sectors	against	attempts	to	dislodge	squatters.		
As	early	as	March	of	2000	requests	were	being	made	to	investigate	and	evict	
squatters	on	Association	lands.		The	constant	threat	of	property	owners	and	the	fear		
	
Some	pig	farmers	managed	to	stave	off	people	looking	for	land.		Local	landholders	will	rent	out	some	
of	these	stalls	to	raise	their	own	pigs,	which	they	then	sell	to	local	markets	for	wholesale	prices.		
Photo:	Sandy	Simon	Torres								
that	would	ensue	became	a	part	of	local	discourse	and	practice.		The	original	double	
bureaucracy	of	the	original	fronts	created	a	grey	area	where	shady	dealings	could	
occur	(selling	lots,	extracting	protection	money,	harassing	local	people	and	sectors).		
The	reason	that	the	fronts	and	sector	councils	could	abuse	people	was	through	the	
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use	of	terror,	a	morally	righteous	terror	that	masked	contradictions	in	its	
enactment.						
						 Demonizing	the	property	owners	also	helped	to	justify,	to	what	to	many,	
presents	a	certain	contradiction	in	their	own	value	system.		While	it	is	unacceptable	
to	steal	from	a	neighbour,	it	is	acceptable	to	steal	from	a	property	owner	because	
they	seek	to	exploit	the	poor,	benefiting	from	their	misery.			From	this	vantage	point,	
it	becomes	acceptable	to	punish	the	rich	as	an	act	of	retribution.		The	property	
owner	from	this	vantage	point	is	stripped	of	their	history,	of	their	humanity	and	
becomes	posited	as	one	of	many	who	benefits	and	profits	from	the	labour	of	
workers	in	the	larger	urban	economy.		As	we	will	see,	the	situation	was	often	more	
complex	than	politicians,	lawyers	and	dirigentes	divulged,	or	realized,	exposing	a	
moral	component	of	this	discourse	that	deserves	closer	scrutiny.				
						 What	is	noteworthy	in	the	accounts	of	the	property	owners	is	that	they	were	
able	to	supplement	their	claims	with	original	legal	documentation,	photos,	
statements	of	property	damage,	newspaper	clippings	that	put	the	invasion	into	a	
larger	political	context	(there	were	similar	attempts	around	the	same	period	nation‐
wide,	just	about	the	time	Fujimori	was	preparing	for	his	third	unconstitutional	re‐
election),	and	a	very	eager	attitude	to	impart	their	perspective.		What	I	got	from	the	
squatters	were	narratives	and	obvious	physical	privations	to	reinforce	their	
position.		Both	sides	made	claims	based	on	information	that	was	deemed	sufficient	
for	the	cases	that	they	made.		That	landowners	resorted	to	legal	documents	and	
written	papers	is	indicative	of	the	belief	held	among	them	that	one	“speaks	with	
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papers,”	and	not	according	to	hearsay	by	implication.		As	I	read	through	notes	from	
public	assemblies,	which	had	been	surreptitiously	provided	to	me	by	ex‐dirigentes,	it	
became	clear	that	leaders	of	the	squatters	had	received	judicial	sentences	and	
summaries	of	disfavourable	judicial	rulings.		This	information	was	suppressed	by	
dirigentes	and	lawyers	and	withheld	from	sector	coordinators	and	community	
members,	according	to	the	notes.		Notwithstanding	this	behaviour,	I	still	do	not	
believe	that	this	suppression	detracts	from	the	cause	of	squatters	or	the	inherent	
moral	critique	of	local	politics	and	economics	that	it	constitutes.	
						 From	what	I	could	gather,	and	this	will	be	borne	out	by	what	follows,	
dirigentes	and	politicians	expected	a	very	different	outcome.		People	expected	
Fujimori	to	stay	in	power	in	2000.		People	expected	landowners	to	back	down	like	
they	did	in	the	Rinconada	when	parts	of	the	Association	were	invaded	in	1990.		Or,	
people	expected	that	thousands	of	families	would	be	able	to	pool	their	money	
together	to	buy	justice,	or	extort	a	settlement	out	of	the	property	owners.		
Throughout	the	initial	years	and	successive	years,	it	was	hoped	that	a	political	
solution	could	be	found	for	a	situation	that	would	become	legally	intractable.		Those	
who	try	to	retain	their	land,	and	the	squatters	that	have	stayed	their	course	have	to	
be	respected	for	their	grit.		Let	us	move	on	now	to	talk	more	about	the	gritty	
experience	as	a	pioneer	on	the	frontiers	of	Lima.		
Personal	versions	of	events	are	often	public	versions	of	events.		We	know	this	
because	newspapers,	those	that	favoured	Fujimori	and	those	of	the	opposition	from	
this	time	period,	gave	the	perspective	of	the	squatters.		Like	the	narratives	we	have	
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collected,	other	squatters	in	other	parts	of	Lima	too	argued,	when	discussing	the	
reasons	why	they	invaded,	that	the	land	was	abandoned,	lacked	title,	or	was	not	
being	used	optimally.		This	notion	was	found	in	Villa	El	Salvador,	San	Juan	de	
Lurigancho,	Villa		Maria,	and	Callao.		In	short,	we	could	say	that	it	was	widespread	
amongst	a	particular	social	group	that	decided	to	invade	private	property	in	Lima	
and	other	areas	throughout	Peru.	
						 Let	us	consider	a	few	quotes	from	the	press	that	correspond	to	this	time	
period.		In	a	special	report	that	appeared	shortly	after	landowners	contracted	
gangsters	to	evict	squatters	in	a	recent	invasion	in	Villa	El	Salvador	killing	five	and	
wounding	dozens	more,	a	journalist	gathered	the	following	deduction	from	
squatters:	
“…the	property	was	abandoned	years	ago	and	it	was	used	as	a	safe	haven	for	
drug	addicts	and	dilenquents.”	
(Settler	quoted	in	Anonymous,	2000e:6)	
	
Squatters	from	Loma	de	Corvina,	a	10,000	square	metre	tract	of	state	land	
sung	a	similar	tune.	
“We	don’t	have	anywhere	to	live.		This	area	is	not	occupied.		Because	of	this,	
we	have	come	to	ask	that	the	government	give	us	land.”	
(Settler	quoted	in	Choy	2000:15)	
	
What	makes	much	of	the	talk	about	what	happened	intriguing	is	that	the	
narrative	has	been,	I	feel,	constructed	bit	by	bit	in	response	to	the	circumstances.		
Nonetheless,	there	is	a	core	to	the	narratives	that	can	be	found	in	different	places	
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simultaneously,	especially	the	abandonment	claim.		At	the	same	time,	there	are	
sincere	impressions	and	general	sentiments	that	find	their	way	into	a	general	
narrative,	like	not	having	a	place	to	live.		Later,	the	narrative	was	solidified	and	
transmitted	among	people	in	the	zone	with	some	possessing	more	detail	depending	
on	their	particular	interests	in	the	case	and	time	living	in	the	area.			
Dirigentes	who	try	to	turn	their	local	support	into	a	political	career	are	much	
more	inclined	and	adept	at	summarily	delivering	all	the	points	of	this	narrative,	for	
instance.		In	contrast,	those	that	have	bought	a	lot	more	recently	have	only	a	vague	
idea	of	what	happened	or	what	the	story	is.		The	difference	is	most	likely	due	to	the	
practices	that	those	who	are	politically	astute	regularly	partake	in	and	the	practices	
that	not	as	politically	active	people	regularly	partake	in.		But,	for	the	most	part,	the	
points	expressed	in	the	following	excerpt	are	the	touchstone	for	many.	
While	I	have	already	made	it	clear	that	there	are	different	voices	within	the	
area,	the	public	discourse	that	resonates	most	is	best	summed	up	by	one	of	
collaborators,	one	of	the	most	active	and	ambitious	dirigentes	in	the	area,	when	she	
said	the	following:	
Why	did	we,	when,	how	did	we	enter?		Er,	we	are	all,	we	live	in	Pamplona,	we	
are	the	sons	and	daughters	of	Pamplona	Alta,	let’s	say.		There	are	also	
communities	that	have	formed,	that	have	invaded	state	land,	let’s	say.		When	
we	came	here	we	thought	that	everything	belonged	to	the	state,	because	[the	
land]	was	abandoned.		In	this	area,	a	number	of	acts	were	committed	against	
public	morality.		That	is,	the	law	was	broken.		It	was	a	hideout	for	delinquents,	
for	drug	addicts.	When	we	took	possession,	we	found	in	some	places	in	the	
Nueva	Rinconada	pig	stys,	but	with	basements.		That	is,	in	Mirador,	Alto	
Progreso,	Nuevo	Amanecer,	no,	Nueva	Florida,	those	stys	have	basements,	and,	
in	those	basements	human	corpses.		That	leads	us	to	believe	that	there	was	
terrorism,	there	were	terrorists,	and	here,	they	were	killed.	
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(Interview	with	Ethel,	Secretary	General	of	a	sector,	June	15,	2010)	
	
It	is	hard	not	to	recognize	the	parallels	between	what	Ethel	had	to	say	about	
the	reasons	for	invading	and	those	given	by	squatters	to	the	press	in	2000.		The	
touch	points	are	very	close,	save	the	local	details	(place	names,	human	corpses	and	
terrorists).			The	elements	abandonment,	drug	addicts	and	delinquents	stand	out	in	
bold	relief.			
From	what	we	can	gather	here,	taking	possession	of	state	land,	and	even	
private	property,	continues	to	be	recognized	as	a	means	of	acquiring	property	for	
people	who	do	not	have	access	to	credit	or	the	ability	to	make	regular	payments	to	a	
bank	based	on	the	precariousness	of	most	work	in	Lima.		In	many	ways,	taking	
possession	of	a	piece	of	land,	like	many	have,	is	a	prerequisite	to	access	to	credit	and	
the	benefits	of	city	living.		That	many	who	came	were	children	from	Pamplona,	
whose	parents	had	in	a	very	similar	way	invaded	land,	gives	credibility	to	this	
assertion.			
The	general	narrative	of	most	people	who	came	to	the	Nueva	Rinconada	is	that	
they	were	unaware	that	the	land	they	would	come	to	possess	was	private	property.		
Some,	like	Ethel,	argue	that	the	land	was	abandoned.		Squatters	went	so	far	as	to	
destroy	walls	and	structures	and	bury	them	to	support	this	version	of	events.		The	
same	tactic	was	attempted	in	Villa	El	Salvador	before	Fujimori	very	publicly	
intervened.		I	had	the	benefit	of	reviewing	home	videos	of	the	area	a	few	days	after	
the	invasion,	so	I	can	say	that	this	tactic	was	used.		This	argument	is	very	much	in	
line	with	the	initial	argument	that	lawyers	unsuccessfully	used	to	challenge	the	
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ownership	of	the	land	in	the	area.		Curiously,	it	remains	in	circulation,	even	though	
the	case	has	been	dismissed	and	the	leadership	in	the	area	admonished	to	reconcile.	
This	is	where	I	started	to	ask	what	purpose	this	version	served.		This	is	when	I	
began	to	think	that	in	many	ways,	this	story	is	the	story	of	the	struggle	between	
good	and	evil.		If	one	listens	to	both	sides	of	the	story	one	gets	to	understand	that	
both	sides	attempt	to	cast	the	other	in	a	morally	inferior	position,	for	a	multitude	of	
reasons,	but	mostly	to	legitimate	their	actions	and	presence	or	non‐presence.			
I	think	that	is	necessary	because	the	situation	really	presents	a	moral	dilemma	
for	both	sides.		Squatters	have	violated	the	rights	of	what	could	easily	be	their	
friends	and	neighbours,	people	who	earned	what	they	had	respecting	social	norms	
and	laws	in	Peru.		The	landowners,	for	their	part,	but	not	in	all	cases,	seek	to	benefit	
from	the	suffering	and	tribulations	of	the	people,	an	act	of	retribution	on	their	part,	
as	well.			
It	gets	more	complicated	as	we	keep	refocusing	on	the	issue	from	different	
vantage	points.		Those	who	led	the	initial	groups	claim	that	they	knew	the	land	that	
they	would	occupy	was	private	land,	but	that	because	it	was	not	in	use	by	the	
owners,	they	could	certainly	stand	to	lose	it.		Others	felt	that	it	was	bought	for	next	
to	nothing,	therefore	it	would	not	be	a	terrible	loss	to	the	landowners.		Others	felt	
pigs	should	not	live	better	lives	than	humans,	referring	to	the	fact	that	they	had	land	
and	that	families	in	Lima	did	not	have	sufficient	land	were	forced	to	pay	rents	they	
could	not	afford,	lived	in	cramped	spaces,	or	shared	a	conflict	ridden	house	with	
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multiple	families.		Not	all	are	without	misgivings,	as	the	reader	will	recall	in	the	final	
points	made	by	Alvin	in	Chapter	8.	
Over	time,	it	appears,	a	number	of	narratives	began	to	emerge	to	reinforce	the	
claim	that	it	was	unoccupied	or	underutilized	land.		The	constant	here	is	that	the	
land	was	not	being	adequately	used	and	that	there	were	those	who	could	put	the	
land	to	better	use.			But,	it	does	not	stop	here.			
The	history	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada	quickly	becomes	a	postmodern	tale.		A	tale	
with	multiple	layers	and	vantage	points,	twisting	its	way	through	the	hills	of	this	
settlement,	picking	up	variants	along	the	way.		It	moves	from	the	real	to	the	
paranormal,	reflecting	the	various	sign	systems	at	work	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	–
sign	systems	that	overlap	with	one	another	creating	various	simultaneous	accounts	
of	events.		Elements	from	different	places	find	a	place	here	somehow.		At	times,	it	
appears	they	are	used	to	explain	child	abandonment,	disease	and	other	events	that	
have	different	circumstantial	or	scientific	explanations.		Along	the	lines	of	research	
by	Michael	Taussig	(1980)	and	Gastón	Gordillo	(2004),	I	argue	that	the	
manifestations	of	spirits	and	mythical	creatures	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	are	a	
product	of	unequal	social	relations	in	the	area	and	within	Lima	as	a	whole.		They	
reflect	a	fetishization	of	social	relations	and	the	effects	that	uneven	development	in	
Lima	has	on	squatter	communities.				
						 Like	every	frontier,	the	Nueva	Rinconada	was	inhabited	by	spirits,	
supernatural	beings	and,	even,	Apus,	or	Andean	mountain	spirits.		Locals	tell	stories	
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of	the	Llorona50,	a	beautiful	maiden	bathed	in	an	ethereal	white	light	that	visited	
people,	men	especially,	at	night.		She	is	said	to	try	to	seduce	men	away	from	their	
destinations.		There	is	also	a	viuda	negra51,	who	stalks	the	hills	at	night,	looking	to	
ensnare	local	men.		If	one	receives	a	visit	from	her	she	is	often	the	harbinger	of	
death	and	disease,	or	a	seeker	of	semen.		If	one	is	unfortunate,	they	may	cross	paths	
with	the	jinete,	another	figure	in	local	folklore.		At	night,	one	must	keep	a	vigilant	
eye	on	children,	for	duendes,	or	elves,	play	with	children,	sometimes	leading	them	
away	from	their	home.		Local	children,	some	claim,	have	been	found	abandoned	
alone	in	the	hills.		Apart	from	these	beings	there	are	also	random	spirits	who	one	
can	happen	upon	in	the	dark	of	the	night	—errant	spirits	betwixt	between	the	world	
of	the	living	and	the	dead,	echoes	from	the	past.			
						 The	day	is	no	different	from	the	night	with	respect	to	the	possible	presence	of	
supernatural	beings.		One	day	a	local	man	lost	his	way	while	wandering	the	hillsides,	
admiring	the	beauty	of	the	Manchay	flower.		He	is	said	to	have	come	upon	a	man	
after	roaming	the	hills	for	some	time.		He	offered	the	little	old	man	seated	on	a	rock	
a	cigarette.		The	old	man	pointed	him	the	way	out	of	his	labyrinth.	
						 These	tales	seem	to	be	mixing	indigenous	figures	as	well	as	Biblical	figures.		
The	Llorona,	a	figure	in	Mexican	legend,	can	be	found	in	uninhabited	areas,	or	areas	
where	there	is	darkness	on	the	outskirts	of	Lima.			
																																																								
50	Llorar	is	means	to	cry	in	Spanish.		La	Llorona,	literally,	is	a	woman	who	cries.		Basil	Kirtley	(1960)	
attempted	to	trace	the	legend	back	to	Europe,	finding	parallels	with	a	German	folktale	about	a	
German	maiden	who	murders	her	children	to	be	with	a	lover.		The	story	of	a	wailing	grieving	maid,	
he	notes,	can	be	found	throughout	North	America.		As	suggestive	as	his	interpretation	may	be,	the	
possibility	of	convergent	stories	based	on	a	real	tragedy	involving	a	mother	and	her	children	is	just	
as	plausible	as	a	diffusionist	theory	for	stories	that	follow	a	similar	pattern	in	other	cultures.		
51	Black	widow.	
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The	origin	of	the	viuda	negra	is	not	clear.			She	seems	more	like	a	female	
personification	of	death.		One	person	told	me	how	she	came	to	visit	her	husband	one	
night	and	had	pressed	upon	him	with	her	weight.		It	was	not	long	before	her	
husband	fell	ill	with	a	fever	and	was	hospitalized.		I	thought	it	seemed	like	a	folk	
explanation	for	a	stomach	infection,	no	doubt	prevalent	when	water	and	hygiene	
were	wanting.		Others	told	me	how	the	same	woman	seduced	men.		It	seemed	that	
the	Llorona	and	viuda	negra	crossed	in	their	desires	to	seduce	men.	
						 Now,	from	a	theological	perspective	we	can	begin	to	see	some	striking	
parallels.		The	character	of	Lilith	in	the	Talmud	is	believed	to	lay	with	men	and	
spawn	demons	that	create	strife	in	their	immediate	environ.		If	the	viuda	negra	was	
based	on	a	Judeo‐Christian	reference,	we	might	conclude	that	some	people	were	
making	sense	of	the	gruelling	conditions	by	bringing	in	figures	like	the	viuda	negra.		
Surely,	there	was	also	the	recognition	that	science	could	explain	the	same	
phenomenon	in	terms	of	malnutrition	or	viral	and	bacterial	infections,	however	
most	people	couched	their	understanding	of	these	events	in	terms	of	references	to	
mythological	figures.			
						 Demons	and	creatures	of	the	night	usually	inhabit	unpopluated	areas.		The	
gradual	disappearance	of	these	entities	seems	to	coincide	with	the	consolidation	of	
the	settlement.		There	seemed	to	be	a	relationship	between	the	appearance	of	light,	
the	light	of	progress,	electrical	light	and	the	disappearance	of	spirit	spottings,	
according	to	locals.		Many	collaborators	claimed	that	spirits	were	not	as	present	as	
they	were	in	the	beginning.		It	appears	that	the	populating	of	the	area	pushed	
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spiritual	beings	out	of	the	area.	But,	from	the	narratives	we	hear,	there	was	a	time,	
near	the	beginning,	when	spirits	intermingled	more	with	the	living.								
							 The	stories	are	doing	a	lot	of	moral	work.		They	seem	to	warn	of	the	dangers	of	
loose	women	and	weak	wills,	both	of	which	seem	to	indicate	that	the	stories	are	a	
social	injunction	to	stay	on	the	straight	and	narrow,	or	the	path	of	stable	
monogamous	relationships.		The	correspondence	here	with	the	moral	policing	by	
community	councils	is	noteworthy.		It	could	very	well	be	what	the	stories	mean	on	
one	level	may	reflect	the	political	and	social	processes	that	were	occurring	in	the	
Nueva	Rinconada.			
Pamela	Jones	(1988)	analyzed	different	renditions	of	the	Llorona	legend	
among	Mexican	migrants	to	the	United	States.		Many	of	the	women	with	children	she	
spoke	with	tended	to	regard	the	Llorona	as	a	mother,	who	due	to	her	circumstances,	
either	intentionally	or	unintentionally	murdered	her	children.		University	women	
tended	to	view	the	tragedy	as	a	consequence	of	the	woman’s	desire	to	be	with	a	
lover.		Different	groups	of	women	at	different	stages	in	the	life	interpreted	the	
motives	of	the	Llorona	in	different	ways,	using	the	legend	as	a	vehicle	for	their	own	
anxities.			
Perhaps	myth	became	a	medium	for	the	expression	of	anxieties	around	fidelity	
and	the	survival	of	one	and	one’s	family	at	the	beginning	of	the	invasion.		Because	of	
the	demand	that	all	staunchly	endure	such	privations,	people	began	to	channell	
their	anxieties	about	their	wellbeing	to	mythical	creatures.		This	would	explain	the	
existence	of	the	stories.		There	may	also	have	been	an	extent	to	which	such	stories,	
	 340
like	those	of	the	ghosts	of	insurgents	in	the	area,	worked	to	reaffirm	the	assertions	
being	made	by	squatters	that	terrorists	inhabited	the	area	before	it	was	populated.		
As	conditions	improved	the	stories	lost	their	practical	reference.		With	conditions	
much	improved,	these	stories	remain	as	a	memory,	a	reference	to	the	conditions	
that	initially	existed.	
						 If	I	stretch	these	stories	too	far	I	will	give	the	reader	the	impression	that	these	
stories	are	a	common	trait	among	all	my	collaborators.		I	do	not	believe	this	to	be	
the	case.		Not	all	subscribe	to	these	explanations.		Omar,	a	local	dirigente,	when	I	
recounted	such	tales	was	unconvinced.		He	said	that	people	were	“exaggerating,”	
and	that	nowadays	it	is	necessary	to	act	“in	a	civilized	world	were	myth	no	longer	
has	a	place.”		Others	laughed	when	I	told	them	what	some	people	had	told	me,	
telling	me	that	they	did	not	believe	in	such	things.		So,	as	we	can	see,	not	everyone	
need	subscribe	to	what	they	hear.		There	are	multiple	ways	to	cope	with	
psychological	stress,	indeed.		These	sentiments	reflect	the	different	people	that	have	
come	to	inhabit	the	Nueva	Rinconada	and	the	different	ways	that	they	have	of	seeing	
the	world	and	acting	upon	it.		Many	disbelievers	in	these	mythological	figures	made	
sense	of	the	conditions	in	scientific	terms;	if	these	beings	could	not	be	seen	or	stand	
the	scrutiny	of	objective	analysis,	they	could	not	be	real.	
						 Omar	told	me	a	story	to	illustrate	his	point.		He	said	that	once	he	was	in	the	
dark	on	the	outskirts	of	Lima.		He	heard	a	rustling	sound	and	began	to	run	away	
from	what	appeared	to	be	a	whitish	object.		In	the	morning	he	returned	to	the	site	of	
his	fright	and	discovered	that	it	had	just	been	an	old	plastic	bag	attached	to	a	stick.		
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He	had	run	all	around	the	stick	in	different	directions,	believing	that	the	object	was	a	
ghost	pursuing	him.		Omar	felt	that	stories	of	spirits	had	similar	rational	
explanations.		People	like	Omar	might	attribute	contemporary	myth	to	explain	the	
same	conditions	at	the	beginning,	yet	in	no	less	fetishized	terms.		When	these	
explanations	are	seen	alongside	Andean	and	American	myths	our	talk	of	
malnutrition,	disease,	greed,	and	ambition	seem	like	another	way	of	fetishizing	
unequal	social	relations	and	the	causes	of	the	suffering	of	others.		Moderns	are	no	
more	capable	of	openly	stating	such	relationships.	
The	belief	in	the	supernatural	reflects	a	number	of	things:	that	there	are	
people	that	still	believe	in	spirits	and	supernatural	beings,	that	such	beliefs	
(whether	we	call	them	traditional	or	modern)	work	as	a	commentary	on	social	
relations	and	social	conditions,	and	that	such	beliefs	are	reinforcing	claims	that	the	
land	here	was	unsettled.		There	is	a	coexistence	of	modernist	worldviews	and	
traditional	worldviews	in	communities	here,	perhaps	reflecting	the	cultural	
differences	between	residents	with	complex	individual	histories.		Let	us	consider	
how	contemporary	stories	of	historical	events	work	to	reinforce	landowner	and	
squatter	versions	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada.					
						 The	tales	turn	toward	real	events	and	the	marks	they	have	left	on	the	
collective	conscious	of	the	area.		People	tell	stories	of	terrorists	who	hid	out	here	
during	the	years	of	the	dirty	war	in	the	80s	and	90s.		While	clearing	their	lots,	many	
locals	tell	of	how	they	unearthed	human	remains	in	unmarked	graves.		Some	locals	
tell	of	coca	maceration	pits	in	some	of	the	pig	stys.		A	group	of	dead	bodies	was	
	 342
found	in	a	local	cave.		Squatters	believe	the	bodies	belonged	to	Senderistas.		Some	
landowners	deny	these	claims,	arguing	that	the	military	had	a	base	nearby	and	
regularly	patrolled	the	area	during	the	dirty	war.		Other	landowners	claim	to	have	
witnessed	summary	executions	of	insurgent	groups	in	the	hills	of	the	Association,	
reinforcing	claims	made	by	the	squatters.	
						 The	argument	for	squatters	goes	along	the	lines	of,	well,	if	there	were	
terrorists	in	the	area,	then	obviously	the	landowners	were	not	present.		There	were	
terrorists	in	the	entire	city,	not	just	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada,	though.		Once	again,	the	
debate	gets	bogged	down	in	arguments	that	no	longer	make	sense,	unless	one	finds	
the	dialogic	partner	of	the	narrative.		Like	raising	a	flag,	condemning	terrorists	is	an	
effective	way	of	distancing	oneself	from	these	insurgent	acts	and	establishing	that	
one	is	an	upright	citizen	in	search	of	their	betterment	and	the	betterment	of	the	
nation,	as	well.									
						 The	narrative	of	being	a	good	citizen	is	upheld	with	talk	about	delinquents	
who	used	the	Association	lands	as	a	refuge	prior	to	the	invasion.		Gangs	would	bring	
young	women	here	and	rape	them.		After	robbing	people,	delinquents	would	retreat	
here	to	split	their	bounty.		Not	only	was	the	area	charmed	for	some	time,	but	it	was	
also	a	cesspool.		Settlement	would	then	bring	in	civilization,	banishing	the	inequities	
of	this	abandoned	and	forsaken	place.		The	presence	of	terrorists	before,	like	the	
presence	of	delinquents	that	operated	unchecked,	indicates	that	no	good	came	of	
this	place	before	and	that	now,	with	the	presence	of	the	homeowners,	things	are	
safer	and	more	controlled.		What	I	want	to	emphasize	here	is	that	squatters	and	
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their	councils	have	demonstrated	that	they	have	come	to	establish	order.		Despite	
being	represented	as	disorderly	and	as	a	social	menace	to	more	privileged	areas	of	
Lima,	what	we	see	here	is	that	households	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	are	just	as	
determined	in	their	desire	to	establish	peace	and	order.	
When	stories	refer	to	the	desire	to	cleanse	the	area	and	bring	about	
civilization,	the	proponents	in	changing	the	history	of	the	area	are	the	squatters.		
The	real	violence	of	squatters	when	and	landowners	tends	to	be	occluded	by	these	
recountings	of	the	past.		As	squatters	talk	of	purifying	practices,	landowners	talk	of	a	
pure	place	that	preceded	the	presence	of	squatters.			
Living	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	allowed	my	analysis	to	go	beyond	the	
narratives	here	and	see	what	people	were	doing.		Not	really	surprisingly,	people,	
like	in	most	areas	of	Lima	where	people	have	chosen	to	squat	on	land	and	build	it	
up,	are	serious	about	establishing	order	and	establishing	a	degree	of	peace	in	their	
neighbourhoods.		People	aspire	to	something	more	and	over	generations	become	
more	plugged	in	to	a	contemporary	urban	living	style	that	is	now	global.			
						 As	civilization	began	to	stake	a	place,	spirits	would	be	banished	and	
supernatural	creatures	pushed	back	out	into	a	new	frontier.		Civilization,	then,	is	
experienced	as	a	contradictory	force,	as	a	front	of	sorts	that	expands	and	
incorporates	new	elements,	generating	dialectical	narratives,	which	reflect	both	
local	and	national	development	practices.		We	return	now	to	look	at	the	future	
vision	for	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		
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Conclusion —Tu envidia es mi progreso 
	
						 The	title	of	this	chaper,	Your	envy	is	my	progress,	also	that	of	this	dissertation,	
is	an	expression	that	I	got	off	a	decal	on	motortaxis	in	Pamplona.		A	variant	on	this	
theme	is	the	Tu	envidia	es	mi	triunfo,	Your	envy	is	my	triumph,	decal.		The	words	hit	
me	causing	a	discomforting	and	exhilarating	electric	jolt	to	course	throughout	my	
body.		I	was	discomforted	by	the	triumphalism	and	egoism	in	the	phrase,	but	I	was	
exhilarated	because	I	recognized	that	it	made	reference	to	an	emotion,	envidia,	and	a	
cause	for	this	emotion,	progreso	also	seemingly	synonymous	with	triunfo.			
						 Up	until	this	point	I	had	been	making	note	of	the	use	of	various	emotions,	
much	in	the	same	way	that	Walter	Benjamin	did	in	his	Arcade’s	Project	
(2002[1999]).		In	one	part	he	collected	as	many	citations	as	possible	on	the	emotion	
of	ennui	at	the	turn	of	the	twentieth	century	in	Paris.		What	I	do	here	is	to	lay	out	a	
similar	eclectic	list	to	link	together	different	emotions	in	an	attempt	to	get	at	the	
driving	motor	of	events	in	both	daily	living	and	what	happened	in	places	like	the	
Nueva	Rinconada	in	Lima.		We	must	not	forget,	the	larger	series	of	events,	the	longe	
durée	of	events	that	led	up	to	the	formation	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada,	though.		What	I	
am	looking	for	here	is	a	social	aura	surrounding	development	processes,	or	the	
commentary	and	everyday	talk	that	reflects	ongoing	processes.	
						 The	analysis	of	partial	truths	forms	a	mosaic	of	perspectives	we	can	use	to	
form	a	representation	of	the	social	interactive	field	of	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		This	
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gives	us	a	rich	description	of	practices	to	connect	with	the	emotive	economy	of	not	
only	the	Nueva	Rinconada	but	Pamplona	at	large.		We	might	then	consider	certain	
voices	in	this	field	to	be	illustrative	anecdotes,	or	significant	inflections	of	dominant	
discourses	and	narratives,	of	what	is	happening	in	this	rich	field.		Their	voices	
resonate	and	play	off	of	other	voices	in	the	area,	making	what	each	says	a	unique	
variant	on	similar	themes	in	ways	that	were	alluded	to	earlier	in	my	discussion	
about	Bakhtin’s	process	of	the	internalization	of	voices.		I	would	add	that	these	
voices	are	often	reflective	of	daily	practices,	however	there	need	not	always	be	a	
correspondence.			
						 As	much	as	I	argue	for	a	correspondence,	I	must	also	admit	that	there	are	
contradictions	between	what	people	say	and	do.		I	choose	not,	however,	to	view	this	
as	a	weakness	to	the	type	of	analysis	that	I	have	been	doing	here.		What	is	important	
is	that	the	signs	are	of	an	epoch,	a	social	generation,	or	times	which	can	be	
compared	as	being	historically	definitive.		Variance	can	be	revelatory	too,	especially	
when	discussing	partial	truths	as	we	have	seen.		As	we	continue	this	exploration,	
relationships	between	emotions	and	the	practices	and	hopes	of	people	will	be	
brought	to	bear	on	our	discussion.		I	want	to	think	about	the	different	behaviours	
that	have	been	rendered	into	a	discursive	form.		What	do	these	expressions	make	
reference	to	and	do	they	have	anything	to	do	with	the	socio‐economic	context	in	
which	they	can	be	found?		What	I	focus	on	here	are	prominent	and	repetitive	
components	of	daily	discursive	practice	in	Pamplona.			
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						 The	collection	of	these	citations	was	from	different	sites	within	the	field,	at		
different	events,	with	different	actors.		The	significance	of	these	events	was	sought	
from	actors,	if	not	in	a	direct	manner,	then	through	careful	listening	and	attention	to	
the	social	context	of	the	event.		Where	possible,	further	social	commentary	was	
elicited.		Admittedly,	such	an	analysis,	like	the	one	here,	is	suggestive	at	this	point.		
More	rigorous	investigation	would	most	likely	reveal	more	complex	links,	and	give	
some	contours	to	the	mapping	I	have	attempted	here.		Let	us	consider	our	first	piece	
of	evidence.								
						 On	the	January	27,	2011	community	leaders	were	encouraged	by	the	Jesuit	
organization	PEBAL	to	create	a	development	plan	for	the	Nueva	Rinconada.		The	
initiative	was	funded	by	the	Spanish	savings	bank	Caja	del	Mediterráneo.		There	
were	six	workshops	where	the	aim	was	to	develop	the	capabilities	of	community	
leaders,	guiding	them	in	the	elaboration	of	a	development	plan	for	the	area.		Many	of	
the	dirigentes	were	present	at	the	first	and	last	meetings,	with	attendance	dwindling	
throughout	the	course	of	the	meetings,	most	likely	due	to	other	commitments,	or	
perhaps	work.		Notwithstanding	the	lack	of	a	complete	turnout	consistently,	there	
was	a	constant	representation	of	area	dirigentes,	or	delegated	representatives	and	a	
desire	to	work	with	professionals	to	define	clear	objectives	in	areas	of	
infrastructure,	social	development	and	environmental	protection.	
						 The	workshops	demonstrated	that	professionals	and	community	leaders	can	
work	together	to	create	projects	that	will	benefit	the	public.		The	idea	behind	the	
workshops	was	to	have	a	plan	that	could	be	presented	to	political	authorities	that	
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sympathized	with	the	plight	of	landholders	in	the	area,	providing	clear	and	specific	
demands	that	community	members	had	imagined.		Therefore,	some	effort	was	
placed	on	more	accurately	defining	problems	in	the	area	and	how	to	communicate	
those	problems	to	authorities	in	unambiguous	terms	defining	objectives.		For	
something	like	unclean	water,	for	example,	participants	were	taught	that	what	they	
needed	to	do	was	to	define	the	problems	that	unclean	water	produced	in	their	
communities,	defining	the	construction	of	water	mains	and	sewers	as	measures	that	
would	reduce	more	tangible	problems	like	chronic	stomach	infections	and	parasitic	
infections.		The	whole	exercise	brought	experienced	professionals	into	contact	with	
community	leaders,	with	professionals	sharing	their	more	abstract	knowledge	in	
communicating	and	organizing	the	demands	of	locals.		The	workshops	also	allowed	
dirigentes	to	work	together	toward	defining	common	goals,	leading	many	to	realize	
that	their	objectives	were	shared	generally,	if	they	did	not	already	know	this.		
						 The	meetings	also	enabled	me,	an	outsider,	to	get	a	sense	of	what	people	here	
wanted	to	achieve	for	their	community	over	the	next	ten	years.		Most	of	what	people	
had	to	say	was	obvious	to	anyone	who	has	lived	in	the	area	or	grown	up	in	a	pueblo	
jóven,	however	seeing	it	all	said	at	once	made	the	workshop	and	what	was	said	
there	a	succinct	reiteration	of	what	one	experiences	on	a	daily	basis	in	places	like	
the	Nueva	Rinconada.		In	our	first	workshop	we	were	asked	three	questions	to	help	
participants	think	more	about	where	they	wanted	the	area	to	go	in	the	upcoming	
years.			
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						 The	first	question	asked	participants	where	they	saw	the	Nueva	Rinconada	in	
ten	years.		Four	groups	of	around	20	participants	each	thought	about	this	question.		
Combining	the	responses	that	each	group	presented	what	emerged	was	the	picture	
of	the	Nueva	Rinconada	as	a	place	with:	water,	electricity,	brick	houses,	asphalt	
roads,	public	gardens,	parks,	schools,	no	pigs,	community	centres,	soccer	pitches,	
light	posts,	a	water	reservoir,	a	swimming	pool,	a	police	station,	a	hospital,	trees,	a	
woman’s	shelter,	land	titles,	a	recycling	program,	sidewalks	and	a	better	quality	of	
life.		The	image	that	emerges	in	one’s	mind	is	not	so	different	from	more	
consolidated	areas	of	the	city,	but	as	one	can	notice	from	the	list	there	are	elements	
that	reflect	the	unique	problems	that	this	population	seeks	to	address	through	its	
demands.		For	the	most	part,	much	of	what	needed	to	be	done	was	more	material	
than	social.		The	list	above	collapses	the	desires	of	all	four	groups	and	is	a	
reiteration	of	that	political	definition	of	development	–public	works=development.		
Nonetheless,	the	responses	also	served	to	highlight	that	education	and	health	have	
become	basic	necessities	for	young	families	in	the	most	harrowing	conditions	of	the	
city.			
						 People	in	every	corner	of	Lima	seek	a	better	quality	of	life,	as	defined	by	
contemporary	standards.		Second‐rate	education,	poor	hygienic	conditions,	poor	
infrastructure,	a	lack	of	basic	services	and	a	lack	of	recreational	areas	are	not	
desirous.		Many	working	class	parents	do	not,	as	many	would	have	us	believe,	
acquiesce	to	having	less	materially	and	seeing	their	children	face	the	same	
disadvantages	that	they	may	have	in	a	highly	competitive	urban	environment.		If	
cynicism	comes	to	overshadow	the	hopes	of	this	population,	it	is	more	a	matter	of	
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resigning	oneself	to	the	fact	that	one	is	not	able	to	compete	at	the	same	level	due	to	
a	disadvantageous	playing	field.		We	see	the	recognition	that	quality	formal	
education	is	commensurate	with	social	mobility	evinced	in	the	demand	for	a	“high	
quality	of	education”	for	one’s	children.		It	was	more	likely	that	my	collaborators'	
children	spoke	a	foreign	language	and	not	a	native	language,	attesting	to	the	
globalization	of	opportunity	in	Peru.			
						 Improving	material	conditions	carries	degrees	of	expectations.		Even	the	
conditions	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	at	present	are	seen	as	an	improvement	for	some	
people	that	have	come	from	rural	areas	in	Peru.		For	those	who	came	from	their	
parents'	home,	the	conditions	are	not	an	improvement.		In	the	Nueva	Rinconada,	
and	Lima	in	general,	those	who	seek	the	improvements	detailed	above	are	seen	as	
being	those	who	want	to	overcome	their	circumstances	(superarse),	while	those	
who	do	not	share	the	same	concern,	or	are	perceived	as	not	sharing	the	same	
enthusiasm	as	community	leaders,	as	conformists	(conformistas).		A	2007	survey	
conducted	by	the	Diocese	of	Lurin	in	Lima	South	of	23,	847	families	revealed	that	
37%	of	those	surveyed	migrated	to	Lima	for	economic	reasons,	18%	for	educational	
and	cultural	reasons,	11.9%	to	get	ahead	in	their	field,	with	the	remainder	migrating	
for	family	reasons	(17.8%),	violence	(4.4%),	and	other	reasons	(10.9%)	(Alfaro	
2007:103).		The	imperative	here,	in	a	shared	social	sense,	is	to	seek	both	a	material	
and	social	improvement	in	one’s	conditions.		It	should	be	emphasized	that	we	are	
seeing	a	complete	shift	in	energies	and	practices	from	one	generation	to	the	next,	a	
new	orientation,	if	one	will,	with	attendant	social	phenomena.			
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						 The	next	question	that	people	were	asked	was	where	they	saw	themselves	and	
their	families	in	ten	years.		I	copied	the	following	collective	response	from	the	
second	group:	
I	would	like	to	see	my	family	calm,	safe	and	with	a	good	relationship	with	
neighbours.		I	would	like	to	see	my	children	healthy,	my	wife	content	in	a	
home	where	there	is	a	lot	of	love.		I	hope	to	see	my	children	studying,	without	
vices,	and	having	fun	like	children.	
(Fieldnotes	January	27,	2011)	
	
						 No	doubt	this	excerpt	was	written	by	a	man,	but	it	places	a	lot	of	emphasis	on	
the	wellbeing	of	one’s	family	and	the	community,	too.		That	children	are	healthy	in	
all	senses,	even	an	emotional	sense,	is	very	important	to	participants	in	this	group.		I	
would	add	that	what	this	group	wrote	represents	an	ideal	for	most.		By	expressing	it	
as	a	desire,	it	is	something	that	one	wishes,	but	that	is	not	a	reality	at	present.			
						 With	respect	to	the	mention	of	vices,	this	is	a	reference	to	the	danger	that	
children	in	the	area	face	of	becoming	part	of	a	gang	or	falling	into	the	depths	of	
substance	abuse	(whether	it	be	alcohol,	marijuana,	pasta	básica,52	some	other	
addictive	substance,	or	a	combination	of	all	of	the	above).		Within	communities	in	
Lima	South,	the	Diocese	of	Lurin	found	that	29.1%	of	people	thought	that	gangs	
were	problem,	25.7%	theft,	17.1%	drug	addiction,	6.6%	alcoholism,	6.1%	domestic	
violence	and	the	remainder	thought	other	problems	were	graver.		In	the	daily	
experience	of	people,	there	is	a	strong	connection	noted	between	substance	abuse,	
																																																								
52	Pasta	básica	is	a	substance	that	is	collected	from	the	dregs	of	cocaine	production.		It	is	very	
inexpensive	and	highly	addictive.		For	those	who	contend	that	cocaine	production	only	harms	rich	
nations,	they	need	to	come	to	Lima	to	see	the	violence	that	the	control	for	the	sale	and	consumption	
of	this	drug	has	produced	in	lower	income	neighbourhoods	of	Lima.		
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theft	and	gang	behaviour.		Taken	together,	these	three,	and	four	if	we	include	
alcoholism,	seem	to	be	pointing	to	larger	issues	like	the	lack	of	gainful	employment	
and	opportunities	for	youth.		That	said,	people	can	turn	to	other	practices	that	are	
less	detrimental	to	others	or	their	social	environment.		We	should	not,	therefore,	
assume	that	no	employment	correlates	directly	with	drug	abuse	and	criminal	acts	
against	others.		This	line	of	thinking	is	highly	suspect	as	it	seems	to	be	occluding	the	
pervasiveness	of	behaviours	that	destroy	communities	and	families,	namely	the	
transgressions	of	others	in	higher	places,	and	the	effects	that	an	extenuating	labour	
regime	has	on	family	and	the	home.		Here,	we	are	led	to	believe	that	stricter	
adherence	to	societal	ideals	will	yield	a	commensurate	payoff.	
						 To	shed	more	light	on	this	seemingly	simple	excerpt,	I	would	like	to	include	a	
piece	of	a	conversation	on	the	dangers	of	Lima	from	the	perspective	of	a	
collaborator	in	his	mid‐thirties	who	is	a	first	generation	migrant	from	Cajamarca.		
He	sells	juice	in	the	market	that	faces	onto	the	busiest	intersection	in	the	Nueva	
Rinconada.		On	a	daily	basis	he	bears	witness	to	what	happens	at	an	intersection	
that	is	defined	by	local	police	as	a	hotspot	of	criminal	activity,	mostly	petty	thefts,	
but	also	confrontations	between	local	youth	and	youth	from	other	districts.		His	
juice	stand	is	frequented	by	locals	who	discuss	everything	from	politics	to	religious	
beliefs.		His	opinions	are	expert	testimony	on	the	sociological,	economic	and	
political	complexities	of	the	reality	in	which	he	lives.		Here	is	a	segment	of	one	of	our	
conversations,	which	I	began	to	record	because	I	felt	that	he	was	what	in	
anthropological	literature	we	refer	to	as	a	key	informant.		What	he	has	to	say	
situates	the	brief	excerpt	that	I	cited	above.		On	this	day,	we	were	talking	about	why	
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some	children	end	up	being	criminals	in	the	area.		After	listening	to	the	life	stories	of	
a	few	ex‐criminals,	I	had	some	ideas	on	the	subject	and	wanted	to	see	what	Ramón	
thought.		This	conversation	was	sparked	by	two	youths	throwing	rocks	at	one	
another	outside	the	market.		The	incident	had	drawn	the	attention	of	passersby	and	
both	of	us.	
Ramón:		When	people	immigrate	to	Lima	they	work	mostly	and	they	abandon	
their	children,	which	means	that	these	children	grow	up	in	an	isolated	way.			
Everything	depends	on	how	the	parents	arrived,	how	they	migrated:	mothers	
are	abandoned,	they	have	conflicts	in	the	home,	the	father	hits	the	mother	and	
the	children	see	this	type	of	violence.		And,	they	separate.		It	is	like	this	that	the	
father	forgets	about	paying	child	support	for	his	children.		So,	the	mother	has	
to	work	and	the	children	are	left	abandoned.			
Abandonment	is	born	from	this	situation.		But,	there	are	groups	of	youth	that	
are	walking	in	the	streets,	and	because	they	are	abandoned	and	only	
adolescents	they	don’t	know	which	group	to	belong	to,	and	because	they	see	
that	it	is	easier	to	be	with	friends,	with	people	in	their	group	[they	join	them].	
Gangs,	delinquency,	drug	addiction,	in	other	words,	laziness	(ociosidad)	derive	
from	this	situation.	
This	laziness	is	the	mother	of	all	vices	because	they	don’t	work,	they	don’t	
study,	they	don’t	go	to	school.		If	there	is	a	group	of	two	or	three	people	that	
are	gangsters	or	abandoned,	they	start	drinking.		Later	it	won’t	be	three.		It’ll	
be	five,	seven	and	like	this	they	form	big	groups.			
B:	But,	to	be	a	delinquent	requires	effort	and	time	too.		He	has	to	study	his	
victims,	their	respective	patterns.	
R:	The	delinquent	has	to	have	time,	he	has	to	be	lax	to	study	his	victims.		That	
is	his	work	obviously,	logically,	if	they	are	doing	nothing.	
B:	The	victims	are	justified,	saying	they	are	bad,	they	are	greedy,	they	don’t	
want	to	share,	how	is	it?	
R:	Everything	is	born	of	its	origin,	of	its	roots.	
People	from	the	provinces	are	a	little	healthier,	but	in	the	city	they	learn	
mañas53	because	someone	else	did	it	to	you.		So,	there	is	no	trust.	
																																																								
53	Anti‐social	skills	or	talents.		Picking	pockets,	swindling,	learning	to	evoke	fear	in	others	to	extort	
money,	etc.	are	special	skills	that	are	honed.	
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Picardía54	can	be	a	maña.	
	
						 Ramón	told	me	that	when	he	came	to	Lima	he	was	very	naive.		If	some	asked	
him	for	a	favour,	when	he	befriended	someone,	he	might	lend	them	his	cell	phone,	
even	if	one	of	them	took	his	cell	phone	and	never	returned.		On	some	occasions	he	
lent	money,	suffering	the	same	ill	fortune.		
R:	That	is	a	direct	robbery,	because	first	they	earn	your	trust	and	later	they	rob	
you.				
Some	rob	you	in	a	brilliant	way,	in	broad	daylight,	without	yelling,	without	
putting	a	knife	to	you,	without	insulting	you,	nothing.	
This	is	an	intelligent	robbery.		This	way	is	picardía.		This	is	a	maña,	theft	with	
maña.	
We	also	call	people	with	a	good	sense	of	humour	pícaros.			
Therefore,	to	have	maña	is	something	like	being	vivo.	
	
						 Ramón	went	on	to	describe	other	examples	of	maña	finishing	his	explanations	
with	a	general	definition.	
R:	One	can	say	that	people	have	maña	when	they	say	one	thing	instead	of	
another	and	all	of	this	arises	in	the	city.	
	
						 As	much	as	he	feels	that	this	behaviour	is	part	of	the	city,	he	concedes	that	it	
exists	in	the	provincial	towns	of	Peru,	but	to	a	lesser	extent.		He	continues	with	his	
musings.	
R:	Here	people	are	super	liars.		Provincial	Peruvians	become	experts	here.		
They	learn	a	lot	of	things.		Some	even	become	delinquents	and	these	are	
																																																								
54	Something	similar	to	cunning	in	English.	
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sometimes	the	children	of	the	same	people	of	the	masses	(gente	del	pueblo)	
that	have	emigrated.		Write	that	down.	
	
						 While	I	go	on	to	emphasize	the	socio‐economic	factors,	connecting	
abandonment	and	the	lack	of	presence	or	know‐how	of	parents	in	a	new	urban	
context,	Ramón	brings	the	argument	back	around	to	a	discussion	on	the	family.	
R:	There	is	a	lot	of	hate,	rancour.		People	start	to	victimize	others.		There	is	no	
love	and	money	does	not	solve	everything.	
I	had	cousins	that	did	not	have	money,	but,	yes,	the	love	of	their	parents	and	
the	result	is	that	all	the	children	are	professionals.		Everything	rests	in	the	fact	
of	giving	love	so	that	children	do	not	go	astray.	
(Ramón,	Interview	recorded	on	November	14,	2010)	
	
						 There	is	quite	a	lot	in	this	small	excerpt.		We	can	appreciate	that	crime,	
distrust,	ambition,	cunning,	hate,	dishonesty	are	all	connected	and	that	the	only	
salve	for	these	destructive	behaviours	seems	to	be	a	loving	and	principled	family.		It	
would	not	be	a	stretch	to	associate	envy	with	the	sting	of	seeing	others	enjoy	the	
success	that	one	has	sought.		What	we	see	is	that	the	excerpt	in	our	meeting	was	a	
loaded	commentary	on	the	social	circumstance	of	people	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	
and	areas	that	have	arisen	due	to	self‐help	housing.		People	are	acutely	aware	of	the	
importance	of	being	on	good	terms	with	one’s	family	and	their	neighbours.		That	
both	excerpts	come	back	to	love	is	significant.		Love	here	is	seen	as	a	sin‐qua‐non	for	
success	and	social	cohesion.		From	a	loving	home	come	socially	healthy	children	
who	do	not	pour	their	hatred	and	pain	into	their	neighbourhoods.					
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						 Invariably,	the	measure	of	goodness	of	a	person	is	reflected	in	their	
achievements	for	Ramón	and	others.		On	another	occasion,	when	I	asked	about	
overcoming	one’s	condition	(superandose),	he	told	me	that	his	father	told	him	that	
one	can	get	ahead	in	one	of	two	ways:	study	or	business.				
						 In	other	excerpts	from	the	workshop	with	community	leaders	regarding	how	
people	saw	themselves	and	their	children,	people	alluded	a	lot	to	social	
advancement	in	the	city.		One	group	wrote	that	they	saw	themselves	with	“their	own	
business	in	their	home	and	having	health	and	education	in	a	home	constructed	of	
brick	and	cement.”		It	was	important	to	add	that	they	saw	their	children	with	a	
“profession	and	studying.”		One	of	the	groups	recognized	that	for	crime	to	decrease	
the	government	would	have	to	create	more	jobs.		Another	group	saw	their	children	
being	“professionals,	business	owners,	or	working	in	big	companies.”		
						 What	people	imagined	for	their	community	was	not	so	different	from	what	any	
other	neighbourhood	in	Lima	would	aspire	to	have.		The	overwhelming	desire	of	
locals	was	to	see	the	living	conditions	and	social	possibilities	for	their	children	
improved.		The	workshops	highlighted	perceived	deficiencies	in	education	and	
health	care	provided	by	the	state,	seeing	more	state	investment	as	the	obvious	
solution.		An	area	school	psychologist	and	social	worker	confirmed	that	this	attitude	
was	based	on	a	real	lack	of	funding	for	area	state	schools.		The	fear	of	many	locals	to	
go	to	local	state	hospitals,	choosing,	instead,	to	place	their	trust	in	private	hospitals	
speaks	of	the	lack	of	funding	for	state	hospitals.		Unfortunately,	money	does	buy	one	
education	and	health.		For	the	most	part,	the	workshops	demonstrated	that	even	the	
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newest	areas	of	Lima	were	keen	to	see	improvements	in	their	circumstances	–the	
opposite	of	what	impressions	from	more	affluent	areas	would	have	us	believe.		What	
this	workshop	and	the	history	of	Nueva	Rinconada	tell	us	is	that	people	who	have	
been	living	for	generations	in	the	ever‐expanding	frontiers	of	Lima	are	here	to	
partake	in	what	is	locally	referred	to	as	progress,	or	what	is	perceived	as	an	
improvement	in	their	condition	in	all	senses.		
						 In	many	ways,	people’s	commentary	keeps	on	returning	to	what	affects	the	
family	and	how	the	new	family	unit	operates	in	the	city,	in	an	environment	that	is	
dangerous	and	full	of	negative	influences.		Neglect	your	children	and	you	face	the	
danger	that	their	anger	and	frustration	find	a	voice	in	violence	against	other	
compatriots,	who	may	or	may	not	belong	to	your	neighbourhood.		Somehow,	that	
self‐reliance	and	interdependence	that	characterized	rural	living	for	many	has	
become	a	detriment	to	the	family	in	Lima.		Leaving	your	children	alone	in	the	city	
can	leave	them	vulnerable	and	likely	to	join	up	with	other	youths	who	walk	alone.		It	
is	hard	not	to	notice	the	concern	for	the	future	and	wellbeing	of	one’s	children,	
however	there	is	another	interpretation	that	can	be	made	of	this	injunction	to	focus	
one’s	energy	on	the	home	here.	
						 In	conversations	with	collaborators	the	strict	frigidity	of	families	before	they	
migrate	to	Lima	is	often	contrasted	with	dialogue	and	an	open	expression	of	
affection	in	the	home.		Birth	control	is	practiced	among	even	the	poor,	with	families	
nowadays	averaging	just	over	two	children	(the	municipality	of	Lima	puts	the	
number	at	2.1	between	1993	and	2007	in	greater	Lima).		Families	are	to	remain	
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stable	so	that	children	may	have	the	emotional	stability	to	succeed	in	either	
business	or	study.		The	married	couple	should	have	their	own	home.		Women	are	to	
be	educated	just	as	much	as	men,	so	that	they	can	enjoy	equal	opportunities.		
Children	should	not	work,	lest	their	futures	be	truncated.		Being	morally	observant	
of	these	new	ideals	goes	hand‐in‐hand	with	material	progress.	
						 A	study	that	was	conducted	by	psychologists	from	the	Peruvian	University	of	
Applied	Sciences	(UPC)	in	one	of	the	sectors	of	a	collaborator	of	mine	in	2009	
focused	specifically	on	the	family	and	community.		Among	the	problems	on	which	
their	diagnosis	placed	special	priority	was	that	of	communication	in	the	family.		The	
authors	write:	
In	Asentamiento	Humano	X	one	can	see	a	great	lack	of	family	communication,	
which	is	associated	with	the	little	existing	trust	between	family	members.		
[This	lack	of	communication]	is	related	to	an	inadequate	treatment	between	
them,	lack	of	free	time,	stress,	and	worries	that	overcome	the	home	(Montoya	
et	al.	2009:24).	
	
						 The	implication	here	is	that	the	problems	of	the	families	here	are	a	result	of	
their	practices	as	a	family.		A	lack	of	communication	can	occur	between	children	and	
parents	when	parents	are	“impatient”	in	their	wish	to	intervene	in	the	education	of	
their	children.		Television,	long	work	hours,	and	commitments	outside	the	home	on	
weekends	are	listed	as	having	another	negative	impact	on	communication	in	the	
household.		Spouses	experience	a	breakdown	in	their	relationships	due	to	their	
inability	to	listen	to	what	their	spouse	is	really	saying,	blaming,	passing	judgment,	
etc.		The	consequences	of	a	lack	of	communication	are	a	distancing	between	
partners.		As	the	authors	state,	“…they	become	selfish	and	they	forget	about	the	
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needs	of	their	partner.”		Parents	not	listening	to	their	children	results	in	the	
alienation	of	their	children,	resulting	in	drug	use,	violent	behaviour,	etc.	(Montoya	
2009:24‐25).	
						 I	would	qualify	the	study’s	statement	on	egoism	by	saying	that	it	is	prevalent	
outside	the	home	and	an	essential	ingredient	in	getting	ahead	in	the	city.		Here,	one	
could	also	differentiate	another	type	of	egoism,	typical	to	many	men	in	the	world,	an	
entitlement	that	is	born	of	the	belief	that	men	work	and	women	do	all	the	rest	in	
spite	of	circumstances	where	most	women	are	now	forced	to	work	for	the	
betterment	of	the	socioeconomic	conditions	of	one’s	family.		While	the	second,	
through	introspection	and	realism,	is	possible	to	change,	the	first	type	of	egoism,	
which	is	endemic	in	the	area,	has	no	real	solution	save	the	complete	reorientation	of	
Peruvian	society	and	the	world	at	large.	
						 The	study	really	opens	up	an	interesting	debate.		Can	we	change	society	
through	the	modification	of	behaviours	in	the	home,	or	are	behaviours	in	the	home	
bound	to	reflect	values	and	behaviours	outside	the	home?		Both	seem	to	go	hand	in	
hand.		Behaviours	in	homes	have	been	changed	because	the	of	interventions	of	the	
state	and	NGO	groups	who	are	promoting	things	like	“dialogue,”	safe	sex,	equal	
rights,	nutrition,	etc.		And	these	initiatives	are	successful.		I	expected	to	see	some	
resistance	from	my	collaborators,	however,	to	my	surprise,	I	saw	the	exact	opposite	
–an	eager	desire	to	be	cultivated	(with	these	novel	ideas).		Existing	alongside	these	
admonitions	are	those	that	encourage	people	here	to	succeed,	to	overcome	one’s	
circumstances.		I	kept	on	wondering	what	effect	such	contradictory	voices	have	on	
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any	individual.		How	can	people	be	considerate	at	home	and	with	others,	but,	at	the	
same	time,	live	in	a	world	where	competition	in	almost	every	environment	is	
anything	but	friendly	and	considerate?			
						 My	point	here	is	not	to	deny	that	there	are	serious	social	problems	in	less	
privileged	parts	of	the	city.		What	I	want	to	defamiliarize	here	are	the	new	
expectations	that	have	arisen	around	the	family	and	the	goals	that	people	are	
directing	their	energies	toward	in	an	environment	where	employment	is	unstable	
and	working	conditions	for	most	grueling.		The	reality	is	that	most	parents	are	not	
able	to	be	with	their	children	as	much	as	they	would	like.		A	lack	of	opportunities	for	
youth	in	the	area	leads	many	to	release	their	frustrations	in	diversions	like	
substance	abuse	or	acts	directed	against	those	who	have	what	they	lack.			
						 We	are	often	led	by	experts	to	believe	that	liberal	economic	and	political	
reforms	will	improve	this	situation.		And,	maybe	it	does,	but	in	ways	that	see	anti‐
social	behaviour	growing	in	other	areas	like	the	workplace.		Socially	progressive	
professionals	advocate	for	more	spending	in	health	and	education,	however	the	
government	struggles	to	meet	the	real	need	of	the	population.		On	the	ground,	it	
appears	that	those	who	manage	to	claw	their	way	out	of	generalized	precarious	
living	conditions	do	so	at	the	expense	of	their	neighbours	arousing	their	envy	and	
distrust.		This	lack	of	trust,	in	turn,	can	be	felt	among	those	who	have	more	and	
those	who	aspire	to	more.		Could	it	be	that	what	Ramón	defined	as	maña,	as	that	
situation	where	one	says	one	thing	and	does	another,	has	become	the	motor	of	
success?		To	get	ahead	one	must	hide	the	truth	or	distort	it,	especially	in	an	
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environment	where	so	many	are	trying	to	achieve	the	same	goal	–the	progress	of	
their	children.		Seen	this	way,	distrust,	envy,	crime	and	other	socially	inimical	
behaviours	are	the	collateral	damage	of	progress,	or	economic	and	social	
advancement.																											
						 One	day	I	sat	down	to	have	a	coffee	with	a	retired	worker	who	had	a	drink	
stand	on	one	of	the	main	thoroughfares	in	Pamplona.		I	had	been	visiting	him	
regularly,	asking	him	to	explain	different	things	to	me.		On	this	occasion	I	was	
curious	about	viveza	or	being	a	vivo.		He	told	me	to	listen	to	the	following	song,	
which	seems	to	go	with	our	present	discussion.		The	song	was	written	by	Ernesto	
Sánchez	Fajardo,	a	native	of	a	small	town	called	Bamba	in	the	department	of	Ancash.		
He	migrated	to	Lima	as	a	boy	and	later	became	a	renowned	musician,	bringing	the	
sound	of	Andean	huaynos	to	the	capital.	
Verdades	que	amargan		 	 Truths	that	embitter	–Jilguero	de	Huascarán	
Si	reviviera	Luis	Pardo,	 	 If	Luis	Pardo,	the	great	Alama	
el	gran	Alama	y	Atusparia,	 	 and	Atusparia55	were	revived,	
no	habrían	tantos	abusos	 	 there	would	not	be	so	many	abuses	
con	la	clase	proletaria.	 	 of	the	proletariat	class.	
	
A	las	palabras	del	pobre	 	 What	the	poor	say	
nunca	le	dan	las	razones,		 	 they	never	say	it	is	true,	
aunque	la	razón	les	sobre	 	 even	though	the	truth	abounds,	
más	pueden	las	opresiones.		 oppressions	prevail.	
	
Si	uno	aguanta	es	un	bruto,		 If	one	bears	it	he	is	a	brute,		
Y	si	no	aguanta	es	un	malo.	 	 And	if	one	can’t	bear	it	he	is	bad.	
Dale	azote.	Dale	palo.	 	 	 Give	him	the	whip.	Give	him	the	stick.	
Eso	es	la	suerte	del	cholo.	 	 That	is	the	luck	of	the	cholo.	
	
																																																								
55	From	what	I	can	piece	together	these	were	roguish	figures	in	Andean	lore	who	
resisted	abusive	authorities	during	the	19th	century.	
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En	este	mundo	de	vivos	 	 In	this	world	of	vivos,	
el	vivo	vive	del	sonso,		 	 the	vivo	lives	off	the	idiot,	
el	sonso	de	su	trabajo		 	 the	idiot	from	his	work,	
y	el	diablo	de	sus	maldades.	(2)	 and	the	Devil	from	his	evil	deeds.	
	
Verdades	que	amargan	 	 Truths	that	embitter	
	
Si	reviviera	Luis	Pardo,	 	 If	Luis	Pardo,	the	great	Alama	
el	gran	Alama	y	Atusparia,	 	 and	Atusparia	were	revived,	
no	habrían	tantos	abusos	 	 there	would	not	be	so	many	abuses	
con	la	clase	proletaria.	 	 with	the	proletariat	class.	
	
En	que	lugares	no	han	visto		 In	what	places	have	you	not	seen	
el	castigar	con	injusticias,	 	 punishment	with	injustices,	
dar	libertad	al	culpable	 	 giving	freedom	to	the	guilty,	
y	al	inocente	la	cárcel.		 	 and	jail	to	the	innocent.	
	
El	que	roba	cuatro	reales	 	 He	who	robs	four	reales	
la	justicia	lo	estrangula,	 	 justice	strangles	him,	
pero	al	que	roba	millones		 	 But	he	who	robs	millions,	
la	justicia	mas	lo	adula.	 	 Justice	adulates	him	more.	
	
En	este	mundo	de	vivos	 	 In	this	world	of	vivos,	
el	vivo	vive	del	sonso,		 	 the	vivo	lives	off	the	idiot,	
el	sonso	de	su	trabajo		 	 the	idiot	off	of	his	work,	
y	el	diablo	de	sus	maldades.	(2)	 and	the	Devil	off	of	his	evil	deeds.	(2)	
	
						 The	song	gets	at	a	lot	in	a	very	efficient	manner.		Viveza	here	is	seen	as	both	a		
necessity	and	a	lamentful	situation.		Only	the	fool	expects	to	make	a	living	from	an	
honest	day’s	work.		The	world,	the	world	of	people	like	the	singer,	a	migrant	to	Lima,	
is	one	of	vivos	who	live	off	the	honest	labour	of	others.		The	truth	of	the	people	is	
stifled	in	an	environment	where	oppression	overpowers	the	words	of	truth,	
particularly	the	voice	of	common	people.		In	the	song	there	is	a	call	to	retributive	
justice;	folk	figures	who	fought	for	the	proletariat	class	are	mentioned.		The	singer	
states	that	things	might	be	different	if	figures	like	this	existed.		The	Nueva	
Rinconada,	in	many	senses,	feeds	off	the	sense	of	indignation	felt	in	this	folk	song	
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and	brings	it	into	a	physical	expression	of	retributive	justice.		It	could	be	that	many	
daily	practices	are	guided	by	this	grassroots	principle	of	justice	that	decries	the	
advancement	of	others	at	the	expense	of	the	majority.		Justice	here	is	a	rhizome	that	
keeps	popping	up	in	different	places	throughout	Peruvian	history	since	the	violent	
incursion	of	the	Spaniards.56						
						 The	connection	between	viveza	and	distrust	is	very	strong	within	the	
discourse	of	people	who	I	encountered	in	Pamplona.		Ramón	and	I	discussed	the	
issue	of	trust	in	one	of	our	conversations.	
R:	In	this	country	trust	has	been	lost	a	lot.	
Distrust	is	born	[of	the	fact]	that	nobody	cares	for	anybody,	few	care	for	one	
another.		If	everyone	cared	for	each	other,	everything	would	be	different.		
Peruvian	society	would	be	different.	
B:	And	why	does	distrust	exist?	
R:	Distrust,	perhaps,	exists	because	of	delinquency,	above	all	because	of	
bureaucratic	theft	that	comes	from	the	head	of	the	government.	
I	tell	you	that	you	are	going	to	be	president.	
What	would	you	do?	
With	the	condition	that	you	would	change	the	model,	distinct	from	what	
people	in	the	past	have	done,	to	improve	society	with	a	social	market	model	
where	the	people	are	first	and	after	that	capital.	
Here	it	is	the	inverse.		Capital	is	first	and	then	it	is	the	people.		What	does	it	
matter	if	50	or	a	thousand	people	die	in	my	business,	as	long	as	my	capital	
does	go	into	decadence.	
B:	Do	you	see	a	relationship	between	viveza	and	distrust?	
R:	A	lot,	viveza,	viveza	(indiscernible)	
(Ramón,	Interview	recorded	on	November	14,	2010)	
																																																								
56	The	constant	revolts	and	civil	uprisings	that	have	marked	Peruvian	colonial	and	post‐colonial	
history	can	be	seen	in	this	light	as	the	sporadic	channelings	of	a	generalized	feeling	of	indignation	
among	different	groups.		
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						 If	the	leaders	of	a	society	are	seen	as	giving	the	example	that	it	is	acceptable	to	
lie,	cheat	and	steal,	who	can	one	trust?		Ramón	sees	Peru	as	being	capital	driven	
with	social	concerns	falling	by	the	waist	side.		We	get	on	this	topic	through	a	prompt	
on	distrust,	which	he	sees	strongly	associated	with	viveza.		What	is	viveza	but	a	
strong	individualistic,	psychotic	drive	for	self	gain?		It	is	psychotic	because	those	
who	are	the	most	adept	practicioners	are	convinced	that	it	is	a	necessity,	that	it	can	
be	no	other	way	and	that	damage	to	all	others	is	justifiable.		In	the	lyrics	of	Ernesto	
we	see	a	world	where	the	voice	of	the	people	is	silenced	by	the	corruption	of	those	
in	power.		Justice	is	miscarried,	and	honesty	and	humility	are	the	virtues	of	fools.			
						 One	might	be	able	to	attribute	all	of	this	to	the	rantings	of	a	select	few	
malcontents	that	I	have	selectively	culled.		The	survey	conducted	by	the	Diocese	of	
Lurin	in	2007	suggests	otherwise,	though.		When	asked	to	define	the	anti‐value	that	
predominates	in	their	community,	participants	chose	as	follows:	indifference	
(20.4%),	injustice	(17.4%),	lying	(16.7	%),	individualism	(15.2%),	lack	of	faith	
(10.3%),	dishonesty	(7.7%),	other	(12.4%)	(Alfaro	2007:114).		It	is	hard	not	to	
notice	the	relationship	between	the	responses,	and	the	overlap	that	exists	with	the	
responses	that	were	defined	by	the	surveyors.					
						 What	I	am	getting	at	here	is	that	the	problems	of	people	in	urban	areas	cannot	
be	solved	by	giving	them	all	education	and	health	care.		The	problem	is	more	
complex	than	this.		This	goal	may	be	more	a	part	of	the	problem	than	the	solution,	
no	matter	how	well	meaning	this	ideal	may	seem.		Despite	an	improvement	in	
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education	and	health,	many	of	my	collaborators	speak	of	a	social	world	that	is	highly	
divisive	and	shot	through	with	a	socially	unhealthy	dose	of	individualism.		The	
contemporary	notion	of	social	inclusion,	in	practice,	is	an	imposition	of	wills	
because	what	it	promotes	is	an	inclusion	in	a	generalized	form	of	competition	of	
which	most	are	critical.		It	presupposes	a	just,	civil	society	that	makes	rules	and	laws	
for	the	majority.		However,	in	reality,	and	this	is	something	that	comes	out	in	what	
has	happened	in	the	Nueva	Rinconada	and	what	occurs	in	daily	practice,	rules	are	
set	and	upheld	for	the	powerful	elites	who	derive	disproportionate	gain	from	a	
hierarchical	social	system	that	is	now	global	in	its	scope.	
						 In	order	for	there	to	be	true	inclusion,	the	voices	of	the	majority	must	figure	in	
the	laws	and	collective	desires	of	the	nation.		When	people	talk	of	egoism,	distrust,	
delinquency,	etc.	as	being	serious	problems,	we	must	seek	to	understand	the	
complex	causes	and	seek	to	change	the	social	system	we	live	in	to	one	in	which	
social	harmony	prevails.		From	our	discussion	on	Fujimori’s	neoliberal	experiment,	
it	should	be	clear	to	the	reader	that	the	panacea	to	social	ills,	material	
improvements	in	living	conditions,	does	little	to	address	the	social	complexities	of	a	
nation	like	Peru.		As	a	consequence,	people	do	what	they	abhor	to	get	ahead	for	
what	the	heart	would	command	is	foolish	at	best.		Only	the	fool	works,	indeed.	
						 The	last	thing	I	want	to	do	here	is	to	paint	all	those	who	have	privilege	as	bent	
on	the	destruction	of	the	poor.			In	most	cases,	in	fact,	the	exact	opposite	is	true.		
There	is	a	tremendous	amount	of	resources	and	energy	being	directed	to	developing	
the	frontiers	of	the	Peruvian	society.		Most	talk	of	social	inclusion	is	more	about	
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making	people	feel	included	in	a	system	that	has	excluded	them	from	the	beginning.		
Reason	would	demand	that	there	be	something	more	than	just	a	rewording	of	the	
phraseology	of	development	talk	for	the	past	six	decades.		But,	there	is	not.	
						 That	the	potential	of	all	individuals	in	contemporary	Peru	can	be	achieved	is	
utopic.		That	all	can	be	successful	is	utopic.		That	equal	rights	are	guaranteed	for	all	
is	utopic.			The	future	that	most	are	grasping	for	here,	often	at	the	expense	of	others,	
is	simply	not	what	it	is	purported	to	be	at	all.		If	we	state	this,	if	we	imagine	things	
being	different,	ironically,	we	are	being	utopic	and	idealistic.		No	novel	invention	
was	ever	created	without	such	creative	and	non‐conventional	thinking.		Like	
Socrates,	what	I	have	tried	to	do	here	is	to	bring	development,	progress	to	a	state	of	
aporia	by	asking	what	it	is.			
						 Once	again,	I	return	to	our	church	survey	to	illustrate	my	point.		When	asked	
to	define	the	socioeconomic	problem	that	most	affects	the	country,	respondents	
reflected	statistically	what	the	reader	has	seen	in	the	practices	and	discourses	of	my	
collaborators.		Unemployment	was	perceived	as	the	most	important	problem	with	
45%	of	participants	selecting	it,	in	spite	of	a	national	census	in	2007	that	placed	
unemployment	at	3.7%.		Next,	came	corruption,	receiving	26.8%	of	responses	with	
delinquency	being	a	distant	third	at	8.8%.		If	we	view	these	numbers	in	the	light	of	
our	previous	discussion,	the	numbers	are	not	as	important	as	the	reality	that	
informs	them.			
						 In	these	numbers	we	do	not	see	the	desperation	and	inversion	of	values	that	
have	taken	root	among	many.		Nor	do	we	see	the	incessant	disapproval	and	
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rejection	of	this	way	of	living	by	some	at	least.		That	delinquency	places	so	low	
demonstrates	that	most	are	not	swayed	by	the	argument	that	people	are	born	bad.		
Rather,	the	lack	of	employment	and	a	contradictory	system	of	values,	best	
exemplified	in	a	generalized	form	of	corruption,	are	seen	as	principal	impediments	
to	the	well	being	of	the	population.	
						 I	do	not	profess	to	know,	nor	would	I	be	so	presumptuous	as	to	think	I	know,	
the	solution	to	problems	that	are	being	faced	by	most	nations	at	present.		What	I	do	
know	is	that	neoliberal	social	democracies	are	not	the	solution.		This	investigation	
has	strongly	suggested	that	modernity	comes	with	viruses	of	its	own	that	make	the	
promises	of	social	advancement	far	from	being	achieved.		Contexts	like	that	of	
Pamplona	and	the	Nueva	Rinconada	indicate	that	liberal	economics	does	not	make	
beneficaries	out	of	all	of	us.		Yet,	people	keep	on	pushing	for	more.	
						 Can	we	imagine	a	world	where	the	sense	of	community,	that	community	that	
was	born	of	adversity,	like	that	of	many	on	the	frontiers	of	Lima,	could	persist	
throughout	time?		Is	it	possible	under	the	present	configuration	of	powers?	
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